Individualism and Community as Contested Rhetorics in the Catholic New Evangelization Movement

This article addresses a new religious movement within one of the oldest ecclesiastical organizations in Christendom??the Catholic Church. The Catholic New Evangelization (NE) is an intra-ecclesial movement articulated and inspired by the late Pope John Paul II. Our analysis of this movement focuses on the emerging tensions between the contrasting individualist and communalist orientations of what we call ??Vatican II Catholics?? and ??NE Catholics,?? respectively. We examine responses to NE rhetoric and its implementation in the Catholic Archdiocese of Detroit??s central services, the archdiocesan seminary, and two local Detroit parishes. At these sites, the NE rhetoric, especially in its emphasis on having a ??personal relationship with Jesus,?? has intensified individual versus community tensions among Catholic professionals and lay leaders in the Detroit area.     

Embodied Experience in Educational Practice and Research

The intention of this article is to make an educational analysis of Merleau-Ponty??s theory of experience in order to see what it implicates for educational practice as well as educational research. In this way, we can attain an understanding what embodied experience might mean both in schools and other educational settings and in researching educational activities. The analysis will take its point of departure in Merleau-Ponty??s analysis and criticism of empiricist and neokantian theories of experience. This will be followed up by an introduction of some central concepts in Merleau-Ponty??s own understanding of experience with emphasis on their relevance for educational analysis. This way of presenting the theory of embodied experience has the advantage of being able to indicate the difference it makes in the field of theories of experience.     

On Gilmore��s Definition of ��Dead��

Gilmore proposes a new definition of ??dead?? in response to Fred Feldman??s earlier definition in terms of ??lives?? and ??dies.?? In this paper, I critically examine Gilmore??s new definition. First, I explain what his definition is and how it is an improvement upon Feldman??s definition. Second, I raise an objection to it by noting that it fails to rule out the possibility of a thing that dies without becoming dead.     

Getting More than You Paid For: The Parable of the Treasure and the Pearl as the Experience of Transformation

Matthew??s parables of the treasure and pearl are commonly interpreted as a call to give all one has for the kingdom. In this article, I argue that the experience brought about by the objects is instead the point of these parables. In psychoanalytic terms, the treasure and the pearl represent what Bollas (1987) calls the transformational object. The search for the transformational object is inspired by the infant??s earliest memory of the sudden internal and external transformation brought about by the ministrations of the mother. In adult life, it continues in a search for aesthetic or cultural objects that are identified with the metamorphosis of the self. From this perspective, I explore how the objects of treasure and pearl evoke an emotionally dense transformation to be experienced. The kingdom of heaven is like the surprising object, able to joyfully transform our world. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like the experience of surrendering to the beautiful object, for which we have sought.     

From the “metaphysics of the individual” to the critique of society: on the practical significance of Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life

This essay explores the practical significance of Michel Henry??s ??material phenomenology.?? Commencing with an exposition of his most basic philosophical intuition, i.e., his insight that transcendental affectivity is the primordial mode of revelation of our selfhood, the essay then brings to light how this intuition also establishes our relation to both the world and others. Animated by a radical form of the phenomenological reduction, Henry??s material phenomenology brackets the exterior world in a bid to reach the concrete interior transcendental experience at the base of all exteriority. The essay argues that this ??counter reduction,?? designed as a practical orientation to the world, suspends all traditional parameters of onto(theo)logical individuation in order to rethink subjectivity in terms of its transcendental corporeality, i.e., in terms of the invisible display of ??affective flesh.?? The development of this ??metaphysics of the individual?? anchors his ??practical philosophy?? as he developed it??under shifting accents??throughout his oeuvre. In particular, the essay brings into focus Henry??s reflections on modernity, the industry of mass culture and their ??barbaric?? movements. The essay briefly puts these cultural and political areas of Henry??s of thinking into contact with his late ??theological turn,?? i.e., his Christological account of Life and the (inter)subjective self-realization to which it gives rise.     

Validity and Effectiveness of Ambiguity: A Famous Argument by Socrates

An argument can be superficially valid and rhetorically effective even if what is plausibly meant, what is derived from what, and how it is derived is not at all clear. An example of such an argument is provided by Socrates??s famous refutation of Euthyphro??s second definition of holy, which is generally regarded as clearly valid and successful. This paper provides a stricter logical analysis than the ones in the literature. In particular, it is shown that the argument contains a syntactically ambiguous expression, a passage that needs to be read charitably, and a previously unnoticed but crucial shift between two notions of unholy. Different analyses may be provided, depending on how these interpretation problems are solved. The conditions under which the refutation is valid and successful are far from obvious, and are here explicitly specified.     

Looking Through Ulanowicz’s “Third Window”

After a ??very personal?? introduction, and a reference to how accurate indeed is the use of the ??new window?? metaphor by Ulanowicz and about what ??can be seen through it??, the article dwells into the evolution of our understanding about the most general sources??material and/or non-material??of change and transformation; in order to examine further the item about the ways through which ??information?? can be a source of change and transformation also in pre-biotic processes, where commonly it is not taken into account. Thus, the article argues the convergence between Ulanowicz??s and the Author??s treatments of??non only biotic??networks of configuration of processes (a central theme in Ulanowicz??s book). Finally, the article pays attention to how Ulanowicz??s vision through his ??new Third Window??, can indeed help us transcend the non desirable division of contemporary culture into two isolated compartments (science and technology versus the humanities and ethics), which has contributed not only to the globalization of communications, transactions, knowledge and so on, but also to the globalization of multiple crisis of different sort that need to be solved if we want ??a better world to be possible??.     

The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure

In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by showing how it can answer two important objections that have been made to it. First, the famous worry that there is no felt similarity to all pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences (sometimes called ‘the heterogeneity objection’). Second, what I call ‘Findlay’s objection’, the claim that it cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain.     

The Subject (of) Listening

Jean-Luc Nancy's phenomenology of listening (trans. 2007) makes a series of claims about the sonic/auditory nature of the subject. First among these is the claim that the subject is a subject to the extent that it is listening, that it is all ears. The subject emerges on the back of the resonance of timbre in the body and the body's becoming-rhythmic. These claims are phrased often in musical terms, or making use of terms and rhetoric from the domains of music theory and music psychology. This article explores the role of music in Nancy's phenomenology with a particular view to the nature of listening in the contemporary world: both how listening is figured as a part of what Nancy terms the inoperative community and how listening figures the cognitive and phenomenological constitution of the subject.     

‘Lecturing’s Work’: A Collaborative Study with Harold Garfinkel

This article discusses some empirical materials from a collaborative study of ??lecturing??s work?? which the author conducted with Harold Garfinkel. The paper shows Garfinkel at work by presenting a history of the collaboration and discussing what we found. The article also considers some larger implications of our research for understanding how ethnomethodological studies can recover and discover the material regularities of everyday life as they are practiced in distinct settings. The paper reports on a program of ethnomethodological inquiry for discovering in situ what the produced orderliness of any setting??s endogenous tasks, competent courses of action and organizational objects could possibly be. The promise is that just what is identifying of social order, action and meaning is to be found massively, as the routine grounds of everyday activities, and in every case, as something worldly and embodied.     

The medieval theory of consequence

The recovery of Aristotle??s logic during the twelfth century was a great stimulus to medieval thinkers. Among their own theories developed to explain Aristotle??s theories of valid and invalid reasoning was a theory of consequence, of what arguments were valid, and why. By the fourteenth century, two main lines of thought had developed, one at Oxford, the other at Paris. Both schools distinguished formal from material consequence, but in very different ways. In Buridan and his followers in Paris, formal consequence was that preserved under uniform substitution. In Oxford, in contrast, formal consequence included analytic consequences such as ??If it??s a man, then it??s an animal??. Aristotle??s notion of syllogistic consequence was subsumed under the treatment of formal consequence. Buridan developed a general theory embracing the assertoric syllogism, the modal syllogism and syllogisms with oblique terms. The result was a thoroughly systematic and extensive treatment of logical theory and logical consequence which repays investigation.     

Explaining Helping Relationships Through Learning Theories and the Question of Human Agency

It is argued that counselors too readily accept the mechanistic terminology of learning theories to account for client behavior, when in fact such terminology is not capturing what really takes place in the consulting room. Following a definition of agency, classical causation theory is presented. Psychology has patterned itself after Newtonian precepts, which rely upon material and efficient causation. As an antidote to this narrow usage, the concept of telosponsivity is presented. A telosponse is behavior carried out “for the sake of” purposes, and draws from the meaning of formal and final causation. Oppositional meanings in experience are what makes telosponsivity both possible and, indeed, necessary. A review of one counseling theory is carried out, and it is then shown how the mechanistic biases of psychology have been incorporated into this theoretical account. Corrective theoretical measures, in line with an agential view of behavior, are then recommended.     

Animal Pain: What It is and Why It Matters

The basis of having a direct moral obligation to an entity is that what we do to that entity matters to it. The ability to experience pain is a sufficient condition for a being to be morally considerable. But the ability to feel pain is not a necessary condition for moral considerability. Organisms could have possibly evolved so as to be motivated to flee danger or injury or to eat or drink not by pain, but by “pangs of pleasure” that increase as one fills the relevant need or escapes the harm. In such a world, “mattering” would be positive, not negative, but would still be based in sentience and awareness. In our world, however, the “mattering” necessary to survival is negative—injuries and unfulfilled needs ramify in pain. But physical pain is by no means the only morally relevant mattering—fear, anxiety, loneliness, grief, certainly do not equate to varieties of physical pain, but are surely forms of “mattering.” An adequate morality towards animals would include a full range of possible matterings unique to each kind of animal, what I, following Aristotle, call “telos”. Sometimes not meeting other aspects of animal nature matter more to the animal than does physical pain. “Negative mattering” means all actions or events that harm animals—from frightening an animal to removing its young unnaturally early, to keeping it so it is unable to move or socialize. Physical pain is perhaps the paradigmatic case of “negative mattering”, but only constitutes a small part of what the concept covers. “Positive mattering” would of course encompass all states that are positive for the animal. An adequate ethic for animals takes cognizance of both kinds. The question arises as to how animals value death as compared with pain. Human cognition is such that it can value long-term future goals and endure short-run negative experiences for the sake of achieving them. In the case of animals, however, there is no evidence, either empirical or conceptual, that they have the capability to weigh future benefits or possibilities against current misery. We have no reason to believe that an animal can grasp the notion of extended life, let alone choose to trade current suffering for it. Pain may well be worse for animals than for humans, as they cannot rationalize its acceptance by appeal to future life without pain. How can we know that animals experience all or any of the negative or positive states we have enumerated above? The notion that we needed to be agnostic or downright atheistic about animal mentation, including pain, because we could not verify it through experience, became a mainstay of what I have called “scientific ideology”, the uncriticized dogma taught to young scientists through most of the 20th century despite its patent ignoring of Darwinian phylogenetic continuity. Together with the equally pernicious notion that science is “value-free”, and thus has no truck with ethics, this provided the complete justification for hurting animals in science without providing any pain control. This ideology could only be overthrown by federal law. Ordinary common sense throughout history, in contradistinction to scientific ideology, never denied that animals felt pain. Where, then, does the denial of pain and other forms of mattering come from if it is inimical to common sense? It came from the creation of philosophical systems hostile to common sense and salubrious to a scientific, non-commonsensical world view. Reasons for rejecting this philosophical position are detailed. In the end, then, there are no sound reasons for rejecting knowledge of animal pain and other forms of both negative and positive mattering in animals. Once that hurdle is cleared, science must work assiduously to classify, understand, and mitigate all instances of negative mattering occasioned in animals by human use, as well as to understand and maximize all modes of positive mattering.     

The impossible reparation

This article discusses the phantasy of returning to the past and symbiotically merging with the mother, which, in an autistic patient, constituted an attempt of impossible reparation. This mode of reparation resulted in a cycle in which any attempt to repair the inner experience by contact with an external object was destined to be disappointing because of the desire for an infantile connection without separateness. The author reviews the literature on reparation and emphasises recent developments resulting from work with Autism Spectrum Disorder children who are far from the depressive position and who have difficulty bearing separateness. The author recognises an essential positive aspect of reparation independent of the ability to perceive the object as separate and suggests that when working with very primitive emotional states, it seems suitable to use a wider definition for what can be considered essentially a primitive reparative act or a precursor for reparation. Next, the author discusses the significance of a phantasy of impossible reparation in an autistic girl with emphasis on the importance of considering the reparative aspects of this defensive phantasy to enable development. Finally, the author relates to the despair that occurs in both analyst and patient when the phantasy is not transformed.     

The Importance of Being Experienced: An Aristotelian Perspective on Experience and Experience-Based Learning

??The importance of being experienced?? plays a central part in the ethical philosophy of Aristotle. An experienced person is a person who has acquired a coping skill, an appropriate attitude and a sense of situation. According to Aristotle the soul and the body are interdependent, which indicates a close connection between human activity, human cognition and human character. By insisting on the primacy of action, Aristotle changes the educational focal point from an epistemological discussion of knowledge to an ethical discussion of practice. The paper discusses what Aristotle can offer contemporary education in relation to his understanding of experience. The frame of the discussion is organised according to the three notable elements that are contained in Aristotle??s notion of ??the importance of being experienced??: a practice, an appropriate hexis or character and a sense of the situation. As a background for and framing of the discussion, the paper will outline some of the many variants as well as substantial differences of the notion of experience and experience-based learning and categorise them in three different understandings.     

On substantial independence: a reply to Patrick Toner

Patrick Toner has recently criticized accounts of substance provided by Kit Fine, E. J. Lowe, and the author, accounts which say (to a first approximation) that substances cannot depend on things other than their own parts. On Toner??s analysis, the inclusion of this ??parts exception?? results in a disjunctive definition of substance rather than a unified account. In this paper (speaking only for myself, but in a way that would, I believe, support the other authors that Toner discusses), I first make clear what Toner??s criticism is, and then I respond to it. Including the ??parts exception?? is not the adding of a second condition but instead the creation of a new single condition. Since it is not the adding of a condition, the result is not disjunctive. Therefore, the objection fails.     

What ‘biological racial realism’ should mean

A curious ambiguity has arisen in the race debate in recent years. That ambiguity is what is actually meant by ??biological racial realism??. Some philosophers mean that ??race is a natural kind in biology??, while others mean that ??race is a real biological kind??. However, there is no agreement about what a natural kind or a real biological kind should be in the race debate. In this article, I will argue that the best interpretation of ??biological racial realism?? is one that interprets ??biological racial realism?? as ??race is a genuine kind in biology??, where a genuine kind is a valid kind in a well-ordered scientific research program. I begin by reviewing previous interpretations of ??biological racial realism?? in the race debate. Second, I introduce the idea of a genuine kind and compare it to various notions of natural and real biological kinds used in the race debate. Third, I present and defend an argument for my view. Fourth, I provide a few interesting consequences of my view for the race debate. Last, I provide a summary of the article.     

Perelman's rhetorical foundation of philosophy

This article is a Gadamer-Perelman's debate. The author points out the limits of the gadamerian's hermeneutic conception of philosophy and criticizes this conception from Perelman's new rhetoric point of view. Instead of speaking of truth as an ontological originary experience, the rhetorical foundation of philosophy allows us to say that in philosophy the important is the contrastation and the confrontation of criteria and that, for that reason, philosophy is above all characterized by discussibility.Philosophical argumentation, like juridical argumentation, constitutes applications, to different domains, of a theory of argumentation which we consider as a new rhetoric.By identifying this theory with the general theory of persuasive speech, which seeks to obtain the intellectual as well as the emotional adherence of an audience, no matter which, we state that all speeches which do not aspire to an impersonal validity proceed from rhetoric. (Ch. Perelman,L'empire rhétorique, p. 177).But, if one does not admit that the philosophical thesis may be founded on evident intuitions, it will be necessary to reccur to argumentative technics to make them prevail. The new rhetoric then becomes the indispensable tool of philosophy. (Ch. Perelman,L'empire rhétorique, p. 21).     

Rules for argumentation in dialogues

In this article it is pointed out what kind of rules for communication and argumentation are required in order to make it possible to resolve disputes in an orderly way. In section 2, Gricean maxims and Searlean speech act conditions are integrated in such a way that five general rules for communication can be formulated. In section 3, starting from Lewis's definition of convention, it is argued that the interactional effect of accepting is conventionally linked with the complex communicative act complex of argumentation. In section 4, the rules for argumentation are placed in a dialogical perspective.