Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science

Paul Hoyningen-Huene argues that what makes scientific knowledge special is its systematic character, and that this can be used to solve the demarcation problem. He labels this STDC: “Systematicity Theory’s Demarcation Criterion.” This paper argues that STDC fails, because there are areas of intellectual activity that are highly systematic, but that the great majority of scientists and historians and philosophers of science do not accept as scientific. These include homepathy, creationism, and climate change denial. I designate these activities “facsimile sciences” because they mimic the appearance of science but are not, by the standards of philosophers and scientists, scientific. This suggests that we need additional criteria to demarcate science from non-science and/ or nonsense.

     

Baby steps: investigating the development of perceptual–motor couplings in infancy

There are cells in our motor cortex that fire both when we perform and when we observe similar actions. It has been suggested that these perceptual‐motor couplings in the brain develop through associative learning during correlated sensorimotor experience. Although studies with adult participants have provided support for this hypothesis, there is no direct evidence that associative learning also underlies the initial formation of perceptual–motor couplings in the developing brain. With the present study we addressed this question by manipulating infants’ opportunities to associate the visual and motor representation of a novel action, and by investigating how this influenced their sensorimotor cortex activation when they observed this action performed by others. Pre‐walking 7–9‐month‐old infants performed stepping movements on an infant treadmill while they either observed their own real‐time leg movements (Contingent group) or the previously recorded leg movements of another infant (Non‐contingent control group). Infants in a second control group did not perform any steps and only received visual experience with the stepping actions. Before and after the training period we measured infants’ sensorimotor alpha suppression, as an index of sensorimotor cortex activation, while they watched videos of other infants’ stepping actions. While we did not find greater sensorimotor alpha suppression following training in the Contingent group as a whole, we nevertheless found that the strength of the visuomotor contingency experienced during training predicted the amount of sensorimotor alpha suppression at post‐test in this group. We did not find any effects of motor experience alone. These results suggest that the development of perceptual–motor couplings in the infant brain is likely to be supported by associative learning during correlated visuomotor experience.     

How simulations fail

‘The problem with simulations is that they are doomed to succeed.’ So runs a common criticism of simulations—that they can be used to ‘prove’ anything and are thus of little or no scientific value. While this particular objection represents a minority view, especially among those who work with simulations in a scientific context, it raises a difficult question: what standards should we use to differentiate a simulation that fails from one that succeeds? In this paper we build on a structural analysis of simulation developed in previous work to provide an evaluative account of the variety of ways in which simulations do fail. We expand the structural analysis in terms of the relationship between a simulation and its real-world target emphasizing the important role of aspects intended to correspond and also those specifically intended not to correspond to reality. The result is an outline both of the ways in which simulations can fail and the scientific importance of those various forms of failure.     

THE ‘EXTENDEDNESS’ OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

In recent years, the idea has been gaining ground that our traditional conceptions of knowledge and cognition are unduly limiting, in that they privilege what goes on inside the ‘skin and skull’ (Clark 1997: 82) of an individual reasoner. Instead, it has been argued, knowledge and cognition need to be understood as embodied (involving both mind and body), situated (being dependent on the complex interplay between the individual and its environment), and extended (that is, continuous with, rather than separate from, the world ‘outside’). Whether these various interrelations and dependencies are ‘merely’ causal, or are in a more fundamental sense constitutive of knowledge and cognition, is as much a matter of controversy as the degree to which they pose a challenge to ‘traditional’ conceptions of cognition, knowledge and the mind. In this paper we argue that when the idea of ‘extendedness’ is applied to a core concept in epistemology and the philosophy of science—namely, scientific evidence—things appear to be on a much surer footing. The evidential status of data gathered through extended processes—including its utility as justification or warrant—do not seem to be weakened by virtue of being extended, but instead are often strengthened because of it. Indeed, it is often precisely by virtue of this extendedness that scientific evidence grounds knowledge claims, which individuals may subsequently ascribe to themselves. The functional equivalence between machine‐based gathering, filtering, and processing of data and human interpretation and assessment is the crucial factor in deciding whether evidence has been gathered, rather than the distinction between intra‐ and extracranial processes or individual and social processes (or combinations thereof). To prioritize biological processes here, and to assert the superiority of human cognitive capacities seems both arbitrary and unwarranted with respect to gathering evidence, and ultimately would lead to an unattractive skepticism about many of the methods used in science to gather evidence. In other words, conceiving of scientific evidence as ‘impersonal’ (or at least not necessarily personal) not only better captures the character of evidence‐gathering in practice, but also makes sense of a large amount of evidence‐gathering that ‘personal’ accounts fail to either acknowledge or accurately describe. Whilst we suggest it is likely that all internally‐distributed evidence‐gathering processes are merely contingently internal processes, a significant number of externally‐distributed evidence‐gathering processes are necessarily externally‐distributed. Some evidence can only be gathered by extended epistemic agents.     

Do Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence?

In 1979 astronomer Carl Sagan popularized the aphorism “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” (ECREE). But Sagan never defined the term “extraordinary.” Ambiguity in what constitutes “extraordinary” has led to misuse of the aphorism. ECREE is commonly invoked to discredit research dealing with scientific anomalies, and has even been rhetorically employed in attempts to raise doubts concerning mainstream scientific hypotheses that have substantive empirical support. The origin of ECREE lies in eighteenth-century Enlightenment criticisms of miracles. The most important of these was Hume’s essay On Miracles. Hume precisely defined an extraordinary claim as one that is directly contradicted by a massive amount of existing evidence. For a claim to qualify as extraordinary there must exist overwhelming empirical data of the exact antithesis. Extraordinary evidence is not a separate category or type of evidence--it is an extraordinarily large number of observations. Claims that are merely novel or those which violate human consensus are not properly characterized as extraordinary. Science does not contemplate two types of evidence. The misuse of ECREE to suppress innovation and maintain orthodoxy should be avoided as it must inevitably retard the scientific goal of establishing reliable knowledge.     

Existence problems in philosophy and science

We initially characterize what we’ll call existence problems as problems where there is evidence that a putative entity exists and this evidence is not easily dismissed; however, the evidence is not adequate to justify the claim that the entity exists, and in particular the entity hasn’t been detected. The putative entity is elusive. We then offer a strategy for determining whether an existence problem is philosophical or scientific. According to this strategy (1) existence problems are characterized in terms of causal roles, and (2) these problems are categorized as scientific or philosophical on the basis of the epistemic context of putative realizers. We argue that the first step of the strategy is necessary to avoid begging the question with regard to categorization of existence problems, and the second step categorizes existence problems on the basis of a distinction between two ways in which an entity can be elusive. This distinction between kinds of elusiveness takes as background a standard account of inference to the best explanation. Applying this strategy, we argue that the existence of a multiverse is a scientific problem.     

Rethinking the scientist-practitioner model: On the necessary complementarity of the natural and human science dimensions

Although the dominant scientist–practitioner model has considerable professional support, it remains the case that there is a fundamental mismatch between its conceptualisation of the practitioner as a laboratory scientist in a clinical setting and the actual requirements for good counselling practice. In particular, there is mismatch between the kind of knowledge generated in the laboratory setting and the epistemic requirements of the therapeutic situation; and between the (detached, impersonal) kind of decision-making engaged in by the laboratory scientist and the (interpersonal, interactive) kind engaged in by the practitioner. Moreover, being structural in character, these limitations cannot be rectified by piecemeal modifications of the standard model, such as those envisaged on the ‘local clinical scientist model’. Nor can the recent push towards ‘evidence-based practice’ suffice as a corrective because the core problem simply replicates itself on that level. Instead, since they derive from an unduly restrictive conception of what constitutes scientific inquiry, they require endorsement of the equal partnership of the human science template as a corrective. Moreover, far from compromising its scientific commitments, this actively facilitates rethinking the integration of science and practice in the service of the effective practice of care.     

False recognition in younger and older adults: Exploring the characteristics of illusory memories

Roediger and McDermott (1995) demonstrated that when subjects hear a list of associates to a “theme word” that has itself not been presented, they frequently claim to recollect having heard the nonpresented theme word on the study list. In Experiment 1, we found that asking subjects to explain theirremember responses, by writing down exactly what they remembered about the item’s presentation at study, did not significantly diminish the rate ofremember false alarms to nonpresented theme words. We also found that older adults were relatively more susceptible than younger adults to this false-recognition effect. Subjects’ explanations suggested that both veridical and illusory memories were predominantly composed of associative information as opposed to sensory and contextual detail. In Experiment 2, we obtained quantitative evidence for this conclusion, using a paradigm in which subjects were asked focused questions about the contents of their recollective experience. Lastly, we found that both younger and older adults recalled more sensory and contextual detail in conjunction with studied items than with nonpresented theme words, although these differences were less pronounced in older adults.     

Metacognition in Humans and Animals

ABSTRACT— It has long been assumed that metacognition—thinking about one's own thoughts—is a uniquely human ability. Yet a decade of research suggests that, like humans, other animals can differentiate between what they know and what they do not know. They opt out of difficult trials; they avoid tests they are unlikely to answer correctly; and they make riskier "bets" when their memories are accurate than they do when their memories are inaccurate. These feats are simultaneously impressive and, by human standards, somewhat limited; new evidence suggests, however, that animals can generalize metacognitive judgments to new contexts and seek more information when they are unsure. Metacognition is intriguing, in part, because of parallels with self-reflection and conscious awareness. Consciousness appears to be consistent with, but not required by, the abilities animals have demonstrated thus far.     

Acquired Equivalence Changes Stimulus Representations

Acquired equivalence is a paradigm in which generalization is increased between two superficially dissimilar stimuli (or antecedents) that have previously been associated with similar outcomes (or consequents). Several possible mechanisms have been proposed, including changes in stimulus representations, either in the form of added associations or a change of feature salience. A different way of conceptualizing acquired equivalence is in terms of strategic inference: Confronted with a choice on which it has no evidence, the organism may infer from its history of reinforcement what the best option is, and that inference is observed as acquired equivalence. To test this account, we combined an incremental learning task with an episodic memory test. Drawings of faces were made equivalent through acquired equivalence training, and then paired with words in a list learning paradigm. When participants were asked to recognize specific face-word pairings, they confused faces more often when they had been made equivalent. This suggests that prior acquired equivalence training does influence how memories are coded. We also tested whether this change in coding reflected acquisition of new associations, as suggested by the associative mediation account, or whether stimuli become more similar through a reweighting of stimulus features, as assumed by some categorization theories. Results supported the associative mediation view. We discuss similarities between this view and exemplar theories of categorization performance.     

Explaining the Success of Science: Kuhn and Scientific Realists

In this essay, I critically evaluate the approaches to explaining the success of science in Kuhn and the works of inference-to-the-best-explanation scientific realists. Kuhn’s challenge to realists, who invoke the truth of theories to explain their success, is two-fold. His paradigm-account of success confronts realists with the problem of theory change, and the historical fact of successful theories later rejected as false. Secondly, Kuhn’s account of the success of science has no need to bring truth into the explanation. In turn, I argue that weakness in Kuhn and the prevailing forms of scientific realism motivate a better account of realism which I characterize as ‘best current theory realism’ and defend against the pessimistic meta-induction and the problem of theory-change. This realism argues that the best explanation of the success of current and past scientific theories only requires the simple claim that our best current theories are true. Kuhn’s account can explain how normal science succeeds but cannot account for why its problem solutions work where they do and why they fail for other puzzles.     

Metaphilosophy and the Role of Intuitions

The practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence has recently been criticized by experimental philosophers. While some traditional philosophers defend intuitions as a trustworthy source of evidence, others try to undermine the challenge this criticism poses to philosophical methodology. This paper argues that some recent attempts to undermine the challenge from experimental philosophy fail. It concludes that the metaphilosophical question whether intuitions play a role in philosophy cannot be decided by analyzing our use of the word ‘intuition’ or related terms, and what philosophers rely on may not be manifest on the surface of what they write. The question what intuitions are and what their role is in philosophy has to be settled within the wider framework of a theory of knowledge, justification, and philosophical methodology.

     

5-13岁儿童对物种起源认知的发展

本研究采用临床访谈法,采用开放式和封闭式问题情境,测查了5-13岁儿童对物种起源认知的发展。结果显示儿童对物种起源的解释越来越符合科学的解释,这种认知发展过程并不是以一种起源认知替代另一种起源认知的过程,而是多种起源认知以某种方式共存于儿童的认知系统中。本研究结果既显示了儿童对物种起源认知发展的跨文化一致性,也体现了不同文化和宗教环境影响下的差异性。     

Freud,Jung and The Great Chain of Being

For some time, it has been clear that psychoanalytic theories are built upon the kind of master narratives Roy Schafer, a New York psychoanalyst, described in 1980. As such, psychoanalytic theories may today have lost some of their initial scientific credibility in that they can no longer be seen as summarizing findings from data collected in a research environment. As aids in participating in their patients’ process of healing, however, narratives continue to be used by practitioners and reflect allegiance to core beliefs and propositions with roots in long‐standing Western thought. In this article, the metaphors in master narratives of Freud and Jung are compared with a conceptual system identified by cognitive linguists as ‘The Great Chain of Being’. Based on this analysis, the article proposes that theoretical formulations have mainly a secondary role to play in achieving good outcomes. The most critical element is the therapist's capacity to access a specific narrative for what transpires throughout each treatment.     

Why Frankenstein is a Stigma Among Scientists

As one of the best known science narratives about the consequences of creating life, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818) is an enduring tale that people know and understand with an almost instinctive familiarity. It has become a myth reflecting people’s ambivalent feelings about emerging science: they are curious about science, but they are also afraid of what science can do to them. In this essay, we argue that the Frankenstein myth has evolved into a stigma attached to scientists that focalizes the public’s as well as the scientific community’s negative reactions towards certain sciences and scientific practices. This stigma produces ambivalent reactions towards scientific artifacts and it leads to negative connotations because it implies that some sciences are dangerous and harmful. We argue that understanding the Frankenstein stigma can empower scientists by helping them revisit their own biases as well as responding effectively to people’s expectations for, and attitudes towards, scientists and scientific artifacts. Debunking the Frankenstein stigma could also allow scientists to reshape their professional identities so they can better show the public what ethical and moral values guide their research enterprises.     

Improving the quality of medical care: the normativity of evidence-based performance standards

Poor quality medical care is sometimes attributed to physicians?? unwillingness to act on evidence about what works best. Evidence-based performance standards (EBPSs) are one response to this problem, and they are increasingly employed by health care regulators and payers. Evidence in this instance is judged according to the precepts of evidence-based medicine (EBM); it is probabilistic, and the randomized controlled trial (RCT) is the gold standard. This means that EBPSs suffer all the infirmities of EBM generally??well rehearsed problems with the external validity of research findings as well as the inferential leap from study results in the aggregate to individual patient care. These theoretical weaknesses promise to have a practical impact on the care of patients. To avoid this, EBPSs should be understood as guidelines indicative of average effectiveness rather than standards to be applied in every case.     

The legal basis for the Danish committee on scientific dishonesty

The author, a High Court Judge, has chaired the Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty (DCSD) since its establishment in 1992. The Committee has worked in the health sector, but from 1999 the scope has been broadened to cover all fields of science. The article describes how the work is organised and the experiences gained. It is stressed, that the difficulty in connection with scientific dishonesty is, first and foremost, to organise a system suitable for investigating cases effectively, professionally, and with proper respect to the fundamental legal rights of the parties involved. The Committee has also spent much effort in determining what can be termed scientific dishonesty and what falls outside this category but which may, nevertheless, be characterised as breaching of good scientific practice. It is emphasised that these rules are not arbitrarily established by the Committee, but formulated in accordance with norms general accepted by opinion leaders in the scientific community. An carlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium, Scientific Misconduct. An International Perspective, organised by The Medical University of Warsaw, 16 November, 1998. The article is based on more comprehensive articles by the same author in DCSD’s Annual Reports for 1993 and 1995.     

Discrepancies between scientific theory and practice in relation to physiological hypotheses

We give anecdotal accounts from our own experience of scientific theories which have been generally accepted as the ‘ruling opinion’ long after sufficient evidence has been collected for their disproof. This has led us to the opinion that the normal scientific process, of working hypothesis followed by experimental test aimed at disproof, is being replaced by the ‘ruling opinion’ followed by experiment aimed at confirmation. The apparently widespread adoption of this procedure may be postulated to arise in part from the need for workers entering a new field of study to obtain grants and to get their results published.     

Heidegger on Expression: Formal Indication and Destruction in the Early Freiburg Lectures

Of all the methodological terms used by Heidegger in the early Freiburg period, few have attracted less consensus than Formal Indication. With its relation to the earliest lecture series, critical debate has tended to focus on the extent to which this concept defines the difference between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. The argument of this paper is that Formal Indication is best understood in its relation to Heidegger’s other key methodological term from this period, Phenomenological Destruction. Not only do (i) both concepts grow out of the same problem set, but (ii) they act in a limited sense as counter-movements to one another. Considered together, I argue, they make up Heidegger’s response to the problem of language as expressed by Paul Natorp, and first dealt with in the Kriegsnotsemester in 1919.