The Proteus Effect: The Effect of Transformed Self‐Representation on Behavior

Virtual environments, such as online games and web‐based chat rooms, increasingly allow us to alter our digital self‐representations dramatically and easily. But as we change our self‐representations, do our self‐representations change our behavior in turn? In 2 experimental studies, we explore the hypothesis that an individual’s behavior conforms to their digital self‐representation independent of how others perceive them—a process we term the Proteus Effect. In the first study, participants assigned to more attractive avatars in immersive virtual environments were more intimate with confederates in a self‐disclosure and interpersonal distance task than participants assigned to less attractive avatars. In our second study, participants assigned taller avatars behaved more confidently in a negotiation task than participants assigned shorter avatars. We discuss the implications of the Proteus Effect with regards to social interactions in online environments.     

Parental Representations,Self-View,and Interpersonal Functioning of Older Adolescents

This study examines the relationship between parental object representations, self-representations, and interpersonal relations in a nonclinical sample of older adolescents. It was hypothesized that individuals with parental representations that are conceptually low, hostile, and rejecting would be significantly related to a negative view of self and poor interpersonal relations. The results suggest that parental benevolence, ambitiousness, and conceptual level are significantly related to interpersonal functioning. Parental representations that are qualitatively poor were found to be associated with a negative view of self. However, a high conceptual level of mother was noted to be significantly related to a negative self-representation. The findings generally confirm the nature of the relationship between object representations and self, but also suggest that the structural component of parental representations may reflect a cognitive component of the self rather than an affective one. The difficulties of controlling for depression and method variance issues are also discussed.     

In and out of a daydream: attachment orientations, daily couple interactions, and sexual fantasies

In this study, the authors examined the contribution of attachment orientations to the content of daily sexual fantasies. The two partners of 48 couples independently reported on their attachment orientations and provided daily reports on relationship interactions and sexual fantasies for a period of 21 days. Results showed that attachment anxiety was associated with wishes for intimacy and representations of others as more affectionate in sexual fantasies. Conversely, avoidant attachment was associated with avoidance-related wishes and representations of the self and others as more aggressive and alienated. Negative couple interactions increased habitual attachment-related wishes and self-representations. Specifically, during days characterized by negative couple interactions (relationship-damaging behaviors), attachment anxiety was associated with portrayal of the self as more helpless and avoidant attachment was associated with the expression of more avoidant wishes and portrayal of the self as less helpless. The discussion focuses on the manifestations of attachment-related interpersonal goals in sexual fantasies.     

人际互动中的“自我-他人”区分:多水平的探索

人际互动的根本问题在于我们如何在表征自身想法和感受的同时试图去理解他人的心理和情感状态, 以驾驭复杂的社交环境。最近研究发现个体主要通过模拟自我加工过程实现对他人的理解, 但这种自我加工以及心理模拟在一定程度上混淆了自我与他人。因此, 为进行成功的人际互动, 大脑必须灵活区分自我和他人相关的表征, 这种能力被称为“自我-他人”区分(self-other distinction, SOD)。通过探讨感知、动作、认知以及情感等不同加工水平社会认知过程中的“自我-他人”区分及相应的研究范式, 实现对人际互动过程更全面而深入的理解, 为改善社会认知、情感障碍以及自闭症的干预提供依据。在此基础上, 提出了具体的研究展望。     

The felt presence of other minds: Predictive processing,counterfactual predictions,and mentalising in autism

The mental states of other people are components of the external world that modulate the activity of our sensory epithelia. Recent probabilistic frameworks that cast perception as unconscious inference on the external causes of sensory input can thus be expanded to enfold the brain’s representation of others’ mental states. This paper examines this subject in the context of the debate concerning the extent to which we have perceptual awareness of other minds. In particular, we suggest that the notion of perceptual presence helps to refine this debate: are others’ mental states experienced as veridical qualities of the perceptual world around us? This experiential aspect of social cognition may be central to conditions such as autism spectrum disorder, where representations of others’ mental states seem to be selectively compromised. Importantly, recent work ties perceptual presence to the counterfactual predictions of hierarchical generative models that are suggested to perform unconscious inference in the brain. This enables a characterisation of mental state representations in terms of their associated counterfactual predictions, allowing a distinction between spontaneous and explicit forms of mentalising within the framework of predictive processing. This leads to a hypothesis that social cognition in autism spectrum disorder is characterised by a diminished set of counterfactual predictions and the reduced perceptual presence of others’ mental states.     

Representations of dread: the dreaded self and the dreaded state of the self

The experience of dread, an extreme form of fear that is induced by terror and horror, is seen as manifested in the shapes of a "dreaded self" and a "dreaded state of the self." These representations reflect psychic dangers ranging from a common, feared identification to states of disconnection, desolation, ego dissolution, and nonexistence. It is suggested that life crises and traumatic impingements, informed by developmental and psychic realities, are critical determinants of multiple dreaded self-representations; that disavowal often serves to massively ward off the recognition of the awful; and that these representations serve a preconscious signal function that anticipates the danger of reexperiencing an original terror. Case examples illustrate these points and reflect the utility of the language of dreaded representations in the treatment situation.     

Using Drawings to Elicit Nonverbal Constructs in Experiential Personal Construct Psychotherapy

Clients who have experienced psychological wounds prior to the use of language frequently struggle to articulate and make sense of their core constructs around self and others. These early wounds can have a significant influence on future relational interactions, even though they may be experienced at a nonverbal level. While eliciting these preverbal constructs may be essential to the healing process, without verbal representation the therapeutic task can be difficult. In this article, we will discuss the use of symbolism within personal construct psychology as well as the use of drawings as representations of nonverbal constructs. We will then discuss experiential personal construct psychotherapy and its focus on the ways we both connect and disconnect from others. Finally, we will present Kristen, a therapy client who experienced early relational wounds and increasingly dissociated in response to relational stress as she matured. Kristen's work in therapy around her fragmented sense of self included drawing her internal self-parts. Only then was she able to wrap words around that which she previously experienced nonverbally. In this case study, Kristen's drawings and her core constructs as elicited during four years of therapy will be presented and discussed.     

Toward a model of self pathology underlying personality disorders: narratives, metacognition, interpersonal cycles and decision-making processes

If we want to explain the links between the various and heterogeneous elements--symptoms, dysfunctional forms of behavior and poor social functioning--making up personality disorders, we need model a self pathology that portrays dysfunctions, the links among them, and how their interactions maintain disorders over time. In our view, the most likely elements of self pathology are: a. problematic contents (thoughts and emotions)--experienced subjectively as states of mind and organized in the form of narratives; b. shortfalls in the ability, termed meta-cognition, to reflect on mental states, both of oneself and of others; c. pathogenic interpersonal schemas; and d. maladaptive decision-making processes. These elements get altered in the various personality disorders and interact to form typical pathological organizations. This article seeks to describe a model of self pathology in personality disorders and discuss its current scientific status based on a literature review that spans several disciplines. The model is illustrated with an example of how the pathogenic elements can interact to form personality disorder. Lastly, the limitations and advantages of the model are discussed.     

Interpersonal coping styles and couple relationship quality: Similarity versus complementarity hypotheses

This study employs a dyadic approach and examines how two partners' interpersonal coping styles may independently and jointly predict their relationship quality. Hypotheses were derived on the basis of dyadic coping theory focusing on how similar versus complementary styles of interpersonal coping may be useful in explaining couples' relationship quality. On the basis of attachment theory and self‐determination theory, three interpersonal coping styles were included: dismissive, adaptive, and anxious/expressive. Data were collected from 123 romantic couples. Actor–partner interdependence models revealed that interpersonal coping styles were related to self‐perceived (actor effect) and partner‐perceived (partner effect) relationship quality. Furthermore, results also showed that relationship quality was predicted by the interactions between self's and partner's interpersonal coping styles. Findings suggest that future research should focus on understanding interpersonal coping behaviors of both partners in a relationship, especially the complex interactions between two partners' characteristics and their effects on relationship outcomes. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Cognitive-Interpersonal Approach to Depressive Symptoms in Preadolescent Children

Cognitive and interpersonal aspects of depressive symptoms were investigated in a community sample of children. Eighty-one 8- to 12-year-olds completed scales assessing cognitive representations of social relationships and symptoms of depression and anxiety. Teachers provided ratings of peer rejection. Children with elevated levels of depressive symptoms displayed increased negativity in their beliefs about self, family, and peers, as well as distinct patterns of interpersonal information processing. Anxiety symptoms did not make a unique contribution beyond depression to negative representations of family and peers; in contrast, symptom-specific profiles of self-representations were found. Structural equation analysis supported a model linking negative interpersonal representations, peer rejection, and depressive symptoms. The findings suggest that future studies may benefit from approaches that incorporate both cognitive and interpersonal variables as predictors of child depression.     

What you don't know won't hurt me:

This study addresses the implications of interpersonal communication technology use for personal relationships. Elements of an impression management model, which specifies the processes and outcomes of strategic uses of channel and message for self‐presentational goals, are tested. Respondents indicated their preference for interpersonal communication channels (telephone, answering machine, electronic mail, letters) in 4 types of episodes involving issues that either supported or threatened their own or their partner's self‐presentation. Findings supported the hypotheses predicting that individuals recognize mediated channels' capacity to manage ambiguity and clarity in interactional episodes and use those perceptions in forming their channel preferences. The constrictions of mediated channels are often seen as advantageous for interactions that could threaten positive impressions. The results support a functional perspective that views mediated communication channels as a tool for managing self‐relevant information in pursuit of self‐presentational goals.     

Attention to behavioral events during interaction: two actor-observer gaps and three attempts to close them

In social interactions, people must pay attention to many behavioral events unfolding in themselves and the other person-events that can be observable or unobservable, intentional or unintentional. Three studies explored how people distribute their attention to these different event types and, as a result, build up representations of self and partner during the interaction. Relying on basic principles of attention, the authors predicted 2 actor-observer gaps: Actors pay more attention to unobservable events and less to observable events than do observers, and actors pay more attention to unintentional events and less to intentional events than do observers. Study 1 documents both gaps. Studies 2 and 3 explore factors that might close the gaps, such as relational intimacy and empathy. Implications of these results for the role of attention in attribution and interpersonal behavior are discussed.     

人际自立特质对大学生情绪调节策略作用的纵向研究

虽然不少学者认为人格会影响情绪调节策略的使用,但是目前尚缺乏人格与认知重评、表达抑制这两种情绪调节策略关系的纵向研究。根据人际自立与情绪关系的系列研究,假设人际自立会影响情绪调节策略的使用。采用青少年学生人际自立量表和情绪调节问卷对374名大学生进行了间隔6个月的两次调查。结果发现,人际主动、人际灵活显著预测6个月后的认知重评。这说明某些人格特质可以影响特定情绪调节策略的使用。     

The relational self: an interpersonal social-cognitive theory

The authors propose an interpersonal social-cognitive theory of the self and personality, the relational self, in which knowledge about the self is linked with knowledge about significant others, and each linkage embodies a self-other relationship. Mental representations of significant others are activated and used in interpersonal encounters in the social-cognitive phenomenon of transference (S. M. Andersen & N. S. Glassman, 1996), and this evokes the relational self. Variability in relational selves depends on interpersonal contextual cues, whereas stability derives from the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations. Relational selves function in if-then terms (W. Mischel & Y. Shoda, 1995), in which ifs are situations triggering transference, and thens are relational selves. An individual's repertoire of relational selves is a source of interpersonal patterns involving affect, motivation, self-evaluation, and self-regulation.     

Shared representations between self and other: a social cognitive neuroscience view

The abilities to identify with others and to distinguish between self and other play a pivotal role in intersubjective transactions. Here, we marshall evidence from developmental science, social psychology and neuroscience (including clinical neuropsychology) that support the view of a common representation network (both at the computational and neural levels) between self and other. However, sharedness does not mean identicality, otherwise representations of self and others would completely overlap, and lead to confusion. We argue that self-awareness and agency are integral components for navigating within these shared representations. We suggest that within this shared neural network the inferior parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere play a special role in interpersonal awareness.     

Cognitive-Emotional Interactions in the Brain

Abstract

Emotion and cognition are mediated by separate but interacting systems of the brain. The core of the emotional system is a network that evaluates (computes) the biological significance of stimuli, including stimuli from the external or internal environment or from within the brain (thoughts, images, memories). The computation of stimulus significance takes place prior to and independent of conscious awareness, with only the computational products reaching awareness, and only in some instances. The amygdala may be a focal structure in the affective network. By way of neural interactions between the amygdala and brain areas involved in cognition (particularly the neocortex and hippocampus), affect can influence cognition and cognition can influence affect. Emotional experiences, it is proposed, result when stimulus representations, affect representations, and self representations coincide in working memory.     

Embodied inference and spatial cognition

How much about our interactions with--and experience of--our world can be deduced from basic principles? This paper reviews recent attempts to understand the self-organised behaviour of embodied agents, like ourselves, as satisfying basic imperatives for sustained exchanges with the environment. In brief, one simple driving force appears to explain many aspects of perception, action and the perception of action. This driving force is the minimisation of surprise or prediction error, which--in the context of perception--corresponds to Bayes-optimal predictive coding (that suppresses exteroceptive prediction errors) and--in the context of action--reduces to classical motor reflexes (that suppress proprioceptive prediction errors). In what follows, we look at some of the phenomena that emerge from this single principle, such as the perceptual encoding of spatial trajectories that can both generate movement (of self) and recognise the movements (of others). These emergent behaviours rest upon prior beliefs about itinerant (wandering) states of the world--but where do these beliefs come from? In this paper, we focus on the nature of prior beliefs and how they underwrite the active sampling of a spatially extended sensorium. Put simply, to avoid surprising states of the world, it is necessary to minimise uncertainty about those states. When this minimisation is implemented via prior beliefs--about how we sample the world--the resulting behaviour is remarkably reminiscent of searches seen in foraging or visual searches with saccadic eye movements.     

Implicit Self-Importance in an Interpersonal Pronoun Categorization Task

Object relations theories emphasize the manner in which the salience/importance of implicit representations of self and other guide interpersonal functioning. Two studies and a pilot test (total N?=?304) sought to model such representations. In dyadic contexts, the self is a “you” and the other is a “me”, as verified in a pilot test. Study 1 then used a simple categorization task and found evidence for implicit self-importance: The pronoun “you” was categorized more quickly and accurately when presented in a larger font size, whereas the pronoun “me” was categorized more quickly and accurately when presented in a smaller font size. Study 2 showed that this pattern possesses value in understanding individual differences in interpersonal functioning. As predicted, arrogant people scored higher in implicit self-importance in the paradigm. Findings are discussed from the perspective of dyadic interpersonal dynamics.     

Action understanding as inverse planning

Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an “intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a “teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.