Systematic and heuristic processing of majority and minority-endorsed messages: the effects of varying outcome relevance and levels of orientation on attitude and message processing

Two experiments investigated the conditions under which majority and minority sources instigate systematic processing of their messages. Both experiments crossed source status (majority vs. minority) with message quality (strong vs. weak arguments). In each experiment, message elaboration was manipulated by varying either motivational (outcome relevance, Experiment 1) or cognitive (orientating tasks, Experiment 2) factors. The results showed that when either motivational or cognitive factors encouraged low message elaboration, there was heuristic acceptance of the majority position without detailed message processing. When the level of message elaboration was intermediate, there was message processing only for the minority source. Finally, when message elaboration was high, there was message processing for both source conditions. These results show that majority and minority influence is sensitive to motivational and cognitive factors that constrain or enhance message elaboration and that both sources can lead to systematic processing under specific circumstances.     

Majority versus minority influence: the role of message processing in determining resistance to counter‐persuasion

Two experiments examined the extent to which attitudes changed following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter‐persuasion. In both experiments participants' attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages, delayed in time, which argued opposite positions (initial message and counter‐message). In the first experiment, attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a second counter‐message only when the initial message contained strong versus weak arguments. Attitudes changed following majority influence did not resist the second counter‐message and returned to their pre‐test level. Experiment 2 varied whether memory was warned (i.e., message recipients expected to recall the message) or not, to manipulate message processing. When memory was warned, which should increase message processing, attitudes changed following both majority and minority influence resisted the second counter‐message. The results support the view that minority influence instigates systematic processing of its arguments, leading to attitudes that resist counter‐persuasion. Attitudes formed following majority influence yield to counter‐persuasion unless there is a secondary task that encourages message processing. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Levels of consensus and majority and minority influence

Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of consensus information on majority and minority influence. In all experiments two levels of consensus difference were examined; large (82% versus 18%) and small (52% versus 48%). Experiment 1 showed that a majority source had more influence than a minority source, irrespective of consensus level. Experiment 2 examined the cause of this effect by presenting only the source label (‘majority’ versus ‘minority’), only the consensus information (percentages) or both. The superior influence of the majority was again found when either (a) both source label and consensus information were given (replicating Experiment 1) and (b) only consensus information was given, but not when (c) only the source label was given. The results showed majority influence was due to the consensus information indicating more than 50% of the population supported that position. Experiment 3 also manipulated message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to identify whether systematic processing had occurred. Message quality only had an impact with the minority of 18%. These studies show that consensus information has different effects for majority and minority influence. For majority influence, having over 50% support is sufficient to cause compliance while for a minority there are advantages to being numerically small, in terms of leading to detailed processing of its message. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mood and multiple source characteristics: mood congruency of source consensus status and source trustworthiness as determinants of message scrutiny

This research deals with the interplay of mood and multiple source characteristics in regard to persuasion processes and attitudes. In a four-factorial experiment, mood (positive vs. negative), source consensus status (majority vs. minority), source trustworthiness (high vs. low), and message strength (strong vs. weak) were manipulated. Results were in line with predictions of a mood-congruent expectancies perspective rather than competing predictions of a mood-as-information perspective. Specifically, individuals in both moods evinced higher message scrutiny given mood-incongruent (vs. mood-congruent) source characteristics. That is, across source trustworthiness, positive (negative) mood led to higher message scrutiny given a minority (majority) versus a majority (minority) source. Furthermore, across source consensus, positive (negative) mood led to higher message scrutiny given an untrustworthy (trustworthy) versus a trustworthy (untrustworthy) source. Additional analyses revealed that processing effort increased from doubly mood-congruent source combinations (low effort) over mixed-source combinations (intermediate effort) to doubly mood-incongruent combinations (high effort). Implications are discussed.     

Majority versus minority influence and prediction of behavioral intentions and behavior

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and minority influence on attitude-consistent behavioral intentions. In the first experiment, when attitudes were changed via minority influence there was a greater likelihood to engage in an attitude-consistent behavioral intention than when attitudes were changed via majority influence. This suggests that minority influence leads to stronger attitudes (based on systematic processing) that are more predictive of behavioral intentions, while attitude change via majority influence is due to compliance through non-systematic processing. Further support for this interpretation comes from the finding that the amount of message-congruent elaboration mediated behavioral intention. When there was no attitude change, there was no impact on behavioral intention to engage in an attitude-consistent behavior. Experiment 2 explored the role of personal relevance of the topic and also included a real behavioral measure. When the topic was of low personal relevance, the same pattern was found as Experiment 1. When the topic was of high personal relevance, thus increasing the motivation to engage in systematic processing, attitudes changed by both a majority and minority source increased behavioral intention and actual behavior. The results are consistent with the view that both majorities and minorities can lead to different processes and consequences under different situations.     

Social influence: The role of originality

Two experiments investigated the role of message originality vs. conventionality in social influence. It was hypothesized that subjects would generate more original proposals when confronted with a minority advocating an original viewpoint than when confronted with a conventional minority proposal or with an original majority proposal. In the first experiment, subjects exposed to an original minority paired with a conventional majority produced a wider range and more original proposals than those exposed either to a conventional minority paired with a conventional majority or to a majority source only. The second experiment further demonstrated that the original message induced creative processing only when attributed to a minority source but not when attributed to a majority source. It also showed that the original minority elicited creative processing mainly when paired with a conventional majority, but not when paired with a majority advocating an equally original position. Findings are interpreted in the frame of Nemeth's (1986) minority influence theory.     

Minority versus majority influence and uncertainty orientation: processing persuasive messages on the basis of situational expectancies

The authors examined the effects of uncertainty orientation on processing persuasive messages from minority sources versus majority sources. The authors gave participants a proattitudinal or counterattitudinal message that either a numerical majority or a numerical minority endorsed and that contained strong or weak arguments. In support of the hypothesis that was related to message scrutiny, uncertainty-oriented individuals engaged in greater message scrutiny when the Source-Position (i.e., minority/majority-pro/con) pairing was imbalanced (in majority-con, minority-pro conditions) than when it was balanced (in majority-pro, minority-con conditions). Certainty-oriented participants showed the opposite pattern, scrutinizing the message more when the situation was balanced than when the situation was imbalanced. Support for the hypothesis that was related to nonsystematic processing was less clear because the majority appeared to have played a greater role in accounting for the aforementioned interaction than did the minority. Additional analyses supported this interpretation. However, in all cases, individual differences in uncertainty orientation moderated strength and direction of information processing.     

Heuristic processing of distinctiveness information in minority and majority influence

The role of distinctiveness information in majority and minority influence was studied. Students read a message containing strong or weak arguments advocated by a minority or majority source. The communicator's minority (majority) status was said to be either distinctive to the target topic or nondistinctive across topics. Major dependent variables were attitude judgments and cognitive responses. Across conditions, messages were processed systematically, and a majority communicator tended to be more persuasive than a minority communicator. Most importantly, high distinctiveness led to greater influence than low distinctiveness, and this effect was independent of argument strength and minority versus majority status. Theoretical and applied implications of these findings are discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is politician A or politician B more persuasive? recipients' source preference and the direction of biased message processing

Participants' preference for one of two politicians running for the post of Chancellor in Germany was measured. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, participants were then presented with a persuasive message ascribed to one of these two sources. The message was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. Different from previous research on the role of message ambiguity for attitude change, the ambiguous message consisted of arguments rated as moderately convincing in a pretest rather than of a mixture of strong and weak arguments. The results were in line with predictions derived from the heuristic‐systematic model (HSM). Indicating unbiased systematic processing, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message. In the case of an ambiguous message, in line with the HSM's bias hypothesis, more agreement was found among participants preferring the source politician as compared to participants preferring the other politician. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When credibility attacks: The reverse impact of source credibility on persuasion

Recent research on the self-validation hypothesis suggests that source credibility identified after message processing can influence the confidence people have in their own thoughts generated in response to persuasive messages (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004). The present research explored the implications of this effect for the possibility that high credibility sources can be associated with more or less persuasion than low credibility sources. In two experiments, it is demonstrated that when people generate primarily positive thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because the message contains strong arguments) and then learn of the source, high source credibility leads to more favorable attitudes than does low source credibility. When people have primarily negative thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because it contains weak arguments), however, this effect is reversed—that is, high source credibility leads to less favorable attitudes than does low source credibility.     

Resistance to persuasive messages as a function of majority and minority source status

Three experiments examined the extent to which attitudes following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter-persuasion. In Experiment 1, participants’ attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages which argued opposite positions (initial pro-attitudinal message and subsequent, counter-attitudinal counter-message). Attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a (second) counter-message than attitudes following majority endorsement of the initial message. Experiment 2 replicated this finding when the message direction was reversed (counter-attitudinal initial message and pro-attitudinal counter-message) and showed that the level of message elaboration mediated the amount of attitude resistance. Experiment 3 included conditions where participants received only the counter-message and showed that minority-source participants had resisted the second message (counter-message) rather than being influenced by it. These results show that minority influence induces systematic processing of its arguments which leads to attitudes which are resistant to counter-persuasion.     

Self-referencing, quality of argument, and persuasion

This research examines whether self-referencing and self-attention facilitate careful examination of a message, referred to as systematic processing. In Experiment 1, undergraduates (n=158) who were induced to be either high or low in self-referencing read either a strong or a weak two-sided article that discussed tuition increases. Contrary to predictions, low self-referencing participants agreed more with increasing tuition than high self-referencing participants. Participants who read strong versus weak arguments agreed more with increasing tuition. In Experiment 2 undergraduates (n=204) who were either high or low in self-attention and either high or low in self-referencing read either a strong or weak two-sided article that discussed tuition increases. Consistent with predictions, participants who were either high in self-attention or high in self-referencing were more persuaded by strong than weak arguments. Specifically, both high self-attention, low self-referencing participants and low self-attention, high self-referencing participants were significantly more persuaded by strong than weak arguments. There was a trend for high self-attention, high self-referencing participants to be more persuaded by strong than weak arguments. There were no argument quality effects for low self-attention low self-referencing participants. The results of these two studies suggest that both self-referencing and self-attention facilitate systematic processing.     

The Effects of Caffeine Consumption on Direct and Indirect Majority and Minority Influence

A study is reported that examines the effect of caffeine consumption on majority and minority influence. In a double blind procedure, 72 participants consumed an orange drink, which either contained caffeine (3.5mg per kilogram of body weight) or did not (placebo). After a 40-minute delay, participants read a counter-attitudinal message (antivoluntary euthanasia) endorsed by either a numerical majority or minority. Both direct (message issue, i.e., voluntary euthanasia) and indirect (message issue-related, i.e., abortion) change was assessed by attitude scales completed before and after exposure to the message. In the placebo condition, the findings replicated the predictions of Moscovici's (1980) conversion theory; namely, majorities leading to compliance (direct influence) and minorities leading to conversion (indirect influence). When participants had consumed caffeine, majorities not only led to more direct influence than in the placebo condition but also to indirect influence. Minorities, by contrast, had no impact on either level of influence. The results suggest that moderate levels of caffeine increase systematic processing of the message but the consequences of this vary for each source. When the source is a majority there was increased indirect influence while for a minority there was decreased indirect influence. The results show the need to understand how contextual factors can affect social influence processes.     

Effects of caffeine on persuasion and attitude change: The role of secondary tasks in manipulating systematic message processing

Two experiments are reported that examine the effects of caffeine consumption on attitude change by using different secondary tasks to manipulate message processing. The first experiment employed an orientating task whilst the second experiment employed a distracter task. In both experiments participants consumed an orange‐juice drink that either contained caffeine (3.5 mg/kg body weight) or did not contain caffeine (placebo) prior to reading a counter‐attitudinal communication. The results across both experiments were similar. When message processing was reduced or under high distraction, there was no attitude change irrespective of caffeine consumption. However, when message processing was enhanced or under low distraction, there was greater attitude change in the caffeine vs. placebo conditions. Furthermore, attitudes formed after caffeine consumption resisted counter‐persuasion (Experiment 1) and led to indirect attitude change (Experiment 2). The extent that participants engaged in message‐congruent thinking mediated the amount of attitude change. These results provide evidence that moderate amounts of caffeine increase systematic processing of the arguments in the message resulting in greater agreement. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Making Attributions for Behaviors: The Prevalence of Correspondence Bias in the General Population

Previous research on the question of whether matching message content to the functional basis of people's attitudes may lead to biased message processing has been inconclusive. In particular, existing evidence is open to reinterpretation such that matched strong arguments led to more attitudinal agreement because they were scrutinized more effortfully than mismatched strong arguments. The present study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that matching the message to attitude functions may lead to biased processing only given an ambiguous (vs. an unambiguous strong or weak) message. High and low self-monitors were presented with a matched message (i.e., a quality appeal for low self-monitors and an image appeal for high self-monitors) or a mismatched message (opposite combinations). The message content was strong, weak, or ambiguous. As predicted, only given an ambiguous message did biased processing lead to more agreement when the appeal matched (versus mismatched) attitude functions. In contrast, a strong message led to more agreement than a weak message regardless of functional matching (unbiased processing).     

Caffeine, Cognition, and Persuasion: Evidence for Caffeine Increasing the Systematic Processing of Persuasive Messages

Caffeine is known to increase arousal, attention, and information processing–all factors implicated in facilitating persuasion. In a standard attitude-change paradigm, participants consumed an orange-juice drink that either contained caffeine (3.5 mg/kg body weight) or did not (placebo) prior to reading a counterattitudinal communication (anti-voluntary euthanasia). Participants then completed a thought-listing task and a number of attitude scales. The first experiment showed that those who consumed caffeine showed greater agreement with the communication (direct attitude: voluntary euthanasia) and on an issue related to, but not contained in, the communication (indirect attitude: abortion). The order in which direct and indirect attitudes were measured did not affect the results. A second experiment manipulated the quality of the arguments in the message (strong vs. weak) to determine whether systematic processing had occurred. There was evidence that systematic processing occurred in both drink conditions, but was greater for those who had consumed caffeine. In both experiments, the amount of message-congruent thinking mediated persuasion. These results show that caffeine can increase the extent to which people systematically process and arc influenced by a persuasive communication.     

Mood as a resource in dealing with health recommendations: How mood affects information processing and acceptance of quit-smoking messages

Objective: An experimental study tested the effects of positive and negative mood on the processing and acceptance of health recommendations about smoking in an online experiment. It was hypothesised that positive mood would provide smokers with the resources to systematically process self-relevant health recommendations.

Design: One hundred and twenty-seven participants (smokers and non-smokers) read a message in which a quit smoking programme was recommended. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: positive versus negative mood, and strong versus weak arguments for the recommended action.

Main outcome measures: Systematic message processing was inferred when participants were able to distinguish between high- and low-quality arguments, and by congruence between attitudes and behavioural intentions. Persuasion was measured by participant's attitudes towards smoking and the recommended action, and by their intentions to follow the action recommendation.

Results: As predicted, smokers systematically processed the health message only under positive mood conditions; non-smokers systematically processed the health message only under negative mood conditions. Moreover, smokers’ attitudes towards the health message predicted intentions to quit smoking only under positive mood conditions.

Conclusion: Findings suggest that positive mood may decrease defensive processing of self-relevant health information.     

Matching the message source to attitude functions: Implications for biased processing

A study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that matching (vs. mismatching) the source of a persuasive message to the functional basis of recipients’ attitudes may lead to positively biased processing. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, high and low self-monitors were presented with a persuasive message ascribed to a source that either matched or mismatched the functional basis of their attitudes (i.e., an expert source for low self-monitors and an attractive source for high self-monitors). The message content was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. As predicted, given an ambiguous message biased processing led to more agreement when the source matched (vs. mismatched) attitude functions. In contrast, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message regardless of source matching (unbiased processing). Results are discussed with respect to the role of the activation and use of heuristics in biased processing.     

Exploring Message Framing Outcomes When Systematic,Heuristic, or Both Types of Processing Occur

Mixed findings have emerged in message framing studies, even when such studies employ the same general type of framing, such as goal framing. This article attempts to show that by extending the heuristic–systematic model‐based explanation of message framing effects to incorporate conditions that may prompt both systematic and heuristic processing, this theory may accommodate some of the aberrant findings. The research reported shows that by varying a message issue's risky implications and its personal relevance, 2 factors that potentially influence the type of processing people employ, systematic, heuristic, or concurrently both types of processing were evoked and influenced people's judgments, causing alternative patterns of message framing effects to occur. The results offer insight into how each of these types of processing can affect message framing outcomes, and they imply that certain seemingly aberrant findings in the literature can be reconciled with this extended theory.