How virtuous is humor? What we can learn from current instruments

Despite the diverse philosophical accounts of the relation of humor to virtue or vice, this ethical dimension has not been included explicitly in psychological humor instruments. Yet, behavior described in humor questionnaires covering a broad variety of components can be used to study an implicit relation of humor to vices and virtues. The main aim of the present paper was (1) to find humorous behavior and attitudes representing virtues and vices within an item pool of 12 popular humor questionnaires; and (2) to investigate the nature of the virtues represented by their item contents. A comprehensive measure of humor covered the entire range from virtue to vice, with the majority of items evaluated as neutral. Humanity and wisdom were most strongly represented, but the items cover all six core virtues (Dahlsgaard, 2004 Dahlsgaard, K. 2004. “Universal virtues?—Lessons from history”. In Character strengths and virtues, Edited by: Peterson, C and Seligman, MEP. 33–52. New York: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar]) to varying degrees. Further research can now investigate the relationship of humor and individual virtues more closely.     

My point is valid,yours is not: myside bias in reasoning about abortion

The study explores whether people are more inclined to accept a conclusion that confirms their prior beliefs and reject one they personally object to even when both follow the same logic. Most of the prior research in this area has relied on the informal reasoning paradigm; in this study, however, we applied a formal reasoning paradigm to distinguish between cognitive and motivational mechanisms leading to myside bias in reasoning on value-laden topics (in this case abortions). Slovak and Polish (N?=?387) participants indicated their attitudes toward abortion and then evaluated logical syllogisms with neutral, pro-choice, or pro-life content. We analysed whether participants’ prior attitudes influenced their ability to solve these logically identical reasoning tasks and found that prior attitudes were the strongest predictor of myside bias in evaluating both valid and invalid syllogisms, even after controlling for logical validity (the ability to solve neutral syllogisms) and previous experience of logic.     

Jumping to conclusions, a lack of belief flexibility and delusional conviction in psychosis: a longitudinal investigation of the structure, frequency, and relatedness of reasoning biases

Two reasoning biases, jumping to conclusions (JTC) and belief inflexibility, have been found to be associated with delusions. We examined these biases and their relationship with delusional conviction in a longitudinal cohort of people with schizophrenia-spectrum psychosis. We hypothesized that JTC, lack of belief flexibility, and delusional conviction would form distinct factors, and that JTC and lack of belief flexibility would predict less change in delusional conviction over time. Two hundred seventy-three patients with delusions were assessed over twelve months of a treatment trial (Garety et al., 2008). Forty-one percent of the sample had 100% conviction in their delusions, 50% showed a JTC bias, and 50%-75% showed a lack of belief flexibility. Delusional conviction, JTC, and belief flexibility formed distinct factors although conviction was negatively correlated with belief flexibility. Conviction declined slightly over the year in this established psychosis group, whereas the reasoning biases were stable. There was little evidence that reasoning predicted the slight decline in conviction. The degree to which people believe their delusions, their ability to think that they may be mistaken and to consider alternative explanations, and their hastiness in decision making are three distinct processes although belief flexibility and conviction are related. In this established psychosis sample, reasoning biases changed little in response to medication or psychological therapy. Required now is examination of these processes in psychosis groups where there is greater change in delusion conviction, as well as tests of the effects on delusions when these reasoning biases are specifically targeted.     

Reasoning, emotions, and delusional conviction in psychosis

The aim of the study was to elucidate the factors contributing to the severity and persistence of delusional conviction. One hundred participants with current delusions, recruited for a treatment trial of psychological therapy (PRP trial), were assessed at baseline on measures of reasoning, emotions, and dimensions of delusional experience. Reasoning biases (belief inflexibility, jumping to conclusions, and extreme responding) were found to be present in one half of the sample. The hypothesis was confirmed that reasoning biases would be related to delusional conviction. There was evidence that belief inflexibility mediated the relationship between jumping to conclusions and delusional conviction. Emotional states were not associated with the reasoning processes investigated. Anxiety, but not depression, made an independent contribution to delusional conviction.     

The Fallacy Fallacy: From the Owl of Minerva to the Lark of Arete

The fallacy fallacy is either the misdiagnosis of fallacy or the supposition that the conclusion of a fallacy must be a falsehood. This paper explores the relevance of these and related errors of reasoning for the appraisal of arguments, especially within virtue theories of argumentation. In particular, the fallacy fallacy exemplifies the Owl of Minerva problem, whereby tools devised to understand a norm make possible new ways of violating the norm. Fallacies are such tools and so are vices. Hence a similar problem arises with argumentative vices. Fortunately, both instances of the problem have a common remedy.

     

Associations between myside bias on an informal reasoning task and amount of post‐secondary education

One hundred and twelve undergraduate university students completed an informal reasoning task in which they were asked to generate arguments both for and against the position they endorsed on three separate issues. Performance on this task was evaluated by comparing the number of arguments they generated which endorsed (myside arguments) and which refuted (otherside arguments) their own position on that issue. Participants generated more myside arguments than otherside arguments on all three issues, thus consistently showing a myside bias effect on each issue. Differences in cognitive ability were not associated with individual differences in myside bias. However, year in university was a significant predictor of myside bias. The degree of myside bias decreased systematically with year in university. Year in university remained a significant predictor of myside bias even when both cognitive ability and age were statistically partialled out. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mental models in propositional reasoning and working memory's central executive

We examine the role of working memory's central executive in the mental model explanation of propositional reasoning by using two working memory measures: the classical “reading span” test by Daneman and Carpenter (1980 Daneman, M. and Carpenter, P. A. 1980. Individual differences in working memory and reading. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 19: 450–466. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) and a new measure. This new “reasoning span” measure requires individuals to solve very simple anaphora problems, and store and remember the word solution in a growing series of inferential problems. We present one experiment in which we check the involvement of the central executive in conditional and disjunctive inference tasks and compare predictions of the new reasoning span test with those of the classical reading span test. The results of the experiment confirm that reasoning responses, which according to mental model theory require high cognitive work, are predicted by working memory measures. Results also show that some reasoning responses are probably obtained by means of superficial biases or strategies that do not load working memory. The reasoning span test, which involves the central executive to a greater degree, predicts reasoning performance better than the reading span test. The significance and possibilities of the new measure in studying reasoning are discussed.     

The Vices of Argument

What should a virtue theory of argumentation say about fallacious reasoning? If good arguments are virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of bad argumentation to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through analysis of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad misericordiam.     

Reasoning serves argumentation in children

The argumentative theory of reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, in press-c) claims that reasoning evolved for argumentation: to find and evaluate arguments in dialogic contexts. The theory has drawn most of its supportive evidence from work with adults, leaving open the possibility that argumentive features of reasoning are in fact entirely learned. Evidence is reviewed here suggesting that the special relation between reasoning and argumentation holds at all ages. More specifically, it is argued that (a) children possess at least rudimentary argument skills, (b) they are able to reap the benefits of social reasoning from very early on, (c) confirmation bias is present as soon as they start to argue, and (d) children can be victims of the same biases that affect adults when they use reasoning in the wrong contexts. These claims strengthen the argumentative theory of reasoning and support a call for more research on the interactive features of reasoning in both adults and children.     

Churches as organisations: towards a virtue ecclesiology for today

This article is an attempt to offer insights from organisation studies to ecclesiology. To do so it draws particularly on the work of the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre to offer a virtue ecclesiology for today. The application of MacIntyre's conceptual framework of practices, institutions, goods and virtues to all kinds of organisations, which already exists in the field of organisation studies, is extended to the church as an organisation. It suggests that the church may be re-described as an organisation in which the practices of faith are housed within the institution of the church. On this understanding, the gift of the church to the world is not simply the practices of faith but the manner in which they are institutionalised.     

Giotto in Padua: A New Geography of the Human Soul

In the Arena Chapel in Padua, Giotto painted seven allegorical representations of virtues and seven allegorical representations of vices. This article probes the sources for the list of virtues and the list of vices. The ensemble of virtues can be located in St. Thomas Aquinas; the ensemble of the vices, however, is original. The result is a new account of vices that displaces the odler account of the “seven deadly sins.”     

The Most Agreeable of All Vices: Nietzsche as Virtue Epistemologist

It has been argued with some justice by commentators from Walter Kaufmann to Thomas Hurka that Nietzsche's positive ethical position is best understood as a variety of virtue theory – in particular, as a brand of perfectionism. For Nietzsche, value flows from character. Less attention has been paid, however, to the details of the virtues he identifies for himself and his type. This neglect, along with Nietzsche's frequent irony and non-standard usage, has obscured the fact that almost all the virtues he praises are intellectual rather than moral. The vices he most despises include dogmatism, intellectual partisanship, faith, boredom, the desire for certainty and pity. The virtues he most appreciates include curiosity, honesty, scepticism, creativity, the historical sense, intellectual courage and intellectual fastidiousness. These tables of values place Nietzsche squarely among so-called responsibilist virtue epistemologists, such as Lorraine Code and Linda Zagzebski, who emphasize that knowledge is infused with desire and affect. I argue that curiosity construed as the specification of the will to power in the domain of epistemology is the cardinal Nietzschean virtue, and that the others – especially intellectual courage and honesty – are presupposed by curiosity. Thus, Nietzsche turns out to accept his own peculiar brand of the thesis of the unity of virtue.     

Does “putting on your thinking cap” reduce myside bias in evaluation of scientific evidence?

Abstract

The desire to maintain current beliefs can lead individuals to evaluate contrary evidence more critically than consistent evidence. We test whether priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduces this often-observed myside bias, when people evaluate scientific evidence about which they have prior positions. We conducted three experiments in which participants read a news-style article about a study that either supported or opposed their attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. We manipulated whether participants completed a test posing scientific reasoning problems before or after reading the article and evaluating the evidence that it reported. Consistent with previous research, we found that participants were biased in favor of evidence consistent with their prior attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. Priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduced myside bias only when accompanied by direct instructions to apply those skills to the task at hand. We discuss the processes contributing to biased evaluation of scientific evidence.     

Scientists’ Argumentative Reasoning

Reasoning, defined as the production and evaluation of reasons, is a central process in science. The dominant view of reasoning, both in the psychology of reasoning and in the psychology of science, is of a mechanism with an asocial function: bettering the beliefs of the lone reasoner. Many observations, however, are difficult to reconcile with this view of reasoning; in particular, reasoning systematically searches for reasons that support the reasoner’s initial beliefs, and it only evaluates these reasons cursorily. By contrast, reasoners are well able to evaluate others’ reasons: accepting strong arguments and rejecting weak ones. The argumentative theory of reasoning accounts for these traits of reasoning by postulating that the evolved function of reasoning is to argue: to find arguments to convince others and to change one’s mind when confronted with good arguments. Scientific reasoning, however, is often described as being at odds with such an argumentative mechanisms: scientists are supposed to reason objectively on their own, and to be pigheaded when their theories are challenged, even by good arguments. In this article, we review evidence showing that scientists, when reasoning, are subject to the same biases as are lay people while being able to change their mind when confronted with good arguments. We conclude that the argumentative theory of reasoning explains well key features of scientists’ reasoning and that differences in the way scientists and laypeople reason result from the institutional framework of science.     

The Baroness's Comittee and the President's Council: ambition and alienation in public bioethics

The President's Council on Bioethics has tried to make a distinctive contribution to the methodology of such public bodies in developing what it has styled a "richer bioethics." The Council's procedure contrasts with more modest methods of public bioethical deliberation employed by the United Kingdom's Warnock Committee. The practices of both bodies are held up against the backdrop of concerns about moral and political alienation, prompted by the limitations of moral reasoning and by moral dissent from state policy under even the most democratic of governments. Although the President's Council's rhetoric is often scrupulously conciliatory, recurring features of its argumentative practice are regrettably divisive. They order these things better in Britain.     

Religious Character in Church of England Schools: The Relationship Between a Religious Tradition and Its Educational Institutions

Research into the relationship between the Anglican tradition and its schools is relatively undeveloped in England. The research reported here draws on Benne's (2001 Benne , R. ( 2001 ). Quality with soul: How six premier colleges and universities keep faith with their religious traditions . Cambridge , UK : Eerdmans . [Google Scholar]) significant components of the relationship between educational institutions and their founding religious tradition to examine whether these components are a helpful way of describing religious character in Anglican schools. While school leaders and staff are committed to the Christian faith and seek to establish an ethos informed by Christian beliefs and practices, they are less able to articulate a distinctive philosophy of education particularly with respect to teaching, learning and the curriculum; some reasons for this are discussed.     

On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability

In 7 different studies, the authors observed that a large number of thinking biases are uncorrelated with cognitive ability. These thinking biases include some of the most classic and well-studied biases in the heuristics and biases literature, including the conjunction effect, framing effects, anchoring effects, outcome bias, base-rate neglect, "less is more" effects, affect biases, omission bias, myside bias, sunk-cost effect, and certainty effects that violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In a further experiment, the authors nonetheless showed that cognitive ability does correlate with the tendency to avoid some rational thinking biases, specifically the tendency to display denominator neglect, probability matching rather than maximizing, belief bias, and matching bias on the 4-card selection task. The authors present a framework for predicting when cognitive ability will and will not correlate with a rational thinking tendency.     

Medicine as a form of practical understanding

This paper is an attempt to reframe the debate of whether medicine is an art or a science in the Aristotelian sense. The recent book of Pellegrino and Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice, serves as the starting point. Taking clinical interaction as the distinctive feature of medicine, the resemblances of medicine with the characteristics of practical reasoning in the Aristotelian sense are further explored. This comparison proves especially useful in discussing the special status of medical knowledge. Clinical reasoning, resulting in clinical judgments, shows strong similarities with practical reasoning. The application of general principles, instead of deduction from them as in science is essential to both. The ancient concept of practical rationality may therefore be more appropriate while trying to ascribe rationality to medicine than the modern concept of rationality, associated solely with scientific reasoning.