N．弗雷泽和A．霍耐特关于承认理论的争论——对近十余年来西方批判理论第三代的一场政治哲学论战的评析

本文系统地考察了法兰克福学派传统的批判理论第三代围绕"承认"理论展开多年争论的历史过程,着重分析了争论演进的四个阶段及其理论主题;全面概括了争论的两个主要对手南茜·弗雷泽和阿克塞尔·霍耐特各自的理论框架,具体剖析了他们在道德哲学、社会理论、政治分析等层面的分歧和共性;并对这场争论中第三代批判理论的历史贡献、理论地位和现实意义进行了深入阐述.本文的主要目的,是为从事批判理论第三代研究提供入门路径.     

Hegelians Axel Honneth and Robert Williams on the Development of Human Morality

An individual is in the lowest phase of moral development if he thinks only of his own personal interest and has only his own selfish agenda in his mind as he encounters other humans. This lowest phase corresponds well with sixteenth century British moral egoism which reflects the rise of the new economic order. Adam Smith (1723?C1790) wanted to defend this new economic order which is based on economic exchange between egoistic individuals. Nevertheless, he surely did not want to support the moral theory of British egoism. His book The Wealth of Nations suits well into the world view of British moral egoism, but in the book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he presents a moral theory which is the total opposite of moral egoism. Contemporary German intellectuals saw contradiction in Adam Smith??s moral (social) philosophy which they called as Das Adam-Smith-Problem. Smith himself didn??t think that there is any contradiction in a situation where in economic sphere (civil society) individual act egoistically and in ethical sphere (encounter with the imagined Other) he feels humanity and compassion toward his fellow men. Hegel was a passionate reader of Adam Smith and he acknowledged Das Adam-Smith-Problem. He set the task of his social philosophy to overcome this paradox. He wanted to create a theory of a social totality where economic egoism and feelings of humanity are not in contradiction. In the same time Hegel wanted to create a theory on Bildung process where human spirit develops from moral un-freedom (heteronomy) to moral freedom and maturity (autonomy) taking care both aspect of love and reason. In certain Hegel??s texts notion of recognition plays crucial role. That is why modern Hegelians Ludwig Siep, Axel Honneth and Robert Williams consider the notion of recognition to be elementary in Hegel??s threefold theory of developing human spirit from family via civil society to sittliche state. For Hegel family is a sphere where people love their ??concrete other?? and where feeling surpasses reason. Civil Society is a sphere of private contracts and economic exchanges where cold egoistic and calculative reason surpasses feelings. In the sphere of State the contradiction between family and Civil Society (Das Adam-Smith-Problem) is solved by ??rational feeling??. According to Hegel State should protect citizens from alienating effect of egoistic reason of Civil Society and cultivate ??family-feelings?? to rational feelings which integrate citizen into ??sittliche community?? through reciprocal process of recognition. In this article I want to consider Hegelians Honneth??s and Williams??s relevance to the theory of moral development.     

A Formal Recognition of Social Attachments: Expanding Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition

Axel Honneth draws a distinction between three types of recognition: (1) love, (2) respect and (3) social esteem. In his The Struggle for Recognition, the recognition of cultural particularity is situated in the third sphere. It will here be argued that the logic of recognition of cultural identity also demands a non‐evaluative recognition, namely a respect for difference. Difference‐respect is formal because it is a recognition of the value of a particular culture not “for society” or “as such”, but for the social group involved. Yet, although it is formal, difference‐respect cannot be reduced to respect for personal autonomy and its preconditions, as Honneth wrongly suggests in Redistribution or Recognition? It is argued here that difference‐respect is oriented towards another dimension of the person, namely social attachments. This kind of respect entails a separate register of formal recognition with a corresponding concept of personal identity and a parallel category of social disrespect. What morally justifies difference‐respect from a recognition‐theoretic approach is the practical relation‐to‐self that thus becomes possible, namely self‐respect as a sense of belonging. The formal conception of the good life that Honneth articulates should include the insight that this sense of belonging is as much a necessary condition for the good life as is personal autonomy.     

承认的哲学:一种社会批判——阿克塞尔·霍耐特访谈

这是法国《智慧》杂志对德国法兰克福社会研究所主任霍耐特的一次访谈,话题涉及承认原则同自由主义的关系、承认作为现代规范和道德原则之可能、承认规范在法兰克福学派史中的方法论突破、承认道德的心理学要素、从承认原则看新自由主义的不足等几个方面。     

John Searle and Pierre Bourdieu: Divergent Perspectives on Intentionality and Social Ontology

Despite Searle's claim of theoretical proximity between his concept of the Background and Bourdieu's concept of the habitus, there is at least one substantial difference in the respective ways in which these concepts have been elaborated: the Background is conceived as a nonintentional neurophysiological reality whereas the habitus is fully intentional, or rather constitutes a nonrepresentational level of intentionality completely overlooked from Searle's standpoint. Moreover, each concept implicates a distinct perspective on social reality: the former suggests that significance is superimposed yet essentially external to this reality; the latter indicates that significance is immanent. I elaborate on the comparison between the two concepts/perspectives from different angles in order to highlight the existing differences as well as explore possible underlying affinities, which depend upon reconsidering the conventional understanding of intentionality as an exclusive attribute of mental phenomena. I show that Searle's analysis of the Background is inundated with indications of the undeniably intentional character of something he attempts to define as a nonintentional reality. Finally, I discuss the connection between the immanence of significance in Bourdieu's account of social reality and the conflict-centered orientation of this account. This dimension is noticeably absent from Searle's theorizing of the social.     

From Psychologism to Personhood: Honneth, Recognition, and the Making of Persons

The paper explores the philosophical anthropology and the moral grammar of recognition. It does so by examining how the formation of the self is informed by social recognition, the result of which can motivate individuals and groups to engage in struggles for recognition. To pursue this task, the discussion focuses on the insights of Honneth, who grounds his theory of recognition in the intersubjective relations between persons. The idea that recognition impacts the formation of personal identity is regarded as susceptible to the charge of reducing recognition demands into demands for satisfying psychological needs. Contrary to this worry, the central claim of the paper is that such an identity-based understanding of recognition can still be salvaged. More precisely, this can be done by conceiving of demands of recognition as demands for inclusion into personhood through which the moral dimension of recognition struggles is properly understood. This article concludes that despite its potential ambiguities, the notion of personhood and its relation to recognition remains philosophically defensible.     

Through a Glass Darkly: A Dialogue Between Dementia and Faith

SUMMARY

Our understanding and experience of dementia is changing and developing, as is our understanding and experience of faith. Both areas offer signs of hope but both also contain evidence of discrimination and disenchantment. This paper seeks to explore these parallel worlds from the perspective of the person with dementia, the family carer, the institutional carer and the community of faith. It closes with a challenge to theology to demonstrate just what is the Good News of the Gospel for the person with dementia.     

哈贝马斯与霍耐特团结观之辨析

哈贝马斯认为,团结指的是主体之间在交往共同体中互相尊重,彼此负责并包容他者的关系,它以正义为基础并以普遍语用学和主体间性为前提;霍耐特认为,团结是个体对共同体做出的贡献和成就得到认可和重视,而对共同体产生的休戚与共的忠诚感,它是主体间性基础上的承认的第三种模式.通过对二者团结观的比较分析,笔者认为与哈贝马斯语言理论相比,霍耐特承认理论更具现实性和可行性,实现了社会批判理论的范式转换.     

从承认理论到多元正义构想——霍耐特哲学思想发展的基本轨迹

承认理论是霍氏政治哲学、道德哲学的思想核心,多元正义构想则是霍氏承认理论的进一步拓展.因而,从承认理论到多元正义构想是霍氏哲学思想发展基本轨迹.如果说,霍氏试图将承认理论从交往理论进一步发展为道德一元论,使之处于康德传统的道德理论与社群主义之间;那么,其多元正义构想及政治伦理学则试图在康德道德哲学、后现代伦理学与哈贝马斯话话伦理学之间进行调和.总起来说,霍氏承认理论已经构成了一个比较完整的框架,但多元正义构想及政治伦理学则只是处于初创阶段,还有待于进一步阐发和完善.     

无神论与有神论的对话

在20世纪八九十年代,基本上是“有神论有人讲,无神论无人讲”。这样,基督教发展到我们眼皮底下(党校宿舍院)而无人敢过问,唯恐违反宗教信仰自由政策。我们认为,人家有在教内宣传有神论的自由,我们有在教外(社会上、人群中)宣传无神论的自由——不过这个宣传要有点“由头”;不然,凭空“开讲”是没人听的。有一家信点佛教的老人,她家是什么神也信,屋内既供着观音菩萨,也供着财神灶君。这一天,她也想“赶时兴”加入基督教,教方牧师说,欢迎你“信了主”。     

Dialogue Between Science and Spirituality: Informational Therapies

Every action, specifically the therapeutic act, is determined by our mental state: love and compassion. Positive thinking, which must lead us in our research and our acts, is based on the fact that therapeutic results are determined by a treatment of the entire human being: “Body–Mind–Spirit,” which is outstretched, according to tradition, on the four levels of consciousness: Plan 7: Body; Plan 6: Metabolism; Plan 5: Mental; Plan 4: Information (Spirituality). Within the context of a chronic condition, homeopathy practice and the use of differentiations factors have been an example of the possible patient's transformation (a journey toward the health state) and of the dialogue between science and spirituality.