The Relationship Between Aesthetic Value and Cognitive Value

Recent attention to the relationship between aesthetic value and cognitive value has focused on whether the latter can affect the former. In this article, I approach the issue from the opposite direction. I investigate whether the aesthetic value of a work can influence its cognitive value. More narrowly, I consider whether a work's aesthetic value ever contributes to or detracts from its philosophical value, which I take to include the truth of its claims, the strength of its arguments, and its internal consistency. I argue that aesthetic value does have such an impact, at least sometimes and to some degree. The aesthetic merits of some works help to preserve their consistency, and the aesthetic defects of other works render them self‐contradictory.     

Cognitive Enhancement and the Value of Cognitive Achievement

Cognitive enhancement has an increasingly wider influence on our life. The main issue that concerns epistemologists is what its epistemological implications are. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard argue that cognitive enhancement improves cognitive achievement, but this view faces axiological objections. A worry exists that cognitive enhancement undermines achievements and erodes intellectual character. Crucially, two parties seem to talk past each other because the nature of cognitive enhancement and the value of cognitive enhancement are not clearly distinguished. To end the stand‐off between the two parties, I take insight from Gwen Bradford’s work and argue that, other things being equal, cognitive enhancement either decreases the value of cognitive achievement or undermines cognitive achievement. In the face of this threat, I further submit that we could learn to live with cognitive enhancement in an integrated way so that the lost value can be restored.     

Aesthetic,Ethical, and Cognitive Value

Abstract

This paper addresses two recent debates in aesthetics: the ‘moralist debate’, concerning the relationship between the ethical and aesthetic evaluations of artworks, and the ‘cognitivist debate’, concerning the relationship between the cognitive and aesthetic evaluations of artworks. Although the two debates appear to concern quite different issues, I argue that the various positions in each are marked by the same types of confusions and ambiguities. In particular, they demonstrate a persistent and unjustified conflation of aesthetic and artistic value, which in turn is based on a more general failure to explicitly tackle the demarcation of aesthetic value. As such, the claims of each side are rendered ambiguous in respect of the relation that is supposed to hold between all these types of value and artistic value. These issues are discussed in light of a recent argument proposed by Matthew Kieran, to undermine, to some extent, the conceptual distinction between aesthetic, cognitive-ethical, and artistic values in our appraisal of art works. In rejecting his argument, I defend the conceptual distinction and a pluralistic conception of artistic value that allows for cognitive and ethical values to count as artistic, but not aesthetic, values.     

The Relational Value of Empathy

ABSTRACT

Philosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. Once we better understand in what ways empathy is a uniquely relational phenomenon, we can unveil its relevance to morality, which avoids the strictures of both partiality and impartiality. On the one hand, it is the relational value of empathy that grounds defeasible reasons to empathize insofar as empathy is morally called for by a particular relationship (or if we have defeasible reasons to establish a relationship by empathy). On the other hand, it is precisely empathy’s relational value that allows us to show that it can be kept within bounds. To realize empathy’s relational value, we are not constantly required to empathize. Instead, once we properly appreciate empathy’s distinct relational value, we can show that this leaves us room to respond to impartialist concerns.     

Cognitive Empathy and Emotional Empathy in Human Behavior and Evolution

The Psychological Record - This article presents 7 simple models of the relationship between cognitive empathy (mental perspective taking) and emotional empathy (the vicarious sharing of emotion)....     

The QCAE: A Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy

Empathy has been inconsistently defined and inadequately measured. This research aimed to produce a new and rigorously developed questionnaire. Exploratory (n ₁= 640) and confirmatory (n ₂= 318) factor analyses were employed to develop the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE). Principal components analysis revealed 5 factors (31 items). Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed this structure in an independent sample. The hypothesized 2-factor structure (cognitive and affective empathy) was tested and provided the best and most parsimonious fit to the data. Gender differences, convergent validity, and construct validity were examined. The QCAE is a valid tool for assessing cognitive and affective empathy.     

The QCAE: a Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy

Empathy has been inconsistently defined and inadequately measured. This research aimed to produce a new and rigorously developed questionnaire. Exploratory (n? = 640) and confirmatory (n? = 318) factor analyses were employed to develop the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE). Principal components analysis revealed 5 factors (31 items). Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed this structure in an independent sample. The hypothesized 2-factor structure (cognitive and affective empathy) was tested and provided the best and most parsimonious fit to the data. Gender differences, convergent validity, and construct validity were examined. The QCAE is a valid tool for assessing cognitive and affective empathy.     

认知共情和情绪共情的发展差异:元分析初探

共情的毕生发展模型表明认知共情和情绪共情两维度可能存在发展差异,本研究借助元分析技术考察个体认知共情和情绪共情的毕生发展特点。通过文献检索和筛查,获取了136项研究和178个独立效应量,共计50606名被试。发表偏差检验表明文献选取不存在发表偏差,异质性检验表明应选取随机效应模型进行分析。随机效应模型分析的结果表明,总体而言个体的共情反应以认知共情为主（Z=5.39,p<0.001）。进一步的调节效应分析表明,不同发展阶段个体的共情反应受认知共情和情绪共情的影响存在差异（Q_b=73.99,p<0.001）。具体而言,学前期儿童主要以情绪共情为主,儿童中期至成年早期主要以认知共情为主,成年中期至成年晚期主要以情绪共情为主。     

The Empathy Imbalance Hypothesis of Autism: A Theoretical Approach to Cognitive and Emotional Empathy in Autistic Development

The Psychological Record - There has been a widely held belief that people with autism spectrum disorders lack empathy. This article examines the empathy imbalance hypothesis (EIH) of autism....     

认知共情和情绪共情的发展差异:元分析初探

共情的毕生发展模型表明认知共情和情绪共情两维度可能存在发展差异,本研究借助元分析技术考察个体认知共情和情绪共情的毕生发展特点。通过文献检索和筛查,获取了136项研究和178个独立效应量,共计50606名被试。发表偏差检验表明文献选取不存在发表偏差,异质性检验表明应选取随机效应模型进行分析。随机效应模型分析的结果表明,总体而言个体的共情反应以认知共情为主（Z=5.39,p<0.001）。进一步的调节效应分析表明,不同发展阶段个体的共情反应受认知共情和情绪共情的影响存在差异（Q_b=73.99,p<0.001）。具体而言,学前期儿童主要以情绪共情为主,儿童中期至成年早期主要以认知共情为主,成年中期至成年晚期主要以情绪共情为主。     

Comparison of Cognitive Empathy,Emotional Empathy,and Social Functioning in Different Age Groups

Empathic responses and optimum social functioning are associated with psychological and physical health benefits. The aim of this study was to compare emotional empathy, cognitive empathy, and social functioning among different age groups, including adolescence, young adulthood, middle adulthood, and late adulthood. One hundred and ninety‐six people (92 males, 104 females) with the age range of 14 to 85 assigned to four age groups (adolescents, young adults, middle adults, and older adults) participated in this study. Participants were asked to complete the Empathy Quotient, the Revised Eyes Test, and Social Functioning Scale. The results showed that there were significant differences between older adults and other groups. Emotional empathy increased in older people, but there were deficits in some aspects of cognitive empathy. Also, the findings showed an age‐related decline in social functioning. Due to deficits in cognitive empathy affected by ageing, older adults showed some impairment in their ability to interpret emotional cues. This age‐related decline in cognitive empathy might be a reason for weak social functioning in older adults. Therefore, considering these elements would be helpful to provide healthcare strategies for elderly people.     

共情的认知神经研究回顾

共情是指个体对他人情绪和想法的感受及理解,它在人类个体和社会的发展中起到了重要作用。近年来,脑成像技术为研究共情的神经基础提供了有力的技术支持,发现了共情的关键功能脑区。基础与临床的实验证据表明,更好地理解共情的神经机制对于孤独症、反社会人格等精神障碍有重要的意义。该文对相关的研究进行了综述并对未来可能的研究方向提出了展望     

Cognitive Level and Achievement in Computer Literacy

This study measured to what degree achievement in a computer literacy course related to each of the following variables: general cognitive level, computer aptitude and prior experience using computers, and inherent stress. Subjects were 60 students enrolled in an undergraduate business course designed to teach the use of software packages. Achievement was measured by three course exams. Achievement early in the course was moderately related to measures of computer aptitude and cognitive level, but by the end of the course prior experience using computers emerged as the most important variable. Despite the logical and empirical connections drawn between general cognitive abilities and the ability to learn how to use computers, general abilities may be only marginally relevant to the task of learning to use software.     

认知神经科学的心理学理论价值

从认知神经科学面临的三个挑战--(1)神经科学是“还原” 的,不能完全解释一个人的心理活动过程;（2）认知神经科学无法真正解释人的心理与行为;（3）认知神经科学只能揭示出神经事件与认知活动或行为活动的相关性--入手来讨论其心理学理论价值,阐明认知神经科学在心理学研究中的重要地位及主流趋势。同时指出,认知神经科学只是心理学学科门类中的一种,它能解决的问题也只限于特定的范围,对它要有科学理性的认识和定位。     

Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge‐how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge‐how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge‐how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti‐intellectualism. Unlike neo‐Rylean anti‐intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge‐how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge‐how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.