共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 46 毫秒
1.
Krist Vaesen 《Synthese》2011,181(3):515-529
The Credit Theory of Knowledge (CTK)—as expressed by such figures as John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Ernest Sosa—holds that knowing
that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believing that p. Opponents have presented three sorts of counterexamples to CTK: S might know that p without deserving credit in cases of (1) innate knowledge (Lackey, Kvanvig); (2) testimonial knowledge (Lackey); or (3) perceptual
knowledge (Pritchard). The arguments of Lackey, Kvanvig and Pritchard, however, are effective only in so far as one is willing
to accept a set of controversial background assumptions (for instance, that innate knowledge exists or that doxastic voluntarism
is wrong). In this paper I mount a fourth argument against CTK, that doesn’t rest on any such controversial premise, and therefore
should convince a much wider audience. In particular, I show that in cases of extended cognition (very broadly conceived),
the most salient feature explaining S’s believing the truth regarding p may well be external to S, that is, it might be a feature of S’s (non-human, artifactual) environment. If so, the cognitive achievement of knowing that p is not (or only marginally) creditable to S, and hence, CTK is false. 相似文献
2.
Peter Langland-Hassan 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):145-173
Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we
imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom.
Three different proposals are outlined, building on theories that link visualization to sensorimotor predictive mechanisms
(e.g., “efference copies,” “forward models”). Each sees visualization as a kind of reasoning, where its freedom consists in our ability to choose the topic of the reasoning. Of the three options, I argue that the approach many will find most attractive—that visualization is a
kind of “off-line” perception, and is therefore in some sense misrepresentational—should be rejected. The two remaining proposals
both conceive of visualization as a form of sensorimotor reasoning that is constitutive of one’s commitments concerning the way certain kinds of visuomotor scenarios unfold. According to the first, these commitments
impinge on one’s web of belief from without, in the manner of normal perceptual experience; according to the second, these commitments
just are one’s (occurrent) beliefs about such generalizations. I conclude that, despite being initially counterintuitive,
the view of visualization as a kind of occurrent belief is the most promising. 相似文献
3.
Aaron Rizzieri 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(2):235-242
Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation
between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base one’s beliefs
on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that E = K entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced
belief necessarily can not serve as evidence for a further proposition. 相似文献
4.
Chrisoula Andreou 《Philosophical Studies》2006,131(3):583-606
There is a great deal of plausibility to the standard view that if one is rational and it is clear at the time of action that
a certain move, say M1, would serve one’s concerns better than any other available move, then one will, as a rational agent, opt for move M1. Still, this view concerning rationality has been challenged at least in part because it seems to conflict with our considered
judgments about what it is rational to do in cases of temptation that share the structure of Warren Quinn’s self-torturer
case. I argue that there is a way to accomodate our considered judgments about the relevant cases of temptation without giving
up the standard view or dismissing, as in some way rationally defective, the concerns of the agents in the relevant cases.
My reasoning relies on the idea that, at least in some cases, whether an action serves one’s concerns well depends on what
action(s) or course(s) of action it is part of. In the final section of the paper, I explain how this idea sheds light on
an important source of frustration in collective decision-making. 相似文献
5.
6.
Autonomy,Force and Cultural Plurality 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Monica Mookherjee 《Res Publica》2008,14(3):147-168
Within now prolific debates surrounding the compatibility of feminism and multiculturalism in liberal societies, the need
arises for a normative conception of women’s self-determination that does not violate the self-understandings or values of
women of different backgrounds and forms of life. With reference to the recent British debate about forced marriage, this
article proposes an innovative approach to this problem in terms of the idea of ‘plural autonomy’. While the capacity for
autonomy is plural, in the sense of varying across cultures, autonomy in any world-view involves a capacity to ‘endorse’ one’s
decisions in certain crucial spheres of life. Non-endorsement, coercion or force occurs if one risks being alienated from
the (cultural) goods and relationships that structure one’s capacity to act in the world. This approach counsels more caution
than prominent liberal approaches with respect to negotiating the contested boundary between freedom and force in a diverse
society.
相似文献
Monica MookherjeeEmail: |
7.
Purushottama Bilimoria 《Sophia》2008,47(3):359-376
Nietzsche represents in an interesting way the well-worn Western approach to Asian philosophical and religious thinking: initial
excitement, then neglect by appropriation, and swift rejection when found to be incompatible with one’s own tradition, whose
roots are inexorably traced back to the ‘ancient’ Greeks. Yet, Nietzsche’s philosophical critique and methods - such as ‘perspectivism’
- offer an instructive route through which to better understand another tradition even if the sole purpose of this exercise
is to perceive one’s own limitations through the eyes of the other: a self-destruktion of sorts. To help correct this shortcoming and begin the long overdue task of even-handed dialogue - or contemporary comparative
philosophy - we will be served well by looking at Nietzsche’s mistakes, which in turn informed the tragic critic of the West
of the last century, Martin Heidegger. We may learn here not to cast others in one’s own troubled image; and not to reverse
cultural icons: Europe’s Superman, and Asia’s Buddha.
相似文献
Purushottama BilimoriaEmail: |
8.
Bas C. van Fraassen 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2011,40(1):15-32
Thomason (1979/2010)’s argument against competence psychologism in semantics envisages a representation of a subject’s competence as follows:
he understands his own language in the sense that he can identify the semantic content of each of its sentences, which requires
that the relation between expression and content be recursive. Then if the scientist constructs a theory that is meant to
represent the body of the subject’s beliefs, construed as assent to the content of the pertinent sentences, and that theory
satisfies certain ‘natural assumptions’, then it implies that the subject is inconsistent if the beliefs include arithmetic.
I challenge the result by insisting that the motivation for Thomason’s principle (ii), via Moore’s Paradox, leads to a more
complex representation, in which stating the facts and expressing one’s beliefs are treated differently. Certain logical connections
among expressions of assent, and between expression and statement, are a matter of consequence on pain of pragmatic incoherence, not consequence on pain of classical logical inconsistency. But while this salvages the possibility that a modification of the above sort of representation could be adequate, Thomason’s
devastating conclusion returns if the scientist identifies himself as the subject of that representation, even when paying
heed to the requirement of pragmatic coherence of the sort highlighted by Moore’s Paradox. 相似文献
9.
Restating an interlocutor’s position in an incredulous tone of voice can sometimes serve legitimate dialectical ends. However,
there are cases in which incredulous restatement is out of bounds. This article provides an analysis of one common instance
of the inappropriate use of incredulous restatement, which the authors call “modus tonens.” The authors argue that modus tonens
is vicious because it pragmatically implicates the view that one’s interlocutor is one’s cognitive subordinate and provides
a cue to like-minded onlookers that dialectical opponents are not to be treated as epistemic peers.
相似文献
Robert B. TalisseEmail: |
10.
We look into the transformation of meanings in psychotherapy and suggest a clinical application for Wittgenstein’s intuitions
concerning the role of linguistic practices in generating significance. In post-modern theory, therapy does not necessarily
change reality as much as it does our way of experiencing it by intervening in the linguistic-representational rules responsible
for constructing the text which expresses the problem. Since “states of mind assume the truths and forms of the language devices
that we use to represent them” (Foucault, 1963, p. 57), therapy may be intended as a narrative path toward a new naming of one’s reified experiences. The clinical problem
we consider here, the pervasive feeling of inadequacy due to one’s excessive height (dysmorphophobia), is an excellent example
of “language game” by which a “perspicuous representation” (the “therapy” proposed by Wittgenstein in the 1953) may bring out alternatives to linguistically-built “traps”, putting the blocked semiotic mechanism back into motion. 相似文献
11.
Lars Gundersen 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(3):353-364
According to Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge, an agent a knows that p just in case her belief that p is true and also satisfies the two tracking conditionals that had p been false, she would not have believed that p, and had p been true under slightly different circumstances, she would still have believed that p. In this paper I wish to highlight an interesting but generally ignored feature of this theory: namely that it is reminiscent
of a dispositional account of knowledge: it invites us to think of knowledge as a manifestation of a cognitive disposition to form true beliefs.
Indeed, given a general account of dispositions in terms of subjunctive conditionals, the two tracking conditionals are satisfied
just in case the belief in question results from some cognitive disposition to form true beliefs. Recently, such a conditional
account of dispositions has, however, been criticised for its vulnerability to so-called ‘masked’, ‘mimicked’ and ‘finkish’
counterexamples. I show how the classical counterexamples to Nozick’s theory divide smoothly into four corresponding categories
of counterexamples from epistemic masking, mimicking and finkishness. This provides strong evidence for the thesis that satisfaction of the two tracking conditionals
is symptomatic of knowledge and that knowledge is instead constituted by a dispositional capability to form true beliefs. The attempt to capture such a cognitive, dispositional capability in
terms of the tracking conditionals, although providing a good approximation in a wide variety of cases, still comes apart
from the real thing whenever the epistemic layout is characterised by masking-, mimicking- and finkish mechanisms. In the
last part of the paper I explore the prospect of improving the tracking theory in the light of these findings. 相似文献
12.
William J. Fitzpatrick 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(3):585-617
The distinction between harm that is intended as a means or end, and harm that is merely a foreseen side-effect of one’s action,
is widely cited as a significant factor in a variety of ethical contexts. Many use it, for example, to distinguish terrorist
acts from certain acts of war that may have similar results as side-effects. Yet Bennett and others have argued that its application
is so arbitrary that if it can be used to cast certain harmful actions in a more favorable light, then it can equally be manipulated
to do the same for any kind of harmful action. In response, some have tried to block such extensions of the intend/foresee
distinction by rejecting its application in cases where the relation between the plainly intended means and the harm is “too
close”. This move, however, has been attacked as vague and obscure, and Bennett has argued that all the plausible candidates
for explicating the idea of excessive closeness ultimately fail. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of excessive
closeness with the aim of rescuing the intend/foresee distinction from such charges of arbitrariness. The account is based
on the distinction between merely causal and constitutive relations among states of affairs, and I show both how it escapes Bennett’s objections to other accounts and how it applies to a variety of cases. Finally,
I also examine Quinn’s alternative move of shifting the focus of the intend/foresee distinction in an attempt to sidestep
the issue of closeness, and argue that it is not ultimately successful. In fact, Quinn’s view has shortcomings that can be
resolved only by returning to an appeal to some notion of closeness, underscoring the need for the sort of account I offer. 相似文献
13.
Anita Konzelmann Ziv 《Synthese》2011,183(1):27-45
The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano’s epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements
of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano’s notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility,
immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge
involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold
attempt to examine one’s assertions and to do so by searching for the objective grounds of the truths asserted lies at the
heart of Bolzano’s notion of knowledge. However, the explanatory task of searching for grounds requires methods that cannot
warrant infallibility. Hence, its constitutive role in a conception of knowledge seems to imply the fallibility of such knowledge.
I argue that the explanatory task contained in Bolzanian knowing involves a high degree of epistemic virtues, and that it
is only through some salient virtue that the credit of infallibility can distinguish Bolzanian knowing from a high degree
of Bolzanian believing. 相似文献
14.
15.
Brandt C. Gardner Dean M. Busby Brandon K. Burr Sarah E. Lyon 《Contemporary Family Therapy》2011,33(3):253-272
A large body of research has been devoted to the study of family-of-origin (FOO) experience influences on future relationship
outcomes and processes. In addition, substantial information exists regarding the role relationship attributions play in connection
with relationship quality and stability. Yet, limited information has been forthcoming regarding how the FOO experience has
an influence on attributions made in romantic relationships. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was employed to assess the
impact of the FOO experience on attributions made about one’s own communication and personality variables, as well as the
communication and personality variables of one’s partner from a sample of individuals who had completed the RELATionship Evaluation (N = 6,649). Results show evidence of a relationship between the FOO experience and the attributions made about oneself and
one’s partner. Results were particularly pronounced for the communication variables. Gender differences also were found. The
utility of study findings for couple and family researchers and practitioners is discussed. 相似文献
16.
The more accurately people assess their comprehension, the more likely they are to engage in study behaviors that precisely
target gaps in their learning. However, comprehension regulation involves more than knowing when to implement a new study strategy; it also involves deciding which strategy will most effectively resolve one’s confusion. In two experiments, we explored how people’s motivational orientations
influence which study strategies they select to regulate their comprehension. In Experiment 1, people who were motivated to
vigilantly protect against potential mistakes (i.e., prevention-focused individuals) were more likely to adopt a rereading strategy than people who were motivated to eagerly pursue new learning
opportunities (i.e., promotion-focused individuals). In Experiment 2, this difference in strategy use emerged specifically in response to confusing sentences that
had been inserted into the text. Furthermore, by using rereading strategies to resolve their confusion, prevention-focused
individuals performed better than promotion-focused individuals on a comprehension test and a transfer task. 相似文献
17.
Mikel Burley 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(2):81-94
This paper examines Wittgenstein’s conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch.
These are that, firstly: even if someone’s life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death
vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed; and secondly: when voiced from a first-person standpoint, the claim to be absolutely safe due to one’s virtuousness
appears hubristic and self-undermining. I argue that Wittgenstein’s mystical conception of safety, unlike some others, requires
no claim about one’s own virtue and hence can be construed as avoiding these problems. 相似文献
18.
We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason
to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains
an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort
of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chance that not p” and “p but it there’s a chance that not p.” We argue that the best defense of fallibilism against this objection—a “pragmatist” defense—makes the following claims.
First, while knowledge that p is compatible with an epistemic chance that not-p, it is compatible only with an insignificant such chance. Second, the insignificance of the chance that not-p is plausibly understood in terms of the irrelevance of that chance to p’s serving as a ‘justifier’, for action as well as belief. In other words, if you know that p, then any chance for you that not p doesn’t stand in the way of p’s being properly put to work as a basis for action and belief.
相似文献
Matthew McGrathEmail: |
19.
Robin Wang 《Dao》2010,9(3):339-351
This essay argues that moral self-cultivation as described in the Confucian tradition involves the cultivation of the body.
Preparing the body in certain ways, perhaps by making it healthy, is a necessary part of moral self-cultivation. This claim
includes: (a) nourishing the body in a proper way is a first step in moral self-cultivation, and the bodily care is instrumentally valuable to one’s flourishing life; (b) making and keeping a healthy body is partly constitutive of a moral well-being and hence bodily care is also intrinsically valuable to a flourishing life. This perspective on embodied virtue is established through a discussion of qi. The body as the storehouse of qi is not only a passive reservoir of knowledge that serves as moral guidance, but also actively plays an indispensable and
integral role in activities related to one’s moral transformation. A well-cared for body provides a moral agent with the temporal
and spatial possibility for moral refinement and an enhanced good life. 相似文献