On the nature and order of organizational processing: A reply to Peterson

Several points in the original article by Palmer and Rock (1994) are clarified in light of Peterson’s (1994) commentary. First, we address several issues related to the nature and order of organizational processes in our theory. We argue that many of her objections result from misconceptions about our theory. We attempt to clarify the relevant issues, including the fact that we intended the theory to describe an ordering of processes in cascade rather than as a sequence of classical discrete stages. Second, we discuss Peterson’s objections to our discussion of her findings on the relation between figure-ground processing and object recognition. We argue against her “prefigural recognition” proposal on logical grounds and provide an alternative account of her findings in terms of our theory.     

The nature and varieties of felt presence experiences: A reply to Nielsen

Nielsen [Nielsen, T. (2007). Felt presence: Paranoid delusion or hallucinatory social imagery? Consciousness and Cognition, 16(4), 975–983.] raises a number of issues and presents several provocative arguments worthy of discussion regarding the experience of the felt presence (FP) during sleep paralysis (SP). We consider these issues beginning with the nature of FP and its relation to affective-motivational systems and provide an alternative to Nielsen’s reduction of FP to a purely spatial hallucination. We then consider implications of the “normal social imagery” model. We can find only one specific empirical hypothesis articulated within this framework and it turns out to be one that we explicitly addressed in our original paper. We also review our position regarding the possible relation of FP during SP to a number of related anomalous experiences and contrast FP to anomalous vestibular-motor (V-M) phenomena. We review our position that the neuromatrix concept, in the light of available evidence, is more appropriately applied to V-M experiences than FP. Finally, we pursue speculations, raised in Nielsen’s commentary, on the wider implications of FP.     

A reply to Cunning on the nature of true and immutable natures

The Cambridge Companion to Humanism. Jill Kraye (ed.). Cambridge Companions to Literature. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xvii + 320. £35.00 hbk, £12.95 pbk. ISBN 0–521–43038–0 (hbk), 0–521–43624–9 (pbk).

Scepticism in the History of Philosophy ‐ A Pan‐American Dialogue. Edited by Richard H. Popkin. Dordrecht‐Boston‐London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996. pp. xxii + 285, hbk, £99.00, ISBN 0–7923–3769–7

Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe. David B. Ruderman. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1995. pp. xi + 392. ISBN 0–300–06112–9

Pluralism and The Personality of the State. David Runciman. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. xiv + 279. £35.00. ISBN 0521–55191–9

Gassendi et L'Europe. Edited by Sylvia Murr. Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1997. pp. 494. FF 240. ISBN 2–7116–1306–2

Nicholas Malebranche: Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion. Edited by Nicholas Jolley, trans. by David Scott. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. xlii + 287.

John Locke: Anleitung des menschlichen Verstandes. Eine Abhandlung von den Wunderwerken. In der Übersetzung Königsberg 1755 von Georg David Kypke, edited by Terry Boswell, Riccardo Pozzo and Clemens Schwaiger. Stuttgart‐Bad Cannstatt, 1996, 2 vols., pp. xxviii + 2187pp. viii + 140. DM 186. ISBN 3–7728–1711–4

Leibniz's ‘New System’ (1695). Edited by Roger S. Woolhouse, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 1996. pp. x + 201. ISBN 88–222–4454–0 (hbk).

Mary Astell: Political Writings. Edited by Patricia Springborg. (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xlviii + 286. (hbk.) £45.00 (hbk.) £15.95 (pbk.) ISBN 0–521–41800–3 (hbk.) 0–521–42845–9 (pbk.)

Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Men and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Edited by Sylvana Tomaselli. (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. xxxvii + 349. (hbk.) £35.00 (hbk.), £8.95 (pbk.) ISBN 0–521–43053–4 (hbk.) 0–521–43633–8 (pbk.)

Knud Haakonssen: Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. pp. x + 386. £45.00 hbk. ISBN 0–521–49686–1. £15.95 pbk. ISBN 0–521–49802–3

Hartwig Wiedebach: Die Bedeutung der Nationalität für Hermann Cohen. Europaea Memororia. Studien und Texte zur Geschichte der europäischen Ideen. Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 1997. pp. viii + 340.     

The nature of the reading deficit in developmental dyslexia: a reply to Ellis

Ellis (1979) credits me with the view that “developmental dyslexia might be regarded as a genetic form of deep dyslexia” and then proceeds to argue that my grounds for this view are ill-founded. He offers an alternative proposal, that developmental dyslexia may be likened to (acquired) surface dyslexia. In this paper I will attempt to answer Ellis' (1979) criticisms and provide a critique of his alternative proposal.     

Accreditation: A reply to mathers

Accreditation in counselling is meant not for the benefit of the counsellor but for the protection of the public. It is concerned more with guaranteeing certain standards of ethics than with the acclamation of status. Whatever method is used, it must avoid the pitfalls of conservatism and academicism which in other professions have been jointly responsible for the attack on accreditation itself as a process. Those involved in counselling and psychotherapy should not wait passively until Parliament acts, but need to be critically involved in bringing into being a system of accreditation which is both flexible and creative.     

Vagueness and incoherence: A reply to Burns

I would like to thank Terence Horgan, William Throop and especially my wife, Diane Schwartz, for helpful suggestions for improving this paper and for valuable and insightful discussions on the topic of vagueness. I would also like to thank Ithaca College for generously supporting the work on this paper with a Summer Research Grant.     

Omniscience and physicalism: A reply to Beyer

In a recent issue ofSophia, Jason A. Beyer introduced objections to the antitheist arguments that purport to show the inconsistencies between God’s attributes. In this short response I argue that Beyer’s objections are untenable.