Science as Structured Imagination

This paper offers an analysis of scientific creativity based on theoretical models and experimental results of the cognitive sciences. Its core idea is that scientific creativity — like other forms of creativity — is structured and constrained by prior ontological expectations. Analogies provide scientists with a powerful epistemic tool to overcome these constraints. While current research on analogies in scientific understanding focuses on near analogies, where target and source domain are close, we argue that distant analogies — where target and source domain differ widely — are especially useful in periods of intense conceptual change. To argue this point, we discuss three case studies from the history of science: early physiologists like Harvey, early evolutionary biologists like Darwin, and recent theorists on the evolution of the human mind like Mithen.     

SCIENCE AND RELIGION AS LANGUAGES: UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENCE–RELIGION RELATIONSHIP USING METAPHORS,ANALOGIES, AND MODELS

Many scholars often use the terms “metaphors,” “analogies,” and “models” interchangeably and inadvertently overlook the uniqueness of each word. According to recent cognitive studies, the three terms involve distinct cognitive processes using features from a familiar concept and applying them to an abstract, complicated concept. In the field of science and religion, there have been various objects or ideas used as metaphors, analogies, or models to describe the science–religion relationship. Although these heuristic tools provided some understanding of the complex interaction, they failed to address the broad nature of science and religion as well as the multifarious relationship between the two in a sociocultural context. Unlike the previous candidates, the concept of language, including the notions of linguistic worldview, linguistic identity, dialects, power, and bilingualism, offers a unique and comprehensive window through which science, religion, and the relationship between the two are seen with clarity.     

Analogical Mapping by Constraint Satisfaction

A theory of analogical mapping between source and target analogs based upon interacting structural, semantic, and pragmatic constraints is proposed here. The structural constraint of isomorphism encourages mappings that maximize the consistency of relational corresondences between the elements of the two analogs. The constraint of semantic similarity supports mapping hypotheses to the degree that mapped predicates have similar meanings. The constraint of pragmatic centrality favors mappings involving elements the analogist believes to be important in order to achieve the purpose for which the analogy is being used. The theory is implemented in a computer program called ACME (Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine), which represents constraints by means of a network of supporting and competing hypotheses regarding what elements to map. A cooperative algorithm for parallel constraint satisfaction identities mapping hypotheses that collectively represent the overall mapping that best fits the interacting constraints. ACME has been applied to a wide range of examples that include problem analogies, analogical arguments, explanatory analogies, story analogies, formal analogies, and metaphors. ACME is sensitive to semantic and pragmatic information if it is available, and yet able to compute mappings between formally isomorphic analogs without any similar or identical elements. The theory is able to account for empirical findings regarding the impact of consistency and similarity on human processing of analogies.     

Form symbolism, analogy, and metaphor

Simple forms, such as a square and a circle, can be symbolic; for example, a square can be deemed to behard and a circle to besoft. The relation between form symbolism and the comprehension of metaphors and analogies was studied in three experiments. Subjects were asked to rate matches between terms such assoft andhard andcircle andsquare as symbols (Experiment 1), metaphors (Experiment 2), and analogies (Experiment 3). The results show that a highly rated symbolic relation could be a poorly rated metaphorical relation. Ratings of analogies were similar to ratings of symbols. We argue that apt metaphors, analogies, and symbolic forms claim that the vehicle and the topic of the comparisons have common features, but that metaphoric representation entails more common features than does either symbolism or analogy, because metaphor requires that the vehicle be an especially apt example of a superordinate class. Thus, metaphor is a particularly strong claim about common features shared by the topic and the vehicle.     

How the sperm dominates the ovum — objectification by metaphor in the social representation of conception

This investigation is about the use of metaphors in the everyday understanding of conception. It is argued that the analysis of the relationship between source and target domain in a metaphor used as an objectification device can help explain how social representations are acquired collectively and individually. We expect that in popular knowledge of conception the central metaphors and images relate to the subjects' everyday experience as social actors and sexual beings because social and sexual experience is pervasive and well-understood. In an experimental questionnaire study involving 169 subjects, it is shown as hypothesized that subjects prefer to compare the process of fertilization, i.e. the role and behaviour of sperms and ovum, with sexual and sex-role behaviour where the role of men is projected upon sperms and the role of women upon the ovum. This implies that sperms are seen not only as more active, but also as harder, stronger, and more dominant than the ovum. These effects are stronger, the more subjects personally subscribe to a more conservative sex-role orientation. In the discussion it is suggested that it is necessary to analyse the two intricately linked levels of objectification, the cognitive process of selecting specific images and the social process of the diffusion of popular knowledge, if we want to understand how common sense works.     

Emergent representations, interaction theory and the cognitive force of metaphor

We focus here on the problem of how new representations emerge through a cognitive agent's interaction with the environment. We address this problem within a framework where representation-building mechanisms operate to create new representations against a backdrop of existing representations, and argue that novel and creative metaphors in any language provide a prime example of this phenomenon. Our approach to modeling the emergence of representation integrates ideas from three different streams of research: (1) the interaction theory of metaphor proposed by Black and others to account for the creativity of metaphors; (2) gestalt theories of perception; and (3) contemporary research supporting a constructivist and action-oriented view of perception and cognition. Combining these insights together, we outline our Gestalt projection model, and discuss three different ways in which new representations might emerge through metaphors. Finally, we propose that metaphor may be viewed as a cognitive force through which a cognitive agent asserts its creative spirit onto the environment.     

Understanding and appreciating metaphors

We consider three theories that have dominated discussions of metaphor. One view is that metaphors make comparisons, the basis for the comparison being the features (or categories) that the terms of the metaphor share. The second view is that metaphors involve an anomaly. The third view is that metaphors are ‘interactive’, producing a new way of seeing the terms. We propose a new theory—the domains-interaction view—that draws on elements of all three earlier views, but borrows especially from the interaction view. We consider the implications of our theory for three questions: What are metaphors? How are they understood? What makes a good metaphor? We argue that metaphors correlate two systems of concepts from different domains. The best metaphors involve two diverse domains (more distance between domains making for better metaphors) and close correspondence between the terms within those domains. We call the degree of correspondence within-domain similarity. Metaphors are interpreted in several stages: the terms of the metaphor are encoded; the domains involved are inferred; the structures to be seen as parallel are found; the correspondences between these structures are ‘mapped’ or constructed; the terms of the metaphor are compared. If the terms are not seen to match or occupy analogous roles in their different domains, then the metaphor may be reinterpreted. The evidence on all this is tentative but supports our view. We review two studies (Tourangeau and Sternberg, 1981) that support the hypothesis that distance within domain relates negatively to aptness, whereas distance between domains relates positively. Several studies on comprehension tend to disconfirm the comparison theory's notion that the tenor and vehicle necessarily share features. Tenor and vehicle also appear to have asymmetrical roles in the interpretive process.     

Common and specific features in pictorial analogies

Pictures belonging to different domains (cups and persons), as well as pictures belonging to the same domains (cups or persons only), were used to construct analogies of various paradigms. Pictures from different domains shared three common features, while pictures within each domain had two features specific to that domain. When no specific feature change was introduced, an asymmetry of the paradigms IA cup is to B cup as R person is to S person and P person is to Q person as C cup is to D cup) was obtained as an extension of the theory of metaphoricity (Ortony, 1979) predicted. When specific feature changes were introduced, however, the obtained results were not as the extended theory would predict. An alternative model that emphasizes the function of a set of reference feature changes in extraction and comparison of the feature changes that may exist in the first and second terms was proposed to account for the experimental findings.     

Checking the heavenly ‘bank account of karma’: cognitive metaphors for karma in Western perception and early Theravāda Buddhism

To visualize the accumulation of good and bad karma in terms of credit or debt in a bank account is a common feature in works on Buddhism and other Indian traditions. Applying conceptual metaphor theory, this article tracks the metaphorical framework of understanding karma as a kind of ‘heavenly bank account’ back to its roots in early European scholarship. Based on a comparison with metaphors for karma to be found in Pāli texts of the Theravāda tradition, namely, the analogies of ripening, inheritance, and the dark/bright dichotomy, this article argues that the ‘bank-account’ imagery differs in significant – if subtle – respects from these emic metaphors, displaying certain Judeo-Christian preconceptions of moral bookkeeping, sin, and salvation.     

The semantic pointer theory of emotion: Integrating physiology,appraisal, and construction

Emotion theory needs to explain the relationship of language and emotions, and the embodiment of emotions, by specifying the computational mechanisms underlying emotion generation in the brain. We used Chris Eliasmith’s Semantic Pointer Architecture to develop POEM, a computational model that explains numerous important phenomena concerning emotions, including how some stimuli generate immediate emotional reactions, how some emotional reactions depend on cognitive evaluations, how bodily states influence the generation of emotions, how some emotions depend on interactions between physiological inputs and cognitive appraisals, and how some emotional reactions concern syntactically complex representations. We contrast our theory with current alternatives, and discuss some possible applications to individual and social emotions.     

道德情绪在道德隐喻映射中的作用及其神经机制

道德隐喻的加工, 实质上是从始源域的身体感知觉经验映射到目标域, 表征抽象道德概念的过程。新近研究从认知神经科学角度揭示道德隐喻加工的神经机制, 进而探讨情绪因素在道德隐喻映射中的作用。道德隐喻映射机制是在具体道德情境中身体感知经验与情绪体验、认知加工相互作用的结果。未来研究应拓展道德隐喻映射的维度和方向, 在社会交互环境中丰富和完善研究范式, 提高生态效度和跨文化效度。     

Misunderstanding metaphor: What's the problem?

In order to investigate the potential difficulties posed by task demands and by surface features of metaphorical sentences, children aged 6, 7, and 9 years were presented with metaphorical grounds encoded in five alternative linguistic forms: predicative metaphors, topicless metaphors, similes, analogies, and riddles. The task demands posed by comprehension of predicative metaphors proved greater than those posed by topicless metaphors, suggesting that it is more difficult to specify the similarity between two given terms than it is to generate a missing term. When topicless metaphors were rewritten either in an explicit analogic form or in the form of a riddle, comprehension was increased; however, when predicative metaphors were rewritten as similies, the addition of the term “like” to make clear the similarity relationship between the two terms failed to elevate understanding.     

Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy

A theory of analogy must describe how the meaning of an analogy is derived from the meanings of its parts. In the structure-mapping theory, the interpretation rules are characterized as implicit rules for mapping knowledge about a base domain into a target domain. Two important features of the theory are (a) the rules depend only on syntactic properties of the knowledge representation, and not on the specific content of the domains; and (b) the theoretical framework allows analogies to be distinguished cleanly from literal similarity statements, applications of abstractions, and other kinds of comparisons. Two mapping principles are described: (a) Relations between objects, rather than attributes of objects, are mapped from base to target; and (b) The particular relations mapped are determined by systematicity, as defined by the existence of higher-order relations.     

The relationship of analogical distance to analogical function and preinventive structure: the case of engineering design

Analogy was studied in real-world engineering design, using the in vivo method. Analogizing was found to occur frequently, entailing a roughly equal amount of within- and between-domain analogies. In partial support for theories of unconscious plagiarism (Brown & Murphy, 1989; Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996) and Ward's (1994) path-of-least-resistance model, it was found that the reference to exemplars (in the form of prototypes) significantly reduced the number of between-domain analogies between source and target, as compared with using sketches or no external representational systems. Analogy served three functions in relation to novel design concepts: identifying problems, solving problems, and explaining concepts. Problem identifying analogies were mainly within domain, explanatory analogies were mainly between domain, and problem-solving analogies were a mixture of within- and between-domain analogies.     

The neural, evolutionary, developmental, and bodily basis of metaphor

We propose that there are four fundamental kinds of metaphor that are uniquely mapped onto specific brain “networks” and present preliterate (i.e., evolutionary, including before the appearance of written language in the historical record), prelinguistic (i.e., developmental, before the appearance of speech in human development), and extralinguistic (i.e., neuropsychological, cognitive) evidence supportive of this view. We contend that these basic metaphors are largely nonconceptual and entail (a) perceptual-perceptual, (b) cross-modal, (c) movement-movement, and (d) perceptual-affective mappings that, at least, in the initial stages of processing may operate largely outside of conscious awareness. In opposition to our basic metaphor theory (B_mT), the standard theory (S_mT) maintains that metaphor is a conceptual mapping from some base domain to some target domain and/or represents class-inclusion (categorical) assertions. The S_mT captures aspects of secondary or conceptual metaphoric relations but not primary or basic metaphoric relations in our view. We believe our theory (B_mT) explains more about how people actually recognize or create metaphoric associations across disparate domains of experience partly because they are “pre-wired” to make these links.     

From perceptual rags to metaphoric riches--bodily, social, and cultural constraints on sociocognitive metaphors: comment on Landau, Meier, and Keefer (2010)

What leads people to describe some of their interpersonal relationships as "close" and "warm" and others as "distant" and "cold"? Landau, Meier, and Keefer (2010) proposed that conceptual metaphors facilitate social cognition by allowing people to use knowledge from a relatively concrete (source) domain (e.g., physical distance) in understanding a different, usually more abstract (target) concept (e.g., love). We concur that such a notion of metaphors can greatly enrich the field of social cognition. At the same time, we believe it is important to devote greater theoretical attention to the nature of metaphorical representations in social cognition. We believe that Landau et al. place too much emphasis on sociocognitive metaphors as top-down knowledge structures and pay too little attention to the constraints that shape metaphors from the bottom up. In the present contribution, we highlight important bottom-up constraints, imposed through bodily constraints and social scaffolds. Sociocognitive metaphors do not exist just for mental representation but for action as well. We discuss the relevance of grounding sociocognitive metaphors for broader motivational purposes.