CAUSATION AND THE CANBERRA PLAN

David Lewis has a general recipe for analysis: the Canberra Plan. His analyses of mind, color, and value all proceed according to the plan. What is curious is that his analysis of causation – one of his seminal analyses – doesn't. It doesn't and according to Lewis it can't. Lewis has two objections against using the Canberra Plan to analyze causation. After presenting Lewis' objections I argue that they both fail. I then draw some lessons from their failure.     

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION

Underdevelopment is the most controversial issue of our time. In a world which apparently exhibits so much power and yet does so little to drive it back, it represents the challenge par excellence. However, concerning this most pressing and controversial issue of underdevelopment, of all the disciplines which study man, philosophy is the one which until now said the least. At first sight, to mark off in the topic of underdevelopment an area of real philosophical concern does not seem feasible indeed. Underdevelopment understood as a mere failure of development appears to be within the competence of the disciplines of the social sciences, especially of economics, rather than that of philosophy. Viewed as a technical problem, it could thereby be declared outside the sphere of direct philosophical inquiry.
But this reason is no sooner accepted than it comes up against itself by the very nature of the conflicts in which the social sciences got bogged down in their attempt to understand underdevelopment. Although not directly spelt out, the conflicts are unmistakably pervaded throughout by philosophical questions. It suffices to point out the main cause of the theoretical split which divides scholars, in the general issue of tradition and modernity, to really bring out the eminently philosophical nature of the debate. We are obviously referring to the conflict between modernization theory and the neo-Marxist school. The purpose of this paper is precisely to show that the topic of underdevelopment, not only raises one of the basic and oldest problems of philosophy, namely the nature of the connection between the spiritual and the material, but also helps positively to reformulate it.     

CAUSALITY, INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY: MIND BODY INTERACTION IN SPINOZA

According to Spinoza mental events and physical events are identical. What makes Spinoza's identity theory tempting is that it solves the problem of mind body interaction rather elegantly: mental events and physical events can be causally related to each other because mental events are physical events. However, Spinoza seems to deny that there is any causal interaction between mental and physical events. My aim is to show that Spinoza's apparent denial of mind body interaction can be reconciled with the identity theory. I argue that Spinoza had both an extensional and an intensional concept of cause and when Spinoza seems to deny mind body interaction he is having in mind the intensional concept of cause. This intensional concept of cause corresponds to that of causal explanation. I will argue that Spinoza anticipated Donald Davidson's view that even though mental events cannot be explained by referring to physical events and vice versa, mental and physical events are causally related to each other.     

AGENT CAUSATION AND THE PROBLEM OF LUCK

Abstract: On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent‐causal libertarian accounts. A view of this type is defended against a recent and challenging version of the argument from luck.     

CAUSATION,DISPOSITIONS, AND PHYSICAL OCCASIONALISM

Even though theistic philosophers and scientists agree that God created, sustains, and providentially governs the physical universe and even though much has been published in general regarding divine action, what is needed is a fine‐grained, conceptually coherent account of divine action, causation, dispositions, and laws of nature consistent with divine aseity, satisfying the widely recognized adequacy conditions for any account of dispositions.¹ Such an account would be a basic part of a more comprehensive theory of divine action in relation to the fundamental concepts of science and of mathematics. Our aim in this article is simply to present such a theory.     

THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL DIVINE CAUSATION AND THE BENEFITS OF PARTIAL CAUSATION: A RESPONSE TO SKOGHOLT

In this article, I defend my previous argument that natural divine causation suffers under the problem of causal overdetermination and that it cannot serve as a line of demarcation between theistic evolution (TE) and intelligent design (ID). I do this in light of Christoffer Skogholt's critique of my article. I argue that Skogholt underestimates the naturalistic ambitions of some current thinkers in TE and fails, therefore, to adequately respond to my main argument. I also outline how partial causation better serves as a model for the relationship between God's providence and evolution.     

EMERGENCE, DOWNWARDS CAUSATION AND THE COMPLETENESS OF PHYSICS

The 'completeness of physics' is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downwards causation. I argue that it must do this if it is to feature in a valid causal argument for physicalism. Drawing on the notion of conferring causal power, I formulate a suitable principle, 'strong completeness'. I investigate the metaphysical implications of distinguishing this principle from emergent downwards causation, and I argue that categoricalist accounts of properties are better equipped to sustain the distinction than dispositional essentialist accounts. Finally, I argue that the additional evidence needed for strong completeness renders the causal argument otiose for any properties amenable to scientific reduction.     

PERCEIVED JOB CHARACTERISTICS AND JOB SATISFACTION: AN EXAMINATION OF RECIPROCAL CAUSATION

The following four assumptions were tested (a) satisfaction with job/task events and perceptions of job challenge, autonomy, and importance are direct, reciprocal causes of each other; (b) job perceptions are also caused directly by situation attributes, although perceptual distortions resulting for individual dispositions must also be considered; (c) job satisfaction is also cognitively consistent with (i.e., caused by) individual dispositions, although these individual dispositions are generally different from those associated with job perceptions; and (d) individuals reply on job perceptions, and not situational attributes, for information in formulating job satisfaction attitudes. The assumptions are tested on a sample of nonsupervisory subjects ( n = 642) from divergent work environments (e.g., production-lines and a computer software department). A nonrecursive, structural equation analysis, combined with tests of logical consistency, supported the assumptions above. The results were employed to recommend changes in current perspectives regarding perceptual/affective dichotomies and unidirectional causal models and moderator models that link job perceptions to job satisfaction.     

DIS-UNIFIED PLURALIST ACCOUNTS OF CAUSATION

One way of assessing the philosophical literature on causation is to consider views on the nature of the causal relation. Early theorists were 'monists', taking there to be one causal relation. More recent theorists, however, have turned to pluralism, which holds that the causal relation is only accurately captured by two (or more) relations. I argue that one way of being a pluralist – the way which takes there to be exactly two types of causation – is self defeating, if it promises to handle intuitions about all causal situations. I illustrate the point via neuron diagrams.     

THE VISUAL EXPERIENCE OF CAUSATION

The thesis that we can visually perceive causal relations is distinct from the thesis that visual experiences can represent causal relations. I defend the latter thesis about visual experience, and argue that although they are suggestive, the data provided by Albert Michotte's experiments on perceptual causality do not establish this thesis. Turning to the perception of causality, I defend the claim that we can perceive causation against the objection that its arcane features are unlikely to be represented in experience.