The Emergence of Better Best System Laws

The better best system account, short BBSA, is a variation on Lewis’s theory of laws. The difference to the latter is that the BBSA suggests that best system analyses can be executed for any fixed set of properties (instead of perfectly natural properties only). This affords the possibility to launch system analyses separately for the set of biological properties yielding the set of biological laws, chemical properties yielding chemical laws, and so on for the other special sciences. As such, the BBSA remains silent about possible interrelations between these freestanding sets of laws. In this paper, I explicate an emergence relation between them which preserves the autonomy or novelty of each special science’s laws but also shows their dependence: the autonomy of each level’s generalisations is given because nomicity is conferred to them system intrinsic, their dependence is established via their supervenience on lower level laws. As will be shown, the autonomy of special science laws is further strengthened by their ceteris paribus character.     

Good,Better, Best: Between Culture and Self-Enhancement

The topic of self-enhancement and culture is discussed. The question of the universality of the self-enhancement motive, well-documented in the West, inspired a lively debate, pertaining mainly to the existence of a self-enhancement motive in East-Asian cultures. The present paper presents some major findings that challenge the basic assumption of Markus and Kitayama (1991) and of Heine et al. (1999) that the self-enhancement motive does not exist in East-Asian cultures. These findings relate to the following issues: self-enhancement in East-Asia in culturally accepted domains; the role of modesty in self-enhancement; relevance of anonymity to self-enhancement manifestation; self-enhancement done by significant others; implicit measures of self-esteem; and the relations between well-being and self-enhancement in East-Asia. Some common beliefs, that self-enhancement inhibits self-improvement and that low uniqueness implies low self-enhancement are discussed and questioned. The paper suggests that the controversy regarding the self-enhancement motive may boil down to the question of the degree to which the social norms regarding restrictions on self-success are internalized in a culture.     

Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences

Discussion of moral explanation has reached animpasse, with proponents of contemporaryethical naturalism upholding the explanatoryintegrity of moral facts and properties, andopponents – including both anti-realists andnon-naturalistic realists – insisting thatsuch robustly explanatory pretensions as moraltheory has be explained away. I propose thatthe key to solving the problem lies in thequestion whether instances of moral propertiesare causally efficacious. It is argued that,given the truth of contemporary ethicalnaturalism, moral properties are causallyefficacious if the properties of the specialsciences are. Certain objections are rebuttedinvolving the nature of causation, on the onehand, and putative special features of themoral realm, on the other.     

Is Age Special? Justice,Complete Lives and the Prudential Lifespan Account

This article explores the problem of justice between age‐groups. Specifically, it presents a challenge to a leading theory in this field, Norman Daniels' Prudential Lifespan Account. The challenge relates to a key assumption that underlies this theory, namely the assumption that all individuals live complete lives of equal length. Having identified the roles that this assumption plays, the article argues that the justifications Daniels offers for it are unsatisfactory and that this threatens the foundation of his position, undermining his claim that ‘the fact that we all age’ makes age a special problem of distributive justice. This shows that the problem of justice between age‐groups is not special in the way Daniels proposes; rather it involves the same irreducibly interpersonal distributive decisions as other problems of justice. The consequences of this argument are several‐fold. Most importantly, it shows that the Rawlsian account of justice to which Daniels hopes to attach his theory to requires significantly greater benefits to be conferred on those in earlier age‐groups relative to those in later age‐group, not a distribution similar to simultaneous equality as Daniels proposes.     

Physicalism and Downward Causation in Psychology and the Special Sciences

Wilderness valued as mere resource for human‐interest satisfaction is challenged in favor of wilderness as a productive source, in which humans have roots, but which also yields wild neighbors and aliens with intrinsic value. Wild value is storied achievement in an evolutionary ecosystem, with instrumental and intrinsic, organismic and systemic values intermeshed. Survival value is reconsidered in this light. Changing cultural appreciations of values in wilderness can transform and relativize our judgments about appropriate conduct there. A final valued element in wildness is its idiographic historical particularity, and most surprising is the emergence of a novel morality when humans learn to let values go wild.     

Conspiracy theories,impostor syndrome,and distrust

Philosophical Studies - Conspiracy theorists believe that powerful agents are conspiring to achieve their nefarious aims and also to orchestrate a cover-up. People who suffer from impostor syndrome...     

Challenging Design: How Best to Account for the World as It Really Is

Evolutionary psychology and intelligent‐design theory both need to be able to account for the empirical world, or the world as it is. This essay is an attempt to clarify the challenges these theories need to meet, if the relevant empirical findings are replicable. There is evidence of change in the biological world and of modularity of mind, and there is a growing body of work that finds evolutionary theory a convincing and fruitful account of the “design” of the mind. Three major empirical findings within evolutionary psychology are presented and discussed. The author claims that Cartesian dualism, as it is usually meant within psychology—a split between body and mind—is false, but that Descartes' original division between body and soul has not been challenged and is not challenged by the evidence that the mind is also a biological entity. The article concludes that the convergence of theology and science is to be found in the onus to discover the truth about the world as it really is, and this calls for an ability on both parts to account for the empirical world.     

Philosophy of Science Between the Natural Sciences,the Social Sciences,and the Humanities: Introduction

This introduction provides a detailed summary of all papers of the special issue on the second conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science: GWP.2016.     

Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence

Synthese - Conspiracy theories are often portrayed as unwarranted beliefs, typically supported by suspicious kinds of evidence. Yet contemporary work in Philosophy argues provisional belief in...     

Properties,Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization

According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non‐empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. It therefore seems to provide a way around the causal exclusion problem. There is reason to doubt, however, that the subset account can achieve both tasks. The problem arises when we look closely at the relation between properties and causal powers, specifically, at the idea that properties confer powers on the things that have them. If realizers are to be ontically prior to what they realize, then we must regard the conferral of powers by properties as a substantive relation of determination. This relation of conferral is at the heart of a kind of exclusion problem, analogous to the familiar causal exclusion problem. I argue that the subset account cannot adequately answer this new exclusion problem, and is for that reason ill‐suited to be the backbone of a non‐reductive physicalism.     

Horror,Fear, and the Sartrean Account of Emotions

Phenomenological approaches to affectivity have long recognized the vital role that emotions occupy in our lives. In this paper, I engage with Jean‐Paul Sartre's well‐known and highly influential theory of the emotions as it is advanced in his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. I examine whether Sartre's account offers two inconsistent explications of the nature of emotions. I argue that despite appearances there is a reading of Sartre's theory that is free of inconsistencies. Ultimately, I highlight a novel reading of Sartre's account of the emotions: one that is both phenomenologically accurate and supported by textual evidence.     

From Liverpool to Freetown: West African Witchcraft,Conspiracy and the Occult

In this ethnography I examine the key features of occult discourses among middle-class Sierra Leoneans living in Britain, based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Merseyside and Cheshire between 2001-2002. It is evident that the subjects of this study are quick to engage with the conspiracy-theorising besetting Euro-American popular culture in conveying their anxieties about the civil war, poverty and corruption that have ravaged Sierra Leone, coupled to the institutionalised racism and socio-economic problems that beset the black community in Liverpool. This despair has translated into a general trepidation about West African witchcraft that has become a global metaphor for the malcontents of modernity. In recent years these worries have been added to, fuelled by the heavy responsibility individuals experience to provide financial support and moral guidance to those relatives who have been forced to leave Sierra Leone during the years of civil strife. They are secretly mistrusted by the middle-class Sierra Leoneans living in Liverpool, who worry that their less-well-off relatives malign their good intentions through their accusations of witchcraft.     

Statistical Bias and Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories

Previous research proposes that endorsement of anomalous beliefs is associated with proneness to conjunction error. This supposition ignores important differences between belief types. Correspondingly, the present study examined the degree to which components of statistical bias predicted conspiratorial ideation and belief in the paranormal. Confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling revealed that conjunction error was associated with conspiratorial ideation, whilst perception of randomness most strongly predicted belief in the paranormal. These findings opposed the notion that anomalous beliefs, by virtue of possession of common characteristics, relate similarly to conjunction error. With regard to conspiracy, conjunction‐framing manipulations produced only minor variations in relationship strength. This supported the notion that conspiratorial ideation was associated with a domain‐general susceptibility to conjunction error. Framing, however, did influence the relationship between belief in the paranormal and conjunction; whilst paranormal conjunctions were generally easier to solve, performance declined as level of paranormal belief increased.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.