共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Carlo Penco 《Philosophical Investigations》2010,33(4):360-379
On the basis of historical and textual evidence, this paper claims that (i) after his Tractatus, Wittgenstein was actually influenced by Einstein's theory of relativity and, (ii) the similarity of Einstein's relativity theory helps to illuminate some aspects of Wittgenstein's work. These claims find support in remarkable quotations where Wittgenstein speaks approvingly of Einstein's relativity theory and in the way these quotations are embedded in Wittgenstein's texts. The profound connection between Wittgenstein and relativity theory concerns not only Wittgenstein's “verificationist” phase (more closely connected with Schlick's work), but also Wittgenstein's later philosophy centred on the theme of rule‐following. 相似文献
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David G. Stern 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(4):383-401
In this paper I consider one of the influential challenges to the notion that perceptual experience might be completely conceptually structured, a challenge that rests on the idea that conceptual structure cannot do justice to the fineness of grain of perceptual experience. In so doing, I canvass John McDowell's attempt to meet this challenge by appeal to the notion of demonstrative concepts and review some criticisms recently leveled at McDowell's deployment of demonstrative concepts for this purpose by Sean D. Kelly. Finally, I suggest that, though Kelly's criticisms might challenge McDowell's original presentation of demonstrative concepts, a modified notion of demonstrative concepts is available to the conceptualist that is proof against Kelly's criticisms. 相似文献
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The Tractatus contains twodifferent proofs of the Grundgedanke, or thenonreferentiality of logical constants. In thispaper, I explicate the first proof in TLP 5.4s andreconstruct the less explicitly stated second proof. My explication of the first proof shows it to beelegant but based on an invalid inference. In myreconstruction of the second proof, the main argumentis that the sign of a logical constant does not denotebecause it possesses the punctuation-mark-nature. Andit possesses the punctuation-mark-nature because,given the analyticity thesis in TLP 5, one canestablish for everyday language an adequate symbolismwith N as the sole fundamental operation such that itssign is a bar indicating merely the order and scope ofits application. 相似文献
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《Philosophical Investigations》2006,29(2):202-208
Books reviewed: Max Kölbel and Bernard Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance (London: Routledge, 2004). x + 308, price £60.00 hb, ISBN 0‐415‐30517‐9. Reviewed by Constantine Sandis, Oxford Brookes UniversityOxford Brookes University Harcourt Hill Campus Oxford OX2 9AT csandis@brookes.ac.uk 相似文献
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Thomas Morawetz 《Philosophical Investigations》2006,29(2):180-197
In response to arguments made by Professors Levvis, Patterson and Eisele, I attempt to clarify a few of the main themes of my book, Law's Premises, Law's Promise. Professor Levvis’ paper gives me the opportunity to contrast the status of propositions held true by disputants in legal debate with propositions held fast as bedrock convictions about the nature of reality and experience. Professor Patterson's arguments allow me to show how legal decision making as a deliberative or interpretative practice rests, as all practices do, on a foundation of shared understanding (of mutually “knowing one's way about”). And Professor Eisele's remarks stimulate a discussion of the relation of conceptual analysis and the analysis of practices. 相似文献
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Leo K. C. Cheung 《Philosophical Investigations》2008,31(3):197-226
This paper aims to argue against the resolute reading, and offer a correct way of reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus. According to the resolute reading, nonsense can neither say nor show anything. The Tractatus does not advance any theory of meaning, nor does it adopt the notion of using signs in contravention of logical syntax. Its sentences, except a few constituting the frame, are all nonsensical. Its aim is merely to liberate nonsense utterers from nonsense. I argue that these points are either not distinctive from standard interpretations or incorrect. Instead, the Tractarian elucidations help to shed light on the nature of language and logic, and introduce the correct method in philosophy. Philosophy deals with philosophical utterances and Tractarian elucidations by pointing out that they are nonsensical. By doing this, one is helped to see that what they appear to be saying is shown by significant propositions saying something else. 相似文献
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《Philosophical Investigations》2006,29(1):93-97
Books reviewed: Sara Ellenbogen, Wittgenstein's Account of Truth, Suny Press, 2003, vii–xv + 148. Reviewed by Randy Ramal, Claremont Graduate University602 South College Avenue Claremont, CA 91711 USA 相似文献
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