Trust in testimony about strangers: young children prefer reliable informants who make positive attributions

Young children have been described as critical consumers of information, particularly in the domain of language learning. Indeed, children are more likely to learn novel words from people with accurate histories of object labeling than with inaccurate ones. But what happens when informant testimony conflicts with a tendency to see the world in a particular way? In impression formation, children exhibit a positivity bias in personality judgments. This study examined whether 3- to 7-year-olds would accept reliable testimony about a stranger’s personality that conflicted with a putative positivity bias (i.e., a negative trait attribution). Overall, participants accepted testimony from reliable informants more often than expected by chance, although they were significantly more likely to do so when the information was positive than when it was negative. These findings indicate that in addition to the reliability status of informants, information processing biases have a substantial impact on children’s use of informant testimony to learn about the social world.     

Sensitivity to Shared Information in Social Learning

Social learning has been shown to be an evolutionarily adaptive strategy, but it can be implemented via many different cognitive mechanisms. The adaptive advantage of social learning depends crucially on the ability of each learner to obtain relevant and accurate information from informants. The source of informants’ knowledge is a particularly important cue for evaluating advice from multiple informants; if the informants share the source of their information or have obtained their information from each other, then their testimony is statistically dependent and may be less reliable than testimony from informants who do not share information. In this study, we use a Bayesian model to determine how rational learners should incorporate the effects of shared information when learning from other people, conducting three experiments that examine whether human learners behave similarly. We find that people are sensitive to a number of different patterns of dependency, supporting the use of a sophisticated strategy for social learning that goes beyond copying the majority, and broadening the situations in which social learning is likely to be an adaptive strategy.     

Epistemic trust: modeling children's reasoning about others' knowledge and intent

A core assumption of many theories of development is that children can learn indirectly from other people. However, indirect experience (or testimony) is not constrained to provide veridical information. As a result, if children are to capitalize on this source of knowledge, they must be able to infer who is trustworthy and who is not. How might a learner make such inferences while at the same time learning about the world? What biases, if any, might children bring to this problem? We address these questions with a computational model of epistemic trust in which learners reason about the helpfulness and knowledgeability of an informant. We show that the model captures the competencies shown by young children in four areas: (1) using informants’ accuracy to infer how much to trust them; (2) using informants’ recent accuracy to overcome effects of familiarity; (3) inferring trust based on consensus among informants; and (4) using information about mal‐intent to decide not to trust. The model also explains developmental changes in performance between 3 and 4 years of age as a result of changing default assumptions about the helpfulness of other people.     

Trust

Children rely extensively on others' testimony to learn about the world. However, they are not uniformly credulous toward other people. From an early age, children's reliance on testimony is tempered by selective trust in particular informants. Three- and 4-year-olds monitor the accuracy or knowledge of informants, including those that are familiar. They prefer to seek and endorse information provided by someone who has proved accurate in the past rather than someone who has made mistakes or acknowledged ignorance. Future research is likely to pinpoint other heuristics that children use to filter incoming testimony and may reveal more generalized patterns of trust and mistrust among individual children.     

When Eyewitnesses Talk

ABSTRACT— When two people witness an event, they often discuss it. Because memory is not perfect, sometimes this discussion includes errors. One person's errors can become part of another person's account, and this proliferation of error can lead to miscarriages of justice. In this article, we describe the social and cognitive processes involved. Research shows how people combine information about their own memory with other people's memories based on factors such as confidence, perceived expertise, and the social cost of disagreeing with other people. We describe the implications of this research for eyewitness testimony.     

The role of testimony in young children's solution of a gravity-driven invisible displacement task

Previous research has shown that young children make a perseverative, gravity-oriented, error when asked to predict the final location of a ball dropped down an S-shaped opaque tube (Hood, 1995). We asked if providing children with verbal information concerning the role that the tubes play, in determining the ball's trajectory would improve their performance. Experiment 1 showed that performance of 3.5-year-olds improved after hearing testimony about the movement of the ball. Experiment 2 showed that the specific content of the testimony – rather than any accompanying non-verbal cues – helped children improve. These findings suggest that other people's testimony can be a valuable source of information when young children learn about the physical world. Indeed, under some circumstances children seem to benefit more from verbal than visual information. An educational implication is that it may sometimes be ineffective to focus on the impact of first-hand experience while marginalizing the role of verbal information.     

Alignment in social interactions

According to the prevailing paradigm in social-cognitive neuroscience, the mental states of individuals become shared when they adapt to each other in the pursuit of a shared goal. We challenge this view by proposing an alternative approach to the cognitive foundations of social interactions. The central claim of this paper is that social cognition concerns the graded and dynamic process of alignment of individual minds, even in the absence of a shared goal. When individuals reciprocally exchange information about each other's minds processes of alignment unfold over time and across space, creating a social interaction. Not all cases of joint action involve such reciprocal exchange of information. To understand the nature of social interactions, then, we propose that attention should be focused on the manner in which people align words and thoughts, bodily postures and movements, in order to take one another into account and to make full use of socially relevant information.     

Interactions Between Knowledge and Testimony in Children’s Reality-Status Judgments

In 2 studies, we attempted to capture the information-processing abilities underlying children’s reality-status judgments. Forty 5- to 6-year-olds and 53 7- to 8-year-olds heard about novel entities (animals) that varied in their fit with children’s world knowledge. After hearing about each entity, children could either guess reality status immediately or listen to testimony first. Informants varied in their expertise and in their testimony, which either supported or refuted the entities’ existence. Results revealed that children were able to evaluate the fit between the new information and their existing knowledge; this information then governed their decision regarding whether to seek testimony. Testimony had the strongest effect when new information did not conflict with, but was also not representative of, children’s knowledge.     

证据顺序和证词自信度对学前末期儿童因果推理的影响

开展两个实验探究证据顺序和证词自信水平对5岁儿童因果推理的影响机制。132名和127名5岁儿童分别参与实验1和实验2。实验1发现证据顺序对儿童因果推理的影响表现为近因效应,但证词的自信水平差异不影响儿童的因果推理;实验2发现如果儿童注意到证词的自信水平信息,他们更倾向于在自信证词条件依据证词推断因果关系,证据顺序的影响力被削弱。研究结果说明证据顺序变化导致易受影响的近因效应。     

Voters’ Partisan Responses to Politicians’ Immoral Behavior

Politicians’ moral behaviors affect how voters evaluate them. But existing empirical research on the effects of politicians’ violations of moral standards pays little attention to the heterogeneous moral foundations of voters in assessing responses to violations. It also pays little attention to the ways partisan preferences shape responses. We examine voters’ heterogeneous evaluative and emotional responses to presumably immoral behaviors by politicians. We make use of moral foundation theory’s argument that people vary in the extent to which they endorse, value, and use the five universally available moral intuitions: care, fairness, loyalty, authority and sanctity. We report on a 5 × 3 between‐subjects experiment asking a random sample of 2,026 U.S. respondents to respond to politicians’ violations of different moral foundations. We randomly vary which of the five foundations is violated and the partisanship of the actor (Republic/Democrat/Nonpartisan). Results suggest that partisanship rather than moral foundations drives most of U.S. voters’ responses to moral foundations violations by politicians. These foundations seem malleable when partisan actors are involved. While Democrats in this sample show stronger negative emotional response to moral violations than Republicans, partisans of both parties express significantly greater negativity when a politician of the other party violates a moral foundation.     

“I Believe in Cusk”: The Effect of Explicit Belief Statements on Children’s Reality Status Judgments and Beliefs about Consensus

Children learn about the world through others’ testimony, and much of this knowledge likely comes from parents. Furthermore, parents may sometimes want children to share their beliefs about topics on which there is no universal consensus. In discussing such topics, parents may use explicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution is real”) or implicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution happened over millions of years”). But little research has investigated how such statements affect children’s beliefs. In the current study, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 102) were shown videos of their parent providing either Explicit (“Cusk is real”) or Implicit (“I know about cusk”) belief testimony about novel entities. Then, children heard another speaker provide either Denial (“Cusk isn’t real”) or Neutral (“I’ve heard of cusk”) testimony. Children made reality status judgments and consensus judgments (i.e., whether people agree about the entity’s existence). Results showed that explicit and implicit belief statements differentially influenced children’s beliefs about societal consensus when followed by a denial: explicit belief statements prevented children from drawing the conclusion that there is societal consensus that the entity does not exist. This effect was not related to age, indicating that children as young as 4 use these cues to inform consensus judgments. On the reality status task, there was an interaction with age, showing that only 4-year-olds were more likely to believe in an entity after hearing explicit belief statements. These findings suggest that explicit belief statements may serve as important sources of both children’s beliefs about novel entities and societal consensus.     

The impact of informant gender on children’s endorsement of scientific and non-scientific information

By roughly 6 years of age, children acquire the stereotype that men are more competent than women in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), potentially leading to greater trust in scientific information provided by men. This study tested whether 3- to 8-year-old children differentially endorsed conflicting information about science and toys presented by male and female informants depicted as a ‘man’ and ‘woman’ (Exp1) or ‘scientists’ (Exp2). Children were expected to endorse toy testimony from gender-matched informants; thus, the key question concerned endorsement of science testimony. In Exp1 (N = 149), boys and girls showed a same-gender informant preference for toy testimony; however, girls endorsed the male informant's testimony more for science than for toys – but only when tested by a male experimenter. In Exp2 (N = 264), boys and girls showed a same-gender preference, irrespective of content. Findings suggest that STEM-related gender stereotypes might lead girls to trust scientific information presented by men over women in certain contexts.     

Illusions of causality at the heart of pseudoscience

Pseudoscience, superstitions, and quackery are serious problems that threaten public health and in which many variables are involved. Psychology, however, has much to say about them, as it is the illusory perceptions of causality of so many people that needs to be understood. The proposal we put forward is that these illusions arise from the normal functioning of the cognitive system when trying to associate causes and effects. Thus, we propose to apply basic research and theories on causal learning to reduce the impact of pseudoscience. We review the literature on the illusion of control and the causal learning traditions, and then present an experiment as an illustration of how this approach can provide fruitful ideas to reduce pseudoscientific thinking. The experiment first illustrates the development of a quackery illusion through the testimony of fictitious patients who report feeling better. Two different predictions arising from the integration of the causal learning and illusion of control domains are then proven effective in reducing this illusion. One is showing the testimony of people who feel better without having followed the treatment. The other is asking participants to think in causal terms rather than in terms of effectiveness.     

How social and non-social information influence classification decisions: A computational modelling approach

Social information such as observing others can improve performance in decision making. In particular, social information has been shown to be useful when finding the best solution on one’s own is difficult, costly, or dangerous. However, past research suggests that when making decisions people do not always consider other people’s behaviour when it is at odds with their own experiences. Furthermore, the cognitive processes guiding the integration of social information with individual experiences are still under debate. Here, we conducted two experiments to test whether information about other persons’ behaviour influenced people’s decisions in a classification task. Furthermore, we examined how social information is integrated with individual learning experiences by testing different computational models. Our results show that social information had a small but reliable influence on people’s classifications. The best computational model suggests that in categorization people first make up their own mind based on the non-social information, which is then updated by the social information.     

儿童社会认识论:儿童对信息提供者的选择性信任

个体掌握的知识很多来自于他人的传授。从4岁起,儿童就意识到不同的信息提供者在可靠性上存在差异。他们根据与提供者间的熟悉程度、提供者过往陈词的准确性、以及来自他人的线索等策略对于信息提供者的可靠性进行评估,从而决定谁更值得信任。未来关于儿童对于信息提供者选择性信任的研究应从扩展探究的知识领域、对于信息提供者其他特征的操纵、以及潜在文化差异检验等方面进行。     

A consideration of challenges to psychological assessment instruments used in forensic settings: Rorschach as exemplar

In this brief primer, we provide an outline of key issues that will help psychologists organize and prepare their expert testimony. These issues include the need to obtain essential sources of research, a review of the actual legal standards regarding admissibility of test data in expert testimony, the nature of the expert relative to the assessment instrument in expert testimony, the nature of legal versus scientific debate, and the examination of appropriate qualifications of expertise when offering legal testimony. In addition, we use a summary of information contained in several recent articles to address challenges directed against forensic psychological testing. We use the empirical literature on the Rorschach as an exemplar in discussing these issues, as the admissibility of the Rorschach in particular has been challenged, and the issues frequently focused on with the Rorschach are equally applicable to other psychological measures. In this article, we provide essential sources of Rorschach research regarding several empirical studies that summarize important information and directly address previous criticisms of the measure.     

In the absence of conflicting testimony young children trust inaccurate informants

The present research investigated the nature of the inferences and decisions young children make about informants with a prior history of inaccuracies. Across three experiments, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds (total N = 182) reacted to previously inaccurate informants who offered testimony in an object‐labeling task. Of central interest was children's willingness to accept information provided by an inaccurate informant in different contexts of being alone, paired with an accurate informant, or paired with a novel (neutral) informant. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that when a previously inaccurate informant was alone and provided testimony that was not in conflict with the testimony of another informant, children systematically accepted the testimony of that informant. Experiment 3 showed that children accepted testimony from a neutral informant over an inaccurate informant when both provided information, but accepted testimony from an inaccurate informant rather than seeking information from an available neutral informant who did not automatically offer information. These results suggest that even though young children use prior history of accuracy to determine the relative reliability of informants, they are quite willing to trust the testimony of a single informant alone, regardless of whether that informant had previously been reliable.     

The effects of labelling,expert testimony,and information processing mode on juror decisions in SVP civil commitment trials

Expert witnesses offering testimony in sexually violent predator civil commitment trials may use diagnostic labels that are either familiar (e.g. ‘psychopath’) or unfamiliar (e.g. ‘paraphilia’) to jurors. Using predictions based on cognitive experiential self-theory, we explored the influence of testimony type (clinical versus actuarial) and diagnostic label (psychopath versus paraphilia) on jurors motivated to adopt either an experiential processing mode (PM; in which heuristic cues may be strongly relied upon) or an analytic rational PM. Consistent with previous research, our results indicated that when given a psychopathic diagnostic label, mock jurors motivated to process information experientially were more influenced by clinical testimony, whereas mock jurors induced into a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. However, experientially oriented jurors given a paraphilia diagnostic label did not show the expected influence of clinical expert testimony, and instead were more persuaded by actuarial testimony. These findings are discussed from a judgement and heuristics cues framework. The implications of several procedural suggestions are examined. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.