Henri Hubert,racial science and political myth

Henri Hubert developed early Durkheimian critiques of racial sciences such as an throposociology from his perspective as an archeologist, historian, and ethnographer of primitive European religions. His major works on the “primitive” Celts and Germans continue these critiques of racism. But Hubert also engaged in the political mythologizing of French national identity by trading in the republican myth of “celtisme.”     

Response to Hubert Dreyfus and Nancy Sherman

This paper tries to make clear what practical intelligibility is and how it is threatened at times of cultural breakdown or devastation. It argues that it is easy to overlook a breakdown in practical intelligibility because there is a tendency to frame the problems in terms of theoretical reason. Once one gets clear on what the threat to intelligibility is (and what it is not) one can see fairly straightforward ways to respond to the comments made by Dreyfus and Sherman.     

What God Cannot Do: Divine Power,the Gratuity of Grace,and Henri De Lubac

When Pius XII promulgated his encyclical Humani generis in 1950, it was widely read as censuring Henri de Lubac’s views on human nature and the desire for God. In recent years, as controversies about nature and grace have revived, this reading of Humani generis has been widely assumed by supporters and critics of de Lubac alike. Henri de Lubac, however, always insisted that the encyclical did not touch his position. This article will argue that, whatever the objectives of the encyclical’s drafters, he was correct. It will make its case by turning to an issue neglected in contemporary debates about nature and grace: divine power. It will first trace the history of Christian reflection on divine power, a story whose twists and turns have only recently been uncovered by medieval historians, and then argue that, with this history in view, interpreting the crucial line in Humani generis as excluding de Lubac’s position becomes untenable. Finally, this article will discuss the implications of this conclusion for contemporary accounts of human nature, the desire for God, and the gratuity of grace.     

Individuality and hubris in mythology: The struggle to be human

Mankind's social and psychological evolution require changing attitudes and behavior to maintain a harmony with the world, society, and his own self. Loss of immediacy with the world, power over it, and the increasing capacity for individuality pose special problems for the accomplishment of such harmony. How this is recognized, understood, and dealt with is a task undertaken through psychoanalysis, myth, philosophy, and literature. Various examples are given to show that the constancy of the basic truths about the nature of being human leads to a resonance among the diverse approaches and across the span of millennia and cultures.     

The critique of intellect: Henri Bergson's prologue to an organic epistemology

Bergson never dared to entitle his own work in such a fashion. However, his philosophical contribution on the workings of intelligence deserves such a high title. This article seeks to elucidate Bergson's contribution to philosophy in terms of his anticipation of several developments in human understanding. The work begins by investigating the relation between thought and the world (reality) by reviewing a series of constructivist concepts. In many ways, constructivism is related to both structuralism and post-structuralism, however this work does not seek to detail these interrelations in any overt way. Instead, these concepts lay the groundwork for a review of Bergson's discussion of intellect in relation to life, psyche, and modern physics. Central concepts include limitation, circularity, and complementarity. Ultimately, the article seeks to display how Bergson's work is not only a precursor to constructivism but lays the foundation for a modified constructivism that can achieve a rigorous philosophical level. The proposed ground for the intellect is in the organic. Such an epistemological foundationalism would ultimately justify an evolutionary epistemology, in that, the structuring of the organic is evolving and thus the structuring of intellect would likewise evolve. Clarifying such an epistemology may aid in developing Delueze's an-organic bergsonism.     

What It Is to Pretend

Pretense is a topic of keen interest to philosophers and psychologists. But what is it, really, to pretend? What features qualify an act as pretense? Surprisingly little has been said on this foundational question. Here I defend an account of what it is to pretend, distinguishing pretense from a variety of related but distinct phenomena, such as (mere) copying and practicing. I show how we can distinguish pretense from sincerity by sole appeal to a person's beliefs, desires, and intentions – and without circular recourse to an ‘intention to pretend’ or to a sui generis mental state of ‘imagining.’     

What Not to Multiply Without Necessity

The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle—The Laser—which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity.