道德相对主义的界标

本文主要在理论上划清了"道德相对主义"的界限.在对"道德"与"相对主义"进行辨析的基础上,对"道德相对主义"与道德相对性、道德多元主义、道德地方主义,强道德相对主义与弱道德相对主义进行了区分.对"道德相对主义"进行分类;总结了道德相对主义的一般论证模式;阐明了道德相对主义的对立面以及道德相对主义的家族相似概念.最后陈述了必须拒斥道德相对主义的理由,即道德与法律有内在的联系,有普遍有效的法律,便有普遍有效的道德观念和规范.     

道德相对主义与先天道德客观主义

道德相对主义主张,当不同文化或个人的根本道德原则发生冲突时,我们没有客观的标准去评判它们的优劣。这种观点有可能剥夺我们进行道德谴责的权利,或者削弱道德谴责的力度,在实践中会带来一系列不良的后果。道德客观主义不一定非要采取道德实在论的形式,还可以采取非实在论的形式,如先天道德客观主义的形式。先天道德客观主义主张道德可以建立在先天理由或先天辩护的基础上,这种得到先天辩护的道德知识,如同先天数学知识一样,也是客观的。尽管道德知识是可误的,但这并不意味着没有客观上正确的道德真理,正如科学知识也是可误的,但这并不意味着没有客观上正确的科学真理。     

略谈道德相对主义

本文对道德相对主义割裂道德特殊性与普遍性、相对性与绝对性,否认道德的客观标准和道德普遍性的理论实质和实践危害给予了分析批判,指出其对于我们引导人们明辨道德是非、树立正确的道德价值观、遵行社会主义道德和公民道德原则规范,吸收人类历史上有价值的道德资源,培养高尚的道德品质,都是极为不利的。     

道德相对主义的多重合理性、挑战与续思

道德相对主义又称伦理相对主义,它既是人类道德认识中存在的一种独特现象,又是现实的人类道德生活中的一种行为方式或实践。道德相对主义的存在具有多重合理性,包括社会(实践的、生活的)层面的存在合理性和认识论层面的存在合理性以及价值合理性。从历史和现实来看,道德相对主义所面对的挑战来自两个方面,一个是来自外部的道德绝对主义的挑战,一个是来自其内部的极端的道德相对主义的挑战。道德相对主义在道德多元与道德一元的关系问题、道德工具论与道德目的论的关系问题、道德策略灵活性与道德原则坚定性的关系问题上将激励我们的理论思考。     

道德相对主义:论争与价值

道德相对主义既非一个独立的学术流派,亦非某一时代的道德思潮,而是伦理思想史上长期出现的一种思想倾向。学者们围绕道德相对主义的相关问题展开了激烈的论争,在充满敌意、对立和冲突中推动了道德相对主义的发展,由此产生了众多的道德理论。当代学者不再拘泥于知识论意义上的相对主义研究,而是转向发掘道德相对主义的多样性与情境性的特点,进而重视道德相对主义在不同实践领域中的重要价值。     

中国教育界对道德相对主义与个人中心主义的反思

当前对青少年进行伦理道德教育,应特别注意抵制道德相对主义与个人中心主义,这是教育工作者,尤其是道德教育工作者的严肃使命     

道德相对主义和厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响

社会直觉模型认为有意识的道德推理过程发生在道德直觉判断之后。那么, 道德直觉判断又是怎么形成的, 是否受认知推理和情绪的影响?实验1首先验证道德直觉判断的存在; 实验2考察了道德相对主义对道德直觉判断的影响; 实验3考察了厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响。结果发现: (1)道德绝对主义比道德相对主义条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受认知推理影响。(2)厌恶情绪比中立情绪启动条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受情绪影响。因此, 道德直觉判断会受认知推理和情绪的影响。     

先秦儒学对道德相对主义的回应与超越

道德相对主义对主流价值观念的挑战主要可以概括为三个方面:道德原则是否具有普遍必然性、理性能否认知道德原则、道德原则能否摆脱道德实践上的冲突.先秦儒学理清了作为普遍、必然的道德原则的仁与作为具体的行为规范的礼之间的紧张关系,从而澄清了道德相对主义因混淆两者而带来的混乱;先秦儒学并未像道德相对主义那样认为道德原则无法通过理性证明因而不存在,而是认为道德原则是明证的,其落实依旧需要理性的认知;在实践上先秦儒家主张行权返经,强调在道德原则统摄下所作的变通都是为了更好地实现仁道,从而有效避免了道德纷争.先秦儒学智慧是对道德相对主义的回应与超越.     

实践语境与生产力标准——对马克思主义是“道德相对主义”的回应

伍德、米勒等“分析的马克思主义”学者认为,由于马克思主义遵循历史唯物主义 的立场,无法确立什么是“真正的道德规定”,最终必定会走向“道德相对主义”,进而否 定对社会形态或生产方式进行道德评价的合法性。实际上,虽然马克思、恩格斯多次描述了 道德相对性现象,并且反对道德普遍主义,但马克思、恩格斯在实践的语境中,非常明确地 给出了各式各样的道德判断,且把生产力作为道德标准的共同尺度,并内含着一种“道德进 步”的信念。因而马克思主义既不是“规范性的道德相对主义”,也不是“元道德的相对主 义”,更不能因此否定马克思主义对资本主义社会道德批判的合法性。     

对相对主义的反思:从重要的重言式到诱人的矛盾式

苏珊·哈克提供了一个分析相对主义的统一框架,将蒯因的本体论相对性等诸多论题都纳入相对主义的范围内来讨论。她区分了浅层相对主义和深层相对主义,前者是指讨论的主题会随着不同的因素而变化,后者是指只有相对于某些因素,这些主题才有意义。哈克应用她的这种区分,探讨了罗蒂的认知相对主义。哈克没有给出对相对主义的直接反驳,但是通过与普特南的概念相对主义的详细对比,描绘了一种她称为"坦陈实在论"的理论,以表明引发特定形式的相对主义的考虑可以怎样以非相对主义的方式得到安置。     

Moral Relativism

Moral relativism comes in many varieties. One is a moral doctrine, according to which we ought to respect other cultures, and allow them to solve moral problems as they see fit. I will say nothing about this kind of moral relativism in the present context. Another kind of moral relativism is semantic moral relativism, according to which, when we pass moral judgements, we make an implicit reference to some system of morality (our own). According to this kind of moral relativism, when I say that a certain action is right, my statement is elliptic. What I am really saying is that, according to the system of morality in my culture, this action is right. I will reject this kind of relativism. According to yet another kind of moral relativism, which we may call epistemic, it is possible that, when one person (belonging to one culture) makes a certain moral judgement, such as that this action is right, and another person (belong to another culture) makes the judgement that the very same action is wrong, they may have just as good reasons for their respective judgements; it is even possible that, were they fully informed about all the facts, equally imaginative, and so forth, they would still hold on to their respective (conflicting) judgements. They are each fully justified in their belief in conflicting judgements. I will comment on this form of moral relativism in passing. Finally, however, there is a kind of moral relativism we could call ontological, according to which, when two persons pass conflicting moral verdicts on a certain action, they may both be right. The explanation is that they make their judgements from the perspective of different, socially constructed, moral universes. So while it is true in the first person's moral universe that a certain action is right, it is true in the second person's moral universe that the very same action is wrong. I explain and defend this version of ontological moral relativism.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.     

Moral Relativism and Majority Rule

A number of arguments against relativism are based on the concept of majority rule. Since, the arguments allege, on relativism moral truth is founded on majority opinion, relativism entails that (a) moral progress and reform are impossible, (b) propaganda, advertising, brainwashing, and high birth rates turn mistaken moral judgments into correct ones, (c) moral horrors, if enough people believe them acceptable, are not moral horrors at all, (d) finding out what’s right and what’s wrong is extremely easy, (e) moral reasoning is very different from what we normally take it to be, and (f) internal criticism of a moral code is impossible. These arguments get their due in this article, which first defines and explicates relativism and then exposes, explains, and criticizes the arguments. Especially important to understand about the relation between relativism and majority opinion is the notion of a convention. Accordingly, it is discussed at some length.