Need for uniqueness,self-schemas,and thought as moderators of the false-consensus effect

L. Ross and his colleagues (L. Ross, D. Greene, & P. House, 1977, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 880–892) have demonstrated the tendency for people to expect peer similarity in behavior, termed the “false-consensus” bias. The present study was concerned with factors that might affect the generality of this bias. Specifically, we looked at the impact of level of need for uniqueness (C. R. Snyder & H. L. Fromkin, 1977, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 5, 518–527), existence of a self-schema (H. Markus, 1977, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63–78), and thought on expectations of peer similarity. It was predicted that thought would polarize the estimates of high and low N Uniq individuals in opposite directions, but only when the individual possessed a self-schema along the relevant behavioral dimension. The results for behaviors reflecting independence supported this prediction. Discussion centered around limits of the false-consensus bias, along with consideration of the complexities involved in the link between availability factors and interpersonal judgments.     

Why additive utility models fail as descriptions of choice behavior

This experiment sought to determine whether previously found metric violations of additive expectancy-value models C.F. J. C. Shanteau, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1974, 103, 680–691; J. G. Lynch and J. L. Cohen, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1978, 36, 1138–1151) were attributable to the inappropriateness of these models or to nonlinearities in the relationship between numerical ratings and underlying psychological impressions. Undergraduate participants performed two tasks employing the same experimental stimuli. In the first task, they rated the subjective values of hypothetical bets, judged separately and in combination. In the second task, they made pairwise comparisons of the same bets in terms of preference. The use of the same experimental stimuli in both tasks allowed a test of alternative models of utility judgment through application of the criterion of scale convergence (M. H. Birnbaum & C. T. Veit, Perception and Psychophysics, 1974, 15, 7–15). Results suggested that the additive expectancy-value model of judgments of the utilities of combinations of outcomes should be replaced by a weighted averaging rule in which the weight given to the value of each outcome in the averaging process is greater when this value is negative and extreme than when it is neutral.     

Informational cues and attributions based on role behavior

A recent experiment by Messick and Reeder (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 18, 482–491) attempted to extend Jones, Davis, and Gergen's (Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 302–310) classic finding that out-of-role behavior.is more informative for person perception than in-role behavior. It is argued, however, that this study confounded two variables, role performance and occupation. Evidence is presented that the occupation variable alone could have produced Messick and Reeder's results. Both variables seem to affect attributions. The importance of these findings for relating attribution theory and role theory is discussed.     

Depth relationships in young children's drawings

It has been found in previous studies that attempts to represent the occlusion of a further object by a nearer one are infrequent in the drawings of young children (N. Ingram, The encoding of depth relations in children's drawing. Unpublished paper, Department of Psychology, University of Southampton, 1975; N. Freeman, D. Eiser, & J. Sayers, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 23, 305–314, 1977; M. Cox, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 26, 551–554, 1978). Possible explanations for this are considered. In the first part of the present study 64 children of mean age 6 years 10 months were asked to draw two opaque objects placed one behind the other. Previous findings were confirmed in that over two-thirds of the children drew the two objects separately in a horizontal or, more commonly, a vertical relationship. In the second part of the study the children were asked to draw an opaque object which they saw placed inside and/or behind a transparent glass beaker. All Inside Glass drawings showed the object within the confines of the glass, but half of the Behind Glass drawings showed the object to the side of, or above, the glass. Implications of these findings are discussed in terms of an orientation to the visual world rather than the visual field.     

Finite and infinite state confusion models

A confusion model is defined as a model that decomposes response probabilities in stimulus identification experiments into perceptual parameters and response parameters. Historically, confusion models fall into two groups. Models in Group I, which includes Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50) overlap model, were developed on the basis of the notion that stimulus identification is mediated by a finite number of internal states. We call the general class of models that have this processing interpretation finite state confusion models. Models in Group II, which includes Luce's (R. O. Luce et al., Eds., Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (Vol. I), New York: Wiley, 1963) biased choice model, were not developed on the basis of an explicit processing interpretation. It is shown here that models in Group II are not finite state confusion models. We prove in addition that except for Falmagne's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 206–224) simply biased model models in Group II belong to a certain class of infinite state confusion models, namely, models asserting that stimulus identification is mediated by a continuous space of vectors representing detector activation levels.     

Sequencing of vocational development stages: Further studies

This paper reports two studies which support the prediction derived from Hershenson's (Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1968, 15, 23–30) life-stage vocational development model that average scores on Self-differentiation (worker self-concept and motivation) would exceed those on Competence (work habits, skills, and interpersonal relations), which in turn would exceed those on Independence (appropriateness and crystallization of vocational goals). The first study involved ratings by project staff on an inner city, socially disadvantaged population, and the second study involved self-ratings by individuals who had changed occupations in midcareer. Findings are consistent with those reported by Hershenson and Langbauer (Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1973, 20, 519–521) on a population of deaf clients.     

From anticipation to integration: the role of integrated action-effects in building sensorimotor contingencies

Ideomotor approaches to action control have provided evidence that the activation of an anticipatory image of previously learned action-effects plays a decisive role in action selection. This study sought for converging evidence by combining three previous experimental paradigms: the response–effect compatibility protocol introduced by Kunde (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(2), 387–394, 2001), the acquisition-test paradigm developed by Elsner and Hommel (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(1), 229, 2001), and the object-action compatibility manipulation of Tucker and Ellis (Visual Cognition, 8(6), 769–800, 2001). Three groups of participants first performed a response–effect compatibility task, in which they carried out power and precision grasps that produced either grasp-compatible or grasp-incompatible pictures, or no action effects. Performance was better in the compatible than in the incompatible group, which replicates previous observations and extends them to relationships between grasps and objects. Then, participants were to categorize object pictures by carrying out grasp responses. Apart from replicating previous findings of better performance in trials in which object size and grasp type was compatible, we found that this stimulus–response compatibility effect depended on previous response-effect learning. Taken together, these findings support the assumption that the experience of action–effect contingencies establishes durable event files that integrate representations of actions and their effects.     

Equity judgments in hypothetical,four-person partnerships

Subjects' ratings of the fairness of a set of suggested allocations in hypothetical, four-person partnerships demonstrated that an ordinal relationship between inputs and outcomes is not a sufficient definition of equity. Subjects' suggestions for fair distributions of outcomes failed to conform to G. W. Walster's (Representative Research in Social Psychology, 1975, 6, 65–67) increasing-profits and profit-sign criteria, and were better fit by R. J. Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear formula than by any other formula thus far proposed.     

On mediation

The mediation-nonmediation dichotomy proposed by the Kendlers (Psychological Review, 1962, 69, 1–16) and subscribed to by Cole and Medin (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1973, 15, 352–355) is reviewed and critiqued. It is proposed that the appropriate question for research is how children mediate, not when they mediate.     

On aspiring to present a developmental theory of occupational aspirations: A reader's guide to Gottfredson

L. S. Gottfredson's preceding comment (Journal of Vocational Behavior 1983, 23, 203–212)is characterized by undocumented and arbitrary assertions. Moreover, we still maintain and cite further evidence that the features of the stages she describes represent an implausible account of development. We conclude that there is nothing in either L. S. Gottfredson's original (Journal of Counseling Psychology 1981, 28, 545–579) article or her preceding paper that leads us to alter our belief that the views we present in our own article (Journal of Vocational Behavior 1983, 23, 179–212) will be useful for the future development of vocational theory and intervention.     

Exogenous spatial precuing reliably modulates object processing but not object substitution masking

Object substitution masking (OSM) is used in behavioral and imaging studies to investigate processes associated with the formation of a conscious percept. Reportedly, OSM occurs only when visual attention is diffusely spread over a search display or focused away from the target location. Indeed, the presumed role of spatial attention is central to theoretical accounts of OSM and of visual processing more generally (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 129:481–507, 2000). We report a series of five experiments in which valid spatial precuing is shown to enhance the ability of participants to accurately report a target but, in most cases, without affecting OSM. In only one experiment (Experiment 5) was a significant effect of precuing observed on masking. This is in contrast to the reliable effect shown across all five experiments in which precuing improved overall performance. The results are convergent with recent findings from Argyropoulos, Gellatly, and Pilling (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 39:646–661, 2013), which show that OSM is independent of the number of distractor items in a display. Our results demonstrate that OSM can operate independently of focal attention. Previous claims of the strong interrelationship between OSM and spatial attention are likely to have arisen from ceiling or floor artifacts that restricted measurable performance.     

Comment on Gollin and Rosser

Gollin and Rosser (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1974, 17, 539–544) misunderstand the way in which we use the term mediation. We agree with them in the need to reject inferences about cognitive processes from what children do not do, and we also agree in the need for age × task experimental designs.     

Measured interests versus expressed interests as predictors of long-term occupational membership

This study compared the predictive accuracy of measured versus expressed interests over a 21-year period using as a criterion occupational membership at age 36. Subjects were 83 males whose measured and expressed interests were elicited at ages 15, 18, and 25. The Strong Vocational Interest Blank was used to determine measured interests while expressed interests were determined through a combination of questionnaires and interviews. C. McArthur's (Journal of Applied Psychology, 1954, 38, 346–353) method was employed to determine the predictive validity of subjects' measured interests. The predictive validity of expressed interests was determined by using A. Roe's (The psychology of occupations. New York: Wiley, 1956; Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1957, 4, 212–217) scheme for occupational classification to code occupational preferences and compare them to age 36 occupations. Results indicated that at each point in the study expressed interests were slightly better predictors of age 36 occupational membership than measured interests. Supplementary analyses revealed no relationship between the extent to which subjects' measured or expressed interests corresponded to age 36 occupations and either overall job or career satisfaction.     

Measurement foundations for multiattribute psychophysical theories based on first order polynomials

The class of first order polynomial measurement representations is defined, and a method for proving the existence of such representations is described. The method is used to prove the existence of first order polynomial generalizations of expected utility theory, difference measurement, and additive conjoint measurement. It is then argued that first order polynomial representations provide a deep and far reaching characterization of psychological invariance for subjective magnitudes of multiattributed stimuli. To substantiate this point, two applications of first order polynomial representation theory to the foundations of psychophysics are described. First, Relation theory, a theory of subjective magnitude proposed by Shepard (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1981, 24, 21–57) and Krantz (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 168–199), is generalized to a theory of magnitude for multiattributed stimuli. The generalization is based on a postulate of context invariance for the constituent uniattribute magnitudes of a multiattribute magnitude. Second, the power law for subjective magnitude is generalized to a multiattribute version of the power law. Finally, it is argued that a common logical pattern underlies multiattribute generalizations of psychological theories to first order polynomial representations. This abstract pattern suggests a strategy for theory construction in multiattribute psychophysics.     

The root cause of the attentional blink: First-target processing or disruption of input control?

Identification of the second of two targets (T2) is impaired when presented shortly after the first (T1). T1-based theories ascribe this attentional blink (AB) to a T1-initiated period of inattention. Distractor-based theories ascribe it to a disruption of input control caused by post-T1 distractors. The finding that an AB occurs without intertarget distractors (Nieuwenstein, Potter, & Theeuwes, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 35:159-169, 2009) seemingly disconfirms distractor-based theories. The present experiments addressed different ways in which distractor-based theories might account for that finding. Intertarget events were varied in four experiments. Experiment 1 replicated Nieuwenstein, Potter, and Theeuwes??s findings. The next two experiments tested two ways (lack of visual stimulation, violation of expectation) in which the blank intertarget interval might cause an AB. Experiment 4 explored whether backward-masking of T1 can account entirely for the larger AB obtained with intervening distractors or whether distractors also disrupt input control. The results disconfirm predictions from distractor-based theories and support the claim of T1-based theories that T1 processing alone is sufficient for the AB. Simulations based on the eSTST (Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 35:787-807, 2009) and the B&B models (Olivers & Meeter, Psychological Research, 115, 836-863 2008) were compared. Predictions were more accurate from the T1-based theory (eSTST) than from the distractor-based theory (B&B).     

Fairness and preference

Two equity models were evaluated by fitting them to subjects' judgments of the fairness of payment distributions to “self” and “other” under hypothetical work situations. Neither the E. Walster, G. W. Walster, and E. Berscheid (Equity: Theory and Research, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1978) equity formulation nor Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear model adequately accounted for the fairness judgments regardless of whether self worked more or less than other. Subjects also were asked to indicate their most preferred payment distributions and these preferences were significantly different from the fairness judgments. Results suggested that fairness judgments were influenced by a bias in the direction of overpayment to self.     

Children's preference for novelty in selective learning: Developmental stability or change?

Data relating novelty preference to age for normal children are inconsistent, although a current theory predicts a developmental shift from novelty to familiarity preference in selective learning (D. Zeaman, 1976, in T. J. Tighe & R. N. Leaton (Eds.), Habituation: Perspectives from child development, animal behavior, and neurophysiology (pp. 297–320), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum). Support for this theory, however, has been derived primarily from studies of retardate learning. Normal children's novelty preference was examined within a modified Moss-Harlow (E. Moss & H. F. Harlow, 1947, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 40, 333–342) design to compare Zeaman's model with that of S. L. Witryol and W. Wanich (1983, The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 143, 3–8). Each of 16 problems, consisting of three single-stimulus demonstration trials and one two-choice test, was administered to 180 children (mean CA 4, 5.5, and 7 years) in three reward conditions. Novelty was manipulated by varying stimulus familiarization in the demonstration trials. Experiment 1 showed strong preferences for novel over familiar (demonstrated) stimuli at each age. Experiment 2 revealed novelty preference across age levels, two levels of reward contrast, and two levels of task difficulty. It was reasoned that Moss-Harlow tasks designed for normal children typically present a much higher level of difficulty than that intended by researchers. Furthermore, developmental decreases in novelty preference by retardates may derive from (a) transfer of training from prior experiments and (b) specific, repetitive instructions which may have directed attention away from stimulus novelty.     

An experimental and theoretical investigation of the constant-ratio rule and other models of visual letter confusion

The constant-ratio rule (CRR) and four interpretations of R. D. Luce's (In R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, & E. Galanter (Eds.), Handbook of mathematical psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Wiley, 1963) similarity choice model (SCM) were tested using an alphabetic confusion paradigm. Four stimulus conditions were employed that varied in set size (three, four or five stimulus elements) and set constituency (block letters: A, E, X; F, H, X; A, E, F, H; A, E, F, H, X), and were presented to each subject in independent blocks. The four interpretations of the SCM were generated by constraining one, both, or neither of its similarity and bias parameter sets to be invariant in across-stimulus set model predictions. The strictest interpretation of the SCM (both the similarity and bias parameters constrained), shown to be a special case of the CRR, and the CRR produced nearly equivalent across-set predictions that provided a reasonable first approximation to the data. However, they proved inferior to the least strict SCM (neither the similarity nor bias parameters were constrained; the common interpretation of the SCM in visual confusion). Additionally, the least strict SCM was compared to J. T. Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50, 449–454) overlap model, the all-or-none model (J. T. Townsend, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1978, 18, 25–38), and a modified version of L. H. Nakatani's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 104–127) confusion-choice model. Both the least strict SCM and confusion-choice models produced nearly equivalent within stimulus set predictions that were superior to the overlap and all-or-none within-set predictions. Measurement conditions related to model structure and equivalence relations among the models, many of them new, were examined and compared with the statistical fit results of the investigation.     

Career exploration in adulthood

The study described was designed to examine career exploration in the adult years, as seen from the perspective of decision-making behavior. Using conceptual models provided by H. B. Gelatt (Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1962, 9, 240–245) and D. V. Tiedeman (Personnel and Guidance Journal, 1961, 40, 15–21), two research questions were posed: (1) To what extent does exploration occur prior to more terminal career behaviors? and (2) To what extent are exploratory and terminal career decision modes interdependent? These questions were addressed by examining the series of decisions made by 95 subjects over a period of 18 years. The results supported the expectation that decisions made at earlier stages of development are more likely to be of an exploratory nature and that decisions made at later stages are more likely to be of a terminal nature. In addition, support was found for the hypothesis that decision-making strategies at various stages of development are interdependent.     

Dissonance theory revised again: Comment on the paper by Fazio,Zanna, and Cooper

Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper (Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view on each theory's proper domain of application. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1977, 13, 464–479) specified mutually exclusive domains of application for dissonance and self-perception theory and used a misattribution-of-arousal procedure to distinguish between dissonance reduction and self-perception processes. Because their proposed limitations of the domains of the two theories and their use of the misattribution procedure are not directly derivable from earlier statements of either theory, it may be best to regard their analysis as a new theory, rather than as a conciliation of the parent theories. New analyses based on the Fazio et al. results indicate that their data provide an insufficient basis for preferring their theory to earlier versions of dissonance and self-perception theories. Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view of each theory's proper domain of application. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1977, 13, 464–479.