Śaṇkara on Action and Liberation

In this paper I attempt to understand the implications of ?a?kara's claim that liberation is not an action. If liberation is not an action, how is it up to us and therefore our responsibility? What role do actions have in a life concerned with liberation? The key to understanding ?a?kara's view, I suggest, requires broad reflection on his claim in his commentary on Brahma Sūtra I.1.4 that cessation of action in accordance with Vedic prohibition is not an action. I will conclude by discussing the implications of this interpretation on the nature of māyā in ?a?kara.     

‘Everyone’, consequences,and generalization arguments

This paper addresses issues raised by recent discussion in normative ethics which concern relations between properties of individual actions and of certain groups of actions. First, an ambiguity common to ‘everyone can’ and ‘everyone ought’ is examined. Next, a similar ambiguity in talk about consequences is studied; here several procedures for identifying and evaluating consequences are compared. Then a notation that untangles the ambiguities is presented. Next, this notation is employed in an analysis of Marcus Singer's deduction of his generalization argument. Finally, there is a study of the question as to whether or not conflicts are possible between Singer's generalization argument and the dictates of consequences of individual actions. The findings are that such conflicts are or are not possible depending upon how a certain restriction on generalization arguments is interpreted, and that in either case the proponent of generalization arguments is faced with problems.     

Japanese preschoolers’ evaluation of circular and non-circular arguments

Observational and experimental data have revealed that preschoolers possess some argumentation skills, both in the production and the evaluation of arguments. However, these skills might have been fostered by the particular cultural context of Western middle- and upper-classes families, to which most children studied belong. Some data suggests that children in other cultures possess at least some of these skills, but no experimental data had been gathered in Eastern cultures. These cultures are supposed to frown on argumentation, and might thus be less conducive to the early development of argumentation skills. We test the emergence of argument evaluation skills in Japanese 5-year-olds by presenting them with a choice between endorsing a strong, perceptual argument, and a weak, circular argument. A first experiment revealed a trend in the direction of the strong argument. A second experiment that addresses some methodological concerns of the first demonstrates a significant tendency to follow the strong argument. These results are similar to those previously gathered in two other cultures (Swiss and Maya), and suggest that some basic argumentation skills are early developing across cultures.     

Grim’s arguments against omniscience and indefinite extensibility

Patrick Grim has put forward a set theoretical argument purporting to prove that omniscience is an inconsistent concept and a model theoretical argument for the claim that we cannot even consistently define omniscience. The former relies on the fact that the class of all truths seems to be an inconsistent multiplicity (or a proper class, a class that is not a set); the latter is based on the difficulty of quantifying over classes that are not sets. We first address the set theoretical argument and make explicit some ways in which it depends on mathematical Platonism. Then we sketch a non Platonistic account of inconsistent multiplicities, based on the notion of indefinite extensibility, and show how Grim??s set theoretical argument could fail to be conclusive in such a context. Finally, we confront Grim??s model theoretical argument suggesting a way to define a being as omniscient without quantifying over any inconsistent multiplicity.     

Inferentialism and knowledge: Brandom’s arguments against reliabilism

I take issue with Robert Brandom’s claim that on an analysis of knowledge based on objective probabilities it is not possible to provide a stable answer to the question whether a belief has the status of knowledge. I argue that the version of the problem of generality developed by Brandom doesn’t undermine a truth-tracking account of noninferential knowledge that construes truth-tacking in terms of conditional probabilities. I then consider Sherrilyn Roush’s claim that an account of knowledge based on probabilistic tracking faces a version of the problem of generality. I argue that the problems she raises are specific to her account, and do not affect the version of the view that I have advanced. I then consider Brandom’s argument that the cases that motivate reliabilist epistemologies are in principle exceptional. I argue that he has failed to make a cogent case for this claim. I close with the suggestion that the representationalist approach to knowledge that I endorse and Brandom rejects is in principle compatible with the kind of pragmatist approach to belief and truth that both Brandom and I endorse.

     

Jen,love and universality—Three arguments concerning jen in Confucianism

Universality, rather than partiality, is the characteristic of Confucian jen. This article puts forward three arguments to clarify confusion of interpretation: (1) that jen, rather than shu, is the main thread running through the whole system of Confucianism, and that by its two procedures of chung and shu, it presents itself as an integration of one's self with others; (2) that jen, as love, does not signify a natural preference, but an ethical refinement of an ordinary feeling of fondness, that it derives from such a feeling but goes beyond it, and that it functions as a universal commitment which begins with family affection but is not limited to it; (3) that jen, as universal love, is deontological in motive, not only in contrast to a mutuality of love but also in opposition to a utilitarianism of love.     

Kenosis,Dynamic Śūnyatā and Weak Thought: Abe Masao and Gianni Vattimo

The verb κεν?ω (kenos) means ‘to empty’ and St. Paul uses the word ?κ?νωσεν (ekenosen) writing that ‘Jesus made himself nothing’ and ‘emptied himself’. ?ūnyatā is a Buddhist concept most commonly translated as emptiness, nothingness, or nonsubstantiality. An important kenosis–?ūnyatā discussion was sparked by Abe Masao’s paper ‘Kenotic God and Dynamic ?ūnyatā’ (in 1984). I confront the kenosis–?ūnyatā theme with Vattimo’s kenosis-based philosophy of religion. For Vattimo, kenosis refers to ‘secularization’: when strong structures such as the essence and the fulfilment of the Christian message are weakened. Parallels between Abe’s and Vattimo’s thought will be demonstrated with regard to themes current in East–West comparative philosophy: reality and emptiness, the overcoming of metaphysics, the position of the Self, the human and the divine, and the relationship between science and religion. The latter point is particularly timely because since the 1990s religious fundamentalism has pushed forward a curious ‘religion as science’ hypothesis. Both thinkers’ relationship with the idea of Nothingness will also be explored. Finally, Abe’s interpretation of ?ūnyatā will be presented as a form of ‘weak thought’. Both Abe and Vattimo design a religious attitude based on negativity without falling into the trap of anti-religious nihilism. Abe’s negation of the subject, which leads to a pluralism of beings, can very well be compared with Vattimo’s paradoxical ‘credere di credere’ (to believe to believe), through which Vattimo describes the attitude of an ego that has lost its own subjectivity. The person who does not believe but only ‘believes to believe’ is a sort of non-ego. I show that a ‘half-theistic’ way of thinking God based on kenosis can work in the service of plurality because it deconstructs the principle of reality based on faith and ‘fullness’.     

Can religious arguments persuade?

In his famous essay “The Ethics of Belief,” William K. Clifford claimed “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” (Clifford’s essay was originally published in Contemporary Review in 1877; it is presently in print in Madigan (1999)). One might claim that a corollary to Clifford’s Law is that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to withhold belief when faced with sufficient evidence. Seeming to operate on this principle, many religious philosophers—from St. Anselm to Alvin Plantinga—have claimed that non-believers are psychologically or cognitively deficient if they refuse to believe in the existence of God, when presented with evidence for His existence in the form of relevant experience or religious arguments that are prima facie unassailable. Similarly, many atheists fail to see how believers can confront the problem of evil and still assert their belief in a benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient Creator. In this paper, I propose to explain why religious arguments so often fail to persuade (I take the term ‘religious argument’ to include arguments whose conclusions are either assertions or denials of religious claims). In doing so, I first offer an account of persuasion and then apply it to religious arguments. I go on to argue that at least some religious arguments commit a form of question-begging, which I call “begging the doxastic question.”~An argument begs the doxastic question, on my account, when a subject would find the argument persuasive only if she antecedently believes the argument’s conclusion. This form of question begging is not, strictly speaking, a case of circularity and thus, is not a fallacy; rather, it would explain why one coming to the argument would fail to be persuaded by it unless he already accepted its conclusion. This has the effect, when applied to religious argumentation, that religious arguments are rarely persuasive, which raises the further question: what good are religious arguments? I end by suggesting some non-persuasive functions of religious argument. Finally, I suggest that a full understanding of religious argumentation should give evidentialists pause, for religious beliefs look less like belief states that are sensitive to evidentiary states and more like framework principles or fundamental commitments.     

Do incompatible arguments cause extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments? The role of congruence between argument compatibility and argument quality

Previous studies have demonstrated that arguments incompatible with prior beliefs are subjected to more extensive refutational processing, scrutinized longer, and judged to be weaker than arguments compatible with prior beliefs. However, this study suggests whether extensive processing is implemented when evaluating arguments is not decided by argument compatibility, but by congruence between two evaluating tendencies elicited by both argument compatibility and argument quality. Consistent with this perspective, the results of two experiments show that relative to congruent arguments, participants judged arguments eliciting incongruent evaluating tendencies as less extreme in strength, spent more time, and felt more hesitant generating strength judgments for them. The results also show that it is mainly incongruent arguments, not congruent arguments, whose strength ratings were more closely associated with the perceived personal importance of the issue, which intensified the tendency to evaluate arguments depending on argument compatibility. These results suggest that it is the incongruity between argument compatibility and argument quality, and not simply the argument compatibility, that plays a more important role in activating an extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments.     

Action in perception? Empirical and philosophical arguments against the enactive approach to perception

This paper focuses on the epistemic conditions of visual perception, ie it concentrates on the question of what kind of knowledge is required for us in order to be able to see colours and shapes as spatial properties of things. According to contemporary theories of sensory perception that follow the tradition of George Berkeley, like Alva Noe's so-called enactive approach to perception, this type of visual perception requires a certain kind of implicit practical knowledge, namely implicit sensorimotor knowledge of the way sensory stimulation varies as the perceiver moves. Two objections are presented against this central claim of the enactive approach. First, empirical evidence from psychological research on children's cognitive and motor development suggests that visual content is entirely independent of sensorimotor knowledge. Second, the enactive approach gets involved in the characteristic problems of classical sense--datum theories by introducing the extremely problematic claim that the recognition of appearances is the epistemic starting point for the perception of things and their properties.     

Early and deep: two independent paradigms?

Did Winnicott replace or transform Freud's metapsychology? The author's aim is to explore more deeply the views developed in a previous paper based solely on Winnicott. Here the author draws on other studies to respond to two questions recently posed by Fulgencio concerning the meaning of the term metapsychology and the existence of a new topography in Winnicott's work. For many authors, Winnicott does not reject Freudian metapsychology and says nothing new in this field; in the field of paediatric anthropology, however, he focuses on dependence, and in the field of the living embodiment of the drives on being and self as different from ego. But Green notes the existence of a third topography, that of self/object, and also examines the vicissitudes of being by isolating the concept in Winnicott's work. For the author, however, being seems in continuity with his whole anthropological and ontological perspective; and when Winnicott introduces environmental factors of which the infant is unaware, he also introduces a heuristic distinction between early and deep: there is thus neither a rejection nor a reformulatation of the metapsychological theorization, but rather a coexistence of two paradigms.     

Behavior modification and the principle of normalization: clash or synthesis?

The aim of this article is to analyze the relationship between the principle of normalization and behavior modification with reference to the use of moderate punishment. Applying the normalization ideology through non‐aversive strategies alone has resulted in poor outcomes. Research demonstrates that moderate punishment can be a useful aid towards the development of normative interventions. In this way the negative implications of the dogmatic equation of ‘normativeness’ with non‐aversiveness on the effectiveness of intervention are avoided. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Research ethics and the principle of Justice as Fairness – A restatement

In my recent article, I addressed the question of whether a potential categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired patients from non-therapeutic medical research would be inaccordance with the Principle of Justice as Fairness. I came to the conclusion that a categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired persons from relevant research projects may collide with Rawls’s understanding of Justice as Fairness. Derek Bell has criticized my paper by denying that it is legitimate to apply Rawls to this bioethical problem. In my restatement I try to show that an extrapolation of John Rawls’s thought to such bioethical cases is possible, because Rawls himself has written that his orientation towards decisionally non-impaired persons is an idealized situation that allows extrapolations. In a second part I try to show that Bell hasroughly misunderstood my concept of “presumed consent” which I make a prerequisite for the legitimisation of research on decisionally impaired persons. In using advance consent as a proposal for resolving the problem, Bell has indirectly confirmed my approach because he is using a similar construct of consent, which operates with similar hypotheses and probabilities of error. I see here no categorical difference between Bell’s conclusion and my discussion. Thus, Bell’s reply does not represent a refutation of my thoughts, but rather it is a para phrased confirmation of my central theses. I conclude by showing the relevance of Rawls, pointing out that the discussion between Bell and me illustrates how Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium is an appropriate approach to finding a solution to this bioethical problem. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Dynamic and Syncretic Dimensions to Śāntarakṣita's Presentation of the Two Truths

It is common for philosophers from the Madhyamaka school of Indian Buddhist thought to offer a presentation of the two truths, ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) and conventional truth (sa?v?tisatya), as a vehicle for presenting their views on the ontological status of entities. Though there is some degree of variance, generally ultimate truths are described as objects known by an awareness of knowing things as they are. Conventional truths are objects as conceived by a mistaken awareness, one that superimposes a mode of existence onto objects that is not actually there. These two truths are contrasted (one is accurate; one is not) and used as a vehicle for understanding the ontological status of phenomena and the means by which they are known. ?āntarak?ita (725–788 CE) was among the most important Madhyamaka thinkers in Indian Buddhist history, yet his presentation of the two truths has several features that signal its uniqueness. This paper will discuss two particular unique dimensions to ?āntarak?ita's views on the two truths: his integration of aspects of Cittamatra/Yogācāra thinking, including the rejection of external objects, into his presentation of conventional truths, and the dynamic way in which conventional truths are not merely presented as objects of a mistaken awareness, but rather as an important soteriological step in the process of realizing the ultimate. This syncretic and dynamic integration of Yogācāra thought, where its ideas are fully engaged and incorporated into an over-arching Madhyamaka philosophical system is a key component to the thought of one of the most important, influential, and innovative figures in the late period of Indian Madhyamaka, and one which has yet to be fully acknowledged in secondary literature.     

What ontological arguments don’t show

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Daniel Dombrowski contends that: (1) a number of versions of the ontological argument [OA] are sound; (2) the deity whose existence is most well...