Probabilistic causality reexamined

According to Nancy Cartwright, a causal law holds just when a certain probabilistic condition obtains in all test situations which in turn satisfy a set of background conditions. These background conditions are shown to be inconsistent and, on separate account, logically incoherent. I offer a corrective reformulation which also incorporates a strategy for problems like Hesslow's thrombosis case. I also show that Cartwright's recent argument for modifying the condition to appeal to singular causes fails.Proposed modifications of the theory's probabilistic condition to handle effects with extreme probabilities (0 or 1) are found unsatisfactory. I propose a unified solution which also handles extreme causes. Undefined conditional probabilities give rise to three good, but non-equivalent, ways of formulating the theory. Various formulations appear in the literature. I give arguments to eliminate all but one candidate. Finally, I argue for a crucial new condition clause, and show how to extend the results beyond a simple probabilistic framework.     

Laws,causality and the intentional explanation of action

Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis, which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the claim “reason is not a cause of action,” namely, the “proper logical” argument, the “logical relation” argument, and the “rule-following” argument. This rebuttal suggests that the causal relationship between reason and action can provide a justification for intentional explanations.     

Functional explanation,consequence explanation,and Marxism

I argued in Karl Marx's Theory of History that the central claims of historical materialism are functional explanations, and I said that functional explanations are consequence explanations, ones, that is, in which something is explained by its propensity to have a certain kind of effect. I also claimed that the theory of chance variation and natural selection sustains functional explanations, and hence consequence explanations, of organismic equipment. In Section I I defend the thesis that historical materialism offers functional or consequence explanations, and I reject Jon Elster's contention that game theory can, and should, assume a central role in the Marxist theory of society. In Section II I contrast functional and consequence explanation, thereby revising the position of Karl Marx's Theory of History, and I question whether evolutionary biology supports functional explanations. Section III is a critique of Elster's views on functional explanation, and Sections IV and V defend consequence explanation against metaphysical and epistemological doubts. A concluding section summarizes my present understanding of the status of historical materialist explanations.     

Persistence,change, and explanation

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to George Myro for his wonderful insight, advice, and support, in writing this paper. I would also like to thank Ermanno Bencivenga, John Broome, Janet Broughton, Alan Code, Paul Grice, Mark Johnston, David Lewis, Paul Kube, Dugald Owen, Steve Yablo, and Colloquium participants at University of Virginia and Ohio State University for their very helpful discussions.     

Inference,explanation, and asymmetry

Explanation is asymmetric: if A explains B, then B does not explain A. Traditionally, the asymmetry of explanation was thought to favor causal accounts of explanation over their rivals, such as those that take explanations to be inferences. In this paper, we develop a new inferential approach to explanation that outperforms causal approaches in accounting for the asymmetry of explanation.

     

The property transmission hypothesis: a possible explanation for visual impressions of pulling and other kinds of phenomenal causality

Under certain circumstances, stimuli involving two moving objects that do not come into contact reliably give rise to the illusory perceptual impression that one of the objects is pulling the other, as if there is an unseen connection between them. It is proposed that the conditions determining the occurrence of this impression can be explained as cases of application of the property-transmission hypothesis. This is a general hypothesis that causal objects operate in part by transmitting some of their own properties to effect objects under conditions where the causal object is active, where there are cues to the occurrence of generative transmission between the causal object and an effect object, and where there is a time-ordered relation of resemblance between properties of the causal object and those of the effect object. This hypothesis predicts that the pulling impression should occur only when the effect object adopts kinematic properties (speed and direction) that resemble those of the causal object. An experiment is reported that supports this prediction.     

On quantum entanglement,counterfactuals, causality and dispositions

The existence of non-local correlations between outcomes of measurements in quantum entangled systems strongly suggests that we are dealing with some form of causation here. An assessment of this conjecture in the context of the collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is the primary goal of this paper. Following the counterfactual approach to causation, I argue that the details of the underlying causal mechanism which could explain the non-local correlations in entangled states strongly depend on the adopted semantics for counterfactuals. Several relativistically-invariant interpretations of spatiotemporal counterfactual conditionals are discussed, and the corresponding causal stories describing interactions between parts of an entangled system are evaluated. It is observed that the most controversial feature of the postulated causal connections is not so much their non-local character as a peculiar type of circularity that affects them.

     

Perceived control,causality, expectations and help-seeking behaviour

Undergraduates recruited from an introductory psychology course who were currently not seeking professional help (n=81) were compared with a comparable sample seeking professional help at a university psychological services centre (n=53). Participants answered an assessment instrument with reference to the problem currently upsetting them most. As hypothesized, those students seeking help tended to internalize causality, report lower levels of perceived control over their problems, and consider themselves more likely to expend time and energy in resolving their problem. Contrary to expectations, the groups did not differ in optimism about problem resolution. Results from an exploratory analysis of perceptions about the nature of professional and non-professional help are also reported. The findings, consistent with previous research, underscore the importance of differentiating the constructs of locus of control, causal attributions, and perceived control in studying mediators of help-seeking behaviour.     

Mentality and causality

I am grateful to John Bickle, Jaegwon Kim, Brian McLaughlin, and, most especially, to my colleague, Alfred Mele, for much helpful discussion on the topic of intentional causation.     

Dispositions,explanation, and behavior 1

According to the theory of dispositions here defended, to have a disposition is to have some (non‐dispositional) property that enters into a law of a certain form. The theory does not have the crucial difficulty of the singular material implication account of dispositions, but at the same time avoids the unfortunate notion of ‘reduction sentences’. It is further argued that no dispositional explanation is one of the covering‐law type; but the theory shows how, for any dispositional explanation! To construct a potential explanation of the covering‐law type. The theory can also be applied fruitfully to human behavior, especially with respect to the issues of reasons and causes and of’ rational’ explanation. The success of the applicability of this theory of dispositions is further evidence of its adequacy.     

Individualism,causal powers,and explanation

Versions of this paper were presented at the 17th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in June 1991, at Cornell University in October 1991, and at Queen's University in January 1992; I thank Terence Horgan and Carl Ginet, respectively, for their comments on the first two of these occasions. I would also like to thank Terence Irwin, Sydney Shoemaker, Bob Stalnaker, Ed Stein, and J. D. Trout for comments on earlier versions of the paper, and Joe Moore, Dave Robb and Sergio Sismondo for useful discussion.     

Evidence,explanation and enhanced indispensability

In this paper I shall adopt a possible reading of the notions of ‘explanatory indispensability’ and ‘genuine mathematical explanation in science’ on which the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) proposed by Alan Baker is based. Furthermore, I shall propose two examples of mathematical explanation in science and I shall show that, whether the EIA-partisans accept the reading I suggest, they are easily caught in a dilemma. To escape this dilemma they need to adopt some account of explanation and offer a plausible answer to the following ‘question of evidence’: What is a genuine mathematical explanation in empirical science and on what basis do we consider it as such? Finally, I shall suggest how a possible answer to the question of evidence might be given through a specific account of mathematical explanation in science. Nevertheless, the price of adopting this standpoint is that the genuineness of mathematical explanations of scientific facts turns out to be dependent on pragmatic constraints and therefore cannot be plugged in EIA and used to establish existential claims about mathematical objects.     

Culture, education, and the attribution of physical causality

Two studies investigated the impact of culturally instilled folk theories on the perception of physical events. In Study 1, Americans and Chinese with no formal physics education were found to emphasize different causes in their explanations for eight physical events, with Americans attributing them more to dispositional factors (e.g., weight) and less to contextual factors (e.g., a medium) than did Chinese. In Study 2, Chinese Americans' identity as Asians or as Americans was primed before having them explain the events used in Study 1. Asian-primed participants endorsed dispositional explanations to a lesser degree and contextual explanations to a greater degree than did American-primed participants, although priming effects were observed only for students with little physics education. Together, these studies suggest that culturally instilled folk theories of physics produce cultural differences in the perception of physical causality.