On inferring one's beliefs from one's attempt and consequences for subsequent compliance

D. J. Bem (1967, 1972) has suggested that a person may infer his or her beliefs from his or her actions. With his information-processing viewpoint, D. J. Bem proposed that individuals, by observing their past behaviors, may draw information for assessing their beliefs about themselves. There is a question, however, about the mechanism of self-perception when there is inconsistency between one's attempt to realize an intended goal and the outcome of the action. In a series of field studies, participants who had unsuccessfully tried to help a stranger were more willing to comply with a relatively large request made later. Implications for self-perception theory as well as for enhancing susceptibility to influence techniques are discussed.     

How pleasant was your childhood? Beliefs about memory shape inferences from experienced difficulty of recall

People's beliefs about how memory works can affect their inferences from experienced difficulty of recall. Participants were asked to recall either 4 childhood events (experienced as an easy task) or 12 childhood events (experienced as a difficult task). Subsequently, they were led to believe that either pleasant or unpleasant periods of one's life fade from memory. When the recall task was difficult (12 events), participants who believed that memories from unpleasant periods fade away rated their childhood as less happy than participants who believed that memories from pleasant periods fade away. The opposite pattern was observed when the recall task was easy (4 events). This interplay of recall experiences and memory beliefs suggests that the judgmental impact of subjective experiences is shaped by beliefs about their meaning. It also suggests that the recall difficulty in clinical memory work may lead a person to make negative inferences about his or her childhood, provided the person shares the popular belief that memory represses negative information.     

Selfless giving

In four studies, we show that people who anticipate more personal change over time give more to others. We measure and manipulate participants’ beliefs in the persistence of the defining psychological features of a person (e.g., his or her beliefs, values, and life goals) and measure generosity, finding support for the hypothesis in three studies using incentive-compatible charitable donation decisions and one involving hypothetical choices about sharing with loved ones.     

The relevance of Nash equilibrium to psychiatric disorders

In game theory, the word ‘game’ is used to describe any interdependence between interacting parties, and the Nash equilibrium is a prominent tool for analysing such interactions. I argue that the concept of the Nash equilibrium may also be used in non-gaming contexts. An individual is in a Nash equilibrium if his or her beliefs are consistent with his or her actions. Given that discordance between beliefs and behaviour is a typical cause of psychiatric disorders, individuals who are not in a Nash equilibrium are likely to be affected by such disorders. In this regard, the concept of the Nash equilibrium could aptly be introduced into the medical practitioner’s vocabulary for describing a patient’s mental health status.     

Morality,choice and inwardness

The present paper tries to analyse the way in which Judge William, in Sören Kierkegaard's work Either/Or, distinguishes between the aesthetic and the ethical way of life. Basically his distinctions seem to be that the ethicist is a seriously committed person (has inwardness) whereas the aestheticist is indifferent, and that the former accepts universal rules whereas the latter makes an exception for himself. — In order to come from the aesthetic to the ethical stage one must, according to Judge William, make a choice of oneself. We try to show that such a choice is only one among several factors implicit in his reasoning and that he does not at all consider it as a ‘leap’, but as based upon reasons, though his reasons are mostly of an aesthetic nature. Far from seeing the Judge as a champion of choice, we maintain that the book primarily contains a plea for a certain personality ideal. This probably has to do with the fact that he does not seem to be in doubt as to what one ought to do, only as to how to become a person who does what he ought to do. We shall also argue that a choice of oneself, as a matter of fact, is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to bring a person within the ethical stage, as described by the Judge. — A person who lives ethically does not, according to Judge William, necessarily act rightly, but his actions are either right or wrong, as opposed to the actions of the aestheticist which fall outside the domain of the ethical. In order to obtain a tenable distinction within his philosophy between ‘being within the ethical stage’ and ‘acting ethically rightly’ the first concept should be defined in terms of inwardness (serious commitment), the latter as inward conformity with certain universal rules. — This idea of inwardness, probably the most original and fruitful contribution of ‘Equilibrium’, seems to be based, however, like most of his ethical reasoning, on certain controversial assumptions about human nature.     

Five-year-old children's difficulty with false belief when the sought entity is a person

A total of 153 children (excluding those who erred on control questions), mainly 5 and 7 years of age, participated in two experiments that involved tests of false belief. In the task, the sought entity was first at Location 1 and then, unknown to the searching protagonist, it moved to Location 2. In Experiment 1, performance was well below ceiling in 5-year-olds when the sought entity was a person, and this contrasted with a task in which the sought entity was a physical object. Performance was especially inaccurate when the sought person moved of his or her own volition rather than when the sought person was requested to move by a third party. Interestingly, 5-year-olds were more likely to nominate Location 1 when asked where the searching protagonist would look first than when asked what he or she would do next. In Experiment 2, however, 5-year-olds also tended to nominate Location 1 following a question that included the word "first" even in a test of true belief--a patently incorrect response. Altogether, the results suggest that 5-year-old children have considerable difficulty with a test of false belief when the sought entity is a person acting under his or her own volition. This suggests that 5-year-olds' handle on states of belief is surprisingly fragile in this kind of task.     

Word and Person Effects on Decoding Accuracy: A New Look at an Old Question

The purpose of this study was to extend the literature on decoding by bringing together two lines of research, namely person and word factors that affect decoding, using a crossed random-effects model. The sample was comprised of 196 English-speaking grade 1 students. A researcher-developed pseudoword list was used as the primary outcome measure. Because grapheme-phoneme correspondence (GPC) knowledge was treated as person and word specific, we are able to conclude that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a student to know all GPCs in a word before accurately decoding the word. And controlling for word-specific GPC knowledge, students with lower phonemic awareness and slower rapid naming skill have lower predicted probabilities of correct decoding than counterparts with superior skills. By assessing a person-by-word interaction, we found that students with lower phonemic awareness have more difficulty applying knowledge of complex vowel graphemes compared to complex consonant graphemes when decoding unfamiliar words. Implications of the methodology and results are discussed in light of future research.     

The Embodied God: Core Intuitions About Person Physicality Coexist and Interfere With Acquired Christian Beliefs About God,the Holy Spirit,and Jesus

Why are disembodied extraordinary beings like gods and spirits prevalent in past and present theologies? Under the intuitive Cartesian dualism hypothesis, this is because it is natural to conceptualize of minds as separate from bodies; under the counterintuitiveness hypothesis, this is because beliefs in minds without bodies are unnatural—such beliefs violate core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and consequently have a social transmission advantage. We report on a critical test of these contrasting hypotheses. Prior research found that among adult Christian religious adherents, intuitions about person psychology coexist and interfere with theological conceptualizations of God (e.g., infallibility). Here, we use a sentence verification paradigm where participants are asked to evaluate as true or false statements on which core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and psychology and Christian theology about God are inconsistent (true on one and false on the other) versus consistent (both true or both false). We find, as predicted by the counterintuitiveness hypothesis but not the Cartesian dualism hypothesis, that Christian religious adherents show worse performance (lower accuracy and slower response time) on statements where Christian theological doctrines about God's physicality (e.g., incorporeality, omnipresence) conflict with intuitions about person physicality. We find these effects for other extraordinary beings in Christianity—the Holy Spirit and Jesus—but not for an ordinary being (priest). We conclude that it is unintuitive to conceptualize extraordinary beings as disembodied, and that this, rather than inherent Cartesian dualism, may explain the prevalence of beliefs in such beings.     

Sexual Outcasts: The Perceived Impact of Body Weight and Gender on Sexuality1

A person's weight may be perceived as an important aspect of his or her sexuality and a significant determinant of his or her interpersonal sexual experiences. However, researchers interested in body weight and sexuality have focused exclusively on sexual disorders found in individuals with eating disorders; consequently, little is known about people's beliefs about weight and sexuality, despite the individual and interpersonal significance of such beliefs. Undergraduates received information about a male or female, obese or normal-weight stimulus person and then evaluated that person along several dimensions related to sexuality. Participants believed that an obese man's sexual experiences would be highly similar to those of a normal-weight man. However, participants viewed an obese woman as less sexually attractive, skilled, warm, and responsive, and perceived her as less likely to experience desire and various sexual behaviors than a normal-weight woman. In addition, participants believed that an obese woman was less sexually attractive, skilled, warm, and responsive than an obese man.     

Janus‐faced nature of colorblindness: Social dominance orientation moderates the relationship between colorblindness and outgroup attitudes

Colorblindness is a popular diversity ideology promoted as a means to intergroup harmony in ethnically diverse nations. While some research suggests that colorblindness reduces intergroup bias, other work suggests that colorblindness may increase it. The present research utilizes a national sample of European New Zealanders to examine whether the relationship between colorblind endorsement and outgroup attitudes is moderated by perceivers' individual differences in social dominance orientation (SDO). Data revealed that for participants low in SDO, colorblind beliefs predicted more negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities. However, for those high in SDO, colorblind beliefs predicted more positive attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Taken together, these findings suggest that colorblindness is not all good or bad for intergroup relations—instead, its effects may depend on perceivers' own egalitarian sentiments.     

On having bad persons as friends

Intuitively, one who counts a morally bad person as a friend has gone wrong somewhere. But it is far from obvious where exactly they have gone astray. Perhaps in cultivating a friendship with a bad person, one extends to them certain goods that they do not deserve. Or perhaps the failure lies elsewhere; one may be an abettor to moral transgressions. Yet another option is to identify the mistake as a species of imprudence—one may take on great personal risk in counting a bad person as a friend. In this paper, I argue that none of these intuitive explanations are entirely convincing; for many such proposals run contrary to widely accepted features of friendship. However, they do point us in the direction of a more satisfying explanation—one which concerns a person’s moral priorities. An individual who counts a morally bad person as a friend is, I propose, one who betrays a distinct kind of defect in her values.     

FRANK CONVERSATIONS

I contend that Jews, Christians, and Muslims who seek peace should not be reluctant to acknowledge the existence of their sometimes profound disagreements, or to affirm the truth of their own beliefs and practices. Since this places me at odds with John Hick, I analyze his views, granting the strengths of his critical realism and arguing that his revisionist–pluralist theory of religion has significant limitations for interreligious dialogue. Since the veridical–pluralist alternative I propose facilitates rather than stifles disagreement, I examine three different conceptions of dialogue that acknowledge the importance of disputes among those searching for truth. I also discuss three virtues—honesty, empathy, and humility—whose cultivation would make us less likely to fail in our search for truth and the peace that is its sign and fruit.     

Basis for Decision: An Attitudinal Analysis of Voting Behavior1

A psychological theory which suggests that a person's attitude toward any object is a function of his beliefs about the object and the evaluative aspects of those beliefs is presented. Thus, in the political arena, a person should like or dislike a given candidate because (a) he believes the candidate has certain personal characteristics, is affiliated with certain reference groups, or is for or against various issues; and (b) evaluated these characteristics, groups, and issues positively or negatively. Evidence from a local survey in the 1964 presidential election supports this theory and its application to voting behavior. In addition, the data clearly indicate that voters do take partisan stands on some issues, do clearly discriminate between the candidates vis-a-vis certain issues, and do change their beliefs during the course of a campaign. These data suggest that a new protrait of the American voter is overdue.     

汉语阅读中的心理词加工

通过两项研究考察了汉语阅读中心理词存在的心理现实性及其加工效率问题。研究1采用词切分任务考察语法知识掌握水平不同的读者词切分的差异,发现他们在词切分上存在很大分歧,语法知识越丰富,词切分差异越小。研究2探讨心理词的加工效率,使用阴影标记目标词,产生四种呈现条件：正常条件、词汇词条件、心理词条件和非词条件,结果发现心理词比词汇词、非词更容易加工。两项研究结果表明汉语阅读的基本信息单元更可能是心理词。     

思想就意味着超越--恩斯特·布洛赫对马克思主义传统做出的创新

布洛赫是第二次世界大战后德国最具独创性的马克思主义哲学家和对马克思主义传统做出创新的人物.他对唯物主义的理解、他对黑格尔的解释、他的宗教哲学观点,他关于遗产的观点,他的社会主义理论等都是他对马克思主义传统做出的重大创新.     

The Root of Dance Therapy: A Consideration of Movement,Dancing, and Verbalization vis-à-vis Dance/Movement Therapy

How and when does dance become therapy? And why is there a need for such intervention? The author, one of the great choreographer Balanchine's prima ballerinas and a professional choreographer in her own right as well, ranges far in seeking societal as well as individual causes for the creation of a new psychotherapy. She uses her passionate adherence to dance per se as a vantage point from which to view humanity's trials and tribulations. She also opens a door into the realm of professional, performing dancers who wanted to give their dancing to the world. Her ironic wit takes note of the nondancers who want to be dance therapists. She also draws a loving portrait of one of the originators of dance therapy in the United States, Marian Chace, who became her friend and mentor.     

Perceptions of Religious Discrimination Among U.S. Scientists

Academic scientists in the United States are relatively nonreligious, at least compared to the general population, and some evidence suggests that the professional culture of academic science may foster perceptions of discrimination among scientists who are religious. We examine perceptions of religious discrimination among biologists and physicists in the United States. The analysis shows that Protestant, Muslim, and adherents of “other” traditions report higher rates of religious discrimination in both biology and physics relative to those who do not identify with a religion. Jewish and Catholic adherents report higher rates of discrimination in biology but not in physics. Most of the religious identity effects among biologists are not explained away by measures of beliefs, practices, or professional and demographic characteristics. On the other hand, religious identity differences in perceptions of religious discrimination among physicists are mediated by measures of religious practice. On the whole, these findings suggest that religious identity itself is more stigmatized in biology than in physics. Results have implications for how university professors—and academic scientists in particular—relate to the broader public.     

In Defense of “Denial”: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad

Bioethicists often draw sharp distinctions between hope and states like denial, self-deception, and unrealistic optimism. But what, exactly, is the difference between hope and its more suspect cousins? One common way of drawing the distinction focuses on accuracy of belief about the desired outcome: Hope, though perhaps sometimes misplaced, does not involve inaccuracy in the way that these other states do. Because inaccurate beliefs are thought to compromise informed decision making, bioethicists have considered these states to be ones where intervention is needed either to correct the person’s mental state or to persuade the person to behave differently, or even to deny the person certain options (e.g., another round of chemotherapy). In this article, we argue that it is difficult to determine whether a patient is really in denial, self-deceived, or unrealistically optimistic. Moreover, even when we are confident that beliefs are unrealistic, they are not always as harmful as critics contend. As a result, we need to be more permissive in our approach to patients who we believe are unrealistically optimistic, in denial, or self-deceived—that is, unless patients significantly misunderstand their situation and thus make decisions that are clearly bad for them (especially in light of their own values and goals), we should not intervene by trying to change their mental states or persuade them to behave differently, or by paternalistically denying them certain options (e.g., a risky procedure).     

The three worlds of the counselor

The counselor is seen as one who is personally involved as he deals with his client, but in much of his counseling he cannot escape dealing with himself as well. Three dilemmas of the counselor are analyzed: Can he enter the value world of his more youthful client in order to deal with such questions as respect for authority and learning from the past without compromising his own values? Can he “care” for the client and still show concern about what the client does? Can the counselor grow as a person and at the same time achieve professional success?