Gradedness of visual awareness depends on attentional scope: Global perception is more graded than local perception

The gradedness or discreteness of our visual awareness has been debated. Here, we investigate the influence of spatial scope of attention on the gradedness of visual awareness. We manipulated scope of attention using hierarchical letter-based tasks (global: broad scope; local: narrow scope). Participants reported the identity of a masked hierarchical letter either at the global level or at the local level. We measured subjective awareness using the perceptual awareness scale ratings and objective performance. The results indicate more graded visual awareness (lesser slope for the awareness rating curve) at the global level compared to the local level. Graded perception was also observed in visibility ratings usage with global level task showing higher usage of the middle PAS ratings. Our results are in line with the prediction of level of processing hypothesis and show that global/local attentional scope and contextual endogenous factors influence the graded nature of our visual awareness.     

The perception of visual emotion: Comparing different measures of awareness

Here, we explore the sensitivity of different awareness scales in revealing conscious reports on visual emotion perception. Participants were exposed to a backward masking task involving fearful faces and asked to rate their conscious awareness in perceiving emotion in facial expression using three different subjective measures: confidence ratings (CRs), with the conventional taxonomy of certainty, the perceptual awareness scale (PAS), through which participants categorize “raw” visual experience, and post-decision wagering (PDW), which involves economic categorization. Our results show that the CR measure was the most exhaustive and the most graded. In contrast, the PAS and PDW measures suggested instead that consciousness of emotional stimuli is dichotomous. Possible explanations of the inconsistency were discussed. Finally, our results also indicate that PDW biases awareness ratings by enhancing first-order accuracy of emotion perception. This effect was possibly a result of higher motivation induced by monetary incentives.     

Measuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other?

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings (CR), through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering (PDW), in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of the relationships between awareness and identification performance, looking to determine (1) which scale best correlates with performance, and (2) whether we can detect performance in the absence of awareness and how the scales differ from each other in terms of revealing such unconscious processing. Based on these findings we discuss whether perceptual awareness should be considered graded or dichotomous. Results showed that PAS showed a much stronger performance-awareness correlation than either CR or PDW, particularly for low stimulus intensities. In general, all scales indicated above-chance performance when participants claimed not to have seen anything. However, such above-chance performance only showed when we also observed a correlation between awareness and performance. Thus (1) PAS seems to be the most exhaustive measure of awareness, and (2) we find support for above-chance performance in the absence of subjective awareness, but such unconscious knowledge only contributes to performance when we observe conscious knowledge as well. Similarities and differences between scales are discussed in the light of consciousness theories and response strategies.     

Subjective awareness scale length influences the prevalence,not the presence,of graded conscious states

There is an ongoing debate about the graded or dichotomous form of visual consciousness. Studies involved in the disagreement have typically employed subjective awareness ratings in psychophysical experiments. Variations in scale length have made comparisons across studies difficult and have even been suspected of influencing conclusions about the form of consciousness. We tested the proposal that a 21-point awareness scale produces dichotomous awareness state reports. The experiment described in this article randomly assigned participants to use one of four scale lengths used in previous studies in a backward masking task. Our findings suggest that all scales indicate the presence of graded awareness states, but that the resulting proportion of degraded state reports differed across the scales. Consequently, we argue that the decision of whether the form of consciousness observed in a given study is dichotomous or graded is dependent on an interpretation of the relative degree of degradation.     

Subjective discriminability of invisibility: A framework for distinguishing perceptual and attentional failures of awareness

Conscious visual perception can fail in many circumstances. However, little is known about the causes and processes leading to failures of visual awareness. In this study, we introduce a new signal detection measure termed subjective discriminability of invisibility (SDI) that allows one to distinguish between subjective blindness due to reduction of sensory signals or to lack of attentional access to sensory signals. The SDI is computed based upon subjective confidence in reporting the absence of a target (i.e., miss and correct rejection trials). Using this new measure, we found that target misses were subjectively indistinguishable from physical absence when contrast reduction, backward masking and flash suppression were used, whereas confidence was appropriately modulated when dual task, attentional blink and spatial uncertainty methods were employed. These results show that failure of visual perception can be identified as either a result of perceptual or attentional blindness depending on the circumstances under which visual awareness was impaired.     

Visual awareness judgments are sensitive to accuracy feedback in stimulus discrimination tasks

In this study we tested the hypothesis that perceptual awareness judgments are sensitive to accuracy feedback about the previous action. We used a perceptual discrimination task in which participants reported their stimulus awareness. We created two conditions: No-feedback and Feedback (discrimination accuracy feedback was provided at the end of each trial). The results showed that visual awareness judgments are related to the accuracy of current and previous responses. Participants reported lower stimulus awareness for incorrectly versus correctly discriminated stimuli in both conditions; they also reported lower stimulus awareness in trials preceded by incorrect discrimination responses, compared to trials preceded by correct discrimination responses. This difference was significantly stronger in the Feedback condition, in which we also observed post-error slowing for PAS ratings. We discuss the relation between visual awareness and the effects of performance monitoring and interpret the results in the context of current theories of consciousness.     

How retaining objects containing multiple features in visual working memory regulates the priority for access to visual awareness

The content of visual working memory influences the access to visual awareness. Thus far, research has focused on retention of a single feature, whereas memoranda in real life typically contain multiple features. Here, we intermixed a delayed match-to-sample task to manipulate VWM content, and a breaking Continuous Flash Suppression (b-CFS) task to measure prioritization for visual awareness. Observers memorized either the color (Exp. 1), the shape (Exp. 2) or both the features (Exp. 3) of an item and indicated the location of a suppressed target. We observed that color-matching targets broke suppression faster than color-mismatching targets both when color was memory relevant or irrelevant. Shape only impacted priority for visual awareness through an interaction with color. We conclude that: (1) VWM can regulate the priority of visual information to access visual awareness along a single feature dimension; (2) different features of a memorandum vary in their potency to impact access to visual awareness, and the more dominant feature may even suppress the effect of the less dominant feature; (3) even stimuli that match an irrelevant feature dimension of the memorandum can be prioritized for visual awareness.     

不相关言语对视觉觉察的影响

前人多在记忆层面探讨不相关言语效应(the Irrelevant Speech Effect, ISE), 而本文选择在意识觉察(conscious awareness)阶段观察这一现象。所有实验均采用视觉掩蔽及听觉输入不相关声音的视听交互方式。实验1在安静、纯音及不相关言语3种听觉背景下让被试对简单图片做视觉觉察判断, 结果发现不相关言语干扰了视觉觉察, 而纯音则未产生干扰。实验2在相同的3种听觉背景下要求被试对复杂图片做视觉觉察判断, 结果同实验1。实验3采用事件相关电位技术, 在同样的3种听觉背景下观察被试对简单图片做视觉觉察判断时的脑电变化, 结果发现不相关言语干扰了视觉觉察负波的形成, 验证了行为学研究的结果。本文结果表明不相干言语在视觉意识觉察阶段就对被试的行为产生了干扰。     

Memory awareness disruptions in amnestic mild cognitive impairment: comparison of multiple awareness types for verbal and visuospatial material

Successful memory is normally accompanied by explicit awareness of retrieval and confidence in the accuracy of the retrieval product. Prior findings suggest that these features of metamemory can be dissociated from retrieval accuracy in Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment (aMCI). However, the literature on this question contains variable and conflicting results, likely because of differences in experimental conditions. We sought to systematically evaluate memory awareness disruptions in aMCI using multiple measures and stimulus formats within the same individuals. Memory awareness was tested with global predictions and postdictions, judgments of learning, confidence level ratings, and modified feeling-of-knowing ratings in tasks of visuospatial and verbal memory. These tests were administered to 14 individuals with aMCI and 15 healthy, age-matched controls. Memory awareness accuracy was calculated as the correspondence between subjective judgments and memory performance.Individuals with aMCI demonstrated impaired global and trial-level retrospective task awareness for visuospatial and verbal stimuli. Additionally, modified feeling-of-knowing awareness was impaired selectively for verbal stimuli. Statistical effect sizes for global awareness impairments were comparable to impairments in several objective neuropsychological memory assessments.Memory awareness (metamemory) disruptions in aMCI were most evident for a subset of subjective judgment types and task input modalities. These findings advance understanding of the nature of memory impairments in aMCI and support the utility of incorporating memory awareness testing to better characterize memory integrity in older adults.     

Metacognitive sensitivity of subjective reports of decisional confidence and visual experience

Previous studies provided contradicting results regarding metacognitive sensitivity estimated from subjective reports of confidence in comparison to subjective reports of visual experience. We investigated whether this effect of content of subjective reports is influenced by the statistical method to quantify metacognitive sensitivity. Comparing logistic regression and meta-d in a masked orientation task, a masked shape task, and a random-dot motion task, we observed metacognitive sensitivity of reports regarding decisional confidence was greater than of reports about visual experience irrespective of mathematical procedures. However, the relationship between subjective reports and the logistic transform of accuracy was often not linear, implying that logistic regression is not a consistent measure of metacognitive sensitivity. We argue that a science of consciousness would benefit from the assessment of both visual experience and decisional confidence, and recommend meta-d as measure of metacognitive sensitivity for future studies.     

Subjective visibility depends on level of processing

Is visual awareness graded or binary? Experimental work has provided support for both possibilities, leading to two coexisting but contradictory theoretical accounts. Here we propose a promising candidate factor through which to integrate both accounts: the depth of stimulus processing required by the task. We compared color identification (a low-level task) with numerical judgements (a high-level task) performed on the very same colored number stimuli. Psychophysical curves were analyzed for both objective discrimination performance and subjective visibility ratings on a trial-by trial basis. We observed a graded relationship between stimulus duration and visibility in the low-level task, but a more non-linear relationship in the high-level task. Both patterns of results have previously been consistently associated with the graded and the dichotomous account, respectively. Follow-up experiments that manipulate the level of processing can further unify previously inconsistent results, thus integrating two major theories of visual awareness.     

Thresholds for detection and awareness of masked facial stimuli

It has been suggested that perception without awareness can be demonstrated by a dissociation between performance in objective (forced-choice) and subjective (yes–no) tasks, and such dissociations have been reported both for simple stimuli and more complex ones including faces. However, signal detection theory (SDT) indicates that the subjective measures used to assess awareness in such studies can be affected by response bias, which could account for the observed dissociation, and this was confirmed by Balsdon and Azzopardi (2015) using simple visual targets. However, this finding may not apply to all types of stimulus, as the detectability of complex targets such as faces is known to be affected by their configuration as well as by their stimulus energy. We tested this with a comparison of forced-choice and yes–no detection of facial stimuli depicting happy or angry or fearful expressions using a backward masking paradigm, and using SDT methods including correcting for unequal variances in the underlying signal distributions, to measure sensitivity independently of response criterion in 12 normal observers. In 47 out 48 comparisons there was no significant difference between sensitivity (d_a) in the two tasks: hence, across the range of expressions tested it appears that the configuration of complex stimuli does not enhance detectability independently of awareness. The results imply that, on the basis of psychophysical experiments in normal observers, there is no reason to postulate that performance and awareness are mediated by separate processes.     

Balancing awareness: Vestibular signals modulate visual consciousness in the absence of awareness

The processing of visual and vestibular information is crucial for perceiving self-motion. Visual cues, such as optic flow, have been shown to induce and alter vestibular percepts, yet the role of vestibular information in shaping visual awareness remains unclear. Here we investigated if vestibular signals influence the access to awareness of invisible visual signals. Using natural vestibular stimulation (passive yaw rotations) on a vestibular self-motion platform, and optic flow masked through continuous flash suppression (CFS) we tested if congruent visual–vestibular information would break interocular suppression more rapidly than incongruent information. We found that when the unseen optic flow was congruent with the vestibular signals perceptual suppression as quantified with the CFS paradigm was broken more rapidly than when it was incongruent. We argue that vestibular signals impact the formation of visual awareness through enhanced access to awareness for congruent multisensory stimulation.     

Fear detection and visual awareness in perceiving bodily expressions

Many research reports have concluded that emotional information can be processed without observers being aware of it. The case for perception without awareness has almost always been made with the use of facial expressions. In view of the similarities between facial and bodily expressions for rapid perception and communication of emotional signals, we conjectured that perception of bodily expressions may also not necessarily require visual awareness. Our study investigates the role of visual awareness in the perception of bodily expressions using a backward masking technique in combination with confidence ratings on a trial-by-trial basis. Participants had to detect in three separate experiments masked fearful, angry and happy bodily expressions among masked neutral bodily actions as distractors and subsequently the participants had to indicate their confidence. The onset between target and mask (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony, SOA) varied from -50 to +133 ms. Sensitivity measurements (d-prime) as well as the confidence of the participants showed that the bodies could be detected reliably in all SOA conditions. In an important finding, a lack of covariance was observed between the objective and subjective measurements when the participants had to detect fearful bodily expressions, yet this was not the case when participants had to detect happy or angry bodily expressions.     

The relation of discrete stimuli can be integrated despite the failure of conscious identification

ABSTRACT

The integration of the sameness or difference of two unconscious stimuli occurs and affects behaviour without subjective visual consciousness. Yet, intermittent stimulus awareness or a process simpler than integration could also account for these results. In a masked go/no-go task, participants provided or withheld a response based on the same/different relation of two stimuli. Post-trial performance on a discrimination task was used to classify invisible stimuli, providing an objective criterion of awareness. Stimulus pairs with a No-go-associated relation showed reduced and slower responding even when those stimuli were incorrectly discriminated and presumably unconscious. Due to the large set of stimuli, this effect is unlikely to be due to response mapping or action triggers. The integration of the relation of discrete stimuli is a cognitive function that is not dependent upon visual awareness, in the form of conscious identification, to occur.     

“You’re on ten,where can you go from there?” Tufnel problems in repeated experiential judgments

We describe a set of Tufnel problems that arise when repeated use of a fixed-point scale precipitates failures to assess a full range of subjective experiences. As empirical evidence, participants in Study 1 periodically reported their depth of mind wandering on either 5- or 7-point Likert scales during a sustained attention task. The proportion of participants providing maximum scale ratings increased quickly over time-on-task and did so more quickly for the 5-point than for the 7-point group. Participants in Study 2 completed the same task using a 10-point scale before indicating whether and where they could have used a scale extended to “11” during the task. Slightly more than 20% of participants reported needing a scale extension. This Need for 11 was associated with differences in both reports of mind wandering depth and task performance. We conclude that Tufnel problems warrant methodological consideration and reflect interesting constraints on human judgment.     

Diminished episodic memory awareness in older adults: evidence from feeling-of-knowing and recollection

The ability to reflect on and monitor memory processes is one of the most investigated metamemory functions, and one of the important ways consciousnesses interacts with memory. The feeling-of-knowing (FOK) is one task used to evaluate individual's capacity to monitor their memory. We examined this reflective function of metacognition in older adults. We explored the contribution of metacognition to episodic memory impairment, in relation to the idea that older adults show a reduction in memory awareness characteristic of episodic memory. A first experiment showed that age affects the accuracy of FOK when predictions are made on an episodic memory task but not on a semantic memory task, suggesting a particular role for episodic memory awareness in metacognitive evaluations. A second experiment showed that the age-difference in episodic FOK accuracy was removed if one took into account subjective reports of memory awareness, or recollection. We argue that the FOK deficit specific to episodic memory is based on a lack of memory awareness manifest as a recollection deficit.     

In and out of consciousness: Sustained electrophysiological activity reflects individual differences in perceptual awareness

Although significant advances in our understanding of the cognitive and neural processes involved in conscious awareness have occurred in recent years, the precise mechanisms that support consciousness remain elusive. Examining the neural correlates associated with the moment a stimulus enters or exits conscious awareness is one way to potentially identify the neural mechanisms that give rise to consciousness. In the present study, we recorded neural activity using electroencephalography (EEG) while participants observed a bilateral shape-from-motion (SFM) display. While the display is in motion, the observer perceives an object that is immediately segregated from a noisy background. After the motion stops, the observer's experience of the object remains momentarily in awareness, before it eventually fades out of consciousness back into the noisy background. Consistent with subjective reports of perceptual experience, we observed a prominent sustained posterior contralateral negativity known as the contralateral delay activity (CDA). This activity was sustained only in conditions associated with sustained awareness. Interestingly, the amplitude of the CDA was correlated with individual differences in visual awareness, suggesting that this activity plays a significant role in the maintenance of objects in consciousness. The CDA is typically associated with visual short-term memory (VSTM), suggesting that conscious visual awareness may be mediated by the same neural and cognitive mechanisms that support VSTM. Our results demonstrate that the CDA may reflect the contents of conscious awareness, and therefore can provide a measure to track when information moves in and out of consciousness.     

Enhanced Cardiac Perception Is Associated With Increased Susceptibility to Framing Effects

Previous studies suggest in line with dual process models that interoceptive skills affect controlled decisions via automatic or implicit processing. The “framing effect” is considered to capture implicit effects of task‐irrelevant emotional stimuli on decision‐making. We hypothesized that cardiac awareness, as a measure of interoceptive skills, is positively associated with susceptibility to the framing effect. Forty volunteers performed a risky‐choice framing task in which the effect of loss versus gain frames on decisions based on identical information was assessed. The results show a positive association between cardiac awareness and the framing effect, accounting for 24% of the variance in the framing effect. These findings demonstrate that good interoceptive skills are linked to poorer performance in risky choices based on ambivalent information when implicit bias is induced by task‐irrelevant emotional information. These findings support a dual process perspective on decision‐making and suggest that interoceptive skills mediate effects of implicit bias on decisions.     

Measuring consciousness: task accuracy and awareness as sigmoid functions of stimulus duration

When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as functions of stimulus intensity (thus obtaining an accuracy and an awareness curve) as suggested by Koch and Preuschoff (2007). The estimated lag between the curves describes how much stimulus intensity must increase for awareness to change proportionally as much as accuracy and the slopes of the curves are used to assess how fast accuracy and awareness increases and whether awareness is dichotomous. The method is successfully employed to assess consciousness characteristics on data from four different awareness scales.