现象学和宗教现象学:对一种宗教学方法的思考

本文拟通过对哲学意义上的现象学和宗教现象学核心概念的整理,考查二者之间的联系与区别,并试图从哲学现象学的角度反观宗教现象学,重新思考宗教现象学的可能性及宗教研究的方法问题。     

初探宗教现象学

宗教现象学是当代西方文化中使用现象学方法来诠释宗教的一种学说,它在理论上与传统宗教的理性实体学说和自然神学理论相区别,一是将宗教的论证方式由外在实体出发转向由人的直观意识出发,二是将对神的论证由理性论证的途径改变为意识直观和生存体验的途径。宗教现象学把人的直观意识体验和生存感受作为其理论的出发点,它同时把宗教理解为前导入的生存的意义纲领。宗教现象学跨越了现象学、存在主义、解释学、心理学、人类学及神学等多个学科,尚有许多理论问题有待进一步澄清。     

“神圣性”问题在宗教学中的理论演进

对"神圣性"的研究在西方宗教理论中占据着一个重要的位置.现代宗教学的神圣性以麦克斯·缪勒的"无限”观念为起点,在化约论的包围下逐步形成和确立了自主领域.宗教现象学对神圣性问题的论证更是包含着"存在之思”的倾向,然而其一方面反对化约论的极端理性主义倾向,一方面也受到理性主义的影响.对宗教学中的神圣性问题的理论争议进行梳理,不仅有助于重新思考"神圣性”这一古老命题,而且促使人们对宗教学各学科理论模式的缺陷进行反思,明晰宗教学各学科之间的矛盾的渊源.     

论宗教神秘本质及诸因素的运演机制

神秘是宗教的根基,它只能被感知但不可描述、“不可言说”,是一种逃避理性意识的“被遮蔽”的非理性体验。奥托运用宗教现象学的理论和方法,把宗教“不可言说”的形而上学实体存在论,转化为一种主体的意识分析和生存主义的诠释学说。根据精神分析学潜意识理论,神秘居于潜意识层,是无法被理性所把握的非理性,它只能通过理性的被意识化的神圣来展现自身。神秘呈现神圣,而神圣遮蔽神秘,唯有通过凝视自为的神圣去还原自在的神秘,才能“回到事实本身”。     

现象学伦理学的基本问题再论 ——尼古拉·哈特曼与伦常价值质料的现象学

尼古拉·哈特曼属于现象学运动的边缘人物。但他的确可以被视为现象学的伦理学或质料的价值伦理学主要的和系统的构建者。他的伦理学通常会带有两个不同的名称:伦常价值的现象学和质料的价值伦理学。这两个名字指称的是同一个对象,但重点不同:前者强调方法,后者偏重内容;前者主要与胡塞尔有关,后者则更多源自舍勒。哈特曼本人的相关伦理学思考既有助于对现象学的价值伦理学的基本要素的把握,也有助于一门价值回应的现象学的展开。     

儒教:作为一种身体中的宗教——一个现象学的视角

儒教是不是一种宗教的讨论反映出中国当代知识分子在中西文化交融过程中对中国传统文化的再认识与再解读,也反映出现代化过程中中华民族精神诉求的一种困顿和反思。本文试图从中西文化比较的论域中,以现象学的方法重新界定宗教的本质,并试图对儒教予以现象学的解读。     

现象学伦理学的基本问题

严格意义上的"现象学的伦理学"是一种反思—描述的伦理学。胡塞尔、哈特曼、耿宁的案例为我们提供了现象学伦理学的三种可能性,它们的共同特点都是在现象学反思中进行的对道德意识的有意无意的本质直观。这样一种现象学的伦理学与其说是一种价值伦理学,不如说是一种道德心理学或道德意识现象学。现象学的反思—描述伦理学与近代以来的规范伦理学的区别,非常类似于数学—逻辑学中的直觉主义与形式主义的差异。与后面两种数学理论一样,前面两种伦理学说也不能被理解为是非此即彼、相互排斥的。只是对它们之间的奠基关系的不同理解,会导向在伦理学思考中的两种不同立场:反思—描述伦理学的和规范伦理学的。这两种伦理学需要彼此互补才能最终构成完整的人类道德系统。     

存在、伦理、爱:现象学神学的基本问题研究

神学的核心问题是关于上帝的问题.从现象学的视域出发探讨神学的问题,不是用现象学的方法来处理神学研究的对象,而是在不断的悬置过程中,使得神学从各种偏见和先见中解放出来,让神学的问题自身来显现自身.现象学神学的根本任务就是思考上帝如何在其自身之中显现自身.海德格尔、列维纳斯、马里翁、克尔凯郭尔和奥古斯丁的现象学神学思想,以...     

作为现象学问题的世界

哲学发端于对世界本源的惊异,可以说,世界问题与哲学本身一样古老.然自19世纪传统哲学接受实证主义方案以来,世界问题已近乎被遗忘.只有到了胡塞尔那里,世界问题才重新被置于哲学运思的核心.在胡塞尔看来,世界起源于意识的成就.世界作为视域总是已预先被给予在我们的经验中,只有澄清了这一普遍视域的起源,现象学从主体性的意向成就出发去揭示世界起源的任务才能被完成,而这只有在实行了现象学还原以后的构造性分析中才能实现.胡塞尔的分析首先着力于澄清前哲学的对世界的理解,这样做的主要目的是要获得先验现象学对世界进行构造分析的主导线索,借以通达现象学意义上的世界概念.     

缪勒比较宗教学与伊利亚德宗教现象学方法之比较研究——宗教研究的方法论及学科旨归

缪勒的比较宗教学借助比较语言学进路,试图对宗教现象作出科学的归纳与解释,并赋予宗教研究以独立学科地位.但其方法论中充斥着自然科学的客体化、实在化特征,化约了宗教作为人类存在活动的主体性本质,将宗教学研究的最终旨归确立为内涵含混的客观真理,宗教学术活动从而成了对宗教信仰或宗教性的化约,宗教研究和宗教之间的矛盾对立在缪勒的体系中凸显出来.伊利亚德的宗教现象学方法则倡导非化约主义,在宗教研究中使宗教近乎其所是的显现自身,神圣因素成为宗教最终不可化约的特质和宗教学的学科母体,而体验神圣、以宗教性方式生存的宗教人则成为宗教活动中的主体.     

The phenomenology of virtue

What is it like to be a good person? I examine and reject suggestions that this will involve having thoughts which have virtue or being a good person as part of their content, as well as suggestions that it might be the presence of feelings distinct from the virtuous person’s thoughts. Is there, then, anything after all to the phenomenology of virtue? I suggest that an answer is to be found in looking to Aristotle’s suggestion that virtuous activity is pleasant to the virtuous person. I try to do this, using the work of the contemporary social psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and his work on the ‘flow experience’. Crucial here is the point that I consider accounts of virtue which take it to have the structure of a practical expertise or skill. It is when we are most engaged in skilful complex activity that the activity is experienced as ‘unimpeded’, in Aristotle’s terms, or as ‘flow’. This experience does not, as might at first appear, preclude thoughtful involvement and reflection. Although we can say what in general the phenomenology of virtue is like, each of us only has some more or less dim idea of it from the extent to which we are virtuous—that is, for most of us, not very much.     

Heidegger on Luther on Paul

Abstract : When it comes to how Heidegger understands theology, Martin Luther was instrumental in his early formulations. Heidegger's interpretation of Luther leads him to descry theology as a discipline best left unfettered by metaphysics and this attitude is carried right through Heidegger's career. By explicating Luther's influence upon Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures from 1919‐1923, we can raise important questions about the nuanced way Heidegger construes Luther's theology in the hopes of inspiring key insights for Luther's appropriation in current post‐Heideggerian theology.     

The phenomenology of propositional attitudes

Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional attitudes may be transparent, just like sensations and emotions are commonly held to be: there may be no appropriate way of describing their phenomenal character apart from describing the properties and objects they represent.     

The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion

My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach.

Religious Experience Reconsidered as an example of theoretical assertiveness in the study of religion

The publication of Religious Experience Reconsidered is one more indication that the incoherent mixture of coyness and braggadocio that for decades has characterized the study of religion and other disciplines, is finally giving way to honest theoretical assertiveness. Taves’ book is a careful treatment of experience deemed religious that manages to do justice to the recurrent features of what people tend to experience in such contexts, while also taking into consideration the culture-bound components of those experiences. What is especially welcome is that instead of seeking to establish a bland middle ground, she has pursued an independent path, making use of scholarship in a variety of disciplines, especially psychology of religion.     

A phenomenology of political apathy: Scheler on the origins of mass violence

In his criticisms of the German youth movement and the emergence of fascism across Europe during the early 1920s, Max Scheler draws a distinction between the different senses of political apathy that give rise to mass political movements. Recent studies of mass apathy have tended to treat all forms of apathy as the same and as a consequence reduced the diverse expressions of mass violence to the same, stripping mass movements of any critical function. I show in this paper that Scheler’s distinction provides the means by which to locate the various origins of mass violence and the practical means by which to address this violence that preserves the liberating potential of collective political movements.

The study of religion(s) in Western Europe III: Further developments after World War II

This essay discusses main features and developments of the study of religion(s) in Western Europe. It attempts a historical, geographical, and thematic synthesis. Part III outlines post-World War II developments with regard to journals, textbooks, and survey works. It looks at national figureheads, disciplinary boundaries and the changing fortunes of the phenomenology of religion. The series concludes by addressing selected key areas of scholarly work and current issues and concerns.     

普兰丁格的矛盾——普兰丁格的宗教排他论与有保证的基督教信念

该文针对美国当代宗教哲学家普兰丁格(Alvin Plantinga)“有保证的基督教信念”①的宗教真理认识论,指出,按照普兰丁格的排他论的宗教真理认识论,并不能保证基督教信念在面对其他宗教信念时具有优越性,因为其他宗教也可以宣称它们符合普兰丁格的宗教真理标准,从而它们的信念为真。因此普兰丁格的认识论是自相矛盾的、失效的。相比之下,普兰丁格的老师阿尔斯顿(William Alston)的实践的和生存论的宗教真理进路更为可取。