The atheist’s free will offence

This paper criticizes the assumption,omnipresent in contemporary philosophy ofreligion, that a perfectly good and loving Godwould wish to confer on (at least some) finitepersons free will. An alternative mode ofDivine-human relationship is introduced andshown to be as conducive to the realization ofvalue as one involving free will.Certain implications of this result are thenrevealed, to wit, that the theists free willdefence against the problem of evil isunsuccessful, and what is more, that free will,if it exists, provides positive support foratheism.     

Can psychology be objective about free will?

This paper takes up the question of free will in behaviour, what it can mean, and how it might be said to occur. The case is made that, thanks to psychology's commitment to a 17th century conception of natural science, it has been effectively insulated from putting teleology to a proper empirical test. After presenting a justification and definition of free will in terms of the human being's telosponsive capacities, the paper closes by surveying aspects of the psychological literature which have gathered data relating to telic behaviour only to explain them away via traditional nontelic “scientific” theories.     

Epistemic issues in the free will debate: can we know when we are free?

In this paper, I argue that the views of Robert Kane on the one hand and John Fischer and Mark Ravizza on the other both lead to the following conclusion: we should have very low confidence in our ability to judge that someone is acting freely or in a way for which they can be held responsible. This in turn means, I claim, that these views, in practice, collapse into a sort of hard incompatibilist position, or the position of a free will denier. That would at least be an unintended consequence, and it might be regarded as a virtual reductio. Versions of the objection could likely be made against a number of other accounts of free will, but I will limit my focus to Kane and Fischer. Along the way, by way of response to some possible objections to my argument, I make some comments about epistemic closure principles.     

The consciousness continuum: from “qualia” to “free will”

The consciousness continuum is seen as extending from simple sensory experiences to complex subjective constructions resulting in the apparent exercise of conscious will. The phenomena between these two extremes include spontaneously occurring mental contents, unintended perceptual experiences, memory retrievals, and problem solving including feedback of conscious contents. Two factors describe this continuum: The presence or absence of intention (psychologically defined) and the complexity of the cognitive construction involved. Among other benefits, such an analysis is intended to provide an alternative to metaphysical and vague concepts such as qualia, free will, and intentionality.     

Free to blame? Belief in free will is related to victim blaming

The more people believe in free will, the harsher their punishment of criminal offenders. A reason for this finding is that belief in free will leads individuals to perceive others as responsible for their behavior. While research supporting this notion has mainly focused on criminal offenders, the perspective of the victims has been neglected so far. We filled this gap and hypothesized that individuals’ belief in free will is positively correlated with victim blaming—the tendency to make victims responsible for their bad luck. In three studies, we found that the more individuals believe in free will, the more they blame victims. Study 3 revealed that belief in free will is correlated with victim blaming even when controlling for just world beliefs, religious worldviews, and political ideology. The results contribute to a more differentiated view of the role of free will beliefs and attributed intentions.     

Why we should(n’t) be discretionists about free will

One of the projects Shaun Nichols takes up in Bound is to provide a folk psychological diagnosis of the problem of free will. As part of this diagnosis, Nichols suggests that the dispute between eliminativists (those who claim free will does not exist) and preservationists (those who claim free will does exist) depends to some extent on assumptions about the way ‘free will’ refers. In light of this, he argues that we might have good reason to accept a discretionary view of free will. Here, I will focus on teasing out some of the more fine-grained features of the discretionary view Nichols proposes. In so doing I will challenge the idea that there is a tenable strategy for consistently preserving two main features of the view: (1) that eliminativists and preservationists can both speak truly, and (2) that the apparent disagreement between them can be diffused by appealing to the role that different practical interests play in the context of utterance. I will conclude with some suggestive remarks on how the spirit of the discretionary view Nichols offers might still be preserved despite the challenge I raise, and why there are good reasons to pursue this kind of view further.     

Hindsight bias and outcome bias in judging directors’ liability and the role of free will beliefs

Following a corporate disaster such as bankruptcy, people in general and damaged parties, in particular, want to know what happened and whether the company's directors are to blame. The accurate assessment of directors’ liability can be jeopardized by having to judge in hindsight with full knowledge of the adverse outcome. The present study investigates whether professional legal investigators such as judges and lawyers are affected by hindsight bias and outcome bias when evaluating directors’ conduct in a bankruptcy case. Additionally, to advance our understanding of the mechanisms underlying these biases, we also examine whether free will beliefs can predict susceptibility to hindsight bias and outcome bias in this context. In two studies (total N = 1,729), we demonstrate that legal professionals tend to judge a director's actions more negatively and perceive bankruptcy as more foreseeable in hindsight than in foresight and that these effects are significantly stronger for those who endorse the notion that humans have free will. This contribution is particularly timely considering the many companies that are currently going bankrupt or are facing bankruptcy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.     

Free love? On the relation between belief in free will,determinism, and passionate love

Is love possible if we are not free? Some philosophers consider that true love is necessarily free, while others think that the nature of love makes it incompatible with a certain type of freedom. Here, we explored the relationship between feelings of passionate love, belief in free will and determinism across three online studies. In Study 1 (N = 257), participants who believed strongly in free will (or determinism) expressed stronger passionate love. In Study 2 (N = 305), we again found a positive association between belief in free will (or determinism) and passionate love, although the passionate love-determinism relationship seems more conditional. Finally, Study 3 (N = 309) confirmed the relationship between belief in free will and passionate love but not between belief in determinism and passionate love. These findings, along with a meta-analysis, suggest that both beliefs in free will and determinism are compatible with passionate love.     

Do attitudes toward societal structure predict beliefs about free will and achievement? Evidence from the Indian caste system

Intuitive theories about the malleability of intellectual ability affect our motivation and achievement in life. But how are such theories shaped by the culture in which an individual is raised? We addressed this question by exploring how Indian children's and adults’ attitudes toward the Hindu caste system – and its deterministic worldview – are related to differences in their intuitive theories. Strikingly, we found that, beginning at least in middle school and continuing into adulthood, individuals who placed more importance on caste were more likely to adopt deterministic intuitive theories. We also found a developmental change in the scope of this relationship, such that in children, caste attitudes were linked only to abstract beliefs about personal freedom, but that by adulthood, caste attitudes were also linked to beliefs about the potential achievement of members of different castes, personal intellectual ability, and personality attributes. These results are the first to directly relate the societal structure in which a person is raised to the specific intuitive theories they adopt.     

“Escape from Freedom”: Authoritarianism-related traits,political ideology,personality, and belief in free will/determinism

Philosophers have long speculated that authoritarianism and belief in determinism are functionally related. To evaluate this hypothesis, we assessed whether authoritarianism and allied personality and political variables predict varieties of belief in determinism in three community samples (N₁ = 566 to 20,010; N₂ = 500; N₃ = 419). Authoritarianism and allied variables manifested moderate to large positive correlations with both fatalistic and genetic determinism beliefs. Controlling for political conservatism did not meaningfully attenuate these relations. Further, openness was negatively related to fatalistic determinism beliefs and agreeableness was negatively related to genetic determinism beliefs. Taken together, our findings clarify the nature of relations between authoritarianism and general personality, on the one hand, and free will/determinism beliefs, on the other, and suggest intriguing intersections between worldviews and personality traits.     

Is a bad will a weak will? Cognitive dispositions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will

In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution (WWA) influenced by an agent’s violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent’s action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2?×?2?×?2 between-subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent variables, and measured participants’ cognitive dispositions using Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: (1) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action’s (and probably also the commitment’s) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; (2) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N?=?710) answered the CRT. A three-way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account.     

The hand of God or the hand of Maradona? Believing in free will increases perceived intentionality of others’ behavior

The question of whether free will actually exists has been debated in philosophy for centuries. However, how belief in free will shapes the perception of our social environment still remains open. Here we investigate whether belief in free will affects how much intentionality we attribute to other people. Study 1a and 1b demonstrate a weak positive relation between the strength of belief in free will and the perceived intentionality of soccer players committing handball. This pattern even holds for behavior that is objectively not intentional (i.e., when the player touches the ball accidentally). Going one step further, in Study 2 we find a weak correlation between belief in free will and perceiving intentions in very abstract geometrical shapes. These findings suggest that whether individuals believe in free will or not changes the way they interpret others’ behavior, which may have important societal consequences.     

Rats respond for food in the presence of free food: How free is the “free” food?

An experiment conducted by A.J. Neuringer (Science, 1969,166, 399–401) in which he reported that rats maintained appreciable levels of bar pressing for earned food in the presence of freely available food was critically examined and replicated. Rats were trained to bar press, then housed in operant chambers and administered a 15-day preference test between free and earned food, followed successively by 10 days of free food only, a second 6-day preference test, and 7 days of earned food only. Throughout the experiment half of the animals were provided with tall free-food containers similar to those used by Neuringer; the other half were provided with short containers similar to those more commonly employed by other researchers. The former animals showed a consistent propensity to bar press for earned food across both preference tests, while the latter animals showed only an initial propensity to bar press which subsequently declined to very low levels. These results indicate that the maintenance of significant amounts of bar pressing by the rats in Neuringer's report was due to the relatively more effortful free-food source he employed. The utility of a neophobia-optimality model in explaining the present data is discussed.     

“Local determination”, even if we could find it,does not challenge free will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn

Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will” (free will that requires indeterminism), he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent concept. Moreover, determinism is unlikely to be established by neuroscience in any form that should trouble compatibilists or libertarians—that is, anyone who thinks we might have free will. We conclude that, in principle, neuroscience will not be able undermine libertarian free will and explain why these conclusions support a coherent compatibilist notion of causal sourcehood.     

On free‐floating attention

This paper is an experimental effort to invite the reader into an interplay between two modes of comprehension: the one predominantly narrative and emotive, and the other predominantly rational and analytic. The interplay of these modes of writing may (or may not, depending on the reader) amplify the thesis of the paper: that Freud's clinical technique of evenly‐suspended attention involves a tension between attentional modes—a paradoxical willing‐not‐to‐will—and this willing unwilling (a kind of free will) undercuts both rational and emotive modes of comprehension, thereby permitting novel prehension of self and other.     

Are human beings free?

This article examines the question of freedom of choice (free-will) in human beings. The process of decision making is analysed and the author presents the conclusion that since this process is determined by the perceptions and interpretations of the person, it cannot be termed free. Applications are drawn to the therapeutic process, specifically in regard to anger and guilt.     

“Free will” is vague

This paper argues that “free will” is vague. The argument has two steps. First, I argue that free will is a matter of degrees and, second, that there are no sharp boundaries separating free decisions and actions and non-free ones. After presenting the argument, I focus on one significant consequence of the thesis, although others are mentioned along the way. In short, considerations of vagueness help understand the logic behind so-called manipulation arguments, but also show why these arguments are ultimately flawed.