Vertical and bisection bias in active touch

We investigated the conditions that underlie the vertical and bisection illusion in touch, in order to understand the basis of their similarity to visual illusions, and the means of reducing the biases in length perception by active touch. Movement, speed, and spatial reference cues were tested. Movements in scanning L-shapes in ipsilateral and contralateral (across the body midline) table-top space produced significant underestimation of the vertical line with the right hand, but not with the left hand. Right-handed scanning of L-shapes showed no significant bias when the vertical line in the figure was aligned to the body midline, suggesting that spatial cues were involved. The vertical line was overestimated in inverted T-shapes, but underestimated in rotated T-shapes, implicating line bisection. Holding scanning latencies constant reduced the vertical error for inverted T-shapes, but could not explain the bisection bias. Sectioning biases were predicted by the location of junctions on sectioned lines, showing that junction points act as misleading anchor cues for movement extents. The illusion was significantly reduced when reference information was added by instructing subjects to relate two-handed scanning of the figure to an external frame and to body-centred cues. It is argued that disparities in spatial reference (anchor) cues for movement extents are involved in vertical and bisection biases in active touch. The hypothesis that length illusions depend on disparities in spatial reference information can also account for the similarity of the tactile to the visual horizontal-vertical illusion.     

Contrasting accounts of direction and shape perception in short-range motion: Counterchange compared with motion energy detection

It has long been thought (e.g., Cavanagh & Mather, 1989) that first-order motion-energy extraction via space-time comparator-type models (e.g., the elaborated Reichardt detector) is sufficient to account for human performance in the short-range motion paradigm (Braddick, 1974), including the perception of reverse-phi motion when the luminance polarity of the visual elements is inverted during successive frames. Human observers’ ability to discriminate motion direction and use coherent motion information to segregate a region of a random cinematogram and determine its shape was tested; they performed better in the same-, as compared with the inverted-, polarity condition. Computational analyses of short-range motion perception based on the elaborated Reichardt motion energy detector (van Santen & Sperling, 1985) predict, incorrectly, that symmetrical results will be obtained for the same- and inverted-polarity conditions. In contrast, the counterchange detector (Hock, Schöner, & Gilroy, 2009) predicts an asymmetry quite similar to that of human observers in both motion direction and shape discrimination. The further advantage of counterchange, as compared with motion energy, detection for the perception of spatial shape- and depth-from-motion is discussed.     

Rational intuition and understanding

Rational intuitions involve a particular form of understanding that gives them a special epistemic status. This form of understanding and its epistemic efficacy are not explained by several current theories of rational intuition, including Phenomenal Conservatism (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception, 2001; Ethical intuitionism, 2005; Philos Phenomenol Res 74:30–55, 2007), Proper Functionalism (Plantinga, Warrant and proper function, 1993), the Competency Theory (Bealer Pac Philos Q 81:1–30, 2000; Sosa, A virtue epistemology, 2007) and the Direct Awareness View (Conee, Philos Phenomenol Res 4:847–857, 1998; Bonjour, In defense of pure reason, 1998). Some overlook it; others try to account for it but fail. We can account for the role of understanding in rational intuition by returning to the view of some of the early Rationalists, e.g. Descartes and Leibniz. While that view carries a prohibitive cost, it does contain an insight that may help us solve the problem of giving understanding its due.     

Color and cognitive penetrability

Several psychological experiments have suggested that concepts can influence perceived color (e.g., Delk and Fillenbaum in Am J Psychol 78(2):290–293, 1965, Hansen et al. in Nat Neurosci 9(11):1367–1368, 2006, Olkkonen et al. in J Vis 8(5):1–16, 2008). Observers tend to assign typical colors to objects even when the objects do not have those colors. Recently, these findings were used to argue that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable (Macpherson 2012). This interpretation of the experiments has far-reaching consequences: it implies that the way we think of objects determines how we see them, thus threatening the role of perception in justifying beliefs. In this paper, I show that the psychological findings can be accounted for without admitting cognitive penetrability. An underestimated but key feature of the experiments is that observers had to judge colors in borderline cases, in conditions of reduced acuity, or on the basis of color-concepts instead of matching. Such judgments are sensitive to the form of bias that Tversky and Kahneman (Science 185:1124–1131, 1974) have termed ‘anchoring’. Adopting a suggestion from Raffman (Philos Rev 103(1):41–74, 1994), I argue that the way subjects in the experiments think of the objects could affect their color judgments without altering their color experiences.     

Sticking with the nice guy: Trait warmth information impairs learning and modulates person perception brain network activity

Social learning requires inferring social information about another person, as well as evaluating outcomes. Previous research shows that prior social information biases decision making and reduces reliance on striatal activity during learning (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, Nature Neuroscience 8 (11): 1611-1618, 2005). A rich literature in social psychology on person perception demonstrates that people spontaneously infer social information when viewing another person (Fiske & Taylor, 2013) and engage a network of brain regions, including the medial prefrontal cortex, temporal parietal junction, superior temporal sulcus, and precuneus (Amodio & Frith, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7(4), 268-277, 2006; Haxby, Gobbini, & Montgomery, 2004; van Overwalle Human Brain Mapping, 30, 829–858, 2009). We investigate the role of these brain regions during social learning about well-established dimensions of person perception—trait warmth and trait competence. We test the hypothesis that activity in person perception brain regions interacts with learning structures during social learning. Participants play an investment game where they must choose an agent to invest on their behalf. This choice is guided by cues signaling trait warmth or trait competence based on framing of monetary returns. Trait warmth information impairs learning about human but not computer agents, while trait competence information produces similar learning rates for human and computer agents. We see increased activation to warmth information about human agents in person perception brain regions. Interestingly, activity in person perception brain regions during the decision phase negatively predicts activity in the striatum during feedback for trait competence inferences about humans. These results suggest that social learning may engage additional processing within person perception brain regions that hampers learning in economic contexts.     

Emotion recognition (sometimes) depends on horizontal orientations

Face recognition depends critically on horizontal orientations (Goffaux & Dakin, Frontiers in Psychology, 1(143), 1–14, 2010): Face images that lack horizontal features are harder to recognize than those that have this information preserved. We asked whether facial emotional recognition also exhibits this dependency by asking observers to categorize orientation-filtered happy and sad expressions. Furthermore, we aimed to dissociate image-based orientation energy from object-based orientation by rotating images 90 deg in the picture plane. In our first experiment, we showed that the perception of emotional expression does depend on horizontal orientations, and that object-based orientation constrained performance more than image-based orientation did. In Experiment 2, we showed that mouth openness (i.e., open vs. closed mouths) also influenced the emotion-dependent reliance on horizontal information. Finally, we describe a simple computational analysis that demonstrates that the impact of mouth openness was not predicted by variation in the distribution of orientation energy across horizontal and vertical orientation bands. Overall, our results suggest that emotion recognition largely does depend on horizontal information defined relative to the face, but that this bias is modulated by multiple factors that introduce variation in appearance across and within distinct emotions.     

Desire for control,perception of control: their impact on autonomous motivation and psychological adjustment

The purpose of the present research was to test the relevance of a theoretical framework based on the matches and the mismatches between desire for control and perception of control (Evans et al. in Br J Psychol 84(2):255–273, 1993), in order to predict autonomous motivation (Deci and Ryan in Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. Plenum, New York, 1985, 2012), depression, and anxiety (Bradley in Handbook of psychology and diabetes: A guide to psychological measurement in diabetes research and practice. Harwood Academic Press, Chur, 1994; Bruchon-Schweitzer in Psychologie de la Santé: Modèles, concepts et méthodes. Dunod, Paris, 2002). Two prospective studies were run among undergraduate students. Results of Study 1 confirmed the relevance of Evans et al.’s (in Br J Psychol 84(2):255–273, 1993) theoretical framework. More specifically, four clusters reflecting different levels of desire for control and perception of control were found. Moreover, results revealed that profiles characterized by high scores on both desire for control and perception of control were more autonomously motivated than those characterized by the three other possible combinations. Results of Study 2 replicated those of Study 1 and showed that participants combining a low desire for control and a high perception of control were the less depressed, followed by participants with high scores on both measures. No significant effects were found for anxiety.     

Importing Logics

The novel notion of importing logics is introduced, subsuming as special cases several kinds of asymmetric combination mechanisms, like temporalization [8, 9], modalization [7] and exogenous enrichment [13, 5, 12, 4, 1]. The graph-theoretic approach proposed in [15] is used, but formulas are identified with irreducible paths in the signature multi-graph instead of equivalence classes of such paths, facilitating proofs involving inductions on formulas. Importing is proved to be strongly conservative. Conservative results follow as corollaries for temporalization, modalization and exogenous enrichment.     

Margaret R. Miles’ Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter: An Eriksonian Perspective

My perspective on Margaret R. Miles’s Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter is informed by Erik H. Erikson’s life cycle model (Erikson 1950, 1959, 1963, 1964, 1968a, b, 1982; Erikson and Erikson 1997) and, more specifically, by my relocation of his life stages and their accompanying human strengths (Erikson 1964) according to decades (Capps 2008). I interpret Miles’s account of her life from birth to age forty as revealing the selves that comprise the composite Self (Erikson 1968a) that come into their own during the first four decades of the life cycle, i.e., the hopeful, willing, purposeful, and competent selves     

The impact of visual illusions on perception, action planning, and motor performance

The present study extended recent research revealing that illusions can influence performance in golf putting (Witt, Linkenauger, & Proffitt Psychological Science, 23, 397–399, 2012), by exploring the potential mediating roles of attention and action planning. Glover and Dixon’s (Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 27, 560–572, 2001) planning–control model suggests that both perceptual and movement-planning processes are prone to illusion-based bias. We therefore predicted that both the perception of target size and a measure of attentional control related to movement planning in golf putting (the quiet eye) would be influenced by the illusion. Moreover, as performance could not be corrected using online control (once the ball was struck), we predicted that these biases would also influence performance. We therefore proposed a three-stage process by which illusory context biases perceptual processes, which in turn bias subsequent attentional control related to movement planning, which in turn biases motor performance. Forty novice golfers completed an Ebbinghaus illusion putting task that was designed to manipulate their perceptions of target size, while quiet eye duration and performance (mean radial error) were measured. The results indicated that the illusion was effective in facilitating differences in perceived target size, with perceptually bigger holes promoting longer quiet eye durations and more accurate putting. Follow-up mediation analyses revealed that illusion-based differences in size perception partially mediated illusion-based differences in both quiet eye duration and performance. Moreover, the relationship between illusion-based differences in quiet eye duration and performance was also significant. Future research should further test this three-stage process of bias in other far-aiming tasks in which online control cannot be used.     

The Gestalt principle of similarity benefits visual working memory

Visual working memory (VWM) is essential for many cognitive processes, yet it is notably limited in capacity. Visual perception processing is facilitated by Gestalt principles of grouping, such as connectedness, similarity, and proximity. This introduces the question, do these perceptual benefits extend to VWM? If so, can this be an approach to enhance VWM function by optimizing the processing of information? Previous findings have demonstrated that several Gestalt principles (connectedness, common region, and spatial proximity) do facilitate VWM performance in change detection tasks (Jiang, Olson, & Chun, 2000; Woodman, Vecera, & Luck, 2003; Xu, 2002, 2006; Xu & Chun, 2007). However, one prevalent Gestalt principle, similarity, has not been examined with regard to facilitating VWM. Here, we investigated whether grouping by similarity benefits VWM. Experiment 1 established the basic finding that VWM performance could benefit from grouping. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding by showing that similarity was only effective when the similar stimuli were proximal. In short, the VWM performance benefit derived from similarity was constrained by spatial proximity, such that similar items need to be near each other. Thus, the Gestalt principle of similarity benefits visual perception, but it can provide benefits to VWM as well.     

Disrupting the Coloniality of Being: Toward De-colonial Ontologies in Philosophy of Education

This essay works to bridge conversations in philosophy of education with decolonial theory. The author considers Margonis?? (1999, 2011a, b) use of Rousseau (1979) and Heidegger (1962) in developing an ontological attitude that counters social hierarchies and promotes anti-colonial relations. While affirming this effort, the essay outlines a coloniality of being at work in Rousseau and Heidegger through thier reliance on the colonial conceptualization of African Americans and Native Americans as savage and primitive. The essay turns to decolonial theory and the work of Maldenado-Torres (Cult Stud 21(2?C3):240?C270, 2007, 2009) to highlight how a decolonial attitude complicates, yet enriches Margonis?? philosophical framework.     

Beyond Original Sin: A Paradigm Shift for the Age of Neuroscience

In this article I explore the implications of Jesus?? location of the kingdom of heaven in the lived experience of the individual and of the findings of neuroscientific research for a paradigm shift in Christian theology, one that moves us beyond the Adamic myth and belief in original sin. Support for a theological paradigm shift based on lived experience is provided by Capps (1993) and for this particular paradigm shift by Pagels (1989) and Ricoeur (2004). I point out that the doctrine of original sin supports and fosters the negativity bias of the brain and inhibits the resculpting of the brain. Drawing on Hanson??s (2009) evidence in support of the brain??s neuroplasticity (i.e., its capacity to change itself) and on Brach??s (2003) critique of the ??trance of unworthiness,?? I make the case for meditative and mindful awareness practices in Christianity and other religious traditions as proven methods for the resculpting of the brain in order that individuals may experience greater joy, contentment, and awareness of the goodness of life and of God??s creation. A longitudinal neuroscientific research study of Roman Catholic nuns (Newberg and Waldman 2009) provides evidence in support of the role of contemplative prayer and meditation in generating the joy and serenity that Jesus?? allusion to the hidden treasure envisions.     

No evidence for directional biases in inhibition of return

The phenomenon of “inhibition of return” (IOR) has been the subject of considerable research interest for nearly 30 years. Two reports claiming directional biases in IOR (Spalek & Hammad, Perception & Psychophysics 66:219–233, 2004, Psychological Science 16:15–18, 2005) were examined more closely, as such findings challenge the theoretical role attributed to IOR and imply that this purported mechanism for the facilitation of visual search would bias search in systematic ways. The data from two new experiments, as well as reanalysis of the original data, showed the reports to result from an unconventional method of calculating IOR that confounded visual field with target location. Although we found significant differences in target detection response times between the visual fields, directional biases were absent from all of the examined data when the conventional method of computing IOR was applied.     

An Introduction to Issues of Gender in Stalking Research

Stalking research has increased substantially in the past 20?years. This special issue is intended to contribute to this literature by using gender as a focus point in 1) applying new theoretical perspectives that incorporate the role of gender to the study of stalking perpetration (Davis et al. 2010; Duntley and Buss 2010), 2) addressing divergent findings regarding gender in experiences of victims (Sheridan and Lyndon 2010) and perpetrators (Thompson et al. 2010), and 3) furthering the study of how gender influences perceptions of stalking (Cass and Rosay 2011; Dunlap et al. 2011; Sinclair 2010; Yanowitz and Yanowitz 2010). To place this special issue in context of the current state of knowledge on gender and stalking, we review the state of the existing research as it relates to the domains covered by articles present in this issue.     

Exemplification as molecular function

Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, 79, 449–464, 2001; Forrest, in Aust J Phil, 83, 213–228, 2006). Instantiation has been advocated by Armstrong to give a solution to what he has called the “pressing problem” of “the multiple location of property universals” (Armstrong, in Universals: An opinionated introduction. University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 89–90). Here I argue that Armstrong’s theory of instantiation fails to solve the problem because it involves two kinds of instantiation to account for particulars “having” and “sharing” universals. As a viable alternative to Armstrong’s theory, I propose a theory of instantiation capable of accounting for both phenomena in a univocal way.     

Mutual information, perceptual independence, and holistic face perception

The concept of perceptual independence is ubiquitous in psychology. It addresses the question of whether two (or more) dimensions are perceived independently. Several authors have proposed perceptual independence (or its lack thereof) as a viable measure of holistic face perception (Loftus, Oberg, & Dillon, Psychological Review 111:835–863, 2004; Wenger & Ingvalson, Learning, Memory, and Cognition 28:872–892, 2002). According to this notion, the processing of facial features occurs in an interactive manner. Here, I examine this idea from the perspective of two theories of perceptual independence: the multivariate uncertainty analysis (MUA; Garner & Morton, Definitions, models, and experimental paradigms. Psychological Bulletin 72:233–259, 1969), and the general recognition theory (GRT; Ashby & Townsend, Psychological Review 93:154–179, 1986). The goals of the study were to (1) introduce the MUA, (2) examine various possible relations between MUA and GRT using numerical simulations, and (3) apply the MUA to two consensual markers of holistic face perception^—recognition of facial features (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, Psychological Review 105:482–498, 1998) and the composite face effect (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, Perception 16:747–759, 1987). The results suggest that facial holism is generated by violations of several types of perceptual independence. They highlight the important theoretical role played by converging operations in the study of holistic face perception.     

New Directions for Research on the Role of Parents and Teachers in the Development of Gender-Related Math Attitudes: Response to Commentaries

We frame our response to the commentaries by Cheryan (2011), Lane (2011), and Shapiro and Williams (2011), in terms of two broad points made by Lane (2011). First, we agree that the various constructs that we termed “math attitudes”—including math-gender stereotypes, math anxiety, math self-concepts, and achievement motivation in math—are in fact distinct (Gunderson et al. 2011b). Nevertheless, we argue that investigating common mechanisms underlying the transmission of these constructs from adults to children is a productive approach because it can lead to general interventions to boost children’s performance and dispositions toward math. Second, we argue that research on the development of gender-related math attitudes exists at the intersection of multiple research areas, including research on attitudes (broadly defined), math, gender, social learning, and child development, and that drawing on well-developed theories in these areas can lead to novel research questions and predictions. The three excellent commentaries broaden the scope of our article on gender-related math attitudes to include the transmission of implicit attitudes from adults to children, stereotype threat, and gender roles in math-related careers (Cheryan 2011; Gunderson et al. 2011b; Lane 2011; Shapiro and Williams 2011).     

Ambivalent Sexism and Religion: Connected Through Values

Sexist attitudes do not exist in a limbo; they are embedded in larger belief systems associated with specific hierarchies of values. In particular, manifestations of benevolent sexism (Glick and Fiske 1996, 1997, 2001) can be perceived as a social boon, not a social ill, both because they are experienced as positive, and because they reward behaviors that maintain social stability. One of the strongest social institutions that create and justify specific hierarchies of values is religion. In this paper, we examine how the values inherent in religious beliefs (perhaps inadvertently) propagate an unequal status quo between men and women through endorsement of ideologies linked to benevolent sexism. In a survey with a convenience sample of train passengers in Southern and Eastern Poland (N?=?180), we investigated the relationship between Catholic religiosity and sexist attitudes. In line with previous findings (Gaunt 2012; Glick et al. 2002a; Ta?demir and Sakall?-U?urlu 2010), results suggest that religiosity can be linked to endorsement of benevolent sexism. This relationship was mediated in our study by the values of conservatism and openness to change (Schwartz 1992): religious individuals appear to value the societal status quo, tradition, and conformity, which leads them to perceive women through the lens of traditional social roles. Adhering to the teachings of a religion that promotes family values in general seems to have as its byproduct an espousal of prejudicial attitudes toward specific members of the family.