Different Worldviews Explain Perceived Effectiveness of Different Employment Tests

A representative sample of (n = 439) adults in the United States responded to questions about the usefulness of tests of cognitive ability and conscientiousness, along with questions about their beliefs in free will and (scientific) determinism. As hypothesized, belief in scientific determinism predicted perceived usefulness of a cognitive ability test and belief in free will predicted the perceived usefulness of a test of conscientiousness. In a subsequent experiment (n = 337), people watched TED‐style talks emphasizing either the importance of talent or the importance of hard work for success. People who watched the talk emphasizing talent scored higher on scientific determinism. Those who watched the talk emphasizing hard work scored both higher on free will and lower on scientific determinism.     

The FAD–Plus: Measuring Lay Beliefs Regarding Free Will and Related Constructs

We describe the development of FAD–Plus, a 27-item measure of lay beliefs in free will and 3 closely related constructs: scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and unpredictability. Previously published measures included only a subset of these variables and tended to assume an a priori pattern of relations among these 4 beliefs. In Study 1, exploratory factor analyses suggested relatively independent factors. This independence was sustained in Study 2, using a confirmatory analysis. Each of the 4 subscales (Free Will, Scientific Determinism, Fatalistic Determinism, and Unpredictability) showed acceptable internal consistencies. Study 2 also mapped out associations with the Big Five personality traits and showed that believing in free will is not synonymous with having an internal locus of control. Study 3 replicated the instrument's structure and subscale reliabilities in a community sample. Preliminary applications are described.     

The FAD-Plus: measuring lay beliefs regarding free will and related constructs

We describe the development of FAD-Plus, a 27-item measure of lay beliefs in free will and 3 closely related constructs: scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and unpredictability. Previously published measures included only a subset of these variables and tended to assume an a priori pattern of relations among these 4 beliefs. In Study 1, exploratory factor analyses suggested relatively independent factors. This independence was sustained in Study 2, using a confirmatory analysis. Each of the 4 subscales (Free Will, Scientific Determinism, Fatalistic Determinism, and Unpredictability) showed acceptable internal consistencies. Study 2 also mapped out associations with the Big Five personality traits and showed that believing in free will is not synonymous with having an internal locus of control. Study 3 replicated the instrument's structure and subscale reliabilities in a community sample. Preliminary applications are described.     

Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble

In Part I, I reflect in some detail upon the free will problem and about the way its understanding has radically changed. First I outline the four questions that go into making the free will problem. Second, I consider four paradigmatic shifts that have occurred in our understanding of this problem. Then I go on to reflect upon this complex and multi-level situation. In Part II of this essay, I explore the major alternative positions, and defend my views, in new ways. Instead of trying to spread over many issues, I present one new argument against compatibilism, which I call ??The Trap??. This tries to explicate the main problem that I find with this position. Then I present an exposition of what we nevertheless need to follow, which I call ??the Appreciation of Agency??. This supports a measure of compatibilism in a more modest form, and opposes hard determinism. On this basis, we can confront the philosophical and practical questions, as to what we ought to believe and how we ought to live, with respect to free will and moral responsibility. This leads to what I call ??The Bubble,?? which addresses the way in which we deal with the tension between the absence of libertarian free will and The Trap, and the crucial need for the Appreciation of Agency. I conclude by reflecting upon three attributes of the free will problem that I consider central, but that have been neglected in the debate: complexity, risk and tragedy.     

FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM: A CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSION

Abstract. The problem of freedom of the will and determinism is one of the most intriguing and difficult in the whole area of philosophy. It constüutes a paradox. If we look at ourselves, at our ability to deliberate and make moral choices, it seems obvious that we are free. On the other hand, if we look at what we believe about causality (i.e., that every event and thing must have a cause), then it appears that we do not have free wills but are determined. Thus we seem to have inconsistent beliefs. In this paper I set forth and analyze the major contemporary arguments for free will and determinism as well as for compatibilism, the position that tries to combine insights from both theories. I end with a brief conclusion regarding my assessment of the status of the arguments.     

Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis

Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism’s relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a meta-analysis to estimate the impact of affect. Our meta-analysis indicates that beliefs in free will are largely robust to emotional reactions.     

Free love? On the relation between belief in free will,determinism, and passionate love

Is love possible if we are not free? Some philosophers consider that true love is necessarily free, while others think that the nature of love makes it incompatible with a certain type of freedom. Here, we explored the relationship between feelings of passionate love, belief in free will and determinism across three online studies. In Study 1 (N = 257), participants who believed strongly in free will (or determinism) expressed stronger passionate love. In Study 2 (N = 305), we again found a positive association between belief in free will (or determinism) and passionate love, although the passionate love-determinism relationship seems more conditional. Finally, Study 3 (N = 309) confirmed the relationship between belief in free will and passionate love but not between belief in determinism and passionate love. These findings, along with a meta-analysis, suggest that both beliefs in free will and determinism are compatible with passionate love.     

Source incompatibilism and the foreknowledge dilemma

The problem that divine foreknowledge poses for free will is one that is notoriously difficult to solve. If God believes in advance how an agent will act, this fact about the past eradicates all alternatives for the actor, given the infallibility of God’s beliefs. And if we assume, with many theists, that free will requires alternatives possibilities, then it looks as if God’s omniscience is incompatible with our free will. One solution to this problem, introduced and defended by David Hunt, draws on the source incompatibilist position in the secular free debate. According to source incompatibilists, free will does not require alternative possibilities but is also not compatible with causal determinism. Hunt argues that because God’s foreknowledge does not eliminate future alternatives through causal means, it is compatible with free will. In this paper, I challenge Hunt’s position using Kevin Timpe’s distinction between “wide” and “narrow” source incompatibilists. I argue that if one wishes to be an incompatibilist concerning free will and causal determinism, one must accept that alternatives are required for free will. And if one must accept that alternatives are a necessary condition for free will, then Hunt’s solution to the foreknowledge dilemma will not succeed.     

“Escape from Freedom”: Authoritarianism-related traits,political ideology,personality, and belief in free will/determinism

Philosophers have long speculated that authoritarianism and belief in determinism are functionally related. To evaluate this hypothesis, we assessed whether authoritarianism and allied personality and political variables predict varieties of belief in determinism in three community samples (N₁ = 566 to 20,010; N₂ = 500; N₃ = 419). Authoritarianism and allied variables manifested moderate to large positive correlations with both fatalistic and genetic determinism beliefs. Controlling for political conservatism did not meaningfully attenuate these relations. Further, openness was negatively related to fatalistic determinism beliefs and agreeableness was negatively related to genetic determinism beliefs. Taken together, our findings clarify the nature of relations between authoritarianism and general personality, on the one hand, and free will/determinism beliefs, on the other, and suggest intriguing intersections between worldviews and personality traits.     

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: A pluralogue part 2: Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM ?C whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.     

Some Implications of Beliefs in Altruism,Free Will,and Nonreductionism

ABSTRACT

In this research, we explored correlates of individuals’ beliefs in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism, as opposed to contrasting beliefs in psychological egoism, determinism, and biological reductionism. Beliefs in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism were associated with heightened a) senses of meaning in life, b) levels of life satisfaction, c) beliefs in morality as a legitimate and important dimension of life, and d) standards of personal moral conduct; they were not associated with levels of social isolation. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

“Local determination”, even if we could find it,does not challenge free will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn

Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will” (free will that requires indeterminism), he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent concept. Moreover, determinism is unlikely to be established by neuroscience in any form that should trouble compatibilists or libertarians—that is, anyone who thinks we might have free will. We conclude that, in principle, neuroscience will not be able undermine libertarian free will and explain why these conclusions support a coherent compatibilist notion of causal sourcehood.     

自由意志与决定论的关系：基于心理学视角

西方心理学的各种理论流派在对人格、自我和行为动因等基本问题作出解答时,始终存在自由意志与决定论的分歧与对峙。该文在对这些分歧和对峙作出评述和分析的基础上,厘清了人类行为的决定因素和目的性动因,主张目的性是自由意志存在的基础,而人类意识行为选择的多样性以及自我对不同选择的断言则使自由意志成为必然。自由意志与决定性是一个问题的两个方面,二者是一种辩证统一的关系。     

Betting Against Hard Determinism

The perennial fear associated with the free will problem is the prospect of hard determinism being true. Unlike prevalent attempts to reject hard determinism by defending compatibilist analyses of freedom and responsibility, this article outlines a pragmatic argument to the effect that we are justified in betting that determinism is false even though we may retain the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. The basic argument is that as long as we accept that libertarian free will is worth wanting, there is a defensible rationale, given the uncertainty which remains as to whether determinism is true or false, to refrain from acting on hard determinism, and thus to bet that libertarian free will exists. The article closes by discussing two potentially decisive objections to this pragmatic argument.     

Kane,Luck, and the significance of free will

Abstract

This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the “Intelligibility” and “Existence” questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls “The Significance Question” about free will: “Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom ‘worth wanting’... and, if so, why?” A desire for “objective worth” has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire.     

Different Types of Religiosity and Lay Intuitions About Free Will/Determinism in Turkey

Religiosity has been found to be positively associated with belief in free will (FW) in the Western world. In the Muslim world, however, religiosity exhibits several characteristics that set it apart from the Western world, including an overemphasis on fate or divine predestination. We, therefore, investigated FW/determinism beliefs and different types of religiosity and conservatism in two samples in Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country (N = 1,690). In Study 1, a confirmatory factor analysis showed that FAD-Plus provided good fit to the data. Study 2 revealed that FW belief is not related to any of the religiosity measures (intrinsic, extrinsic, quest), whereas fatalistic determinism is consistently related to religiosity. The unique predictor of free will turned out to be belief in a just world. Overall, these findings indicate that FW belief is not inherently related to religiosity in Turkey, whereas fatalistic determinism is central to Turkish people’s belief systems.     

Making punishment palatable: Belief in free will alleviates punitive distress

Punishing wrongdoers is beneficial for group functioning, but can harm individual well-being. Building on research demonstrating that punitive motives underlie free will beliefs, we propose that free will beliefs help justify punitive impulses, thus alleviating the associated distress. In Study 1, trait-level punitiveness predicted heightened levels of anxiety only for free will skeptics. Study 2 found that higher state-level incarceration rates predicted higher mental health issue rates, only in states with citizens relatively skeptical about free will. In Study 3, participants who punished an unfair partner experienced greater distress than non-punishers, only when their partner did not have free choice. Studies 4 and 5 confirmed experimentally that punitive desires led to greater anxiety only when free will beliefs were undermined by an anti-free will argument. These results suggest that believing in free will permits holding immoral actors morally responsible, thus justifying punishment with diminished negative psychological consequences for punishers.     

Free will and the Genome Project

...I want to argue that the Human Genome Project itself poses no special problem for human freedom, understood in relation to the philosophical issue of free will versus determinism. It seems to pose a problem only if one muddles the interpretation of the issue or of the project that is supposed to bear on it. There is a need for conceptual clarification to point this out, perhaps, but I see no need for "research" in the sense that implies original investigation. However, I also want to probe a bit deeper to identify a distinct set of philosophical worries about freedom that seem to have been misplaced onto the standard issue, the issue of freedom versus determinism, in this discussion and elsewhere. After arguing that the genome project has no real bearing on free will versus determinism, I shall attempt to identify the threat it poses to freedom partly by detaching it from this standard version of the free will question. I shall argue that the worrisome forms of genetic influence that the project might uncover do not really presuppose determinism. But what they do presuppose -- some form of internal or psychological constraint on behavior -- suggests an alternative version of the free will question as the source of popular fears about scientific explanation of human behavior. What is under threat on this version of the question is the Aristotelian notion of character formation and self-control.     

Beliefs in the Inheritance of Risk Factors for Suicide Scale: development, reliability, stability, and convergent and discriminant validity

Findings from adoption, family, geographical, immigrant, molecular genetic, surname, and twin studies suggest genetic risk factors have a role in suicidal behavior. However, related mental health literacy (knowledge and beliefs) even of future health-care professionals who will be concerned with suicide lag behind this research progress. As no scale for assessing such beliefs is available, the 22-item Beliefs in the Inheritance of Risk Factors for Suicide Scale was constructed, its contents rated by experts in a validation survey and administered to samples of 70 medical and 165 psychology students. Medical students held stronger beliefs in the genetics of suicide than psychology students. Internal scale consistency and test-retest reliability were assessed as adequate. Factor analysis of the 22 items yielded a dominant first factor. Scores were positively related to knowledge about suicide (convergent validity) but for the most part unrelated to lay theories of suicide, political orientation, religiosity, and social desirability (discriminant validity). This novel scale shows potential for assessing individuals' beliefs about the genetics of suicide. Applications may include basic research, educational contexts, and evaluation of professional training.     

A brief history of the concept of free will: issues that are and are not germane to legal reasoning

Examining the history of the concept of free will helps distinguish metaphysical issues beyond the interest of a court of law from considerations about the nature of human action germane to legal reasoning. The latter include Plato's conception of the rational governance of the soul and Aristotle's conception of voluntary action, both of which arose before Hellenistic philosophers propounded analogues of modern positions against determinism (Epicureans) or for the compatibility of free will and determinism (Stoics). The concept of will itself also has a history, being first conceived as a distinct power by Augustine. Modern physics raised new problems about free will, as human motivations began to look less like rational perceptions of the good and more like mechanistic causes. Contemporary philosophy has not solved the problem of free will but has spun off analyses of the nature of action and moral responsibility that are of interest for legal reasoning.