幼儿对所有权权利的理解

对物品的所有权意味着所有者对所有物具有多重权利, 如触碰、使用、更改、追踪和转移等。研究发现, 3岁幼儿就能理解, 所有者对自己的物品具有触碰权和使用权, 而他人不具有。但是, 他们理解所有物的更改权、追踪权和转移权, 却相对滞后。这提示对不同所有权权利表征的发展可能是分化的。此外, 3岁幼儿还理解所有者具有赋予他人使用所有物的权利, 还会积极维护这种权利, 并对阻止权利实施的行为表示抗议, 说明他们也能理解二级所有权权利。为什么幼儿对不同所有权权利的表征会出现分化, 其背后的机制需要未来研究的探索。此外, 某些公共物品(如公共汽车)本身存在着所有权权利相分离的情况, 幼儿是如何表征的, 也值得我们进行研究。不同文化对所有权权利的侧重不同, 提示我们有必要对所有权权利认知的发展进行跨文化检验。     

Parallels in Preschoolers' and Adults' Judgments About Ownership Rights and Bodily Rights

Understanding ownership rights is necessary for socially appropriate behavior. We provide evidence that preschoolers' and adults' judgments of ownership rights are related to their judgments of bodily rights. Four‐year‐olds (n = 70) and adults (n = 89) evaluated the acceptability of harmless actions targeting owned property and body parts. At both ages, evaluations did not vary for owned property or body parts. Instead, evaluations were influenced by two other manipulations—whether the target belonged to the agent or another person, and whether that other person approved of the action. Moreover, these manipulations influenced judgments for owned objects and body parts in the same way: When the other person approved of the action, participants' judgments were positive regardless of who the target belonged to. In contrast, when that person disapproved, judgments depended on who the target belonged to. These findings show that young children grasp the importance of approval or consent for ownership rights and bodily rights, and likewise suggest that people's notions of ownership rights are related to their appreciation of bodily rights.     

My body and other objects: The internal limits of self‐ownership

Common practices such as donating blood or selling hair assume rights of disposal over oneself that are similar to, if not indistinguishable from, property rights. However, a simple view of self‐ownership fails to capture relevant moral differences between parts of a person and other objects. In light of this, we require some account of the continuity in the form of ownership rights a person has over herself and other objects, which also acknowledges the normative differences between constitutive parts of a person, on the one hand, and external objects, on the other. This paper provides such an account by arguing that there are reasons internal to a general justification of property rights to limit the extent of powers included in ownership of different kinds of object, depending on how the person is situated in relation to them. Rejecting a typical Hohfeldian view of property as a univocal, gradable concept allows us to make space for a new approach to property and self‐ownership: one which can make sense of various uses of the body as property without entailing that our relation to those parts is exhaustively characterised by an ordinary property right.     

Children's ascriptions of property rights with changes of ownership

Ownership is not a “natural” property of objects, but is determined by human intentions. Facts about who owns what may be altered by appropriate decisions. However, young children often deny the efficacy of transfer decisions, asserting that original owners retain rights to their property. In Experiment 1, 4–5-year-old and 7–8-year-old children and adults were asked to resolve disputes between initial owners and various types of receivers (finders, borrowers, buyers). Experiment 2 involved disputes both before and after transfers of ownership. At all ages participants privileged owners over non-owners and accepted the effectiveness of property transfers. Overall, children's intuitions about property rights were similar to those of adults. Observed differences may reflect older participants’ willingness to segregate property rights from other considerations in assessing the acceptability of actions.     

Sacrificing parents on the altar of children's rights: Intergenerational struggles and rights in deportability

State actors arguing for the rights of undocumented children often attempt to strengthen children's deservingness by portraying their parents as bad parents who put their children at risk. Through ethnographic observations in Malmö, Sweden and Birmingham, UK, this article shows how such demonization of the parents by the state is not reflected in the everyday life experiences of undocumented families themselves. While the state views the parents as putting their children at risk by ‘hiding’ them, the parents view the state as putting their children at risk by trying to deport them. The article discusses how parents act as ‘humanitarian agents’ responsible for caring for the children when state support to the deserving, rights-bearing child is limited by the notion of the deportable migrant child. These parental practices of unrecognized emotional labour are analysed as motherwork. The interdependent character of family life in deportability is highlighted through how children take on parental responsibilities as well and how stress and knowledge about their irregular situation is shared across generations. To conclude, the article argues that if one neglects the intergenerational context of undocumented children's rights, one risks marginalising the human rights of both children as well as adults.     

Whose forest? Whose land? Whose Ruins? Ethics and conservation

The stakes are very high in many struggles over cultural property, not only because the property is itself valuable, but also because property rights of many kinds hinge on cultural identity. However, the language of property rights and possession, and the standards for establishing cultural rights, is founded in antiquated and essentialized concepts of cultural continuity and cultural purity. As cultural property and culturally-defined rights become increasingly valuable in the global marketplace, disputes over ownership and management are becoming more and more intense. Using the example of a recent lawsuit over logging on Mayan Indian reservations in the Central American country of Belize, this paper argues that cultural essentialist positions are no longer tenable. Assigning exclusive ownership of globally important resources to any group or entity on purely cultural grounds is likely to prolong conflict instead of creating workable management structures. The author instead advocates a concept of “stakeholding” which acknowledges the legitimate interests of diverse individuals and groups. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium entitled “Ethics in Science: Special Problems in Anthropology and Archaeology” held at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Philadelphia, PA, 15 February, 1998.     

Parental Autonomy

ABSTRACT We argue that in societies like our own the prevailing view that parents have both special responsibilities for and special rights over their children fails to give a proper understanding of the autonomy both of parents and of children. It is our claim that there is a logical priority of the separable interests of a child over the autonomy of its parents in the fulfilment of their special responsibilities for and the exercise of their special rights over their children. However, we believe that in acknowledging the child as a distinct locus of interests appropriate weight can still be given to parental autonomy. In particular, since raising a child is a long-term commitment which plays a central role in the life-plans of many adults it will be a legitimate exercise of an adult's autonomy strongly to influence the future of any children involved in such a plan. Such influence will be quite separate from paternalistic concern for those children. But the logical priority of the child's interests will at the same time show why parents are not entitled to behave proprietorially toward their children, even when paternalistic concern is called for.     

Early representations of ownership

To navigate a world filled with private property, children must be able to assign ownership information to objects and update that information when appropriate. In this chapter, the authors propose that children include ownership as an attribute of their object representations. Children can learn about ownership attributes either by witnessing owners acting on their property, a visual source, or by receiving information from the testimony of others, a verbal source. The authors consider the differences between these two forms of information and how they might conflict at the representational level, leading to difficulties in learning about ownership.     

Emotional mortgage

Abstract

Couples who are given property by their parents as a wedding gift or as a gift a little later in the marriage appear to start off their marriages with a bonus that any couple would certainly envy. Often, however, the “given” property has strings attached and the “lucky” couple finds themselves in emotional mortgage to one of their parents. Emotional mortgage is seen as a debt of loyalty and obligation owed to one of the spouse's parents which places the couple in a position of servitude in regard to those parents. The expectation of eventual ownership of property appears to be the mechanism which binds the couple to the parents in the face of countless intrusions and usurpations by the parents.     

Against faith schools: a philosophical argument for children’s rights

In spite of the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants parents the right to an education in conformity with their own religious convictions, this paper argues that parents should have no such rights. It also tries to demonstrate that religious and cultural minorities have no rights to establish faith schools and that it is a child’s right in trust, to autonomous well‐being, which trumps any such claims. Faith schools, it is argued, represent a real and serious threat to children’s autonomy, especially their emotional autonomy. As such, they are incompatible with the aims of education required by a liberal democracy.     

Child Welfare Versus Parental Autonomy: Medical Ethics,The Law,and Faith-Based Healing

Over the past three decades more than 200 children have died in the U.S. of treatable illnesses as a result of their parents relying on spiritual healing rather than conventional medical treatment. Thirty-nine states have laws that protect parents from criminal prosecution when their children die as a result of not receiving medical care. As physicians and citizens, we must choose between protecting the welfare of children and maintaining respect for the rights of parents to practice the religion of their choice and to make important decisions for their children. In order to make and defend such choices, it is essential that we as health care professionals understand the history and background of such practices and the legal aspects of previous cases, as well as formulate an ethical construct by which to begin a dialogue with the religious communities and others who share similar beliefs about spiritual healing. In this paper, we provide a framework for these requirements.     

More Property,Better Sex? The Relationship Between Property Ownership and Sexual Satisfaction Among Married Vietnamese Women

Since the first sexuality research in Vietnam was conducted in the late 1980s, scholarship on this field has proliferated and the topic is now less of a taboo in public discourse. Nevertheless, little is known about the area of sexual satisfaction as well as factors determining a satisfying sexual life for Vietnamese women. Using data from 2783 married women collected from a national survey, we explore the relationships among their sexual satisfaction, socio-demographic factors, and sexual experiences with a focus on their association with ownership of property. Results demonstrated that income, ethnicity, living region, frequency of sex, and sexual experience had a strong relationship with a satisfying sexual life for married women. Additionally, we found that property ownership was a strong predictor of sexual satisfaction: Women who had a savings or bank account in their own name as well as held ownership over their housing or residential land had higher odds of feeling more sexually satisfied. The present study is an important step toward follow-up research that should delve deeper into the field of human subjective sexual well-being not only from the health point of view, but also through a social and cultural lens. The study also has useful implications for those working on sexual health rights as well as for practitioners of women’s rights in development programs and projects that aim to empower women through altering traditional discourses and practices over women’s role in property ownership.     

Child Abuse: parental rights and the interests of the child

ABSTRACT I criticise the 'liberal'view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producer. If natural parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be 'licensed'but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve.     

The child's conceptions about means of production and their owners

Investigated the child's social ideas, namely notions about production means (factory, public transportation, farmland) and family influence on notion acquisition. 120 children of jive age groups (4 to 13 years) were clinically interviewed (sensu Piaget). Children's parents, workers and housewives of an Italian industrial centre, answered to questionnaires inquiring background information on parents and child and appraisal of child's level of understanding. Interview answers were classified on ten level sequences concerning father's job, home ownership, function and ownership of production means and produce. Correlational analyses and separate ANOVAs [5(age) × 2(sex) × 3(production mean)] in three subject areas (owner of production mean, of produce, and produce use) of interview answers reveal that children's ideas about different production means develop with differing rhythms through the same level sequences, which are clearly related to the general characterstics of intelligence described by Piaget. Questionnaires show that parents tend to furnish their children with the degree of information concerning jobs appropriate to the level of development at which the parents believe their children to be.     

Is the Non-rivalrousness of Intellectual Objects a Problem for the Moral Justification of Economic Rights to Intellectual Property?

It is often argued that the fact that intellectual objects—objects like ideas, inventions, concepts, and melodies—can be used by several people simultaneously makes intellectual property rights impossible or particularly difficult to morally justify. In this article, I assess the line of criticism of intellectual ownership in connection with a central category of intellectual property rights, economic rights to intellectual property. I maintain that it is unconvincing.     

Children Apply Principles of Physical Ownership to Ideas

Adults apply ownership not only to objects but also to ideas. But do people come to apply principles of ownership to ideas because of being taught about intellectual property and copyrights? Here, we investigate whether children apply rules from physical property ownership to ideas. Studies 1a and 1b show that children (6–8 years old) determine ownership of both objects and ideas based on who first establishes possession of the object or idea. Study 2 shows that children use another principle of object ownership, control of permission—an ability to restrict others’ access to the entity in question—to determine idea ownership. In Study 3 , we replicate these findings with different idea types. In Study 4 , we determine that children will not apply ownership to every entity, demonstrating that they do not apply ownership to a common word. Taken together, these results suggest that, like adults, children as young as 6 years old apply rules from ownership not only to objects but to ideas as well.     

Gratitude and parents' rights over their children's religious upbringing

Although most parents claim their children owe them obligations of gratitude, there has been no attempt to analyze gratitude as a basis for parental rights over children's religious upbringing. Parents' provision of benefits to their children in an altruistic fashion requires that children ought normally to honor parental requests that they participate in religious rituals and attend sectarian education. However, the limits on parental altruism and the self‐defeating nature of extreme demands for requital of gratitude suggest that gratitude is not a sufficiently strong basis to justify the rights of parents to prevent their children's exposure to religious beliefs inconsistent with their own. The state acts consistently with children's obligation of gratitude when it offers an education providing children the right to exit their religious communities, but not when it seeks to promote radical religious autonomy.     

Mary Wollstonecraft's Feminist Critique of Property: On Becoming a Thief from Principle

The scholarship on Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) is divided concerning her views on women's role in public life, property rights, and distribution of wealth. Her critique of inequality of wealth is undisputed, but is it a complaint only of inequality or does it strike more forcefully at the institution of property? The argument in this article is that Wollstonecraft's feminism is partly defined by a radical critique of property, intertwined with her conception of rights. Dissociating herself from the conceptualization of rights in terms of self‐ownership, she casts economic independence—a necessary political criterion for personal freedom—in terms of fair reward for work, not ownership. Her critique of property moves beyond issues of redistribution to a feminist appraisal of a property structure that turns people into either owners or owned, rights‐holders or things acquired. The main characters in Wollstonecraft's last novel—Maria, who is rich but has nothing, and Jemima, who steals as a matter of principle—illustrate the commodification of women in a society where even rights are regarded as possessions.     

Children's understanding of ownership transfers

An understanding of ownership entails the recognition that ownership can be transferred permanently and the ability to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate transfers. Two experiments explored the development of this understanding in 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-year olds, using stories about gift-giving and stealing. The possibility that children use simple biases to identify owners, such as a first possessor, current possessor or a loan bias, was also investigated. Five-year olds appropriately acknowledged a permanent transfer of ownership in the case of giving but not stealing. Four-year olds allowed permanent transfers but struggled to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate transfers. Many 4-year olds allowed adults, but not children, to keep property that had been stolen. Two- and 3-year olds exhibited a first possessor bias for both stories. We conclude that, by 5 years of age, children possess a mature understanding of ownership transfer whereas younger children are prone to biases.     

Decoupling Marriage and Parenting

This article argues for separating the institutions of marriage and parenting, conceptually and legally. Marriage is neither necessary nor adequate for fostering cooperative and stable co‐parenting. Because promoting marriage fails to protect all children, the state should develop a more suitable formal mechanism whereby co‐parents can commit to cooperate in good faith in order to best serve the interests of their children. Like civil marriage, many of the terms of these contracts are aspirational and not enforceable, though they can guide arrangements for custody and financial support. Co‐parenting agreements need not be limited to two parents, nor need they be limited to legal parents, but can include de facto parents, such as stepparents, foster parents, and other support parents. One important aim of these agreements is to recognise and support the valuable work that married or unmarried co‐parents perform, and to protect the parental rights of caregivers in different kinds of situations.