Cross-task and cross-manipulation stability in shifting the decision criterion

In recognition memory experiments participants must discriminate between old and new items, a judgment influenced by response bias. Research has shown substantial individual differences in the extent to which people will strategically adjust their response bias to diagnostic cues such as the prior probability of an old item. Despite this significant between subject variability, shifts in bias have been found to be relatively predictive within individuals across memory tests. Experiment 1 sought to determine whether this predictability extends beyond memory. Results revealed that the amount a subject shifted response bias in a recognition memory task was significantly predictive of shifting in a visual perception task, suggesting that shifting can generalise outside of a specific testing domain. Experiment 2 sought to determine how predictive shifting would be across two manipulations well known to induce shifts in bias: a probability manipulation and a response payoff manipulation. A modest positive relationship between these two methods was observed, suggesting that shifting behaviour is relatively predictive across different manipulations of shifting. Overall, results from both experiments suggest that response bias shifting, like response bias setting, is a relatively stable behaviour within individuals despite changes in test domain and test manipulation.     

Connectionism and the learning of probabilistic concepts

Three experiments examine the claim of Gluck and Bower (1986, 1988a, 1988b) that the learning of medical concepts can be simulated by a connectionist network in which the symptoms are the input and the diagnosis is the output. The first experiment replicates the main finding of Gluck and Bower. In this experiment, subjects were required to estimate the probability of each of two diseases, given a particular target symptom. In fact these two probabilities were identical, but because one illness was more common than the other, the target symptom was a better predictor of the rare disease than of the common disease. Contrary to a normative probability judgement account, subjects were biased in that they judged the probability of the rare disease given the target symptom to be greater than the probability of the common disease given the target symptom. Gluck and Bower argued that such a result was predicted by a connectionist network using the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule, but it is argued that Gluck and Bower's network simulation was not appropriate for the experiment they had performed. In fact, it appeared that the connectionist network failed to predict the bias in the subjects' probability estimates.

However, this conclusion rests on an assumption that Gluck and Bower implicitly made. They arranged for P(rare disease/target symptom) and P(com-mon disease/target symptom) to be identical across all trials on which the target symptom occurred, both on its own and with other symptoms present. Gluck and Bower assumed that the subjects were estimating these probabilities. But the results of the second experiment showed instead that the subjects were estimating the probability of each disease given only the target symptom. In the final experiment the design was changed so that this problem might be circumvented. In this experiment, again, the subjects were biased in their probability judgements exactly as the connectionist network predicted. Thus, finally, evidence was found which was compatible with the network model but not with a normative account, but this was true only if the network did not include a layer of hidden units.     

The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors

Over the past decade, distrust of atheists has been documented in psychological literature yet remains relatively understudied. The current research sought to test the robustness of anti-atheist prejudice. Specifically, it examined the extent to which an individual’s anti-atheist prejudice remained unchanged in light of new information. One hundred participants from the United Kingdom completed an online experiment. The experiment involved reading a vignette describing the actions of an untrustworthy individual. Participants were asked to make a judgment with regards to the untrustworthy individual’s identity. The occurrence of a cognitive bias, namely, the conjunction fallacy, was used to measure the frequency of anti-atheist prejudice. An examination of judgment errors (i.e., conjunction fallacies) under different conditions was used to test the robustness of anti-atheism prejudice. The results show that anti-atheist prejudice is not confined either to dominantly religious countries or to religious individuals but rather appears to be a robust judgment about atheists.     

Automatic-heuristic and executive-analytic processing during reasoning: Chronometric and dual-task considerations

Human reasoning has been shown to overly rely on intuitive, heuristic processing instead of a more demanding analytic inference process. Four experiments tested the central claim of current dual-process theories that analytic operations involve time-consuming executive processing whereas the heuristic system would operate automatically. Participants solved conjunction fallacy problems and indicative and deontic selection tasks. Experiment 1 established that making correct analytic inferences demanded more processing time than did making heuristic inferences. Experiment 2 showed that burdening the executive resources with an attention-demanding secondary task decreased correct, analytic responding and boosted the rate of conjunction fallacies and indicative matching card selections. Results were replicated in Experiments 3 and 4 with a different secondary-task procedure. Involvement of executive resources for the deontic selection task was less clear. Findings validate basic processing assumptions of the dual-process framework and complete the correlational research programme of K. E. Stanovich and R. F. West (2000).     

Automatic–heuristic and executive–analytic processing during reasoning: Chronometric and dual-task considerations

Human reasoning has been shown to overly rely on intuitive, heuristic processing instead of a more demanding analytic inference process. Four experiments tested the central claim of current dual-process theories that analytic operations involve time-consuming executive processing whereas the heuristic system would operate automatically. Participants solved conjunction fallacy problems and indicative and deontic selection tasks. Experiment 1 established that making correct analytic inferences demanded more processing time than did making heuristic inferences. Experiment 2 showed that burdening the executive resources with an attention-demanding secondary task decreased correct, analytic responding and boosted the rate of conjunction fallacies and indicative matching card selections. Results were replicated in Experiments 3 and 4 with a different secondary-task procedure. Involvement of executive resources for the deontic selection task was less clear. Findings validate basic processing assumptions of the dual-process framework and complete the correlational research programme of K. E. Stanovich and R. F. West (2000).     

The effect of the Müller-Lyer illusion on the planning and control of manual aiming movements

Two experiments used Müller-Lyer stimuli to test the predictions of the planning-control model (S. Glover, 2002) for aiming movements. In Experiment 1, participants aimed to stimuli that either remained the same or changed upon movement initiation. Experiment 2 was identical except that the duration of visual feedback for online control was manipulated. The authors found that the figures visible during movement planning and online control had additive effects on endpoint bias, even when participants had ample time to use visual feedback to modify their movements (Experiment 2). These findings are problematic not only for the planning-control model but also for A. D. Milner and M. A. Goodale's (1995) two visual system explanation of illusory bias. Although our results are consistent with the idea that a single representation is used for perception, movement planning, and online control (e.g., V. H. Franz, 2001), other work from our laboratory and elsewhere suggests that the manner in which space is coded depends on constraints associated with the specific task, such as the visual cues available to the performer.     

Repetition priming and face processing: Priming occurs within the system that responds to the identity of a face

A familiar stimulus that has recently been recognized will be recognized a second time more quickly and more accurately than if it had not been primed by the earlier encounter. This is the phenomenon of “repetition priming”. Four experiments on repetition priming of face recognition suggest that repetition priming is a consequence of changes within the system that responds to the familiarity of a stimulus. In Experiment 1, classifying familiar faces by occupation facilitated subsequent responses to the same faces in a familiarity decision task (Is this face familiar or unfamiliar?) but not in an expression decision task (Is this face smiling or unsmiling?) or a sex decision task (Is this face male or female?). In Experiment 2, familiar faces showed repetition priming in a familiarity decision task, regardless of whether a familiarity judgment or an expression judgment had been required when the faces were first encountered. Expression decisions to familiar faces again failed to show repetition priming. In Experiment 3, familiar faces showed repetition priming in a familiarity decision task, regardless of whether a familiarity judgment or a sex judgment had been asked for when the faces were first encountered. Sex decisions to familiar faces again failed to show repetition priming. In Experiment 4, familiarity decisions continued to show repetition priming when a brief presentation time with encouragement to respond while the face was displayed reduced response latencies to speeds comparable to those for sex and expression judgments in Experiments 1 to 3. The results are problematic for theories that propose that repetition priming is mediated by episodic records of previous acts of stimulus encoding.     

The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty

Research with general knowledge items demonstrates extreme overconfidence when people estimate confidence intervals for unknown quantities, but close to zero overconfidence when the same intervals are assessed by probability judgment. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated if the overconfidence specific to confidence intervals derives from limited task experience or from short-term memory limitations. As predicted by the naive sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), overconfidence with probability judgment is rapidly reduced by additional task experience, whereas overconfidence with intuitive confidence intervals is minimally affected even by extensive task experience. In contrast to the minor bias with probability judgment, the extreme overconfidence bias with intuitive confidence intervals is correlated with short-term memory capacity. The proposed interpretation is that increased task experience is not sufficient to cure the overconfidence with confidence intervals because it stems from short-term memory limitations.     

Fast color grouping and slow color inhibition: evidence for distinct temporal windows for separate processes in preview search

The authors report 4 experiments that examined color grouping and negative carryover effects in preview search via a probe detection task (J. J. Braithwaite, G. W. Humphreys, & J. Hodsoll, 2003). In Experiment 1, there was evidence of a negative color carryover from the preview to new items, using both search and probe detection measures. There was also a negative bias against probes on old items that carried the majority color in the preview. With a short preview duration (150 ms) carryover effects to new items were greatly reduced, but probe detection remained biased against the majority color in the old items. Experiments 2 and 4 showed that the color bias effects on old items could be reduced when these items had to be prioritized relative to being ignored. Experiment 3 tested and rejected the idea that variations in the probability of whether minority or majority colors were probed were crucial. These results show that the time course of color carryover effects can be separated from effects of early color grouping in the preview display: Color grouping is fast, and inhibitory color carryover effects are slow.     

Self-enhancement and theory-based correction processes

Two studies examined bias correction by manipulating a perceived chronic judgmental bias (i.e., overestimator/underestimator) using a modified dot estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants corrected for this perceived estimation bias by making adjustments away from the arbitrary feedback about their personal bias tendencies. In Experiment 2, the perceived desirability of the same estimation bias was manipulated. Results indicated that self-enhancement concerns impacted perceivers’ motivation to correct, at a cost to accuracy. These studies expand our current understanding of theory-based correction by including self-enhancement motives as causes of correction, demonstrating that such corrections can decrease rather than increase judgment accuracy, and illustrating the usefulness of a new perceived bias manipulation in theory testing.     

Recognition is used as one cue among others in judgment and decision making

Three experiments with paired comparisons were conducted to test the non-compensatory character of the recognition heuristic (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002) in judgment and decision making. Recognition and knowledge about the recognized alternative were manipulated. In Experiment 1, participants were presented pairs of animal names where the task was to select the animal with the larger population. In Experiment 2, participants chose the safer 1 out of 2 airlines, and 3 knowledge cues were varied simultaneously. Recognition effects were partly compensated by task-relevant knowledge. The compensatory effects were additive. Decisions were slower when recognition and knowledge were incongruent. In Experiment 3, compensatory effects of knowledge and recognition were found for the city-size task which had originally been used to demonstrate the non-compensatory character of the recognition heuristic. These results suggest that recognition information is not used in an all-or-none fashion but is integrated with other types of knowledge in judgment and decision making.     

Reducing stereotype threat by blurring intergroup boundaries

The authors aimed to establish whether interventions designed to reduce intergroup bias could be applied to the stereotype threat domain. In three experiments, the hypothesis was tested that blurring intergroup boundaries would reduce stereotype threat. In the first study, it was found that female participants who thought about characteristics shared between the genders tended to show less preference for stereotypical female careers than did participants in the baseline condition. In Experiment 2, participants who thought about overlapping characteristics answered more math questions correctly compared to a baseline group and participants who thought about differences between the genders. In Experiment 3, a specific threat manipulation was included. Participants who completed the overlapping characteristics task before receiving the threat completed significantly more math questions correctly than did participants in the baseline and threat conditions. The findings support the idea that interventions designed to reduce intergroup bias can be applied successfully in the reduction of stereotype threat.     

Aging and conditional probability judgments: a global matching approach

Age differences in bias in conditional probability judgments were investigated based on predictions derived from the Minerva-Decision Making model (M. R. P. Dougherty, C. F. Gettys, & E. E. Ogden, 1999), a global matching model of likelihood judgment. In this study, 248 younger and older adults completed frequency judgment and conditional probability judgment tasks. Age differences in the frequency judgment task are interpreted as an age-related deficit in memory encoding. Older adults' stronger biases in the probability judgment task point to age differences in criterion setting. Age-related biases were eliminated when age groups were equated on memory encoding by means of study time manipulation. The authors conclude that older adults' stronger judgment biases are a function of memory impairment.     

The interplay of memory and judgment processes in effects of aging on hindsight bias

Hindsight bias is the phenomenon that after people are presented with the correct answer to a question, their judgment regarding their own past answer to this question is biased toward the correct answer. In three experiments, younger and older adults gave numerical responses to general-knowledge questions and later attempted to recall their responses. For some questions, the correct answer was provided during recall (Experiment 1) or before recall (Experiments 2 and 3). Multinomial model-based analyses show age differences in both recollection bias and reconstruction bias when the correct judgment was in working memory during the recall phase. The authors discuss implications for theories of cognitive aging and theories of hindsight bias.     

Multiple processes in prospective memory retrieval: factors determining monitoring versus spontaneous retrieval

Theoretically, prospective memory retrieval can be accomplished either by controlled monitoring of the environment for a target event or by a more reflexive process that spontaneously responds to the presence of a target event. These views were evaluated in Experiments 1-4 by examining whether performing a prospective memory task produced costs on the speed of performing the ongoing task. In Experiment 5, the authors directly tested for the existence of spontaneous retrieval. The results supported the multiprocess theory (M. A. McDaniel & G. O. Einstein, 2000) predictions that (a) spontaneous retrieval can occur and can support good prospective memory and (b) depending on task demands and individual differences, people rely to different degrees on monitoring versus spontaneous retrieval for prospective remembering.     

Felt dispensability in groups of coactors: The effects of shared responsibility and explicit anonymity on cognitive effort

The study reported here tests the effects of explicit anonymity and shared responsibility on cognitive effort. In Experiment 1, ninety-nine undergraduate students participated in a multiattribute judgment task, and math models of their judgments were constructed. Results showed that students who believed the responsibility for the judgment task was shared by 15 others used less complex judgment strategies than single judges or judges working in pairs. Results also showed that the effect of explicit anonymity on cognitive effort was quite small. In Experiment 2, students performed the job evaluation task and responded to questionnaire items measuring attitudes toward the task. Responses to these items showed that students who shared responsibility for the judgment task with 15 others felt more dispensable than students working alone or students working in pairs. Together these data show that feelings of dispensability can be the primary cause of social loafing in some situations and that feeling necessary can motivate effort in spite of anonymity.     

道德概念垂直空间隐喻对空间关系判断的影响

本研究通过三个实验考察道德概念垂直空间隐喻对空间关系判断的影响。涉及的空间关系判断包括上下关系判断、远近关系判断和距离判断。研究结果显示：（1）上下判断中,在空间上方时,道德词的反应快于不道德词;在空间下方时,不道德词的反应快于道德词;（2）远近判断中,在空间上方时,个体更倾向于将道德词判断为"远",即道德词更偏上;在空间下方时,没有显著的偏向;（3）在距离判断中,个体对道德词的判断出现显著的向上偏移,对不道德词的判断则出现显著的向下偏移。由此得出结论：道德概念的垂直空间隐喻会影响个体对空间关系的判断,具体来说是"道德是上"的隐喻会导致空间关系判断产生"向上"的偏移效应;而"不道德是下"的隐喻则会导致空间关系判断产生"向下"的偏移效应。     

What comes first? How selective attentional processes regulate the activation of a motor routine in a manual search task

An intriguing error has been observed in toddlers presented with a 3-location search task involving invisible displacements of an object, namely, the C-not-B task. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated the dynamics of the attentional focus process that is suspected to be involved in this task. In Experiment 1, 2.5-year-old children were tested on a new adaptation of the C-not-B task in which the opening of the experimenter's hand between cloths provided visual information about the correct localization of the toy. Children still emitted a strong response bias toward the last hiding place. In Experiment 2, 2.5-year-old children were tested on a new version of the task that was designed to investigate the role of the central location in the task. This 2nd experiment demonstrated that changing the hand's movement from A to C to B did not enable children to succeed in the task. In Experiment 3, 2.5-year-old children were tested in a situation that is analogous to the C-not-B with open hands task except for the fact that the experimenter dropped the toy under the 1st cloth in the path. Toddlers succeeded when the toy was hidden at Location A but not when it was hidden at Location B. Data indicate that attentional focus on the experimenter's hand motion is contingent on whether that stimulus is critical to performing the task. We argue that these findings provide a potential mechanism through which motor routines can be regulated in accordance with strategic intentions.     

How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: Evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

Intuitive predictions and judgments under conditions of uncertainty are often mediated by judgment heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Using the classical conjunction bias example, the present study examines the relationship between receptivity to metacognitive executive training and emotion-based learning ability indexed by Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance. After completing a computerised version of the IGT, participants were trained to avoid conjunction bias on a frequency judgment task derived from the works of Tversky and Kahneman. Pre- and post-test performances were assessed via another probability judgment task. Results clearly showed that participants who produced a biased answer despite the experimental training (individual patterns of the biased → biased type) mainly had less emotion-based learning ability in IGT. Better emotion-based learning ability was observed in participants whose response pattern was biased → logical. These findings argue in favour of the capacity of the human mind/brain to overcome reasoning bias when trained under executive programming conditions and as a function of emotional warning sensitivity.     

Congruity effects evoked by subliminally presented primes: automaticity rather than semantic processing

In a size judgment task on words denoting concrete objects, subliminally presented stimuli that preceded the targets influenced response times and were dependent on whether responses to the prime and the target were congruent or incongruent (Experiment 1). These findings, mirroring S. Dehaene et al. (1998), imply that primes are unconsciously categorized and processed to the response stage. However, the effect does not generalize to primes that are not in the response set (Experiment 2), and even exposure to primes not in the response set in an interleaved naming-size judgment task fails to induce it (Experiment 3). However, the effect generalizes from lowercase primes to the same set of uppercase targets (Experiment 4), suggesting an abstract level of operation. The findings suggest that rather than resulting from unconscious prime categorization, the congruity effect results from automatized stimulus-response mappings. Potential differences between the number and the word domain are discussed.