Critical refl ections on intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis1

The authors review the philosophical trend known as postmodernism and the way it has infl uenced a part of psychoanalytic thought, concluding with some comments on the qualities and shortcomings of the new developments. The authors consider the origins and the cultural and aesthetic‐philosophical meaning of postmodernism, identifying some key concepts such as deconstructionism, the disappearance of the ‘individual subject’ and individual identity, and the rejection of ‘in‐depth’ models of psychoanalysis. Then they examine various, wide‐ranging developments in psychoanalytic thought and treatment. They review the intersubjective fi eld in psychoanalysis, especially in the USA, and then explore whether the underlying lack of truth to be discovered, stressed by these ‘new view’ statements, or the fact that the ‘truth’ only exists in linguistic‐narrative constructions is consistent with basic analytic concepts such as the unconscious, phantasy, transference and countertransference, which recall the tri‐dimensional nature of inner psychic reality. The psychoanalytic process is a condition activated through a bond that is able to hold and contain the relationship of the analytic couple and the patient's unconscious world and not through hermeneutic or narrative constructions.     

Diseases of the Understanding and the Need for Philosophical Therapy

The paper develops and addresses a major challenge for therapeutic conceptions of philosophy of the sort increasingly attributed to Wittgenstein. To be substantive and relevant, such conceptions have to identify “diseases of the understanding” from which philosophers suffer, and to explain why these “diseases” need to be cured in order to resolve or overcome important philosophical problems. The paper addresses this challenge in three steps: With the help of findings and concepts from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, it redevelops the Wittgensteinian notion of “philosophical pictures.” Through a case study on seminal versions of familiar mind‐body problems, it examines how such pictures shape philosophical reflection and generate ill‐motivated but captivating problems. Third, it shows that philosophical pictures are constitutive of “diseases of the understanding,” in a quite strict sense of the term. On this basis, the paper explains when and why philosophical therapy is required.     

Phantastic objects and the financial market's sense of reality: a psychoanalytic contribution to the understanding of stock market instability

This paper sets out to explore if standard psychoanalytic thinking based on clinical experience can illuminate instability in financial markets and its widespread human consequences. Buying, holding or selling financial assets in conditions of inherent uncertainty and ambiguity, it is argued, necessarily implies an ambivalent emotional and phantasy relationship to them. Based on the evidence of historical accounts, supplemented by some interviewing, the authors suggest a psychoanalytic approach focusing on unconscious phantasy relationships, states of mind, and unconscious group functioning can explain some outstanding questions about financial bubbles which cannot be explained with mainstream economic theories. The authors also suggest some institutional features of financial markets which may ordinarily increase or decrease the likelihood that financial decisions result from splitting off those thoughts which give rise to painful emotions. Splitting would increase the future risk of financial instability and in this respect the theory with which economic agents in such markets approach their work is important. An interdisciplinary theory recognizing and making possible the integration of emotional experience may be more useful to economic agents than the present mainstream theories which contrast rational and irrational decision-making and model them as making consistent decisions on the basis of reasoning alone.     

Reading Susan Isaacs: toward a radically revised theory of thinking

The author views Isaacs's (1952) paper, The nature and function of phantasy, as making an important contribution to the development of a radically revised psychoanalytic theory of thinking. Perhaps Isaacs's most important contribution is the notion that phantasy is the process that creates meaning, and that phantasy is the form in which all meanings - including feelings, defense 'mechanisms,' impulses, bodily experiences, and so on - exist in unconscious mental life. The author discusses both explicit formulations offered by Isaacs as well as his own extensions of her ideas. The latter include (1) the idea that phantasying generates not only unconscious psychic content, but also constitutes the entirety of unconscious thinking; (2) the notion that transference is a form of phantasying that serves as a way of thinking for the first time (in relation to the analyst) emotional events that occurred in the past, but were too disturbing to be experienced at the time they occurred and (3) a principal aim and function of phantasy is that of fulfilling the human need to get to know and understand the truth of one's experience. The author concludes by discussing the relationship between Isaacs's concept of phantasy and Bion's concepts of alpha function and the human need for the truth, as well as the differences between Fairbairn's and Isaacs's conceptions of the nature of unconscious internal object relationships.     

What Is Left of the Active Externalism Debate?

Since the publication of Clark and Chalmers' Extended Mind paper, the central claims of that paper, viz. the thesis that cognitive processes and cognitive or mental states extend beyond the brain and body, have been vigorously debated within philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Both defenders and detractors of these claims have since marshalled an impressive battery of arguments for and against “active externalism.” However, despite the amount of philosophical energy expended, this debate remains far from settled. We argue that this debate can be understood as answering two metaphysical questions. Yet prominent voices within the debate have assumed that there is a tight relationship between these two questions such that one question can be answered via the other. We defend an alternative ‘wide’ view, whereby mentality is understood as constituted by wide social and cultural factors. Our wide view entails that the two metaphysical questions are separate and should be kept distinct. This suggests that active externalism as understood by prominent voices within that debate requires dissolution, rather than solution. However, if the debate were instead understood as only focusing on the second of the two questions, then there could be a possible future for this debate.     

Psychoanalysis and the Body–Mind Problem

In this paper I have tried to clarify some of the differences between on the one hand ordinary doubts and uncertainties that are part and parcel of the psychoanalytic process, and on the other hand the sort of doubt that Socrates called 'aporia', that is, philosophical and conceptual. I have described one point at which philosophical doubt may creep into psychoanalytic thinking on body/mind issues. I presented a psychoanalytical model of the mind, based largely on Bion and Anzieu, in which mind is seen to be emergent from a body–mind nexus, to which we may, under pressure, regress. I elaborated this by reference to an example of my own somatisation, and to Anzieu's theory of a skin ego. Finally I made some comparisons between philosophical solutions to anxieties arising both in the mind/body area and in general epistemology, and psychoanalytic approaches to similar anxieties in life.     

Chinese Marxist Philosophy Since Reform and Opening-Up

Since reform and opening-up began in 1978, Chinese Marxist philosophy has undertaken the double mission of enhancing the emancipation of the mind in society and of realizing its own ideological emancipation. It has gone through an evolutionary process from “extensive discussion about the criterion of truth” to “reform of philosophical textbooks”; from the proposal of the philosophical conception of “practical materialism” to reflection on “modernity”; and from the carrying-out of dialogues among Chinese, Western, and Marxist philosophies to the exploration of “new forms of civilization.” Chinese Marxist philosophy has shifted its way of doing research with practical materialism as a core conception, and it changed such modes of thinking as the intuitive theory of reflection based on na?ve realism, the theory of linear causality based on mechanical determinism, and the reductionism of essence based on abstract substantialism. As a result, it has boosted changes that were already underway in Chinese philosophy, worldviews, theories of truth, conceptions of history, and views of development, and it has further endowed the discourse system of Marxist philosophy with laudable subjectivity and originality.     

The Baby and the Bathwater: Hans Jonas's Recovery of Aristotelian Biological Concepts

The idiom referred to in the title, “don't throw out the baby with the bath water,” instructs us to keep what is essential and to only throw away what is inessential. Bathing babies has the well-being of the child in mind, the end result of which is cleanliness. Efficiency in the task of cleaning is secondary. No one would throw away a baby when draining the baby's bathwater. Somewhat analogously, science and philosophy each have the goal of the attainment of truth in mind. Part and parcel of this search for truth has been the attachment of being parsimonious, especially since William of Ockham. If the goal is truth, then one cannot get lost in the pursuit of parsimony, therefore losing the truth. The goal of finding the truth must remain intact; the method of parsimony at best remains subservient to the attainment of truth. Hans Jonas believed this regarding truth and pursued the criticism of reductive materialism as part and parcel of his research program in philosophy of biology and philosophical anthropology beginning in 1950. In his mind, reductive materialism, as it was practiced, involved the pursuit of parsimony at the cost of the truth through neglect of the purpose-driven conscious life of the subject. In this article, I expose and defend the recovery of certain elements of Aristotelian biology by Professor Hans Jonas. In the process, I show how Jonas was among the early authors writing on the philosophy of biology and defending ontological essentialism and purposefulness in organisms against reductive materialism and the relentless pursuit of the unity of the sciences. Along this line, I position Jonas among the arguments made regarding teleological explanations current in the philosophy of biology. First, I explain and defend Jonas's thesis that a full understanding of organisms requires recognizing an ontological essentialism regarding organisms. Secondly, I explain and defend Jonas's forward looking and backward looking teleological conceptions of activity insofar as it concurs directly with the conscious experience of life for humans, while situating it within the mainstream of philosophy of biology. Last, the importance of this recovery of Aristotelian concepts highlights Jonas's position as an early proponent of non-reductive materialism. More importantly, his thought forces us to recognize that in the pursuit of truth we must use parsimony well. We should take extreme care to preserve the truth; we should not throw out the baby with the bath water.     

Unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) as clinical concept

A clinical phenomenology of the concept ‘unconscious fantasy’ attempts to describe it from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective, that is, from the immediate experience of the analyst working in session. Articles of psychoanalytic authors from different persuasions are reviewed, which taken as a whole would shed some light on how the concept of unconscious fantasy takes shape in the analyst's mind during the session with the patient. A clinical phenomenology in three steps is described. Each step is illustrated by clinical material. Current controversies around the concept of unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) are still trapped in the discussion about if and how they are really unconscious. The strategy to describe from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective the process of how the analyst's mind embraces the idea that an emerging phenomenon in the relationship with the patient can be defined as ‘unconscious fantasy’, allows us to elude the question as to whether or not we believe that unconscious fantasies exist at all, since we are neither required to assert or deny such a prior existence in order to describe the process of elaboration which, in the end, does formulate a fantasy as fantasy.     

Philosophical intuitions,heuristics, and metaphors

Psychological explanations of philosophical intuitions can help us assess their evidentiary value, and our warrant for accepting them. To explain and assess conceptual or classificatory intuitions about specific situations, some philosophers have suggested explanations which invoke heuristic rules proposed by cognitive psychologists. The present paper extends this approach of intuition assessment by heuristics-based explanation, in two ways: It motivates the proposal of a new heuristic, and shows that this metaphor heuristic helps explain important but neglected intuitions: general factual intuitions which have been highly influential in the philosophies of mind and perception but neglected in ongoing debates in the epistemology of philosophy. To do so, the paper integrates results from three philosophically pertinent but hitherto largely unconnected strands of psychological research: research on intuitive judgement, analogy and metaphor, and memory-based processing, respectively. The paper shows that the heuristics-based explanation thus obtained satisfies the key requirements cognitive psychologists impose on such explanations, that it can explain the philosophical intuitions targeted, and that this explanation supports normative assessment of the intuitions’ evidentiary value: It reveals whether particular intuitions are due to proper exercise of cognitive competencies or constitute cognitive illusions.     

On Attachment to Internal Objects

This paper considers some clinical implications of attachment theory from the perspective of the theory of internal object relationships and the unconscious phantasies that derive from such relationships. The paper focuses on the contributions of Bowlby and his followers, particularly Mary Main, who has developed a language-based methodology to study representational processes in adults and children, bridging the gap between the systematic study of human behavior and clinical psychoanalysis. The theory of inherent role responsiveness in the internal object world—mental representations of self and other in interaction and externalized in complementary role relationships through exchanges of unconscious and conscious messages—is presented as the psychoanalytic complement of Bowlby's theory of internal working models of attachment. Role responsiveness occurs internally as well as externally, so that one can speak of attachment to phantasy objects as well as external objects. Clinical examples illustrate how the therapist, through maintaining a free-floating responsiveness to the patient's enactments, may reconstruct the internal working models of attachment and their origins in the transference. The paperthus illustrates the way in which the origins of phantasy derive from the wished for and feared states related to early experiences of felt security, or lack of it, in relation to the attachment objects, thereby integrating the psychoanalytic theory of phantasy with attachment theory.     

Why concepts can't be theories

In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor's recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the ‘theory-theory’ of concepts. I argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the ‘theory-theory’ is supposed to replace, and to rectify the problems of, the earlier ‘classical’ and ‘probabilistic’ theories, its failure confirms Fodor's original observation. Since my critique does not rest on controversial philosophical assumptions and is readily available from within the cognitive sciences, it is a stronger argument than Fodor's.     

Keeping (Direct) Reference in Mind

This paper explores the psychological analogues of a cluster of arguments that have played an important role in motivating a now widespread, reference‐based approach in philosophy of language. What I will call the psychological analogues of Kripke‐style arguments provide a substantial motivation for a reference‐based approach to concepts. Insofar as such an approach is rarely given serious consideration, the availability of these arguments suggests the need for a rethinking of some foundational assumptions in philosophy of mind and other branches of the cognitive sciences.     

Interpretation, psychoanalysis, and the philosophy of mind

I suggest that a conflict between two philosophical models of the mind so far unremarked in discussions of psychoanalysis is at the heart of questions about its status as a science, the objectivity of psychoanalytic interpretations, and the nature of the unconscious. In philosophy one model is embodied in the tradition of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, among many others, which construes thought as prior to and independent of language. According to this tradition the mind is self-contained and mental contents or "ideas" are essentially subjective phenomena. It follows that knowledge of other minds and the material world is radically problematic. In the second and more contemporary model the phenomenon of meaning is dependent on interactions between minds, and between mind and the world. Since meaning is understood to be intrinsically social, so in an important sense is mind. I develop this second philosophic model, indicating its relevance for psychoanalysis. I also point out some of the contributions of psychoanalysis to philosophy of mind.     

Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science

Several recently developed philosophical approaches to the self promise to enhance the exchange of ideas between the philosophy of the mind and the other cognitive sciences. This review examines two important concepts of self: the 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, and the 'narrative self', which involves personal identity and continuity across time. The notion of a minimal self is first clarified by drawing a distinction between the sense of self-agency and the sense of self-ownership for actions. This distinction is then explored within the neurological domain with specific reference to schizophrenia, in which the sense of self-agency may be disrupted. The convergence between the philosophical debate and empirical study is extended in a discussion of more primitive aspects of self and how these relate to neonatal experience and robotics. The second concept of self, the narrative self, is discussed in the light of Gazzaniga's left-hemisphere 'interpreter' and episodic memory. Extensions of the idea of a narrative self that are consistent with neurological models are then considered. The review illustrates how the philosophical approach can inform cognitive science and suggests that a two-way collaboration may lead to a more fully developed account of the self.     

Has infantile sexuality anything to do with infants?

Classical psychoanalytic theory draws many concepts from mental processes that are assumed to arise in the infant and influence the adult mind. Still, psychoanalytic practice with mothers and infants has been integrated but little within general psychoanalytic theory. One reason is that only few analysts have utilized such practice to further theory. Another reason is that infant therapists tend to abandon classical psychoanalytic concepts in favour of attachment concepts. As a result the concept of infantile sexuality, so central to classical theory, plays an unobtrusive role in clinical discussions on infant therapy. The author argues that infantile sexuality plays an important role in many mother-infant disturbances. To function as a clinical concept, it needs to be delineated from attachment and be understood in the context of mother-infant interaction. Two examples are provided; one where the analyst's infantile sexuality emerged in a comment to the infant. Another is a case of breast-feeding problems with a little boy fretting at the breast. This is interpreted as reflecting the mother's infantile sexual conflicts as well as the boy's emerging internalization of them. Thus, to conceptualize such disorders we need to take into account the infantile sexuality in both mother and baby.     

Binding,narcissistic pathology and the psychoanalytic process

This article discusses the question of truth claims in psychoanalysis, revolving around the concepts “construction”, “reconstruction”, “historical truth” and “narrative truth”. In Part I of the article, these concepts are discussed in an historical context, in particular, Freud's view, the narrative tradition and some of Bion's ideas. In Part II, an attempt is made to synthesize these concepts. It is argued that the constructed character of the unconscious has to be integrated into the patient's reconstruction of his/her life story. The psychoanalytic project enables the patient to create a new narrative that claims to possess historical validity. It is important in this context not to understand the notion of “history” objectivisticallv as if it were a question of revealing certain objective historical facts. Instead, it is suggested that the connection between the present understanding of the past and the past as it was experienced in the past should be understood as a fusion of horizons. Finally, the necessary function of consciousnesslself-consciousness for the psychoanalytic project of acquiring knowledge about one's unconscious is pointed out.     

Three Questions about Minding God

Abstract. Gregory Peterson's Minding God does an excellent job of introducing the cognitive sciences to the general reader and drawing preliminary connections between these disciplines and some of the loci of theology. The book less successfully articulates how the cognitive sciences should impact the future of theology. In this article I pose three questions: (1) What semantics is presupposed in relating the languages of theology and the cognitive sciences? How do the truth conditions of these disparate disciplines relate? (2) What precisely does theology gain from what is central to cognitive science: the emphasis on information processing, inner representation, and the computer model of the mind? What exactly does cognitive science offer to theology beyond the now‐standard rejection of Cartesian dualism, the affirmation of an embodied mind, and the repudiation of reduction? (3) What can the cognitive sciences offer in tackling crucial questions in the theology‐science discussion such as divine agency and divine causation? Finally, I point to a possible begging of the question in the claim that cognitive science relates to theology because theology deals with meaning and purpose, and a particular interpretation of cognitive science grants more meaning and purpose to human beings than antecedent post‐Cartesian positions in the philosophy of mind.     

The analyst's knowledge and authority: a critique of the "new view" in psychoanalysis

A critical assessment is presented of positions recently taken by Mitchell and Renik, who are taken as representatives of a "new view" in psychoanalysis. One article by Mitchell and two by Renik are examined as paradigmatic of certain ways of construing the nature of mind, the analyst's knowledge and authority, and the analytic process that are unduly influenced by the postmodern turn in psychoanalysis. Although "new view" theorists have made valid criticisms of traditional psychoanalytic theory and practice, they wind up taking untenable positions. Specifically called into question are their views on the relation between language and interpretation, on the one hand, and the mental contents of the patient on the other. A disjunction is noted between their discussion of clinical material and their conceptual stance, and their idiosyncratic redefinitions of truth and objectivity are criticized. Finally, a "humble realism" is suggested as the most appropriate philosophical position for psychoanalysts to adopt.