Moral philosophy and moral psychology in Mencius

This paper defends both an interpretation of Mencius’ moral theory and that theory itself against alternative interpretive defences. I argue that the ‘virtue ethics’ reading of Mencius wrongly sees him as denying the distinction between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Virtue ethics is flawed, because it makes such a denial. But Mencius’ moral theory, in spite of Mencius’ obvious interest in moral psychology, does not have that flaw. However, I argue that Mencius is no rationalist. Instead, I show that he upholds a coherentist moral theory, in which reason and psychology both have a role. The final third of the paper compares my interpretation with the work of various important Mencius scholars. I point out that the issue of the difference between moral philosophy and moral psychology is quite important in contemporary Western moral theory.     

The idea of a moral psychology: The impact of psychoanalysis on philosophy in Britain1

In this paper the author addresses the question of the significance of psychoanalysis for moral psychology via a more specific question: the impact of psychoanalysis on British philosophy in the twentieth century. He argues that there has been no influence of any real significance, and offers intellectual reasons why not. However, he also argues that there has recently emerged the possibility for a future engagement between psychoanalysis and philosophy, and he offers a history of the emergence of this possibility. In particular, the author discusses how the emerging interest within philosophy to work out a satisfying approach to naturalist moral psychology leads it to a concern with internal mental structure and, most importantly, to transformations of intrapsychic structures. He believes that this will lead philosophy to take a greater interest in psychoanalysis.     

Rationality and moral autonomy: An essay in moral psychology

Although there are many variations on the theme, so much is made of the good of moral autonomy that it is difficult not to suppose that there is everything to be said for being morally autonomous and nothing at all to be said for being morally nonautonomous. However, this view of moral autonomy cannot be made to square with the well-received fact that most people are morally nonautonomous — not, at any rate, unless one is prepared to maintain that most people are irrational in this respect. I am not. Thus, I reject what I take to be the prevailing view of moral autonomy. I argue that it is false that (1) moral autonomy is such that it is rational for every person to prefer being morally autonomous to being morally nonautonomous, but true that (2) moral autonomy is such that if anyone is morally autonomous, then it is rational for him to prefer being morally autonomous to being morally nonautonomous.     

Mind-body meets metaethics: a moral concept strategy

The aim of this paper is to assess the relationship between anti-physicalist arguments in the philosophy of mind and anti-naturalist arguments in metaethics, and to show how the literature on the mind-body problem can inform metaethics. Among the questions we will consider are: (1) whether a moral parallel of the knowledge argument can be constructed to create trouble for naturalists, (2) the relationship between such a “Moral Knowledge Argument” and the familiar Open Question Argument, and (3) how naturalists can respond to the Moral Twin Earth argument. We will give particular attention to recent arguments in the philosophy of mind that aim to show that anti-physicalist arguments can be defused by acknowledging a distinctive kind of conceptual dualism between the phenomenal and the physical. This tactic for evading anti-physicalist arguments has come to be known as the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. We will propose a metaethical version of this strategy, which we shall call the ‘Moral Concept Strategy’. We suggest that the Moral Concept Strategy offers the most promising way out of these anti-naturalist arguments, though significant challenges remain.     

When moral identity undermines moral behavior: An integrative framework

While research bore out a reliable relationship between moral identity and moral behavior, it has not addressed potential undermining effects of moral identity on moral behavior. This paper offers an integrative framework for conceptualizing such effects. Within this framework, moral identity is defined as a goal that allows for different forms of goal pursuit. The moral identity goal can vary along three axes: prevention versus promotion orientation, external versus internal motivation, and low versus high level of abstraction. It is argued that (a) prevention orientation fosters moral disengagement, (b) external motivation promotes moral hypocrisy, and (c) a less abstract representation of the moral identity goal allows for moral licensing. These undermining effects can be overcome by promotion-oriented, internally motivated and more abstract moral identity goals.     

The role of examples in moral philosophy

Contemporary moral philosophy for the most part relegates examples to a negative role, as counter-examples. In this essay a view is articulated according to which the example has a much more positive and more fundamental role to play in the argumentation of moral philosophy: according to this view, examples may provide grounding for general moral principles. Some of the philosophical implications or presuppositions of such a view of examples are examined.     

Converging Theory and Practice: example selection in moral philosophy

ABSTRACT There is a growing trend in moral philosophy that reflects a return to a more ancient perspective of the subject matter wherein moral theory and moral practice are thought to converge. Like their Greek and Hellenistic predecessors, contemporary moral philosophers are again analysing virtues and character traits, drawing normative conclusions at the end of arguments, and testing their theories against examples from common life. Unfortunately, this literature is still cluttered with abstract, general, unlikely, and cleverly-constructed examples that are more apt to draw both reader and author away from the various moral issues under consideration. This paper argues that the selection of examples drawn from literature, history and common-life experiences offers the following advantages: (1) such examples better serve the purpose of illustration; (2) they function as projects for moral inquiry; (3) they better connect both reader and author to the moral issues being discussed; (4) they help prevent the dichotomisation of moral philosophy into meta-ethics and applied ethics; and (5) they help make it possible again for moral philosophy to have the relevance and importance it once enjoyed in previous periods of history. Selection criteria are outlined, and examples are provided that satisfy them.