Comparison processes in social judgment: mechanisms and consequences

This article proposes an informational perspective on comparison consequences in social judgment. It is argued that to understand the variable consequences of comparison, one has to examine what target knowledge is activated during the comparison process. These informational underpinnings are conceptualized in a selective accessibility model that distinguishes 2 fundamental comparison processes. Similarity testing selectively makes accessible knowledge indicating target-standard similarity, whereas dissimilarity testing selectively makes accessible knowledge indicating target-standard dissimilarity. These respective subsets of target knowledge build the basis for subsequent target evaluations, so that similarity testing typically leads to assimilation whereas dissimilarity testing typically leads to contrast. The model is proposed as a unifying conceptual framework that integrates diverse findings on comparison consequences in social judgment.     

The role of similarity and dissimilarity focus in sequential judgments of physical attractiveness

The present results indicate that procedurally priming comparison focus can change the contrast effect in judgments of physical attractiveness (Kenrick & Gutierres, 1980). Participants were primed to search for similarities vs. differences between target and standard of comparison in a task using material irrelevant to the subsequent physical attractiveness judgment. Focusing participants on similarities testing produced the assimilation effect: evaluation of target and comparison standard as being similar. Focusing participants on dissimilarity testing produced the contrast effect: evaluating the target as different from the standard of comparison.     

The Semantics of Anchoring

Previous research has demonstrated that judgmental anchoring effects—the assimilation of a numeric estimate to a previously considered standard—are semantic in nature. They result because the semantic knowledge about the target object that is activated during the comparison with the anchor influences the absolute judgment. In addition to this semantic influence, the numeric anchor value itself may also yield an effect under specific conditions. The present research was designed to examine the relative strength of both mechanisms and explore their boundary conditions. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that semantic anchoring effects are more potent than purely numeric effects. Study 3 further suggests that purely numeric effects only operate if accessible semantic knowledge is inapplicable to the critical judgment so that semantic influences are incapacitated. The implications of these findings are discussed from the perspective of an integrative model which differentiates between two stages of anchoring. Whereas purely numeric influences appear to be limited to the stage of anchor selection, the actual comparison with the target involves more elaborate semantic processes.     

The use of category and exemplar knowledge in the solution of anchoring tasks

Five studies examine the role that category and exemplar knowledge play in the mediation of anchoring effects--the assimilation of an absolute estimate to a previously considered standard. Studies 1 through 3 demonstrate that comparing the target object with a plausible anchor (i.e., a standard that constitutes a possible value for the target) leads to a selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent exemplar knowledge about the target. This easily accessible knowledge is then used to generate the absolute estimate, which leads to its assimilation to the standard. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrate that comparing the target with an implausible anchor, however, involves the activation of knowledge about the general category of the target, rather than exemplar knowledge about the target itself.     

Selective attention in animal discrimination learning

The traditional approach to the study of selective attention in animal discrimination learning has been to ask if animals are capable of the central selective processing of stimuli, such that certain aspects of the discriminative stimuli are partially or wholly ignored while their relationships to each other, or other relevant stimuli, are processed. A notable characteristic of this research has been that procedures involve the acquisition of discriminations, and the issue of concern is whether learning is selectively determined by the stimulus dimension defined by the discriminative stimuli. Although there is support for this kind of selective attention, in many cases, simpler nonattentional accounts are sufficient to explain the results. An alternative approach involves procedures more similar to those used in human information-processing research. When selective attention is studied in humans, it generally involves the steady state performance of tasks for which there is limited time allowed for stimulus input and a relatively large amount of relevant information to be processed; thus, attention must be selective or divided. When this approach is applied to animals and alternative accounts have been ruled out, stronger evidence for selective or divided attention in animals has been found. Similar processes are thought to be involved when animals search more natural environments for targets. Finally, an attempt is made to distinguish these top-down attentional processes from more automatic preattentional processes that have been studied in humans and other animals.     

Selective Attention in Animal Discrimination Learning

The traditional approach to the study of selective attention in animal discrimination learning has been to ask if animals are capable of the central selective processing of stimuli, such that certain aspects of the discriminative stimuli are partially or wholly ignored while their relationships to each other, or other relevant stimuli, are processed. A notable characteristic of this research has been that procedures involve the acquisition of discriminations, and the issue of concern is whether learning is selectively determined by the stimulus dimension defined by the discriminative stimuli. Although there is support for this kind of selective attention, in many cases, simpler nonattentional accounts are sufficient to explain the results. An alternative approach involves procedures more similar to those used in human information-processing research. When selective attention is studied in humans, it generally involves the steady state performance of tasks for which there is limited time allowed for stimulus input and a relatively large amount of relevant information to be processed; thus, attention must be selective or divided. When this approach is applied to animals and alternative accounts have been ruled out, stronger evidence for selective or divided attention in animals has been found. Similar processes are thought to be involved when animals search more natural environments for targets. Finally, an attempt is made to distinguish these top-down attentional processes from more automatic preattentional processes that have been studied in humans and other animals.     

Not all contrast effects are created equal: extent of processing affects contrast strength

Prevailing theories of judgmental contrasts propose mechanisms ranging from relatively low versus high degrees of thought. The present research tests the hypothesis that the degree of thought involved in producing judgmental contrast has important implications. In three experiments, participants' ability or motivation to engage in effortful thinking was manipulated. In Experiment 1, varying personal relevance produced equivalent contrast effects, but these judgments differed in certainty. In two additional studies, despite equivalent amounts of contrast, a manipulation of the order of the standards and target of comparison led to differences in certainty (Experiment 2) and attitude–behavioral intention correspondence (Experiment 3). This is the first research to show that amount of thinking has implications for the strength and consequences of the judgment.     

Are spatial selection and identity extraction separable when attention is controlled endogenously?

Visual search for a target involves two processes: spatial selection and identity extraction. Ghorashi, Enns, and Di Lollo (2008) found these processes to be independent and surmised that they were carried out along distinct visual pathways: dorsal and ventral, respectively. The two experiments that are described in the present article evaluated this hypothesis. Attentional-blink methodology was combined with voluntary spatial cuing in a visual search task: Intertarget lag was used to manipulate identity extraction; predictive cues were used to signal target locations. Central digit cues in Experiment 1 required participants to identify digits before voluntarily directing attention to a corresponding location, whereas flashed dots in Experiment 2 (indicating an opposite location) required attentional redeployment without prior cue identification. Consistent with the dual-pathway hypothesis, cuing was impaired only when the first target and the number cue competed for ventral-pathway mechanisms. Collectively, the results support the dual-pathway account of the separability of spatial selection and identity extraction.     

Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment

Human judgment and decision making is distorted by an array of cognitive, perceptual and motivational biases. Recent evidence suggests that people tend to recognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human judgment - except when that bias is their own. Aside from the general motive to self-enhance, two primary sources of this 'bias blind spot' have been identified. One involves people's heavy weighting of introspective evidence when assessing their own bias, despite the tendency for bias to occur nonconsciously. The other involves people's conviction that their perceptions directly reflect reality, and that those who see things differently are therefore biased. People's tendency to deny their own bias, even while recognizing bias in others, reveals a profound shortcoming in self-awareness, with important consequences for interpersonal and intergroup conflict.     

图形面积判断任务下信息加工模式和信息呈现方式对吸引效应的影响

研究使用图形面积判断任务取代典型的双属性决策框架, 考察了不同信息加工模式和信息呈现方式对吸引效应的影响。实验1比较了不同信息加工模式对吸引效应的影响, 结果发现, 当被试以直觉的信息加工方式进行面积比较判断时, 吸引效应不显著, 而以分析的信息加工方式判断时吸引效应明显存在, 后者效应强度显著大于前者。实验2通过调整图形排列顺序, 比较了刺激材料呈现方式对吸引效应的影响, 结果表明, 被试以直觉的信息加工方式进行判断时吸引效应依然存在, 但其表现要受信息呈现方式影响, 相对于将目标图形放置于诱引图形和竞争图形之间, 将诱引图形放置于目标图形和竞争图形之间而成为判断背景时, 吸引效应强度更大。研究提出了吸引效应形成的两阶段理论, 认为吸引效应产生的根源同时来自直觉的和分析的两个信息加工阶段, 研究也证实信息呈现方式对被试信息加工方式造成较大影响, 进而影响吸引效应强度。     

Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases

A cognitive-ecological approach to judgment biases is presented and substantiated by recent empirical evidence. Latent properties of the environment are not amenable to direct assessment but have to be inferred from empirical samples that provide the interface between cognition and the environment. The sampling process may draw on the external world or on internal memories. For systematic reasons (proximity, salience, and focus of attention), the resulting samples tend to be biased (selective, skewed, or conditional on information search strategies). Because people lack the metacognitive ability to understand and control for sampling constraints (predictor sampling, criterion sampling, selective-outcome sampling, etc.), the sampling biases carry over to subsequent judgments. Within this framework, alternative accounts are offered for a number of judgment biases, such as base-rate neglect, confirmation bias, illusory correlation, pseudo-contingency, Simpson's paradox, outgroup devaluation, and pragmatic-confusion effects.     

Tuning the engine of cognition: a focus on NMDA/D1 receptor interactions in prefrontal cortex

The prefrontal cortex of the primate frontal lobes provides the capacity for judgment which can constantly adapt behavior in order to optimize its outcome. Adjudicating between long-term memory programs and prepotent responses, this capacity reviews all incoming information and provides an interpretation dependent on the events that have just occurred, the events that are predicted to happen, and the alternative response strategies that are available in the given situation. It has been theorized that this function requires two essential integrated components, a central executive which guides selective attention based on mechanisms of associative memory, as well as the second component, working memory buffers, in which information is held online, abstracted, and translated on a mental sketchpad of work in progress. In this review, we critically outline the evidence that the integration of these processes and, in particular, the induction and maintenance of persistent activity in prefrontal cortex and related networks, is dependent upon the interaction of dopamine D1 and glutamate NMDA receptor signaling at critical nodes within local circuits and distributed networks. We argue that this interaction is not only essential for representational memory, but also core to mechanisms of neuroadaptation and learning. Understanding its functional significance promises to reveal major new insights into prefrontal dysfunction in schizophrenia and, hence, to target a new generation of drugs designed to ameliorate the debilitating working memory deficits in this disorder.     

Subliminal anchoring: Judgmental consequences and underlying mechanisms

Judgmental anchoring—the assimilation of a numeric estimate towards a previously considered standard—is an exceptionally ubiquitous effect that influences human judgment in a variety of domains and paradigms. Three studies examined whether anchoring effects even occur, if anchor values are presented subliminally, outside of judges’ awareness. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate such subliminal anchoring effects: judges assimilated target estimates towards the subliminally presented anchor values. Study 3 further demonstrates that subliminal anchors produced a selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent target knowledge. The implications of these findings for the ubiquity of judgmental anchoring, its different underlying mechanisms, and comparative information processing are discussed.     

How strong is the comparison‐to‐the‐strongest heuristic?: An empirical test of the comparison‐ to‐the‐strongest heuristic in probability judgment1,2

Abstract: Windschitl and Wells (1998 ) proposed that the pairwise comparison between the focal and strongest alternative outcomes plays an important role in probability judgment. However, their studies did not control the effects of alternative outcomes other than the strongest one. This article tested whether only the strongest alternative outcome would affect probability judgment, using a variable selection method in a multiple regression analysis. Study 1 reanalyzed the results of Windschitl and Young (2001 ) and showed that only the strongest alternative outcome affects probability judgment. In Study 2, a new experiment was conducted to modify the methodological problems in Study 1. The results of Study 2 were identical to those of Study 1. All these results consistently supported the comparison hypothesis.     

Effect of forget instructions with and without the conditions for selective search*

A PA probe experiment was conducted to determine whether a mechanism other than selective search is involved in the Only effect of directed forgetting. To accomplish this, a small number of trials which tested all pairs in the list successively (“all” trials) were intermixed with the standard single-probe trials. On “single” trials, both pretest mechanisms and selective search may operate, but on “all” trials, selective search was eliminated. The analysis compared the Only effect and intrusion data under these two conditions and examined the fate of to-be-forgotten (TBF) recall on “all” trials. The evidence confirmed the major role of selective search in producing the Only effect. It was concluded that if a pretest mechanism was operative, it did not have the properties of a voluntary forgetting mechanism and it had only a small effect on the first half of the list.     

How the adoption of impression management goals alters impression formation

Five experiments (N = 390) tested the hypothesis that adopting an impression management goal leads the impression manager to view an interaction partner as having less of the trait he or she is attempting to express. This hypothesis was confirmed for the impression management goals of appearing introverted, extraverted, smart, confident, and happy. Experiment 2 shows that adoption of the impression goal could alter judgments even when participants could not act on the goal. Experiment 3 provides evidence that adopting an impression management goal prompted a comparison mind-set and that this comparison mind-set activation mediated target judgments. Experiment 4 rules out a potential alternative explanation and provides more direct evidence that comparison of the impression manager's self-concept mediates the impression of the target. Experiment 5 eliminates a potential confound and extends the effect to another impression goal. These experiments highlight the dynamic interplay between impression management and impression formation.     

Cognitive-behavioral and electrophysiological evidence of the affective consequences of ignoring stimulus representations in working memory

Ignoring visual stimuli in the external environment leads to decreased liking of those items, a phenomenon attributed to the affective consequences of attentional inhibition. Here we investigated the generality of this “distractor devaluation” phenomenon by asking whether ignoring stimuli represented internally within visual working memory has the same affective consequences. In two experiments we presented participants with two or three visual stimuli and then, after the stimuli were no longer visible, provided an attentional cue indicating which item in memory was the target they would have to later recall, and which were task-irrelevant distractors. Participants subsequently judged how much they liked these stimuli. Previously-ignored distractors were consistently rated less favorably than targets, replicating prior findings of distractor devaluation. To gain converging evidence, in Experiment 2, we also examined the electrophysiological processes associated with devaluation by measuring individual differences in attention (N2pc) and working memory (CDA) event-related potentials following the attention cue. Larger amplitude of an N2pc-like component was associated with greater devaluation, suggesting that individuals displaying more effective selection of memory targets—an act aided by distractor inhibition—displayed greater levels of distractor devaluation. Individuals showing a larger post-cue CDA amplitude (but not pre-cue CDA amplitude) also showed greater distractor devaluation, supporting prior evidence that visual working-memory resources have a functional role in effecting devaluation. Together, these findings demonstrate that ignoring working-memory representations has affective consequences, and adds to the growing evidence that the contribution of selective-attention mechanisms to a wide range of human thoughts and behaviors leads to devaluation.     

Memory Errors From A Change of Standard: A Lack of Awareness or of Understanding?

Memory errors occur when the context standard that is used when judging target behaviors is different from the category norm standard that is available later when the behaviors are recalled. Is insufficient awareness the reason for this change-of-standard effect? Two kinds of awareness were maximized in each of two studies: (a) awareness of the relation between the judgment and the context - telling subjects to be sure to use the non-target persons for comparison when judging the target person (salience); and (b) awareness at recall of the earlier judgmental context - asking subjects to recall the non-target persons before recalling the target person (reinstatement). Context reinstatement reduced memory errors. But when context reinstatement and salience were combined, the memory errors reappeared. In Study 2, an attempt at debiasing failed. The change-of-standard effect is explained in terms of a "natural" tendency to use the current categorical meaning of a judgment to reconstruct the referent of its past contextualized meaning.     

Comparing target detection errors in visual search and manually-assisted search

Subjects searched for low- or high-prevalence targets among static nonoverlapping items or items piled in heaps that could be moved using a computer mouse. We replicated the classical prevalence effect both in visual search and when unpacking items from heaps, with more target misses under low prevalence. Moreover, we replicated our previous finding that while unpacking, people often move the target item without noticing (the unpacking error) and determined that these errors also increase under low prevalence. On the basis of a comparison of item movements during the manually-assisted search and eye movements during static visual search, we suggest that low prevalence leads to broadly reduced diligence during search but that the locus of this reduced diligence depends on the nature of the task. In particular, while misses during visual search often arise from a failure to inspect all of the items, misses during manually-assisted search more often result from a failure to adequately inspect individual items. Indeed, during manually-assisted search, over 90 % of target misses occurred despite subjects having moved the target item during search.     

Display size effects in visual search: Analyses of reaction time distributions as mixtures

In a reanalysis of data from Cousineau and Shiffrin (2004) and two new visual search experiments, we used a likelihood ratio test to examine the full distributions of reaction time (RT) for evidence that the display size effect is a mixture-type effect that occurs on only a proportion of trials, leaving RT in the remaining trials unaffected, as is predicted by serial self-terminating search models. Experiment 1 was a reanalysis of Cousineau and Shiffrin's data, for which a mixture effect had previously been established by a bimodal distribution of RTs, and the results confirmed that the likelihood ratio test could also detect this mixture. Experiment 2 applied the likelihood ratio test within a more standard visual search task with a relatively easy target/distractor discrimination, and Experiment 3 applied it within a target identification search task within the same types of stimuli. Neither of these experiments provided any evidence for the mixture-type display size effect predicted by serial self-terminating search models. Overall, these results suggest that serial self-terminating search models may generally be applicable only with relatively difficult target/distractor discriminations, and then only for some participants. In addition, they further illustrate the utility of analysing full RT distributions in addition to mean RT.