Pragmatic reasoning schemas

We propose that people typically reason about realistic situations using neither content-free syntactic inference rules nor representations of specific experiences. Rather, people reason using knowledge structures that we term pragmatic reasoning schemas, which are generalized sets of rules defined in relation to classes of goals. Three experiments examined the impact of a “permission schema” on deductive reasoning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that by evoking the permission schema it is possible to facilitate performance in Wason's selection paradigm for subjects who have had no experience with the specific content of the problems. Experiment 2 showed that a selection problem worded in terms of an abstract permission elicited better performance than one worded in terms of a concrete but arbitrary situation, providing evidence for an abstract permission schema that is free of domain-specific content. Experiment 3 provided evidence that evocation of a permission schema affects not only tasks requiring procedural knowledge, but also a linguistic rephrasing task requiring declarative knowledge. In particular, statements in the form if p then q were rephrased into the form p only if q with greater frequency for permission than for arbitrary statements, and rephrasings of permission statements produced a pattern of introduction of modals (must, can) totally unlike that observed for arbitrary conditional statements. Other pragmatic schemas, such as “causal” and “evidence” schemas can account for both linguistic and reasoning phenomena that alternative hypotheses fail to explain.     

The brain is not single-minded about inflectional morphology: A response to the commentaries

Jaeger is supportive of our experiment and the claims we make, arguing that the weight of current evidence shows the brain making a distinction between regular and irregular inflectional morphology. Seidenberg & Arnoldussen are unsupportive, criticizing our work on theoretical and methodological grounds. Seidenberg & Arnoldussen’s major worries—that we have misunderstood connectionist theory’s predictions and have committed a “Difficulty Matching Error” in testing them—are important to consider but turn out to be groundless. At bottom, Seidenberg & Arnoldussen fail to recognize the consequences of our choice of German words, rather than English, as stimuli. Once the concept of “difficulty” is given substance in this context, it appears that in German, the brain activates more extensively when dealing with what in the connectionist universe should be, if anything, the easier stimuli, not the harder ones as suggested by Seidenberg & Arnoldussen. Thus regularity cannot be reduced to difficulty.     

Do Conditional Hypotheses Target Rare Events?

When testing hypotheses, rare or unexpected observations are normatively more informative than common observations, and recent studies have shown that participants' behavior reflects this principle. Research has also shown that, when asked to test conditional hypotheses (“If X, then Y”) that are abstract or unfamiliar, participants overwhelmingly consider a supporting observation mentioned in the hypothesis (X&Y) to be more informative than a supporting observation not mentioned (XY). These two empirical findings would mesh well if conditional hypotheses tend to be phrased in terms of rare, rather than common, events. Six experiments are reported indicating that people do have a tendency—often a very strong one—to phrase conditional hypotheses in terms of rare events. Thus, observations mentioned in conditional hypotheses might generally be considered highly informative because they usually are highly informative.     

Consequences of schematism

In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach does not mean to buy an ontologically deflationary approach, according to which we have to accept all the intentional objects there apparently are. Being metaphysically deflationary on intentionalia rather means that from the ontological point of view one must really allow only for those intentionalia for which one is entitled to say that there are such things; typically, for which an ontological proof is available. From metaphysical schematism plus conditional, or partial, ontological committment to intentionalia, further interesting consequences follow. First, this theoretical combination allows one to deal with the ‘too-many entities’ problem (may one fail to accept an ontological proof for an entity of a given kind if she thinks that the entity we would have to be committed to is an entity of another kind?). Second, it allows one to deal with the ‘genuinely true report’ problem (how is it that if we exercise mindreading with respect to a somehow deluded person, we want our reports to come out as really, not merely fictionally, true?).     

Propositions, Sets, and Worlds

If we agree with Michael Jubien that propositions do not exist, while accepting the existence of abstract sets in a realist mathematical ontology, then the combined effect of these ontological commitments has surprising implications for the metaphysics of modal logic, the ontology of logically possible worlds, and the controversy over modal realism versus actualism. Logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets exist if sets generally exist, but are equivalently expressed as maximally consistent conjunctions of the same propositions in corresponding sets. A conjunction of propositions, even if infinite in extent, is nevertheless itself a proposition. If sets and hence proposition sets exist but propositions do not exist, then whether or not modal realism is true depends on which of two apparently equivalent methods of identifying, representing, or characterizing logically possible worlds we choose to adopt. I consider a number of reactions to the problem, concluding that the best solution may be to reject the conventional model set theoretical concept of logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets, and distinguishing between the actual world alone as maximally consistent and interpreting all nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximal. I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), for supporting this among related research projects in philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics during my Resident Research Fellowship in 2005-2006.     

On the Possibility of Inference to the Best Explanation

Various proposals have suggested that an adequate explanatory theory should reduce the number or the cardinality of the set of logically independent claims that need be accepted in order to entail a body of data. A (and perhaps the only) well-formed proposal of this kind is William Kneale’s: an explanatory theory should be finitely axiomatizable but it’s set of logical consequences in the data language should not be finitely axiomatizable. Craig and Vaught showed that Kneale theories (almost) always exist for any recursively enumerable but not finitely axiomatizable set of data sentences in a first order language with identity. Kneale’s criterion underdetermines explanation even given all possible data in the data language; gratuitous axioms may be “tacked on.” Define a Kneale theory, T, to be logically minimal if it is deducible from every Kneale theory (in the vocabulary of T) that entails the same statements in the data language as does T. If they exist, minimal Kneale theories are candidates for best explanations: they are “bold” in a sense close to Popper’s; some minimal Kneale theory is true if any Kneale theory is true; the minimal Kneale theory that is data equivalent to any given Kneale theory is unique; and no Kneale theory is more probable than some minimal Kneale theory. I show that under the Craig-Vaught conditions, no minimal Kneale theories exist.     

Speed of information-processing in an inductive reasoning task and its relationship to psychometric intelligence

The relationship between psychometric intelligence (measured by means of Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices and two verbal subtests of the “Intelligenz-Struktur-Test-70”) and speed of information-processing in a newly developed computerized reaction time (RT) task called the Concept-Verification-Test (CVT) was investigated in a sample of 104 undergraduates. In this CVT, first, one of five possible conceptual rules is presented on a computer monitor. After reading the rule, the subject has to press a button and then one of 27 possible simple geometrical figures is presented, which either is an example of the concept or not. The subject has to press the true button if the presented figure is a positive instance of the rule or the false button if it is not. Two RTs were measured: The Comprehension Reaction Time (CRT) from the onset of the rule to the first button press and the Verification Reaction Time (VRT) from the onset of the figure until the response is given. The different complexity of the conceptual rules used also allowed us to examine the “complexity hypothesis” (i.e. correlations with intelligence should be higher for more complex RT tasks). As predicted, both CRTs and VRTs correlated negatively with intelligence, but we found no evidence for the validity of the complexity hypothesis.     

The Meaning of Meaning-Fallibilism

Much discussion of meaning by philosophers over the last 300 years has been predicated on a Cartesian first-person authority (i.e. “infallibilism”) with respect to what one’s terms mean. However this has problems making sense of the way the meanings of scientific terms develop, an increase in scientific knowledge over and above scientists’ ability to quantify over new entities. Although a recent conspicuous embrace of rigid designation has broken up traditional meaning-infallibilism to some extent, this new dimension to the meaning of terms such as “water” is yet to receive a principled epistemological undergirding (beyond the deliverances of “intuition” with respect to certain somewhat unusual possible worlds). Charles Peirce’s distinctive, naturalistic philosophy of language is mined to provide a more thoroughly fallibilist, and thus more realist, approach to meaning, with the requisite epistemology. Both his pragmatism and his triadic account of representation, it is argued, produce an original approach to meaning, analysing it in processual rather than objectual terms, and opening a distinction between “meaning for us”, the meaning a term has at any given time for any given community and “meaning simpliciter”. the way use of a given term develops over time (often due to a posteriori input from the world which is unable to be anticipated in advance). This account provocatively undermines a certain distinction between “semantics” and “ontology” which is often taken for granted in discussions of realism.     

Time stamp in conditioned place avoidance can be set to different circadian phases

We have reported that the expression of conditioned place avoidance (CPA) in the golden hamster is regulated in a circadian pattern such that the preference is exhibited strongly at the circadian time of prior training but not at other circadian times [Cain, S. W., Chou, T., & Ralph, M. R. (2004a). Circadian modulation of performance on an aversion-based place learning task in hamsters. Behavioural Brain Research, 150(1–2), 201–205]. In that study, animals that were trained at a specific circadian time to discriminate between a “safe” context and one paired with foot shock, showed strong avoidance of the paired context at 24 and 48 h following the last training session, and showed no avoidance at 32 and 40 h following training. In the present study, we hypothesized that this “time stamp” effect is settable to any circadian phase. This was tested by training animals at one of two times of day (ZT13 or ZT4) and testing whether a time stamp would be observed, with avoidance occurring only when training and testing times match. Results confirmed our hypothesis, suggesting that the time stamp in the performance of learned tasks can be set to any circadian phase. Such an ability may allow animals in nature to predict the recurrence of 24 h events, regardless of the time of day the event was encountered.     

Metaphoric comprehension: Studies in reminding and resembling

The theoretical problems posed by metaphoric comprehension are discussed in the context of experiments on prompted recall. Listeners heard sentences of the form “Topic is (like) Vehicle.” In most cases, a statement of the implicit resemblance (the “ground”) was very effective in prompting recall of its related metaphor. This result could not be attributed to the activation, transfer, or additive combination of pre-existing properties of the topic and vehicle terms or to pre-existing associations between grounds and sentence terms. It is argued that the vehicle domain guides a novel schematization of the topic domain, that the perceived resemblance is a higher-order relation among entities (both explicit and implicit) in each domain, and that this abstract relation constitutes the “functional memory unit.” Prompted recall may begin with recognition of this previously experienced relation.     

PRESENTISM,TRUTH AND SUPERVENIENCE

Truthmaker theory is commonly thought to pose a challenge for presentism. Presentism seems to lack the ontological and ideological resources required to adequately underwrite the truth of propositions concerning the past. That is because if presentism is true, then the past does not exist. According to the standard response to this challenge, the truth of propositions concerning the past supervenes on surrogate entities that ‘stand proxy’ for past things. I argue that in order for the standard response to the truthmaker challenge to succeed these surrogate entities must stand in necessary connections to the past. I go on to argue that because the standard response is already committed to denying the existence of cross‐temporal modal connections of this kind, by its own lights that response is in error. 1     

Gradations of awareness in a modified sequence learning task

We argue performance in the serial reaction time (SRT) task is associated with gradations of awareness that provide examples of fringe consciousness [Mangan, B. (1993b). Taking phenomenology seriously: the “fringe” and its implications for cognitive research. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 89–108, Mangan, B. (2003). The conscious “fringe”: Bringing William James up to date. In B. J. Baars, W. P. Banks & J. B. Newman (Eds.), Essential sources in the scientific study of consciousness (pp. 741–759). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.], and address limitations of the traditional SRT procedure, including criticism of exclusion generation tasks. Two experiments are conducted with a modified SRT procedure where irrelevant stimulus attributes obscure the sequence rule. Our modified paradigm, which includes a novel exclusion task, makes it easier to demonstrate a previously controversial influence of response stimulus interval (RSI) on awareness. It also allows identification of participants showing fringe consciousness rather than explicit sequence knowledge, as reflected by dissociations between different awareness measures. The NEO-PI-R variable Openness to Feelings influenced the diversity of subjective feelings reported during two awareness measures, but not the degree of learning and awareness as previously found with traditional SRT tasks [Norman, E., Price, M. C., & Duff, S. C. (2006). Fringe consciousness in sequence learning: the influence of individual differences. Consciousness and Cognition, 15(4), 723–760.]. This suggests possible distinctions between two components of fringe consciousness.     

Can Counterfactuals Really Be about Possible Worlds?

The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A‐worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C‐worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non‐trivial truth‐values under physical determinism. I show that the possible‐worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity of (Q > R) is to be explained. If (P > (Q > R)) has a backtracking reading then the contingent facts that (Q > R) needs to be true in the closest P‐worlds are absent. If (P > (Q > R)) has a forwardtracking reading, then the laws required by (Q > R) to be true in the closest P‐worlds will be absent, because they are violated in those worlds. Solutions like lossy laws or denial of embedding won't work. The only approach to counterfactuals that explains the embedding is a pragmatic metalinguistic approach in which the whole idea that counterfactuals are about a modal reality, be it abstract or concrete, is given up.     

A decidable multi-modal logic of context

We give a logic for formulas φ−ψ, with the informal reading “ψ is true in the context described by φ”. These are interpreted as binary modalities, by quantification over an enumerable set of unary modalities c−ψ, meaning “ψ is true in context c”. The logic allows arbitrary nesting of contexts.A corresponding axiomatic presentation is given, and proven to be decidable, sound, and complete.Previously, quantificational logic of context restricted the nesting of contexts, and was only known to be decidable in very special cases.     

The dissociation of attention deficit disorder from reading disability: A reply to Share and Schwartz

In a study recently reported in this journal (R. H. Felton, F. B. Wood, I. B. Brown, S. K. Campbell, & M. R. Harter, 1987, Brain and Language, 31, 171–184), a 2 × 2 factorial design assessed the separable impact of presence vs. absence of reading disability (RD) and attention deficit disorder (ADD) on 11 different measures of verbal processing ability, with picture vocabulary and age as covariates in the analysis. Share and Schwartz have objected to this analysis on the grounds that only the allegedly “pure” groups in the design (RD without ADD, and ADD without RD) should be compared. They then use the data in the article to compare those two groups directly, concluding that because only two of the measures were significant in a small sample t test, the hypothesis of differential cognitive impacts of ADD and RD is not supported. They further cite Chapman and Chapman (1973) to suggest that because the 11 dependent measures were not matched for discriminating power the analyses are meaningless. In this commentary we submit that the Share and Schwartz argument (1) shows serious misunderstanding of elementary statistical principles; (2) commits what we call the “Fallacy of the Pure Case”; and (3) misunderstands the Chapman and Chapman argument. Noting that our design was not intended to answer the question that bothers Share and Schwartz (that of a distinctive cognitive deficit associated with “pure” ADD) we conclude with some suggestions about the types of designs and data that would more directly speak to their question.     

Linkage analysis: Modus operandi, ritual, and signature in serial sexual crime

This article examines a process of behavioral analysis, referred to as linkage analysis, used in identifying sexual offenses that have been committed by the same offender. This type of analysis examines behavior that is contained in three distinct components of a crime, i.e., the modus operandi (MO) or the “how to” of a crime; the ritual or fantasy-based behaviors for a particular type or series of sexual crimes; the signature or unique combination of behaviors, which suggests that a series of crimes has been perpetrated by the same offender. Linkage analysis involves five assessment procedures: (1) gathering detailed, varied, and multisource documentation; (2) reviewing the documentation and identifying significant features of each crime individually across the series; (3) classifying the significant features of the crime as either MO and/or ritualistic constructs; (4) comparing the combination of MO and ritualistic features across the crimes to determine if a signature exists; (5) compiling a written analysis that details the conclusions derived from the available information. Results of this type of analysis can be used for investigative purposes and, in some instances, can help to inform the decision-making of the courts.     

Wave Function Ontology

I argue that the wave function ontology for quantum mechanics is an undesirable ontology. This ontology holds that the fundamental space in which entities evolve is not three-dimensional, but instead 3N-dimensional, where N is the number of particles standardly thought to exist in three-dimensional space. I show that the state of three-dimensional objects does not supervene on the state of objects in 3N-dimensional space. I also show that the only way to guarantee the existence of the appropriate mental states in the wave function ontology has undesirable metaphysical baggage: either mind/body dualism is true, or circumstances which we take to be logically possible turn out to be logically impossible.While our theory can be extended formally in a logically consistent way by introducing the concept of a wave in a 3N-dimensional space, it is evident that this procedure is not really acceptable in a physical theory... (Bohm 1957, 117)     

Interpersonal dominance and coronary prone behavior

Type A “coronary-prone behavior” is a risk factor for coronary artery and heart disease. Questionnaire research indicates that interpersonal dominance is one of the strongest behavioral correlates of the Type A behavior pattern, although little effort has been made to demonstrate a link between the behavioral manifestations of interpersonal dominance and Pattern A responding. This study was conducted to establish such a link. All possible combinations of extreme As (N = 42) and Bs (N = 42) were matched in dyads that negotiated extreme bipolar opposite positions on a “teacher dismissal” issue. Analysis of process and outcome behaviors suggested that type A individuals are unilaterally more dominant than their Type B counterparts. Possible physiological mechanisms mediating dominance and cardiovascular disease are discussed.     

Some foundations and directions for applied developmental psychology

Applied developmental psychology (ADP) is an “umbrella” discipline which includes a range of psychological sciences and professions committed to use of the data base and methods of developmental psychology to address problems in education, health, human services and public policy. ADP emerges now as a manifestation of increasing recognition of the limits of developmental psychology's traditional models and paradigms, increasing recognition of our appropriate role in social problem-solving and public policy formation and an employment market which reflects these awarenesses. Consideration of clinical psychology as an ADP provides examples of synergies and distinctions helpful in defining ADP. The “linkage” concept inherent in a “scientist-practitioner” model is emphasized as a key in this definition and as a basis for designing appropriate doctoral training programs in ADP.