Social Activism's Possibility through Perspectives of Gloria Anzaldúa,Walter Benjamin and C. G. Jung1

This paper explores the vertices of Jung's, Anzaldúa's and Benjamin's distinct ontologies and the way in which they connect in the shared recognition that what has been estranged in human history is enigmatically lodged in the world's fabric today. Cultural distress, in other words, is the outcome of what has become repudiated in the self and the collective across time. From this perspective, the paper argues that we have a collective responsibility to listen to the claims of the dead laid bare in moments of contemporary real-world danger and it elaborates the psychical dimensions of being that are cultivated in times of danger. The author contends that these psychical presences are the dead of human history including our ancestral heritage that linger and possibly may penetrate our awareness. They haunt and hold a potential to animate our movement towards a sublimatory process that can be seen as a precursor to social responsiveness and action. The author explores this through her own experience with an example of the spawning of spiritual activism within the socio-political maelstrom of AIDS.     

The neural, evolutionary, developmental, and bodily basis of metaphor

We propose that there are four fundamental kinds of metaphor that are uniquely mapped onto specific brain “networks” and present preliterate (i.e., evolutionary, including before the appearance of written language in the historical record), prelinguistic (i.e., developmental, before the appearance of speech in human development), and extralinguistic (i.e., neuropsychological, cognitive) evidence supportive of this view. We contend that these basic metaphors are largely nonconceptual and entail (a) perceptual-perceptual, (b) cross-modal, (c) movement-movement, and (d) perceptual-affective mappings that, at least, in the initial stages of processing may operate largely outside of conscious awareness. In opposition to our basic metaphor theory (B_mT), the standard theory (S_mT) maintains that metaphor is a conceptual mapping from some base domain to some target domain and/or represents class-inclusion (categorical) assertions. The S_mT captures aspects of secondary or conceptual metaphoric relations but not primary or basic metaphoric relations in our view. We believe our theory (B_mT) explains more about how people actually recognize or create metaphoric associations across disparate domains of experience partly because they are “pre-wired” to make these links.     

Relational Complexity and Ethical Responsibility

Richard Miller uses the concepts of alterity and intimacy as touchstones for analyzing neglected aspects of our interpersonal and social relationships. He argues that, as persons in relation, we oscillate between experiences of alterity and intimacy, and it is with a greater awareness of this oscillation that we do best to consider our ethical responsibilities. This paper affirms the value of thinking about—and potentially reimagining—how we conceive and relate to various others. It also makes explicit that, as persons, each of us is separate, not only from some, but from all other persons, even as we are also one with them. Moreover, each of us is different from all other persons, even as we are also like them. The aspects of persons and relationships on which we focus, in a given situation, matter because they partly determine the choices that we make in another’s regard.     

This art of psychoanalysis

It is the art of psychoanalysis in the making, a process inventing itself as it goes, that is the subject of this paper. The author articulates succinctly how he conceives of psychoanalysis, and offers a detailed clinical illustration. He suggests that each analysand unconsciously (and ambivalently) is seeking help in dreaming his 'night terrors' (his undreamt and undreamable dreams) and his 'nightmares' (his dreams that are interrupted when the pain of the emotional experience being dreamt exceeds his capacity for dreaming). Undreamable dreams are understood as manifestations of psychotic and psychically foreclosed aspects of the personality; interrupted dreams are viewed as reflections of neurotic and other non-psychotic parts of the personality. The analyst's task is to generate conditions that may allow the analysand-with the analyst's participation-to dream the patient's previously undreamable and interrupted dreams. A significant part of the analyst's participation in the patient's dreaming takes the form of the analyst's reverie experience. In the course of this conjoint work of dreaming in the analytic setting, the analyst may get to know the analysand sufficiently well for the analyst to be able to say something that is true to what is occurring at an unconscious level in the analytic relationship. The analyst's use of language contributes significantly to the possibility that the patient will be able to make use of what the analyst has said for purposes of dreaming his own experience, thereby dreaming himself more fully into existence.     

Nested ideation and the problem of reality: dreams and works of art in dreams

This study uses seven well-analyzed dreams to establish three empirical generalizations about dreams and works of art nested in dreams: (1) Those dreams attempt to deny a painful reality in some way depicted in the nested element; (2) they present an antithetical view of that reality (both denying and affirming); and (3) they are consistently associated with the problem of reality (the problem of deciding what is real or true). The explanation of these empirical generalizations is based on a hypothesis derived from Freud's 1911 formulation of the dream within a dream.     

From Freud’s dream-work to Bion’s work of dreaming: The changing conception of dreaming in psychoanalytic theory

Bion moved psychoanalytic theory from Freud's theory of dream-work to a concept of dreaming in which dreaming is the central aspect of all emotional functioning. In this paper, I first review historical, theoretical, and clinical aspects of dreaming as seen by Freud and Bion. I then propose two interconnected ideas that I believe reflect Bion’s split from Freud regarding the understanding of dreaming. Bion believed that all dreams are psychological works in progress and at one point suggested that all dreams contain elements that are akin to visual hallucinations. I explore and elaborate Bion’s ideas that all dreams contain aspects of emotional experience that are too disturbing to be dreamt, and that, in analysis, the patient brings a dream with the hope of receiving the analyst’s help in completing the unconscious work that was entirely or partially too disturbing for the patient to dream on his own. Freud views dreams as mental phenomena with which to understand how the mind functions, but believes that dreams are solely the ‘guardians of sleep,’ and not, in themselves, vehicles for unconscious psychological work and growth until they are interpreted by the analyst. Bion extends Freud's ideas, but also departs from Freud and re-conceives of dreaming as synonymous with unconscious emotional thinking – a process that continues both while we are awake and while we are asleep. From another somewhat puzzling perspective, he views dreams solely as manifestations of what the dreamer is unable to think.     

Nested ideation and the problem of reality: dreams and works of art in works of art

This paper continues a line of investigation begun in a previous paper on nested dreams and works of art in dreams (Balter 2005). Part I of the present paper seeks to establish that works of art with nested dreams and works of art within them display certain phenomena also observed in comparable dreams: (i) they unsuccessfully deny a painful reality represented in the nested element; (2) they present an antithetical view of that reality (both denying and affirming); and (3) they are consistently associated with the problem of reality (the problem of deciding what is real or true). Part II of this paper seeks to establish the heuristic value of this line of investigation in dreams and art to elucidate the origin of reality testing.     

Art and emotion in psychoanalysis

Freud's view that art satisfi es psychic needs has been taken to mean that art has its source in the unconscious and that it unifi es pleasure and reality. The author argues that there is a third point that Freud repeatedly emphasizes, which should not be overlooked, that art infl uences our emotions. The author examines what Freud means by this claim, in particular, his reading of Michelangelo's Moses. Freud's focus here on emotions as fundamental to subjective experience, as subject to regulation and as potentially healthy forms of communication serves to supplement and even challenge what he says in his theory of affect. The author concludes by making inferences about a contemporary psychoanalytic theory of affects: that it ought to be inclusive of science (more receptive to neurobiology and less bound to Freud) as well as art (preserving the focus on subjective experience, especially the processing of complex emotions), which is illustrated with the concept of mentalized affectivity.     

Dreams and reality monitoring

Experiment 1 tested the counterintuitive prediction that memories for one's own dreams should not be particularly easy to discriminate from memories for someone else's dreams. Pairs of people reported dreams to each other that they had either dreamed, read, or made up the night before. On a test requiring subjects to discriminate events they had reported from those reported by their partner, subjects had more difficulty with real dreams than with dreams they read or made up. Experiment 2 provided evidence that real dreams do not simply produce overall weaker memories; the deficit for dreams was eliminated with more time to respond and with more detailed cues. In addition, subjects' ratings of various characteristics of their memories (e.g., vividness, personal relevance) indicated that dreams were not generally weaker or impoverished. The results are interpreted within the framework for reality monitoring described by Johnson and Raye (1981): Memories for real dreams are proposed to be deficient in conscious cognitive operations that help identify the origin of information generated in a waking state. At the same time, real dreams are embedded in a network of supporting memories that can be drawn on for reality monitoring decisions under appropriate circumstances. Finally, a comparison of recognition and recall indicated that dreams may leave persisting memories that are difficult to access via free recall.     

The impossibility of incommensurable values

Many recent attacks on consequentialism and several defenses of pluralism have relied on arguments for the incommensurability of value. Such arguments have, generally, turned on empirical appeals to aspects of our everyday experience of value conflict. My intention, largely, is to bypass these arguments and turn instead to a discussion of the conceptual apparatus needed to make the claim that values are incommensurable. After delineating what it would mean for values to be incommensurable, I give an a priori argument that such is impossible. It is widely accepted that value is conceptually tied to desire. I argue that, more specifically, it is proportional to merited desire strength. This connection gives one a metric of all value if there is any such thing. This metric entails that value is a complete ordering over all states of affairs, or, in other words, that value is commensurable.     

Affordances,Dynamic Experience,and the Challenge of Reification

Why is it that affordances have received attention within psychology only in recent decades if they are supposedly what individuals perceive most fundamentally? This paradox can be explained, in part, by the fact that psychologists have usually considered the character of perceiving from a detached stance, and then reified the results of this analysis-an error that William James called the psychologist's fallacy-rather than attending to the immediate flow of perception-action. By the same token, if ecological psychologists were to take stimulus information as what is perceived, rather than as part of a conceptual framework offered to explain how we perceive, they would be committing a similar reification error. Ecological optics as a conceptual framework is always open to revision, even while the reality of affordances is assumed. Bearing in mind this distinction between what is perceived and how it is perceived, investigators need to return regularly to immediate experience, both as a means of verifying that our concepts connect back to our experience of the world and as a way of uncovering new qualities of perceptual experience for investigation. From this perspective, several exemplars of phenomenologically driven perceptual research are examined. Furthermore, the multidimensionality of affordances is considered, with an emphasis on their place in the flow of immediate experience, development, and sociocultural processes.     

Mit Imagination an Albträumen arbeiten

According to Jung fantasies appear during sleep as dreams and while awake, they appear as more or less conscious fantasies. He understood fantasy as an activity of the psyche itself. Fantasy is that which simply occurs without any effort on our part and is always present. Imagination is what we call fantasy when we concentrate on it, i.e. perceive it and do something with it. Due to the close relationship of dreams, fantasies and imagination, the more they are consciously observed and perceived, the more it is possible to use imagination with dreams to better understand them. This is especially true for nightmares so that through imagination helplessness can be overcome and self-efficacy can be stimulated. Steven Starker already proposed using imagination for working on nightmares in 1974 and he also showed how the style of the nocturnal dreams changed as a consequence. In a clinical vignette I show how this technique can be used and what an influence it has. The analyst and analysand are in a communal space of visualization, framed in the beginning by the nightmare. This space is considered as a space of interaction and of potential transformation. The analyst is a part of the process, offering ideas in a symbolic form and reinforcing the analysand’s ideas which lead to stress-reducing behaviour and images that provide an opening for the future. There are pauses in the imaginative work to talk together about the experiences, to link the situation in the imagination to biographical material, and to understand the resources opening up in the material, through the analysand herself. The goal of working with imagination is to ban the anxiety in the dream and to let the dreamer experience the fact that dreams and imagination are not only determined by the anxious feelings but it is also possible to transform these kinds of energy into creative fantasies.     

The Five “A”s of Meaning Maintenance: Finding Meaning in the Theories of Sense-Making

Across eras and literatures, multiple theories have converged on a broad psychological phenomenon: the common compensation behaviors that follow from violations of our committed understandings. The meaning maintenance model (MMM) offers an integrated account of these behaviors, as well as the overlapping perspectives that address specific aspects of this inconsistency compensation process. According to the MMM, all meaning violations may bottleneck at neurocognitive and psychophysiological systems that detect and react to the experience of inconsistency, which in turn motivates compensatory behaviors. From this perspective, compensation behaviors are understood as palliative efforts to relieve the aversive arousal that follows from any experience that is inconsistent with expected relationships—whether the meaning violation involves a perceptual anomaly or an awareness of a finite human existence. In what follows, we summarize these efforts, the assimilation, accommodation, affirmation, abstraction and assembly behaviors that variously manifest in every corner of our discipline, and academics, more generally.     

Subjectivity in Descartes and Kant

Kant's response to Cartesian scepticism is often characterized in the following way. Whereas Descartes drives a wedge between subjective experience and objective reality, Kant argues that there could be no such thing as experience at all if reality were not itself structured in just the way our thought about it is structured. This picture of Kant's response to Descartes portrays him as succeeding, where Descartes fails, in arguing directly from the nature of experience to the nature of reality; as subscribing, therefore, to Descartes' view that one is immediately aware only of one's own mental states, but as seeing a way out of the subjective predicament. I maintain that this picture is deeply flawed. Kant's transcendental argument is in fact a thoroughgoing critique of Descartes' subjectivism, and destroys the Cartesian barrier to recognizing that our awareness of reality is unmediated and direct.     

Falling Man: encounters with catastrophic change

The assault on the twin towers thrust Americans into an encounter with catastrophic change. Previously protected by the illusion of security fed by our relative imperviousness to others' points of view, we are harshly awakened to our defensive blindness. This rupture helps us see the particular beyond the seeming universality, locating culture as a variable frame defining meanings through the narratives that hold complexities of human experience in conceptual space. Don DeLillo's Falling Man offers a reading of catastrophe as a forced encounter with fallibility, breaking apart illusions of sameness and difference, towards integration of what trauma excludes from awareness.     

Consciousness: The transcendentalist manifesto

Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted in the articulation of an intuition: no matter how much we know about the brain, this will not allow us to see how it produces or constitutes phenomenal consciousness. Developing a theme first explored by Kant, and then later by Sartre, this paper argues that the real problem posed by phenomenal consciousness is quite different. Consciousness, it will be argued, is not an empirical but a transcendental feature of the world. That is, what it is like to have an experience is not something of which we are aware in the having of that experience, but an item in virtue of which the genuine (non-phenomenal) objects of our consciousness are revealed as being the way they are. Phenomenal consciousness, that is, is not an empirical object of awareness but a transcendental condition of the possibility of there being empirical objects of awareness.     

From behaviour to consciousness: Translating what animals do to what animals think

Cognitive ethology, an interdisciplinary and comparative branch of zoology, is concerned with the influence of conscious awareness and intention on animal behaviour. It enquires into the evolutionary value of consciousness. However, consciousness is hard to define and any account of animal behaviour based on it will need to take into account both the physical mechanisms that allow for consciousness, and also consider whether we can have knowledge of the phenomenal experience of consciousness in other species. While the first consideration can be investigated scientifically, phenomenal experience needs to be inferred from behaviour, since most animals are not capable of communicating this experience directly. In fact, many accounts of animal behaviour, behavioural ecology in particular, argue that we cannot accurately explain animal behaviour with relation to thoughts or feelings and conscious awareness of them. Rather, we must concern ourselves with what can be objectively observed and measured. Cognitive ethology, however, argues that we cannot give accurate accounts of complex animal behaviour, for example social interactions or tool use, without taking consciousness into account. In this article I will argue that one can justifiably assign and study consciousness in animals through their behaviour, and that an account of certain animals’ behaviour is incomplete without reference to conscious awareness. In other words, behavioural ecology is essentially flawed as it gives, in certain cases, ultimately incorrect accounts of animal behaviour. Firstly it cannot distinguish between behaviour of more and less conscious animals, and secondly, by avoiding any mention of consciousness, it narrows its own scope, and finally cannot explain complex behaviours such as learning in any meaningful way.