Influencing Republicans’ and Democrats’ attitudes toward Obamacare: Effects of imagined vicarious cognitive dissonance on political attitudes

The field of experimental social psychology is appropriately interested in using novel theoretical approaches to implement change in the social world. In the current study, we extended cognitive dissonance theory by creating a new framework of social influence: imagined vicarious dissonance. We used the framework to influence attitudes on an important and controversial political attitude: U.S. citizens’ support for the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 36 Republicans and 84 Democrats were asked to imagine fellow Republicans and Democrats, respectively, making attitude discrepant statements under high and low choice conditions about support for the ACA. The data showed that vicarious dissonance, established by imagining a group member make a counterattitudinal speech under high-choice conditions (as compared to low-choice conditions), resulted in greater support for the Act by Republicans and marginally diminished support by Democrats. The results suggest a promising role for the application of vicarious dissonance theory to relevant societal issues and for further understanding the relationship of dissonance and people’s identification with their social groups.     

‘Perceived ownership’ or cognitive dissonance?

In 1992 a study by Beggan claimed it had confirmed the existence of Nuttin's ‘mere ownership effect’. This study examined an alternative mechanism for Beggan's findings in the form of forced compliance cognitive dissonance. Seventy‐three participants volunteered for the study (66 females and seven males). Results support the view that cognitive dissonance, accepting ownership of a target that was earlier perceived with negative affectivity, is a sufficient condition to enhance estimates of a target object. Ownership per se was not found to be a sufficient condition to enhance owner's estimates of an owned object. In light of this finding cognitive dissonance is offered as a possible mechanism for explaining the previous reports of a perceived ownership effect. This mechanism may also be applicable to instant endowment and mere ownership phenomena. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are moods cognitive?: A critique of Schmitt on Heidegger

Conclusion If, as Schmitt suggests, Heidegger bases the claim that moods are cognitive on the philosophical distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical knowing, then much of what Heidegger says in this connection turns out to be either unclear, trivially true, or else false. Yet Schmitt himself only occasionally seems to recognize how dubious this account really is. Moreover, in attempting to help Heidegger say what he means, Schmitt's interpretation in Chapter 5 falters. It falters because(1) the emphatic likening of moods to skills,(2) the introduction of the bizzare notion knowing how occurrently, and (3) the misconceiving of self-deception, are not to be found in Sein und Zeit. They represent, rather, an imposition upon Sein und Zeit from without. This fact means either that Schmitt's interpretation is faulty or else that it is as much reconstructive as explicative. And if reconstructive, then several conceptual mistakes are attributable to him more than to Heidegger. In spite of these difficulties Martin Heidegger on Being Human is a prize book. It attempts to understand a thinker better than he understood himself. And according to Schleiermacher this is the goal of every hermeneutic.In contrast to the successful parts of the book, the chapter on moods fails to make sense out of Heidegger's view - one reason being, I would guess, that Heidegger is, after all, equivocating on the German word Stimmung. Sometimes he uses it to refer specifically to states such as being depressed, being serene, being anxious. At other times he uses it to refer vaguely to Dasein's attunement to the world. If the human being is always already (immer schon) attuned to the world, and if such a posture toward the world is also considered a mood, then in some imprecise way one's being in a mood might be a necessary condition for any belief to affect him emotionally. But, of course, mood in this broad sense would indicate an ontologically, and not a causally, necessary condition. And so, it would not follow that every belief which affected one emotionally need have some specific mood (e.g., depression, serenity, anxiety) as its necessary causal antecedent. Nor would it follow that, as a matter of fact, a change of belief could not effect a specific change of mood.I fear that with regard to some topics the sense in which one understands Heidegger better than he understood himself may well be the original Socratic sense: one knows what Heidegger himself does not know, viz., that the conceptions of Sein und Zeit are not always intelligible. And one wonders whether any philosophical midwifery can really be of aid - at least with respect to the claim that moods are cognitive.     

Cognitive dissonance and self-monitoring: A matter of context?

In Study 1, high and low self-monitors wrote counterattitudinal essays. For some, we made it salient that they would be endorsing an opinion contrary to that of their peers. For others, no context was provided. Post-essay attitudes of high, relative to low, self-monitors were more consistent with essay topic after opposing peers. Post-essay attitudes of low and high self-monitors did not differ significantly in the no-context condition. In Study 2, high and low self-monitors wrote counterattitudinal essays in the context of opposing either their peers' beliefs or their own values. Post-essay attitudes of low, relative to high, self-monitors tended to conform more to their essays when they believed that they had written in opposition to their values. When writing in opposition to their peers, however, post-essay attitudes of high and low self-monitors did not differ significantly. We discuss the results in terms of the role that self-concept plays in the initiation of dissonance processesStudy 2 is based on the senior honors thesis of the second author conducted under the supervision of the first author, and both studies were supported by a Faculty Research Grant from Union College to the first author. We would like to thank Alice M. Isen, Mark Snyder, Hugh Foley, and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this article, and Nicole Audette, Amy Goldstein, Suzanne Shaker, and Courtney Shapiro for their assistance in collecting and analyzing data.     

Restrained eating: Mediator of gender differences on cognitive restructuring tasks?

This study examined the hypothesis that gender differences in eating restraint might mediate previously reported gender differences in cognitive restructuring tasks. Thirty female and 30 male college students matched for dietary restraint were administered two tests that had differentiated females from males and obese from normal-weight individuals in previous research: Luchins' water jar problems, and the Embedded Figures Test. On the water jar problems, use of the initial solution when no longer most efficient was greater for restrained eaters than for unrestrained eaters and no gender differences were found, supporting the hypothesis. On the Embedded Figures Test, males performed better than females, with restrained females tending to perform most poorly.Portions of this paper were presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, May 1985.     

Does intrinsic reward motivate cognitive control? a naturalistic-fMRI study based on the synchronization theory of flow

Cognitive control is a framework for understanding the neuropsychological processes that underlie the successful completion of everyday tasks. Only recently has research in this area investigated motivational contributions to control allocation. An important gap in our understanding is the way in which intrinsic rewards associated with a task motivate the sustained allocation of control. To address this issue, we draw on flow theory, which predicts that a balance between task difficulty and individual ability results in the highest levels of intrinsic reward. In three behavioral and one functional magnetic resonance imaging studies, we used a naturalistic and open-source video game stimulus to show that changes in the balance between task difficulty and an individual’s ability to perform the task resulted in different levels of intrinsic reward, which is associated with different brain states. Specifically, psychophysiological interaction analyses show that high levels of intrinsic reward associated with a balance between task difficulty and individual ability are associated with increased functional connectivity between key structures within cognitive control and reward networks. By comparison, a mismatch between task difficulty and individual ability is associated with lower levels of intrinsic reward and corresponds to increased activity within the default mode network. These results suggest that intrinsic reward motivates cognitive control allocation.     

On the inconclusiveness of “crucial” cognitive tests of dissonance versus self-perception theories

Several recent experiments are claimed to have tested conflicting predictions of cognitive dissonance and self-perception theories. It is argued that these claims fail to take into account the capacity of each formulation to account adequately for results “predicted” by the other. This argument is then continued, at a metatheoretical level, to reach the conclusion that the two theories are not capable of producing unequivocally contradictory predictions of cognitive consequences of experimental procedures.     

Cognitive dissonance in children: Justification of effort or contrast?

Justification of effort is a form of cognitive dissonance in which the subjective value of an outcome is directly related to the effort that went into obtaining it. However, it is likely that in social contexts (such as the requirements for joining a group) an inference can be made (perhaps incorrectly) that an outcome that requires greater effort to obtain in fact has greater value. Here we present evidence that a cognitive dissonance effect can be found in children under conditions that offer better control for the social value of the outcome. This effect is quite similar to contrast effects that recently have been studied in animals. We suggest that contrast between the effort required to obtain the outcome and the outcome itself provides a more parsimonious account of this phenomenon and perhaps other related cognitive dissonance phenomena as well. Research will be needed to identify cognitive dissonance processes that are different from contrast effects of this kind. nt]mis|This research was facilitated by a fellowship from the Fulbright Scholar Program and the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council, as well as by a visiting professorship at the University of Lille III for T.R.Z. Preparation of the article was facilitated by National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH 63726 to T.R.Z.     

Do amnesics exhibit cognitive dissonance reduction? The role of explicit memory and attention in attitude change

In two studies, we investigated the roles of explicit memory and attentional resources in the process of behavior-induced attitude change. Although most theories of attitude change (cognitive dissonance and self-perception theories) assume an important role for both mechanisms, we propose that behavior-induced attitude change can be a relatively automatic process that does not require explicit memory for, or consciously controlled processing of, the discrepancy between attitude and behavior. Using a free-choice paradigm, we found that both amnesics and normal participants under cognitive load showed as much attitude change as did control participants.     

The influence of cognitive load on self-presentation: can cognitive busyness help as well as harm social performance?

Extra cognitive loads can hinder challenging self-presentations by usurping needed cognitive resources but also may sometimes improve them by shifting attention away from negative self-preoccupation. In Study 1, extraverts and introverts participated in an interview in which they presented themselves as either extraverted or introverted. Congruent self-presentations, which should be cognitively nondemanding, were unaffected by a cognitive busyness manipulation (rehearsing an 8-digit number). However, incongruent self-presentations were affected by busyness. Busyness decreased the effectiveness of extraverts who tried to appear introverted but increased the effectiveness of introverts who tried to appear extraverted. Study 2 found that introverts, who also tend to be socially anxious, reported less public self-consciousness and fewer negative self-focused thoughts when they were busy than when they were not busy.     

Lifshits’ ontognoseology as a version of Lenin’s theory of reflection

In Soviet philosophy, two versions of Lenin’s theory of reflection are represented respectively by Mikhail Lifshits and Todor Pavlov. They both isolate and juxtapose two dialectical elements: reflection and creativity. Within this methodological dilemma, Lifshits’s ontognoseology is an original doctrine of our “mirror” attitude to the world whereby material being is the true subject, while man is a tool of its self-reflection.     

A semiotic theory of imagery processes with experiments on an Indo-European and a Ural-Altaic language: Do speakers of different languages experience different cognitive worlds?

StrØmnes, F. J. A semiotic theory of imagery processes with experiments on an Indo-European and a Ural-Altaic language: Do speakers of different languages experience different cognitive worlds?Scand. J. Psychol., 1973, 14, 291–304.-A theory of information transmission by symbol systems is presented. The theory is related to results on imagery and verbal behaviour found in the literature, and a new experiment is briefly reported. It is argued that information transmission can exclusively take place by the transmission of geometric isomorphs. Some of the conditions which must be fulfilled by a sign system which can transmit geometric isomorphs are pointed out. A supporting experiment, which purports to show that the underlying geometric systems of Ural-Altaic (represented by Finnish) and Indo-European (represented by Swedish) are strikingly different, is reported.     

Autism: cognitive deficit or cognitive style?

Autism is a developmental disorder characterized by impaired social and communicative development, and restricted interests and activities. This article will argue that we can discover more about developmental disorders such as autism through demonstrations of task success than through examples of task failure. Even in exploring and explaining what people with autism find difficult, such as social interaction, demonstration of competence on contrasting tasks has been crucial to defining the nature of the specific deficit. Deficit accounts of autism cannot explain, however, the assets seen in this disorder; for example, savant skills in maths, music and drawing, and islets of ability in visuospatial tests and rote memory. An alternative account, reviewed here, suggests that autism is characterized by a cognitive style biased towards local rather than global information processing – termed ‘weak central coherence’. Evidence that weak coherence might also characterize the relatives of people with autism, and form part of the extended phenotype of this largely genetic disorder, is discussed. This review concludes by considering some outstanding questions concerning the specific cognitive mechanism for coherence and the neural basis of individual differences in this aspect of information processing.     

Connectionist models of cognitive development: where next?

Over the past two decades, connectionist models have generated a lively debate regarding the underlying mechanisms of cognitive development. This debate has in turn led to important empirical research that might not have occurred otherwise. More recently, advances in developmental neuroscience present a new set of challenges for modelers. In this article, I review some of the insights that have come from modeling work, focusing on (1) explanations for the shape of change; (2) new views on how knowledge may be represented; (3) the richness of experience. The article concludes by considering some of the new challenges and opportunities for modeling cognitive development.