Concept Grounding and Knowledge of Set Theory

C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with ‘a priori’. I’m here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic—in particular, to set theory. After setting out the central elements of Jenkins’s account and entertaining challenges to extending it to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension is unlikely.     

The Effects of Emotionality on Concept Formation

The effects of three levels of cognitive tuning (transmission, reception, and no-set) on the free recall of clustered and unclustered word lists were investigated with the use of three ratio measures: proportion of words correctly recalled, number of runs of clusters out of the number of possible runs, and number of clusters utilized over the number of words recalled. Subjects included 99 female undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course. The results supported a cognitive structure as opposed to a motivational interpretation of the tuning set phenomenon. Receivers, being tuned for sorting information into broad categories, recalled a greater number of words, scored lower on the ratio of runs, and used smaller ratios of clusters to words than transmitters who tuned in cognitive structures designed to process discrete bits of information.     

Well Founding Grounding Grounding

Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded (“the meta-grounding thesis”) must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of “well-founded”, which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead to tension with any of the three notions of “well-founded”. Finally, we explore the details of and motivations for further conditions on ground that one might add to generate a conflict between the meta-grounding thesis and a well-founded constraint. We explore these topics by developing and utilizing a formal framework based on the notion of a grounding structure.     

Effects of Computer-Based Fluency Training on Concept Formation

This study provides a preliminary analysis of how the techniques of fluency training can be combined with systematic concept instruction to improve the learning of complex verbal concepts. Fluency techniques, which require the learner to respond accurately at high rates, have typically focused on definition learning when teaching concepts. Instructional psychologists, however, recommend multiple exemplar training for conceptual instruction. To examine this issue, 41 undergraduate students completed a computer-based instructional module on logical fallacies. Participants were assigned to one of four groups, with the modules for each group differing only in the type of practice provided—either fluency or practice with either examples or definitions. Examination of posttest scores revealed significantly higher scores for participants in the examples groups than those in the definitions groups, but low experimental power prevented a clear conclusion to be drawn about differences between the fluency and practice groups. Implications of results and several methodological issues relevant to this area of research are discussed.     

Intrinsicality and Grounding

A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities and necessary connections between wholly distinct entities, on which it is plausible that there are such properties. This paper argues that this promise is illusory. It is not possible to give an analysis of intrinsicality in terms of grounding that is consistent with these theories. Given an adequate analysis should be compatible with these theories, it follows that it is not possible to analyse intrinsicality in terms of grounding.     

The Higher Structural Phases of Concept Formation of Children

By means of a 2 × 2 × 4 way analysis of variance, modified when needed, the self-disclosing ability (as measured by the Jourard Self-Disclosure Questionnaire) of freshman college students from divorce and nondivorce homes was analyzed. The results of the study provide evidence that, generally, a person from a female-based home of the divorce type does not disclose the self any more or any less than a person from a nondivorce home situation. Also, the father does not play a major role in determining or directing the self-disclosure process of his children.     

Sums and Grounding

As I will use the term, an object is a mereological sum of some things just in case those things compose it simply in virtue of existing. In the first half of this paper, I argue that there are no sums. The key premise for this conclusion relies on a constraint on what, in certain cases, it takes for something to ground, or metaphysically explain, something else. In the second half, I argue that in light of my argument against sums, Universalism, which is perhaps the most widely accepted answer to the Special Composition Question, is false.     

Social Construction and Grounding

The aim of this paper is to bring recent work on metaphysical grounding to bear on the phenomenon of social construction. It is argued that grounding can be used to analyze social construction and that the grounding framework is helpful for articulating various claims and commitments of social constructionists, especially about social identities, e.g., gender and race. The paper also responds to a number of objections that have been (or could be) leveled against the application of grounding to social construction from Elizabeth Barnes (2014), Mari Mikkola (2015), and Jessica Wilson (2014).     

Grounding Nominalism

The notion of grounding has gained increasing acceptance among metaphysicians in recent years. In this paper, I argue that this notion can be used to formulate a very attractive version of (property) nominalism, a view that I call ‘grounding nominalism’. Simplifying somewhat, this is the view that all properties are grounded in things. I argue that this view is coherent and has a decisive advantage over competing versions of nominalism: it allows us to accept properties as real, while fully accommodating nominalist intuitions. Finally, I defend grounding nominalism against several seemingly troublesome objections.     

Upward Grounding

Realists about universals face a question about grounding. Are things how they are because they instantiate the universals they do? Or do they instantiate those universals because they are how they are? Take Ebenezer Scrooge. You can say that (i) Scrooge is greedy because he instantiates greediness, or you can say that (ii) Scrooge instantiates greediness because he is greedy. I argue that there is reason to prefer the latter to the former. I develop two arguments for the view. I also respond to some concerns one might have about the view defended. I close by showing that analogous views regarding the truth of propositions (that if the proposition that p is true, then it is true because p) and the existence of facts (that if the fact that p exists, then it exists because p) are supported by analogs of one of these arguments.     

The Effects of Type and Amount of Pretraining on Transfer in Concept Formation

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of 2 types of directed attention pretraining, a form of stimulus predifferentiation, on immediate- and delayed-transfer tasks in concept identification. In both experiments, the participants received either the “seeing-and-discriminating” or “seeing” technique of pretraining, except for those assigned to the control group. The participants received different amounts of pretraining. In the first experiment, participants were required to learn new concepts from the same category for the delayed-transfer task, whereas in the second experiment, the delayed-transfer task involved concepts from a different category. Among the major findings in both experiments are that the pretraining methods resulted in positive transfer on all transfer tasks. In general, the seeing-and-discriminating method yielded a more positive transfer than the seeing technique. Maximal positive transfer effects were found with a small number of trials. The implications of the findings for understanding the effectiveness of various training methods used for problem solving are discussed.     

教学条件下中学生物学概念形成的实验研究

本实验借助假设检验模型对学生在习得条件下生物学概念形成过程进行探究,实验结果表明:1、学生生物学概念的形成存在高起点、缓增长、平台振荡的特点,没有突破现象;2、探究教学更有利于概念的形成.尤其利于发掘学生后程的学习潜力;3、学生对概念的掌握可能存在一个统计学意义上的阈值,相同条件下探究教学比讲授法较更利于学生达到该阈值.     

一个科学概念形成过程的初步实验研究

1　前言　　由Ｌ .Ｂｏｕｔｈｉｌｅｔ所首创的假设检验模型 (ＴｈｅＨｙ ｐｏｔｈｅｓｉｓｔｅｓｔｉｎｇｍｏｄｅｌ)认为 :在概念的形成过程中 ,概念的学习者作为一个问题的积极解决者出现。学习者不断地产生和检验假设 ,这些假设都是关于确定概念属性的规则和方式 ,每一个成功的假设都通过运用它把事物分为可以作为概念的例子或不可作为概念的例子两类而得到检验。无论何时 ,一个不能成功分类的假设就会被抛弃 ,而一个新的假设就会产生 ,直到正确的假设被发现为止。多年来 ,这种假设检验模型已被许多研究者的研究所支持。科学概念形成的…     

Grounding and the indispensability argument

There has been much discussion of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. In this paper I reconsider the debate by using the notion of grounding, or non-causal dependence. First of all, I investigate what proponents of the indispensability argument should say about the grounding of relations between physical objects and mathematical ones. This reveals some resources which nominalists are entitled to use. Making use of these resources, I present a neglected but promising response to the indispensability argument—a liberalized version of Field’s response—and I discuss its significance. I argue that if it succeeds, it provides a new refutation of the indispensability argument; and that, even if it fails, its failure may bolster some of the fictionalist responses to the indispensability argument already under discussion. In addition, I use grounding to reply to a recent challenge to these responses.     

Grounding the Unreal

The scientific successes of the last 400 years strongly suggest a picture on which our scientific theories exhibit a layered structure of dependence and determination. Economics is dependent on and determined by psychology; psychology in its turn is, plausibly, dependent on and determined by biology; and so it goes. It is tempting to explain this layered structure of dependence and determination among our theories by appeal to a corresponding layered structure of dependence and determination among the entities putatively treated by those theories. In this paper, I argue that we can resist this temptation: we can explain the sense in which, e.g., the biological truths are dependent on and determined by chemical truths without appealing to properly biological or chemical entities. This opens the door to a view on which, though there are more truths than just the purely physical truths, there are no entities, states, or properties other than the purely physical entities, states, and properties. I argue that some familiar strategies to explicate the idea of a layered structure of theories by appeal to reduction, ground, and truthmaking encounter difficulties. I then show how these difficulties point the way to a more satisfactory treatment which appeals to something very close to the notion of ground. Finally, I show how this treatment provides a theoretical setting in which we might fruitfully frame debates about which entities there really are.     

Grounding Human Dignity

Abstract: What is the future of human dignity? Is there a limit on what can be done to human organisms? To approach such questions this article reviews some traditional understandings of human dignity and then offers a shift in perspective. Traditional areas in which human dignity has been grounded include the doctrine of the image of God, the notion of humanity as a reconciliation of opposites, the chronological place of humans in the process of creation, God's free grace, and the human capacity for union with the divine. Maintaining that dignity is reserved for the later stages of human development, the author suggests we shift our thinking from notions of dignity to those of value. A fertilized egg as a living organism is to be valued for its uniqueness and nature, but it does not acquire dignity until it individualizes within the larger process of embryogenesis.     

成人与中学生科学概念形成过程的四个对比实验

以一组非人工的、自然的科学概念(“反作用力”、“机械能守恒”、“熵”和“场”)为学习内容,分别以成人和中学生为被试,实验研究成人和中学生科学概念形成过程的异同。结论如下：(1)成人与中学生科学概念形成过程均分为振荡渐进期、高原期和突变期。(2)成人的振荡渐进期较长;中学生的振荡渐进期较短且振荡特征比较明显。(3)成人的高原期出现较晚,但持续较长;中学生的高原期出现较早,但持续较短。(4)中学生的突变期的跨度随概念的抽象程度提高而越来越大。