The impact of emotion on perception: bias or enhanced processing?

Recent studies have shown that emotionally significant stimuli are often better identified than neutral stimuli. It is not clear, however, whether these results are due to enhanced perceptual processing or to a bias favoring the identification of emotionally significant stimuli over neutral stimuli. The present study used a two-alternative forced-choice perceptual identification task to disentangle the effects of bias and enhanced processing. We found that emotionally significant targets were better identified than neutral targets. In contrast, the emotional significance of the foil alternative had no effect on performance. The present results support the hypothesis that perceptual encoding of emotionally significant stimuli is enhanced.     

Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task

In a recent article, [Sergent, C. &; Dehaene, S. (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15(11), 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. (2001). Sensation’s ghost—the non-sensory “fringe” of consciousness, Psyche, 7, 18]. In the experimental study described in this article, we find support for this opposite notion that we should have a parsimonious account of conscious perception. Our reported finding relates to the hypothesis that there is more than one perceptual threshold [Merikle, P.M., Smilek, D. &; Eastwood, J.D. (2001). Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology, Cognition, 79, 115–134], but goes further to argue that there are different “levels” of conscious perception.     

Is it emotion or is it stress? Gender stereotypes and the perception of subjective experience

Two studies of college undergraduates (ns = 95 and 92, primarily non-Hispanic whites and Asian Americans) investigated gender stereotypes of stress and emotion, as well as variables that influence the perception of gender-related differences. Study 1 assessed how gender stereotypes differ from the self-reports of men and women. When asked to choose a label for the subjective experience of the average man and the average woman in a series of problematic hypothetical situations, participants generally tended to believe that the average female would feel ‘emotional,” but that the average male would feel “stressed.” By contrast, the label participants chose to describe their own subjective experience was not significantly affected by their gender. In addition, participants believed the average woman and man differed more in the intensity of their emotions than in the intensity of their stress, a belief contradicted by their own self-reports. Results of Study 2 indicated that gender-related differences in estimations of stress and emotion for the self were reduced or eliminated when specific information about experience-eliciting situations was provided. We would like to thank Matthew Dank for his help in preparing the stimulus materials.     

On the locus of dual-task interference: Is there a bottleneck at the stimulus classification stage?

Recent studies have provided evidence that dual-task interference is typically caused by a single-channel bottleneck, but the processing locus of the bottleneck has yet to be pinned down. A bottleneck locus at the response-selection stage is widely advocated, but an earlier locus would be consistent with most previous evidence. Four new experiments used the “locus of slack” method to investigate whether the stages postponed by the central bottleneck include stimulus classification, a very late stage of perceptual processing. The experiments varied stimulus classification difficulty for two different analogueue perceptual judgements. Experiment 1 found only modest absorption into slack for the difficulty of a spatial position judgement. Experiments 2-4 found virtually no absorption into slack for the difficulty of a box-width judgement. These results support a bottleneck locus beginning at or before the stage of stimulus classification and hence prior to the stage of response selection. Other evidence, however, leaves no doubt that response selection is also subject to bottleneck postponement. Two architectures are discussed that can account parsimoniously for both old and new results. One posits a single bottleneck resulting from a unified CPU-like central processor; the other posits multiple bottlenecks resulting from multiple processors accomplishing different substages of central processing.     

The source of dual-task limitations: Serial or parallel processing of multiple response selections?

Although it is generally recognized that the concurrent performance of two tasks incurs costs, the sources of these dual-task costs remain controversial. The serial bottleneck model suggests that serial postponement of task performance in dual-task conditions results from a central stage of response selection that can only process one task at a time. Cognitive-control models, by contrast, propose that multiple response selections can proceed in parallel, but that serial processing of task performance is predominantly adopted because its processing efficiency is higher than that of parallel processing. In the present study, we empirically tested this proposition by examining whether parallel processing would occur when it was more efficient and financially rewarded. The results indicated that even when parallel processing was more efficient and was incentivized by financial reward, participants still failed to process tasks in parallel. We conclude that central information processing is limited by a serial bottleneck.     

Gender differences in perception of self-orientation: software or hardware?

We evaluated the contribution of attentional strategy to the perception of self-orientation with and without a body tilt in the median plane. Reinking et al (1974 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 30 807-811) found that the frame dependence of females on the rod-and-frame test could be mediated by instructions prompting them to focus on internal cues (ie arising from inside of the body). Here, we measured the influence of attentional instructions on the perception of the morphological horizon. Eleven females and thirteen males estimated their morphological horizon in an upright and a 45 degrees body tilt in the median plane under three instruction conditions. All participants first performed without attentional instructions. Then, participants performed under both internal and external attentional instructions. For females, but not for males, perception of morphological horizon was more footward in the supine than in the upright orientation. Although instructions did not eliminate gender differences, internal instructions allowed females to reduce their perceptual bias in the supine orientation.     

Category effects on estimates of stimuli: perception or reconstruction?

The present study examined a common category effect that has been reported in the literature: the tendency for estimates of individual stimuli to be biased toward the central value of the presented set of stimuli. Both encoding and reconstruction accounts of this central-tendency effect are considered. Plain vertical lines and vertical lines embedded in the Müller-Lyer illusion were estimated while still in view or from memory. Although bias due to the Müller-Lyer illusion remained constant across the two conditions, bias due to the context set (category) occurred only when stimuli were estimated from memory. The results suggest that the category bias occurs at a later stage of processing that the Müller-Lyer effect and offer support for a reconstruction account of category effects on stimulus estimation.     

Subjective reports of stimulus,response, and decision times in speeded tasks: How accurate are decision time reports?

Four experiments examined how accurately participants can report the times of their own decisions. Within an auditory reaction time (RT) task, participants reported the time at which (a) the tone was presented, (b) they decided on the response, or (c) the response key was pressed. Decision time reports were checked for plausibility against the actual RTs, and we compared the effects of experimental manipulations on these two measures to see whether the reported decision times showed appropriate effects. In addition, we estimated the amount of error associated with individual decision time reports by checking how often participants’ decision time reports were implausibly early (i.e., before stimulus onset) or late (i.e., after response), and by using several quantitative models. Overall, the results suggest that decision time reports are not very accurate but they may be usable for some purposes.     

Accuracy of drawing in a dual-task and resistance-to-distraction study: motor or attention deficit?

To determine whether manual incoordination is caused by attention deficit or not, we used an accuracy drawing task as a primary task in dual-task and resistance-to-distraction studies, and examined if thus measured attention could differentiate inattention (IA) and combined (CO) subtypes of ADHD. The secondary tasks and distractions failed to lower the primary task performance in IA, CO and control groups. We also compared the impairment scores of the accuracy drawing tasks from the Movement Assessment Battery for Children [Henderson, S. E., & Sugden, D. A. (1992). Movement assessment battery for children. London: Psychological Corporation.] between the groups with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and/or developmental coordination disorder-inaccurate drawing type (DCD-ID). There were no group differences in the impairment score between the control and the ADHD groups, and between ADHD and ADHD plus DCD-ID groups. We concluded that inaccurate drawing is not caused by attention deficit, but that it is a manifestation of a motor deficit as a separate entity from attention deficit.     

Negative Social Cognitions in Socially Anxious Youth: Distorted Reality or a Kernel of Truth?

We review studies that investigate negative social cognitions of socially anxious youth in relation to two specific domains: interpretation of ambiguous social situations and self-evaluation of social performance, including social skills and nervous behaviors. In this review, we address the question whether socially anxious youth’s negative perceptions are distortions of reality or reflect a kernel of truth as compared to other sources of information including independent adult observers and age peers. Studies key to this question are those that investigate not only the social perceptions themselves but also the social behavior of socially anxious youth. Hence the selection of studies for the review was based on this criterion. From the relevant literature it is, as yet, unclear whether the negative interpretations of ambiguous social situations shown by socially anxious youth are distorted or a reflection of reality. Socially anxious youth’s self-evaluations of social skills appear partly distorted and partly true, depending on the person judging the social skills. In contrast, self-evaluations of nervous behaviors appear distorted. The studies reviewed indicate that research would benefit from including a wider range of perceptions from persons relevant to the socially anxious youth’s daily social environment, not only parents and teachers but also their age peers.     

Perceptual learning in the rat: stimulus differentiation or latent inhibition of common elements?

Preexposure to an unreinforced stimulus facilitates learning (perceptual learning) under some conditions, but it can have the opposite effect (latent inhibition) under other conditions. Researchers have suggested that perceptual learning depends on a change of context, whereas latent inhibition is usually context specific. The associative theory explains both phenomena within a single framework. The authors report 4 experiments that show that perceptual learning does not depend on a context change. The experiments suggest that latent inhibition, unlike perceptual learning, depends on passive exposure. Thus the results do not support the associative theory. They are more consistent with Gibson's stimulus-differentiation theory.     

The hollow-face illusion: object-specific knowledge, general assumptions or properties of the stimulus?

The hollow-face illusion, in which a mask appears as a convex face, is a powerful example of binocular depth inversion occurring with a real object under a wide range of viewing conditions. Explanations of the illusion are reviewed and six experiments reported. In experiment 1 the detrimental effect of figural inversion, evidence for the importance of familiarity, was found for other oriented objects. The inversion effect held for masks lit from the side (experiment 2). The illusion was stronger for a mask rotated by 90 degrees lit from its forehead than from its chin, suggesting that familiar patterns of shading enhance the illusion (experiment 2). There were no effects of light source visibility or any left/right asymmetry (experiment 3). In experiments 4-6 we used a 'virtual' hollow face, with illusion strength quantified by the proportion of noise texture needed to eliminate the illusion. Adding characteristic surface colour enhanced the illusion, consistent with the familiar face pigmentation outweighing additional bottom-up cues (experiment 4). There was no difference between perspective and orthographic projection. Photographic negation reduced, but did not eliminate, the illusion, suggesting shading is important but not essential (experiment 5). Absolute depth was not critical, although a shallower mask was given less extreme convexity ratings (experiment 6). We argue that the illusion arises owing to a convexity preference when the raw data have ambiguous interpretations. However, using a familiar object with typical orientation, shading, and pigmentation greatly enhances the effect.     

Emotion-induced modulation of recognition memory decisions in a Go/NoGo task: Response bias or memory bias?

In recognition memory tests for words, items with negative emotional meaning are more often classified as “old” compared to neutral items, whether or not they are in fact old. Two accounts for this bias have been offered: One proposes that emotions disrupt retrieval and response monitoring processes (executive control account), the other proposes that emotions cause illusory feelings of remembering (memory bias account). We addressed this issue by varying the target signal in a Go/NoGo variant of a recognition memory task for negative, neutral, and positive words and faces: One group of participants was asked to respond to old items whereas the other group was asked to respond to new items. Results showed that the “Go-for-old” group showed the typical emotion-induced response bias shift for both positive and negative words, while the “Go-for-new” group showed the opposite pattern. Results were nonsignificant for faces, but went into the same direction. The findings are clearly inconsistent with the executive control account and speak for a genuine memory illusion induced by emotional arousal.     

Underestimating the duration of future events: memory incorrectly used or memory bias?

People frequently underestimate how long it will take them to complete a task. The prevailing view is that during the prediction process, people incorrectly use their memories of how long similar tasks have taken in the past because they take an overly optimistic outlook. A variety of evidence is reviewed in this article that points to a different, although not mutually exclusive, explanation: People base predictions of future duration on their memories of how long past events have taken, but these memories are systematic underestimates of past duration. People appear to underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.     

Directional bias in the mental representation of spatial events: nature or culture?

Previous research has shown a tendency for people to imagine simple sentences as evolving from left to right, with the sentence subject being located to the left of the object. In two cross-cultural studies comparing Italian and Arab participants, we investigated whether this bias is a function of hemispheric specialization or of directionality of written language (left to right in Italian, right to left in Arabic). Both studies found a reversal of directional bias in Arabs. Italians tended to position the subject to the left of the object, and Arabs tended to position the subject to the right of the object (Experiment 1); both groups were facilitated in a sentence-picture matching task when the subject was drawn in the position that it would usually occupy in the written language (left for Italians, right for Arabs; Experiment 2). In Experiment 2, an additional, language-independent facilitation was observed when action evolved from left to right, suggesting that both hemispheric specialization and scanning habit affect visual imaging.     

Exploring the origin of the number-size congruency effect: Sensitivity or response bias?

Physical size modulates the efficiency of digit comparison, depending on whether the relation of numerical magnitude and physical size is congruent or incongruent (Besner & Coltheart, Neuropsychologia, 17, 467–472, 1979), the number-size congruency effect (NSCE). In addition, Henik and Tzelgov (Memory & Cognition, 10, 389–395, 1982) first reported an NSCE for the reverse task of comparing the physical size of digits such that the numerical magnitude of digits modulated the time required to compare their physical sizes. Does the NSCE in physical comparisons simply reflect a number-mediated bias mechanism related to making decisions and selecting responses about the digit’s sizes? Alternatively, or in addition, the NSCE might indicate a true increase in the ability to discriminate small and large font sizes when these sizes are congruent with the digit’s symbolic numerical meaning, over and above response bias effects. We present a new research design that permits us to apply signal detection theory to a task that required observers to judge the physical size of digits. Our results clearly demonstrate that the NSCE cannot be reduced to mere response bias effects, and that genuine sensitivity gains for congruent number-size pairings contribute to the NSCE.     

Detection of changes in spatial position: Short-term visual memory or motion perception?

The limiting conditions for short-term visual memory were explored for materials which are not readily codable. Two fields of random dots were presented successively in time. On half of the observations, the second display was identical to the first, and on the other half, a fraction of the dots was displaced relative to the first display. The task of the S was to indicate if any of the dots had moved (displacement detection), and in separate tests, if any of the dots had not moved (stationarity detection). Stationarity and displacement detection are largely related to the same variables, although performance is somewhat better with displacement detection. Discrimination of small displacements is critically dependent upon the interval between displays, with maximum accuracy in the region of 64 msec for briefly presented displays. Maximum accuracy is obtained under conditions which yield good apparent motion. By contrast, displacement discrimination is, within limits, relatively independent of the number of dots displayed, of the fraction of displaced dots.