Personal standards and evaluative concerns dimensions of "clinical" perfectionism: a reply to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt et al. (2003)

Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn (2002, 2003) provided a cognitive-behavioral analysis of "clinical" perfectionism, a construct they considered to involve both the determined pursuit of self-imposed standards and extremely vulnerable self-evaluation. They argued against a multidimensional perspective to studying perfectionism. We respond to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt, Flett, Besser, Sherry, and McGee's (2003) reply to Shafran et al. (2002) by considering the theoretical, empirical, and clinical implications of findings identifying two higher-order dimensions of perfectionism reflecting personal standards (PS) and self-critical evaluative concerns. Analyses of data from two diverse study groups, a college student sample (N = 527) and a clinical sample of patients with binge eating disorder (N = 236), revealed that self-criticism accounts for the relation between perfectionism measures and depressive, anxious, and eating disorder symptoms. We conclude that possessing high PS is not by itself maladaptive. Rather, self-critical evaluative tendencies are more relevant than PS to the critical processes Shafran et al. (2002) suggested contribute to the maintenance of clinical perfectionism.     

Revisiting backward recall and benchmark memory effects: a reply to Bireta et al. (2010)

When participants are asked to recall lists of items in the reverse order, known as backward recall, several benchmark memory phenomena, such as the word length effect, are abolished (Bireta et al. Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010). Bireta et al. (Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010) suggested that in backward recall, reliance on order retention is increased at the expense of item retention, leading to the abolition of item-based phenomena. In a subsequent study, however, Guérard and Saint-Aubin (in press) showed that four lexical factors known to modulate item retention were unaffected by recall direction. In a series of five experiments, we examined the source of the discrepancy between the two studies. We revisited the effects of phonological similarity, word length, articulatory suppression, and irrelevant speech, using open and closed pools of words in backward and forward recall. The results are unequivocal in showing that none of these effects are influenced by recall direction, suggesting that Bireta et al.’s (Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010) results are the consequence of their particular stimuli.     

Constraining accommodative homunculi in evolutionary explorations of jealousy: a reply to Barrett et al. (2006)

This article responds to a critique by H. C. Barrett, D. A. Frederick, M. G. Haselton, and R. Kurzban, wherein it is argued that manipulations of cognitive constraints cannot be used to test general evolutionary hypotheses regarding the architecture of mind. In making this argument, Barrett et al. focus on what they believe to be faulty logic in D. DeSteno, M. Y. Bartlett, J. Braverman, and P. Salovey's use of such techniques to examine proposed sex differences in jealousy. In presenting their argument, however, Barrett et al. appear to disregard central findings presented in DeSteno et al. (2002) and, in so doing, fail to grasp the interrelations among findings that might readily address their concerns. Here, the authors present arguments for why and when manipulations of cognitive resources may prove useful in investigating evolved psychological mechanisms and, in so doing, situate their use within the ongoing debate concerning evolved sex differences in jealousy.     

Mystery and meaning: a reply to Green (2000)

In "George A. Miller, Language, and the Computer Metaphor of Mind" (see Note 1), I sought to explain how and why Miller invested the computer metaphor of mind with such strongly revolutionary, antibehaviorist meanings. In reply, Christopher Green (see Note 2) has argued that the answer to this question has to do with the importance of mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists. In response, I argue that, though mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists, there were several other factors of equal or greater importance: specifically, the fascination of Miller and his cohort with language and communication, their frustration with the narrowness of the disciplinary vision of the behaviorists, and their involvement in a different experimental program than that of mainstream behaviorists.     

The importance of frameworks for directing empirical questions: reply to Goodie and Fantino (2000)

A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) make two main criticisms of the predictions of M. C. Lovett and C. D. Schunn's (1999) RCCL model. (RCCL is pronounced "ReCyCLe"; it stands for Represent the task, Construct a set of action strategies, Choose from among those strategies according to success rate, Learn new success rates.) In both cases, the authors believe the criticisms reflect a failure to appreciate the difference between broad frameworks and specific mathematical/computational models. In this article, the value of a broad framework, such as RCCL, in directing new empirical analyses and guiding theoretical development is shown. In particular, RCCL expands on existing work to reveal how variability and change in mental representations influence base-rate sensitivity. The authors also address several other issues raised by A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) and show that qualitative shifts in individuals' choice behavior are present in their original data--a key prediction of RCCL that does not appear in previous accounts.     

Dungeons, gratings, and black rooms: A defense of double-anchoring theory and a reply to Howe et al. (2007).

Replies to comments mad by Howe et al. on the current author's original article. The double-anchoring theory of lightness (P. Bressan, 2006b) assumes that any given region belongs to a set of frameworks, created by Gestalt grouping principles, and receives a provisional lightness within each of them; the region's final lightness is a weighted average of all these values. In their critique, P. D. L. Howe, H. Sagreiya, D. L. Curtis, C. Zheng, and M. S. Livingstone (2007) (a) show that the target's lightness in the dungeon illusion (P. Bressan, 2001) and in White's effect is not primarily determined by the region with which the target is perceived to group and (b) claim that this is a challenge to the theory. The author argues that Howe et al. misinterpret grouping for lightness by equating it with grouping for object formation and by ignoring that lightness is determined by frameworks' weights and not by what appears to group with what. The author shows that Howe et al.'s empirical findings, together with those on grating induction and all-black rooms that they cite as problematic, actually corroborate, rather than falsify, the double-anchoring theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved).     

Occlusion, symmetry, and object-based attention: reply to Saiki (2000)

J. Saiki (2000) argued that, because the stimuli used by M. Behrmann, R. S. Zemel, and M. C. Mozer (1998) were confounded by symmetry, conclusions about whether amodally completed objects can benefit from object-based attention are unwarranted. Here, the authors examine J. Saiki's claim further and expand on their view of the mechanisms underlying object-based attention, suggesting that perceptual organization is the process whereby features from a single object are selectively attended. In light of this, they claim that heuristics such as symmetry and collinearity play an important role in the facilitation of features from a single object. In support of this claim, they present data from a further experiment using displays that exploit common fate, another grouping heuristic, and show that, under these conditions, the hallmark of object-based attention, a single-object advantage, is obtained for the occluded (amodally completed) shapes.     

Sex differences in behavioral and hormonal response to social threat: commentary on Taylor et al. (2000)

Taylor and colleagues proposed that women uniquely respond to stressors by tending to children and befriending other women rather than by fighting or fleeing (S. E. Taylor et al., 2000). In this article, the authors expand Taylor et al.'s evolutionary frame and incorporate several unique aspects of human social dynamics. First, humans are characterized by extensive paternal investment, and thus men's tending is predicted and observed in some stressful contexts. Second, the dynamics of women's befriending suggest an evolutionary elaboration of the mechanisms that support reciprocal altruism. Third, coalitional male-male competition indicates that men's befriending is a predicted component of their fight-or-flight response. Finally, men's tending should result in the evolution of female-female competition over this form of parental investment.     

Autonomic and eyeblink conditioning are closely related to contingency awareness: reply to Wiens and Ohman (2002) and Manns et al. (2002)

S. Wiens and A. Ohman (2002) disputed the conclusion that Pavlovian conditioning is strongly related to contingency awareness (P. F. Lovibond & D. R. Shanks, 2002) on the basis that an inappropriate definition of awareness was used. J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, and L. R. Squire (2002) contended that delay eyeblink conditioning is independent of awareness. The authors of the present article consider these arguments, highlight several problems in the new studies described by the commentators, and conclude that there is still little evidence for unconscious conditioning in either subliminal autonomic conditioning or eyeblink conditioning. The most parsimonious account of existing data is that a single learning process gives rise to both awareness and conditioned responding. Further progress in evaluating the possibility of unconscious conditioning would be facilitated by the development of more completely specified and testable dual-process models.     

Sex differences in physical aggression to partners: a reply to Frieze (2000), O'Leary (2000), and White, Smith, Koss, and Figueredo (2000)

The following points are made in reply to critical comments on the author's meta-analysis of partner physical aggression (J. Archer, 2000): (a) The theoretical dichotomy used in the review is one clearly identifiable in published articles, and the distinction between acts (aggression) and consequences (violence) is clearer than alternative definitions involving victims' perceptions; (b) despite the database containing many samples of U.S. students, there were sufficient other samples to draw meaningful conclusions; (c) the Conflict Tactics Scale may be limited, but in contrast to suggested alternatives, it involves clearly defined categories; (d) sexual aggression, although forming an important part of partner violence, cannot legitimately be aggregated with nonsexual physical aggression; and (e) there is a marked contrast between sex differences in physical aggression toward partners and toward same-sex opponents.     

A self-presentational view of psychotherapy: reply to Hill, Gelso, and Mohr (2000) and to Arkin and Hermann (2000)

The self-presentational view of psychotherapy challenges current assumptions about the benefits of high levels of clients' openness in therapy (A. E. Kelly, 2000). The author responds to questions about whether clients' discretion really is linked to favorable therapy process ratings and outcomes. She also addresses problems that may emerge if readers apply a narrow definition of self-presentation as a form of deliberate manipulation, rather than the intended definition of consciously or unconsciously showing oneself to be a particular kind of person for audiences. A brief review of the evidence on the role of audience feedback in self-concept change is offered, along with suggestions for explaining self-concept change to clients. The author concludes by clarifying and reasserting her suggestion that it is acceptable for clients to reveal the themes as opposed to details of their problems that seem particularly heinous or humiliating.     

Distant context effects in language production: A reply to Motley et al.

Motley, Baars, and Camden (1981), continuing earlier work, report on several experiments that are interpreted as evidence for output editing in language production, editing that is sensitive to lexical, phonological, semantic, and syntactic factors. Their results can be accounted for equally well if context affects the formation, rather than the output, of the subjects' responses. Similar distant context effects on utterance formation have also been observed in naturally occurring speech errors.     

Recall,recognition, and the hippocampus: Reply to Yonelinas et al. (2004)

Two recent studies disagree about whether recall is more impaired than recognition (and recollection more than familiarity) in patients with damage limited to the hippocampus (Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire, 2003; Yonelinas et al., 2002). Wixted and Squire (2004) pointed out that the disagreement about recall and recognition stems entirely from an outlying recognition score obtained by 1 of 55 control subjects in Yonelinas et al. (2002). In their comment on our paper, Yonelinas et al. (2004) minimize the importance of this result and argue that the role of the hippocampus in recollection and familiarity is best studied using different methods that attempt to measure these processes directly. Here, we argue that the recall versus recognition comparison is the strongest test because it relies on the fewest controversial assumptions, and that the other approaches explored by Yonelinas et al. (2002) rely on questionable, theory-laden assumptions. We also rehearse the reasons for concluding that the patients studied by Manns et al. (2003) have damage limited to the hippocampal region (hippocampus proper, dentate gyrus, and subiculum), and we emphasize that important questions remain about the patients studied by Yonelinas et al. (2002), inasmuch as no neuroanatomical information and minimal neuropsychological information has been provided.     

The validity and appropriateness of methods, analyses, and conclusions in Rind et al. (1998): A rebuttal of victimological critique from Ondersma et al. (2001) and Dallam et al. (2001).

The authors respond to 2 victimological critiques of their 1998 meta-analysis on child sexual abuse (CSA). S. J. Dallam et al. (2001) claimed that B. Rind, P. Tromovitch, and R. Bauserman (1998) committed numerous methodological and statistical errors, and often miscoded and misinterpreted data. The authors show all these claims to be invalid. To the contrary, they demonstrate frequent bias in Dallam et al.'s criticisms. S. J. Ondersma et al. (2001) claimed that Rind et al.'s study is part of a backlash against psychotherapists, that its suggestions regarding CSA definitions were extrascientific, and that the moral standard is needed to understand CSA scientifically. The authors show their suggestions to have been scientific and argue that it is Ondersma et al.'s issue-framing and moral standard that are extrascientific. This reply supports the original methods, analyses, recommendations, and conclusions of Rind et al.