Nietzsche's Critique of Pure Altruism—Developing an Argument from Human,All Too Human

Abstract

Nietzsche often appears, especially in his writings from the middle period, to endorse psychological egoism, namely the claim that all actions are motivated by, and are for the sake of, the agent’s own self-interest. I argue that Nietzsche’s position in Human, All Too Human (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) should not be so understood. Rather, he is claiming, more weakly and more plausibly, that no action is entirely unegoistic, entirely free of egoistic motivations. Thus some actions might be motivated both by egoistic and unegoistic motives, on his view. Nietzsche’s argument may, in other words, be understood to be directed specifically against Schopenhauer’s portrayal of moral motivation, as pure, entirely unalloyed altruism, to show that this sort of action is impossible, not to rule out the possibility of any altruistic motive whatsoever. In light of Schopenahuer’s moral psychology, to which Nietzsche to some extent adhered at that time, I develop a concept of motivation and reconstruct Nietzsche’s argument.     

Perception of mind and dehumanization: Human,animal, or machine?

Dehumanization is reached through several approaches, including the attribute‐based model of mind perception and the metaphor‐based model of dehumanization. We performed two studies to find different (de)humanized images for three targets: Professional people, Evil people, and Lowest of the low. In Study 1, we examined dimensions of mind, expecting the last two categories to be dehumanized through denial of agency (Lowest of the low) or experience (Evil people), compared with humanized targets (Professional people). Study 2 aimed to distinguish these targets using metaphors. We predicted that Evil and Lowest of the low targets would suffer mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization, respectively; our predictions were confirmed, but the metaphor‐based model nuanced these results: animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization were shown as overlapping rather than independent. Evil persons were perceived as “killing machines” and “predators.” Finally, Lowest of the low were not animalized but considered human beings. We discuss possible interpretations.     

Reconcilable Differences? Human Diversity,Cultural Relativity,and Sense of Community

Sense of community (SOC) is one of the most widely used and studied constructs in community psychology. As proposed by Sarason in (The Psychological sense of community: prospects for a community psychology, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1974), SOC represents the strength of bonding among community members. It is a valuable component of community life, and it has been linked to positive mental health outcomes, citizen participation, and community connectedness. However, promotion of SOC can become problematic in community psychology praxis when it conflicts with other core values proposed to define the field, namely values of human diversity, cultural relativity, and heterogeneity of experience and perspective. Several commentators have noted that promotion of SOC can conflict with multicultural diversity because it tends to emphasize group member similarity and appears to be higher in homogeneous communities. In this paper, we introduce the idea of a community-diversity dialectic as part of praxis and research in community psychology. We argue that systematic consideration of cultural psychology perspectives can guide efforts to address a community-diversity dialectic and revise SOC formulations that ultimately will invigorate community research and action. We provide a working agenda for addressing this dialectic, proposing that systematic consideration of the creative tension between SOC and diversity can be beneficial to community psychology.     

Why Oedipus and not Christ?: A Psychoanalytic Inquiry into Innocence,Human Sacrifice,and the Sacred—Part I: Innocence,Spirituality, and Human Sacrifice

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Naturalism,Experience, and Hume’s ‘Science of Human Nature’

Abstract

A standard interpretation of Hume’s naturalism is that it paved the way for a scientistic and ‘disenchanted’ conception of the world. My aim in this paper is to show that this is a restrictive reading of Hume, and it obscures a different and profitable interpretation of what Humean naturalism amounts to. The standard interpretation implies that Hume’s ‘science of human nature’ was a reductive investigation into our psychology. But, as Hume explains, the subject matter of this science is not restricted to introspectively accessible mental content and incorporates our social nature and interpersonal experience. Illuminating the science of human nature has implications for how we understand what Hume means by ‘experience’ and thus how we understand the context of his epistemological investigations. I examine these in turn and argue overall that Hume’s naturalism and his science of man do not simply anticipate a disenchanted conception of the world.     

Human movement variability, nonlinear dynamics, and pathology: is there a connection?

Fields studying movement generation, including robotics, psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience utilize concepts and tools related to the pervasiveness of variability in biological systems. The concept of variability and the measures for nonlinear dynamics used to evaluate this concept open new vistas for research in movement dysfunction of many types. This review describes innovations in the exploration of variability and their potential importance in understanding human movement. Far from being a source of error, evidence supports the presence of an optimal state of variability for healthy and functional movement. This variability has a particular organization and is characterized by a chaotic structure. Deviations from this state can lead to biological systems that are either overly rigid and robotic or noisy and unstable. Both situations result in systems that are less adaptable to perturbations, such as those associated with unhealthy pathological states or absence of skillfulness.     

“Minding the Gap”: Imagination,Creativity and Human Cognition

Inquiry into the nature of mental images is a major topic in psychology where research is focused on the psychological faculties of imagination and creativity. In this paper, we draw on the work of L.S. Vygotsky to develop a cultural-historical approach to the study of imagination as central to human cognitive processes. We characterize imagination as a process of image making that resolves “gaps” arising from biological and cultural-historical constraints, and that enables ongoing time-space coordination necessary for thought and action. After presenting some basic theoretical considerations, we offer a series of examples to illustrate for the reader the diversity of processes of imagination as image making. Applying our arguments to contemporary digital media, we argue that a cultural-historical approach to image formation is important for understanding how imagination and creativity are distinct, yet inter-penetrating processes.     

Al-D˛am L ¥ r,Human Conscience and Christian-Muslim Relations

Can human conscience be a uniting bond between Christians and Muslims, across moral and religious differences? This article discusses the notion of d?am L ¥ r as employed by the Egyptian Muslim authors ?Abba ¥ s Mah?mu ¥ d al-?Aqqa ¥ d, Kha ¥ lid Muh?ammad Kha ¥ lid and M. Ka ¥ mil H?usayn. In the 1950s and 1960s, these authors used the notion of d?am L ¥ r to express the inward dimension of Islamic ethics. As Islamic humanists, they also used it to express what Muhammad and Jesus, Muslims and Christians, may 'know together' in the field of ethics. The modern Egyptian material is related to some observations on the semantic history of d?am L ¥ r, and a discussion of the conceptual history of conscience in Christian tradition and European philosophy. The article proposes that a constitutive element in the notion of conscience is the tension between 'knowing by oneself' and 'knowing with others'. In a broader perspective, the article discusses conscience as a globalized concept, and its importance for a Christian-Muslim dialogue which respects the difference of the Other.     

Evaluations of Affirmative Action Applicants: Perceived Fairness,Human Capital,or Social Identity?

This study examined three explanations forevaluations of an affirmative action universityapplicant: type of policy, the human capital model, andsocial identity. Seventy-nine (84% white, 11% black, 3% Asian, and 2% other) participants read auniversity's admissions policy that varied the type ofpolicy (quota or standard), qualifications of theapplicant (weak, strong), and group affiliation(ingroup, outgroup). Then they rated the applicant,policy, and university. Results indicated support forthe social identity perspective. The ingroup applicantwas evaluated more favorably when the affirmative action policy was perceived to be fair. But theingroup member was derogated when the affirmative actionpolicy was perceived as unfair. The perceived fairnessof the affirmative action policy seemed to have little effect on evaluations of the outgroup member.The implications of these findings arediscussed.     

Human Enhancement and the Anthropology of the “Entire Human Being”

About one and a half decades ago, two prominent reports were published in the United States (US) which strongly influenced subsequent international discussions on the topic of human enhancement: a 2002 report on “converging technologies for improving human performance”, based on a workshop which was organised by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) and the US Department of Commerce in December 2001, and the first report of US President George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics (PCBE), published in October 2003 with the title Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. The 2002 report included a wide variety of contributions from academics in various fields of research, from representatives of US institutions, and from companies. Due primarily to the influence of the two NSF staff editing the report, it can be regarded as the first major instance of the influence of transhumanism, a techno-futurist ideology and movement, on the US technology and innovation discourse. The PCBE report, on the other hand, is a prime example of a conservative critique of the transhumanist notion of human enhancement. In this invited contribution, these two crucial publications are analysed mainly in order to point out the relevance of philosophical anthropology as developed since the 1920s by Helmuth Plessner and others. This remarkable school of thought is experiencing a revival in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, and, to some extent, in the English-speaking world. In this article, it is argued that philosophical anthropology provides us with an important alternative to both anthropological essentialism and scientism, two approaches that are still highly relevant in current discourse on human enhancement.     

Fabricated Humans? Human Genetics,Ethics and the Christian Wisdom Tradition1

Abstract: This article highlights the key social issues associated with genetic screening and testing. It identifies an uneasy combination of a cultural drive towards perfection alongside heightened perception of a risk society. Awareness of risk is particularly in evidence in clinical genetics, but is surprisingly silent in public discourse about stem cell research, which has tended to flounder through its unilateral focus on the status of the early embryo. This article concentrates on current practice, such as the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and offers a critical analysis of current debates about ethical issues. It argues that Christian ethics can contribute positively to the debate by drawing on the tradition of prudence or practical wisdom, which goes beyond the secular alternatives of both the consequential analysis of risk and benefit and the precautionary principle.     

Fallen or Unfallen? Christ's Human Nature and the Ontology of Human Sinfulness

Abstract: Because Christ's sinlessness is a matter of virtual consensus among Christians, debates over whether the human nature he assumed was fallen or unfallen turn on the ontological conditions of his being ‘without sin’ (Heb. 4:15). The claim that Christ assumed a fallen nature can be defended by distinguishing between fallenness and sinfulness as properties of nature and hypostasis, respectively. Moreover, by highlighting the peculiar place of the will in human nature, this christological analysis helps counter the charge that an Augustinian understanding of original sin entails a dualism inconsistent with belief in the goodness of creation and human moral accountability.     

Human Dignity as the Essence of Nussbaum’s Ethics of Human Development

Philosophia - Martha C. Nussbaum, in the context of ancient philosophy, formulated ethics of human development based on 10 basic human capabilities (and opportunities) as a precondition of...     

Is Human Life Absurd?

Philosophia - This essay examines whether or not absurdity is intrinsic to human life. It takes Camus’ interpretation of ‘The Absurd’ as its conceptual starting point. It traces...     

A Human Family: Commentary on Paper by Elisabeth Fivaz-Depeursinge,Chloé Lavanchy-Scaiola,and Nicolas Favez

In discussing the paradigm shifting work of Fivaz-Depeursinge and her colleagues, I illustrate how developmental conceptions have shifted from a narrative centered on the discovery of “an Other” to narratives emphasizing what these authors term “collective intersubjectivity.” In this latter view, humans simultaneously share affect and intention with multiple others from birth, and subsequently continue to develop increasingly sophisticated means for doing so thorough out their lives. I situate this phenomenon in philosophy, nonlinear dynamic systems theory and evolutionary biology in order to highlight the species specific, phenomenologically given, and ecologically situated aspects of our intersubjective condition. Intersubjectivity from the perspective of Fivaz-Depeursinge and her group opens us to this collective dimension of membership in a human family.