Morality: An Evolutionary Account

ABSTRACT— Refinements in Darwin's theory of the origin of a moral sense create a framework equipped to organize and integrate contemporary theory and research on morality. Morality originated in deferential, cooperative, and altruistic "social instincts," or decision-making strategies, that enabled early humans to maximize their gains from social living and resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways. Moral judgments, moral norms, and conscience originated from strategic interactions among members of groups who experienced confluences and conflicts of interest. Moral argumentation buttressed by moral reasoning is equipped to generate universal and impartial moral standards. Moral beliefs and standards are products of automatic and controlled information-processing and decision-making mechanisms. To understand how people make moral decisions, we must understand how early evolved mechanisms in the old brain and recently evolved mechanisms in the new brain are activated and how they interact. Understanding what a sense of morality is for helps us understand what it is.     

计算模型在道德认知研究中的应用

道德认知关注道德心理背后的信息加工。近年来, 研究者开始将计算模型应用于道德认知研究, 以探索道德认知如何在大脑中实现。但目前研究者对道德认知进行计算建模的研究处于起步阶段。计算模型(漂移扩散模型、效用模型、强化学习模型和分层高斯过筛器模型)在道德认知行为和生理研究上的运用量化了道德决策、道德判断和道德推理背后的认知过程和神经机制。此外, 这一新进展对理解反社会行为和精神障碍等有所助益。最后, 计算建模有待完善, 未来研究需要关注其潜在的问题。     

The “new categorical imperative” and Adorno’s aporetic moral philosophy

This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae.     

MORAL DECISIONS ABOUT HUMAN GERM-LINE MODIFICATION

Technologies for human germ-line modification may soon enable humanity to create new types of human beings. Decisions about use of this power entail an unprecedented combination of difficulties: the stakes are immense, the unknowns are daunting, and moral principles are called into question. Evolved morality is not a sure basis for these decisions, both because of its inherent imperfections and because genetic engineering could eventually change humans’ innate cognitive mechanisms. Nevertheless, consensus is needed on moral values relevant to germ-line modification. These values could be based on characteristics of human beings that would remain constant regardless of revised genomes.     

两种道德自我调节机制下的道德行为

道德自我调节指个体根据道德自我, 从事(不从事)道德行为和不道德行为。道德自我分为状态道德自我(道德自我知觉)和特质道德自我(道德认同)。道德自我调节的负反馈机制, 指个体依据道德自我知觉, 保持道德行为的波动性, 它包含道德许可效应和道德清洁效应; 正反馈机制, 指个体依据道德认同, 保持道德行为的一致性。解释水平理论整合了正负反馈机制, 两种道德行为。未来研究需探讨公我、个体差异对道德自我调节机制的影响。     

The role of moral utility in decision making: An interdisciplinary framework

What decisions should we make? Moral values, rules, and virtues provide standards for morally acceptable decisions, without prescribing how we should reach them. However, moral theories do assume that we are, at least in principle, capable of making the right decisions. Consequently, an empirical investigation of the methods and resources we use for making moral decisions becomes relevant. We consider theoretical parallels of economic decision theory and moral utilitarianism and suggest that moral decision making may tap into mechanisms and processes that have originally evolved for nonmoral decision making. For example, the computation of reward value occurs through the combination of probability and magnitude; similar computation might also be used for determining utilitarian moral value. Both nonmoral and moral decisions may resort to intuitions and heuristics. Learning mechanisms implicated in the assignment of reward value to stimuli, actions, and outcomes may also enable us to determine moral value and assign it to stimuli, actions, and outcomes. In conclusion, we suggest that moral capabilities can employ and benefit from a variety of nonmoral decision-making and learning mechanisms.     

高科技战争对人民军医道德心理的影响及对策初探

现代高科技战争呈现出的新模式和新特点引发了新的伦理问题,从而对参战医护人员的道德心理构建提出了更高要求。分析了高科技战争对我人民军医道德心理,即道德认知、道德情感、道德意志、道德行为等方面的主要影响,进而从医德心理学科角度提出了相应的优化策略。     

Personal and impersonal stimuli differentially engage brain networks during moral reasoning

Moral decision making has recently attracted considerable attention as a core feature of all human endeavors. Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging studies about moral judgment have identified brain areas associated with cognitive or emotional engagement. Here, we applied graph theory-based network analysis of event-related potentials during moral decision making to reveal the personal/impersonal distinction in the organization of functional connectivity. Our results indicated that the personal task had more larger long-range connections involved in frontal regions and the right hemisphere, and higher network efficiency of some frontal electrodes such as F2 than the impersonal. These might be related to brain resource reorganization contributing to efficient conflict resolution. These findings provide new insights into neural mechanisms of moral dilemmas.     

“Internally Wicked”: Investigating How and Why Essentialism Influences Punitiveness and Moral Condemnation

Kant argued that individuals should be punished “proportional to their internal wickedness,” and recent work has demonstrated that essentialism—the notion that observable characteristics reflect internal, biological, unchanging “essences”—influences moral judgment. However, these efforts have yielded conflicting results: essentialism sometimes increases and sometimes decreases moral condemnation. To resolve these discrepancies, we investigated the mechanisms by which essentialism influences moral judgment, focusing on perceptions of actors’ control over their behavior, the target of essentialism (particular behaviors vs. actors’ character), and the component of essentialism (biology vs. immutability). Participants punished people described as having a criminal essence more than those with a non-criminal essence or no essence. Probing potential mechanisms underlying this effect, we found a mediating role for perceptions of control and weak influences of essentialism focus (behavior vs. character) and component of essentialism (biology vs. immutability). These results extend prior work on essentialism and moral cognition, demonstrating a causal link between perceptions of “internal wickedness” and moral judgment. Our findings also resolve discrepancies in past work on the influence of essentialism on moral judgment, highlighting the role that perceptions of actors’ control over their behavior play in moral condemnation.     

道德情绪:探寻道德与创造力关系的新视角

先前有关道德与创造力的关系研究多关注道德的认知与行为差异对创造力产生的影响, 但研究结果却存在较大的分歧。为此, 研究从道德情绪的视角, 对二者的关系进行了系统地梳理, 发现道德情绪存在: 以情绪效价调节创造性认知; 激发道德动机, 中介人格与创造力的关系; 引发自我觉察, 促进顿悟与创造性成就的产生; 提升心理资本, 影响不同创造力特性的表达等, 多种影响个体创造力的路径。这表明, 与道德认知和行为相比, 道德情绪不仅能更加全面准确地体现出个体实际的道德活动、促进符合道德标准的创造力产生; 还为人们解释道德与创造力的关系提供了多样的路径与可能。未来需继续加深对道德情绪及其内在机制的理解、通过系统性地选取创造性任务, 明确道德情绪、道德与创造力之间的关系, 寻找道德培养与创造力激发的新模式。     

道德外语效应的三种机制及与外语水平的关系

道德外语效应(Moral Foreign Language effect)是指人们的道德判断在外语条件下发生改变的现象,自该效应提出以来,其背后的机制一直都是研究的热点。道德外语效应的解释机制主要有审慎加工增强、情绪反应减少和道德规范联结的减弱等。本文对三种影响机制进行了探讨,发现情绪、道德规范和外语水平对道德判断可能会产生影响。同时,本文指出未来可以从自我控制、认知启动效应、消极情绪启动效应及道德规范与外语水平之间的关系进行研究和探讨。     

The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality

We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments. If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms.

Tom, Huck, and Oliver Stone as advocates in Kohlberg's just community: theory-based strategies for moral education

Kohlberg's studies of moral reasoning provide a good theoretical framework for describing the developmental process that may serve as the basis for programs of moral education for adolescents. Kohlberg viewed moral education, particularly during adolescence, as the stimulation of the natural developmental process which leads to mature moral reasoning. Building on Kohlberg's work, specifically his concept of the just community approach where the teacher and more advanced peers serve as advocates of mature moral reasoning, this article presents the educator with a theoretical rationale for implementing procedures that can foster moral development. A case is made for using contemporary films and literature as mechanisms for stimulating moral development among adolescents.     

青少年网络不道德行为与父母教养方式的关系——道德脱离、责任心、道德同一性的中介作用

研究采用问卷法,对764名青少年进行测试,用结构方程模型检验了教养方式、责任心、道德同一性、道德脱离和网络不道德行为之间的关系模型。结果表明,拒绝型教养方式通过责任心、道德同一性和道德脱离的中介来间接影响网络不道德行为。责任心可以直接作用于网络不道德行为,也可以通过道德脱离的中介来影响网络不道德行为。道德同一性只能通过道德脱离来影响不道德行为。     

Moral identity and the expanding circle of moral regard toward out-groups

This article examines moral identity and reactions to out-groups during intergroup conflict Four studies suggest that a highly self-important moral identity is associated with an expansive circle of moral regard toward out-group members (Study 1) and more favorable attitudes toward relief efforts to aid out-group members (Study 2). Study 3 examines moral identity and national identity influences on the provision of financial assistance to out-groups. Study 4 investigates the relationship between moral identity and (a) the willingness to harm innocent out-group members not involved in the conflict and (b) moral judgments of revenge and forgiveness toward out-group members directly responsible for transgressions against the in-group. Results are discussed in terms of self-regulatory mechanisms that mitigate in-group favoritism and out-group hostility.     

Antisocial Behavior,Moral Disengagement,Empathy and Negative Emotion: A Comparison Between Disabled and Able-Bodied Athletes

Theories of morality suggest that negative emotions associated with antisocial behavior should diminish motivation for such behavior. Two reasons that have been proposed to explain why some individuals repeatedly harm others are that (a) they use mechanisms of moral disengagement to justify their actions, and (b) they may not empathize with and vicariously experience the negative emotions felt by their victims. With the aim of testing these proposals, the present study compared spinal cord injured disabled athletes and able-bodied athletes to determine the effect of reduced visceral afferent feedback caused by spinal cord injury on antisocial behavior, moral disengagement, empathy, and negative emotion (i.e., anger, anxiety, and dejection). Disabled athletes reported less frequent antisocial behavior and lower moral disengagement than able-bodied athletes. Group differences in antisocial behavior were mediated by differences in moral disengagement. The two groups did not differ in empathy or negative emotion. The findings of this study suggest that antisocial behavior may be regulated by mechanisms of moral disengagement.     

Are moral judgments unified?

Whenever psychologists, neuroscientists, or philosophers draw conclusions about moral judgments in general from a small selected sample, they assume that moral judgments are unified by some common and peculiar feature that enables generalizations and makes morality worthy of study as a unified field. We assess this assumption by considering the six main candidates for a unifying feature: content, phenomenology, force, form, function, and brain mechanisms. We conclude that moral judgment is not unified on any of these levels and that moral science should adopt a more fine-grained taxonomic approach that studies carefully defined groups of moral judgments.     

心理学视角下的道德损伤

道德损伤是指个体实施、未能阻止、目睹或听闻违背自身深层的道德信念和期望的行为, 对心理、生理、精神、行为和社会的持久影响。道德损伤作为一个跨学科概念, 自2009年Litz从心理学角度对其重新做出界定以来, 在心理学、伦理学、精神病学、社会学等领域引起了广泛关注。目前研究者已经编制出多个多维度量表来对道德损伤的事件或症状进行测量, 运用认知行为疗法、认知加工疗法和针对道德损伤研发的适当暴露疗法等措施来进行干预。未来的研究可以继续深入探究道德损伤的发生发展机制, 确立道德损伤的诊断标准, 推广道德损伤的适用范围, 丰富道德损伤的内涵, 从而拓展道德损伤研究的广度和深度。     

Is the moral domain unique? A social influence perspective for the study of moral cognition

The nature of the cognitive processes that give rise to moral judgment and behavior has been a central question of psychology for decades. In this paper, we suggest that an often ignored yet fruitful stream of research for informing current debates on the nature of moral cognition is social influence. We introduce what we call the “social‐moderation‐of‐process” perspective, a methodological framework for leveraging insights from social influence research to inform debates in moral psychology over the mechanisms underlying moral cognition and the moral domains in which those mechanisms operate. We demonstrate the utility of the social‐moderation‐of‐process perspective by providing a detailed example of how research on social influence in behavioral ethics can be utilized to test a research question related to a debate between two prominent theories in moral psychology. We then detail how researchers across the field of moral psychology can utilize our social‐moderation‐of‐process perspective.     

Mechanisms of moral disengagement and their differential use by right‐wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in support of war

Right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are associated with the approval of war as a political intervention [McFarland, 2005]. We examined whether the effects of RWA and SDO on war support are mediated by moral‐disengagement mechanisms [i.e., responsibility reduction, moral justification, minimizing consequences, and dehumanizing–blaming victims; Bandura, 1999] and whether the ideologies use the mechanisms differently. Our data were consistent with the possibility that minimizing consequences (Study 1) and moral justification (Study 2) mediate the effects of RWA and SDO on approval of war. Both ideologies were positively associated with all moral‐disengagement mechanism though more strongly so for RWA. Comparisons within ideologies suggest that RWA was most strongly associated with moral justification and SDO was most strongly associated with dehumanizing–blaming victims. We discuss implications and limitations. Aggr. Behav. 36:238–250, 2010. © 2010 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.