Linguistic convention and worldly fact

Philosophical Studies - Truth by convention, once thought to be the foundation of a uniquely promising approach to explaining our access to the truth in nonempirical domains, is nowadays widely...     

Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and worldly incompleteness

Synthese - An influential theory has it that metaphysical indeterminacy occurs just when reality can be made completely precise in multiple ways. That characterization is formulated by employing...     

Correction to: Linguistic convention and worldly fact

Philosophical Studies - The original publication of the article contains two formatting errors, the second of which significantly inhibits readability.     

Representing ethical reality: a guide for worldly non-naturalists

Abstract

Ethical realists hold (i) that our ethical concepts, thoughts, and claims are in the business of representing ethical reality, by representing evaluative or normative properties and facts as aspects of reality, and (ii) that such representations are at least sometimes accurate. Non-naturalist realists add the further claim that ethical properties and facts are ultimately non-natural, though they are nonetheless worldly. My aim is threefold: to elucidate the sort of representation involved in ethical evaluation on realist views; to clarify what exactly is represented and how non-naturalism comes into the picture for non-naturalists; and to defend worldly non-naturalism against some objections. The first question addressed is how we should model evaluation on any realist view, which should in turn guide the identification of which properties and facts are credibly regarded as ‘evaluative’ ones. Then the question is: what role might non-natural properties and facts play, and how are they related to what is represented in ethical evaluation? Once that is clear, we will be in a position to answer certain objections to non-naturalist realism from Jackson, Gibbard, Bedke, and Dreier. I argue that the objections all mischaracterize the role played by non-natural properties and facts on plausible versions of non-naturalist realism.     

Lateral preference and students' worries: a correlation

A significant correlation was found between left-sided lateral preference as measured by the General Laterality subtest of the Lateral Preference Schedule and scores on the Student Worry Survey for 34 male college students but not for 44 female college students (M age = 19.9 yr.). This finding is consistent with other studies done with clinical populations showing correlations between left-handedness in males and various psychological disorders.     

On some sources of metacomprehension

Metacomprehension is defined as readers' evaluations of their performance on a task, involving inferences derived from a text. In two studies metacomprehension was related to characteristics of the inferences required, in terms of 1) amount of information to be kept in long-term memory (Study 1), 2) amount of information to be kept in short-term memory (Study 2) and 3) existence of negatives (Study 2). In the first study, 41 psychology students read a text and afterwards judged 1) the correctness of a set of pragmatic inference statements, and 2) their confidence in being correct or the difficulty of judging each statement. In the second study, 81 high-school students read a text and simultaneously judged 1) the correctness of a set of logical inference statements and 2) their confidence in being correct and the difficulty of judging each statement. In both studies, metacomprehension was not significantly correlated with actual performance. The results indicate that one important source of metacomprehension consists in information processing load. In Study 1, long-term memory requirements represent this load, in Study 2, the existence of negatives.     

On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism

The following paper presents a characterization of three distinctions fundamental to computationalism, viz., the distinction between analog and digital machines, representation and nonrepresentation-using systems, and direct and indirect perceptual processes. Each distinction is shown to rest on nothing more than the methodological principles which justify the explanatory framework of the special sciences.     

On some causes of behavioral contrast

Responding at low rates was differentially reinforced in each of two components of a multiple schedule. In order to study the relative contributions to behavioral contrast in one component of the rates of responding, and of reinforcement in a second component, a series of visual stimuli correlated with the duration of each interresponse time was added to one component. The added stimuli resulted in a decreased rate of responding and hence an increased rate of reinforcement in that component. Despite the increase in the rate of reinforcement, the rate of responding without added stimuli in the other component increased (contrast), even though the increase resulted in less frequent reinforcement.     

On some types of hallucinatory experience

There are types of non-visual hallucinatory experience which occur in the psychoses other than those which have a critical and derogatory content. Wish-fulfilment plays an important part in the formation of the content of these hallucinations. In others, ‘persecutory’ anxiety also occurs. A comparison is made between hallucinatory and dream content. An hypothesis is presented to account for the perceptual quality of these hallucinatory experiences. The therapeutic implications of these considerations concludes this presentation.     

On some limits of hypothetical thinking

Faced with extreme demands, hypothetical thinking runs the danger of total failure. Paradoxical propositions such as the Liar (“I am lying”) provide an opportunity to test it to its limits, while the Liar's nonparadoxical counterpart, the Truthteller (“I am telling the truth”), provides a useful comparison. Two experiments are reported, one with abstract materials (“If I am a knave then I live in Emerald City”) and one with belief-laden materials (a judge says: “If I am a knave then I enjoy pop music”). In both experiments, conditionals with Truthteller-type antecedents were “collapsed” to responses of conditional probability closely resembling estimates of control items. Liar-type antecedents, in contrast, dramatically weakened belief in conditionals in which they were embedded. The results are discussed in the framework of the theory of hypothetical thinking.     

On some limits of hypothetical thinking

Faced with extreme demands, hypothetical thinking runs the danger of total failure. Paradoxical propositions such as the Liar (“I am lying”) provide an opportunity to test it to its limits, while the Liar's nonparadoxical counterpart, the Truthteller (“I am telling the truth”), provides a useful comparison. Two experiments are reported, one with abstract materials (“If I am a knave then I live in Emerald City”) and one with belief-laden materials (a judge says: “If I am a knave then I enjoy pop music”). In both experiments, conditionals with Truthteller-type antecedents were “collapsed” to responses of conditional probability closely resembling estimates of control items. Liar-type antecedents, in contrast, dramatically weakened belief in conditionals in which they were embedded. The results are discussed in the framework of the theory of hypothetical thinking.     

Distinguishing obsessive features and worries: the role of thought-action fusion

Obsessions are a key feature of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and chronic worry is the cardinal feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). However, these two cognitive processes are conceptually very similar, and there is a need to determine how they differ. Recent studies have attempted to identify cognitive processes that may be differentially related to obsessive features and worry. In the current study we proposed that (1) obsessive features and worry could be differentiated and that (2) a measure of the cognitive process thought-action fusion would distinguish between obsessive features and worry, being strongly related to obsessive features after controlling for the effects of worry. These hypotheses were supported in a sample of 173 undergraduate students. Thought-action fusion may be a valuable construct in differentiating between obsessive features and worry.