The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation

The notion of “the burden of proof” plays an important role in real-world argumentation contexts, in particular in law. It has also been given a central role in normative accounts of argumentation, and has been used to explain a range of classic argumentation fallacies. We argue that in law the goal is to make practical decisions whereas in critical discussion the goal is frequently simply to increase or decrease degree of belief in a proposition. In the latter case, it is not necessarily important whether that degree of belief exceeds a particular threshold (e.g., ‘reasonable doubt’). We explore the consequences of this distinction for the role that the “burden of proof” has played in argumentation and in theories of fallacy.     

Introduction: The university revisited

Although universities are asked to play a role in the European knowledge society, the precise scope and meaning of this role is still under discussion. A major issue in this debate is the trend to adapt universities to economic needs and demands of society. In view of taking a critical stance against a one-sided economic interpretation of activities and functions of universities, their so-called “public” role is increasingly stressed in the debate as a crucial responsibility of universities that should not be marginalized and therefore deserves our attention. In this paper, which is the introduction to a special issue on the public role of the university, we want to stress the importance of addressing the question of “the role of universities in the Europe of knowledge” in an open way and thus, without prejudices against or in favour of possible answers. It is our contention that a critical view of what is happening in universities today cannot simply rely on authoritative ideas or principles that are vaguely reminiscent of our university traditions. Consequently, this introductory paper pleas for a firmer argumentative and a richer empirical basis that takes account of the fact that our background (horizon) has thoroughly changed in comparison to traditions that still implicitly inform our judgement of what universities can do, should do or should not do. Finally, we will discuss the way in which the articles collected in this issue are intended stimulating and supporting the debate on the public role of the university in Europe.

Gestalt and feature-intensive processing: Toward a unified model of human information processing

“Cognitive asynchrony theory,” recently developed in research on aging and memory, implies a functional distinction between the processing of “feature-intensive” items, those with numerous identifiable features, and the processing of images which are relatively sparse in such features and are handled in a more wholistic, “gestalt” manner. The present experiments addressed the question of whether such a distinction exists outside the realms of memory in which it has thus far been addressed. The present work used mental rotation as a model system. Consistent with the predictions of this model, Experiment 1 showed that feature-intensive figures required significantly more time to rotate than did gestalt figures, even though angles of rotation were the same. Experiment 2 demonstrated that feature-intensive processing may involve verbally-accessible semantic systems to a greater degree than is the case with “gestalt” items. Experiment 3 identified significant practice effects of feature-intensive stimuli on the processing of gestalt stimuli, but not the reverse. The results of these experiments indicate that the “gestalt/feature-intensive” processing distinction extends to mental rotation as well as to memory. Implications for the nature of mental representation of verbal and visual materials are discussed.     

Gestalt and feature-intensive processing: Toward a unified model of human information processing

“Cognitive asynchrony theory,” recently developed in research on aging and memory, implies a functional distinction between the processing of “feature-intensive” items, those with numerous identifiable features, and the processing of images which are relatively sparse in such features and are handled in a more wholistic, “gestalt” manner. The present experiments addressed the question of whether such a distinction exists outside the realms of memory in which it has thus far been addressed. The present work used mental rotation as a model system. Consistent with the predictions of this model, Experiment 1 showed that feature-intensive figures required significantly more time to rotate than did gestalt figures, even though angles of rotation were the same. Experiment 2 demonstrated that feature-intensive processing may involve verbally-accessible semantic systems to a greater degree than is the case with “gestalt” items. Experiment 3 identified significant practice effects of feature-intensive stimuli on the processing of gestalt stimuli, but not the reverse. The results of these experiments indicate that the “gestalt/feature-intensive” processing distinction extends to mental rotation as well as to memory. Implications for the nature of mental representation of verbal and visual materials are discussed.     

Higher Education,Knowledge for Its Own Sake,and an African Moral Theory

I seek to answer the question of whether publicly funded higher education ought to aim intrinsically to promote certain kinds of “blue-sky” knowledge, knowledge that is unlikely to result in “tangible” or “concrete” social benefits such as health, wealth and liberty. I approach this question in light of an African moral theory, which contrasts with dominant Western philosophies and has not yet been applied to pedagogical issues. According to this communitarian theory, grounded on salient sub-Saharan beliefs and practices, actions are right insofar as they respect relationships in which people both share a way of life, or identify with one another, and care for others’ quality of life, or are in solidarity with each other. I argue that while considerations of identity and solidarity each provide some reason for a state university to pursue blue-sky knowledge as a final end, they do not provide conclusive reason for it to do so. I abstain from drawing any further conclusion about whether this provides reason to reject the Afro-communitarian moral theory or the intuition that blue-sky knowledge is a proper final end of public higher education. I do point out, however, that the dominant Western moral theories on the face of it do no better than the African one at accounting for this intuition.     

Science, Democracy, and the Right to Research

Debates over the politicization of science have led some to claim that scientists have or should have a “right to research.” This article examines the political meaning and implications of the right to research with respect to different historical conceptions of rights. The more common “liberal” view sees rights as protections against social and political interference. The “republican” view, in contrast, conceives rights as claims to civic membership. Building on the republican view of rights, this article conceives the right to research as embedding science more firmly and explicitly within society, rather than sheltering science from society. From this perspective, all citizens should enjoy a general right to free inquiry, but this right to inquiry does not necessarily encompass all scientific research. Because rights are most reliably protected when embedded within democratic culture and institutions, claims for a right to research should be considered in light of how the research in question contributes to democracy. By putting both research and rights in a social context, this article shows that the claim for a right to research is best understood, not as a guarantee for public support of science, but as a way to initiate public deliberation and debate about which sorts of inquiry deserve public support.     

Gender, Video Game Playing Habits and Visual Memory Tasks

The current research examined whether visuospatial recall of both abstract and common objects was related to gender or object familiarity. Seventy two undergraduates from a university in the Southern U.S. were asked to draw the Rey Complex Figure and a series of common objects from memory. A pilot sample of seventy three undergraduates had previously identified common objects as “male” “female” and “neutral” exemplars. Males were significantly better at drawing “male” and “neutral” exemplars whereas females were better at drawing “female” exemplars. Neither gender was significantly better at the Rey task. These results question whether males have an inherent advantage in visual memory. Results also found that experience with playing violent video games was associated with higher visual memory recall.     

The Public Policy Pedagogy of Corporate and Alternative News Media

This paper argues for seeing in-depth news coverage of political, social, and economic issues as “public policy pedagogy.” To develop my argument, I draw on Nancy Fraser’s democratic theory, which attends to social differences and does not assume that unity is a starting point or an end goal of public dialogue. Alongside the formation of “subaltern counterpublics” (Fraser), alternative media outlets sometimes develop. There, members of alternative publics debate their interests and strategize about how to be heard in wider, mass-mediated public arenas. I address the normative implications of this non-unitary, multiple-publics model for news journalism, analyzing how current conventions in mainstream news journalism (e.g., “balance” defined as “airing two extremes”) can restrict public debate and impoverish the public policy pedagogy on offer. I illustrate my arguments with a case study of media coverage of the creation and implementation of a social justice curriculum in British Columbia, Canada.     

On the Meaning of the Constant “c” in Modern Physics

In modern physics, the constant “c” plays a twofold role. On the one hand, “c” is the well known velocity of light in an empty Minkowskian space–time, on the other hand “c” is a characteristic number of Special Relativity that governs the Lorentz transformation and its consequences for the measurements of space–time intervals. We ask for the interrelations between these two, at first sight different meanings of “c”. The conjecture that the value of “c” has any influence on the structure of space–time is based on the operational interpretation of Special Relativity, which uses light rays for measurements of space–time intervals. We do not follow this way of reasoning but replace it by a more realistic approach that allows to show that the structure of the Minkowskian space–time can be reconstructed already on the basis of a restricted classical ontology (Mittelstaedt, Philosophie der Physik und der Raum-Zeit, Mannheim: BI-Wissenschaftsverlag, 1988 and Mittelstaedt, Kaltblütig: Philosophie von einem rationalen Standpunkt, Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag, pp. 221–240, 2003), and that without any reference to the propagation of light. However, the space–time obtained in this way contains still an unknown constant. We show that this constant agrees numerically with “c” but that it must conceptually clearly be distinguished from the velocity of light. Hence, we argue for a clear distinction between the two faces of “c” and for a dualism of space–time and matter.     

“The end of history ” and the fate of the philosophy of history

The “end of history” by Fukuyama is mainly based on Hegel’s treatise of the end of history and Kojeve’s corresponding interpretation. But Hegel’s “end of history” is a purely philosophical question, i.e., an ontological premise that must be fulfilled to complete “absolute knowledge.” When Kojeve further demonstrates its “universal and homogeneous state,” Fukuyama extends it into a political view: The victory of the Western system of freedom and democracy marks the end of the development of human history and Marxist theory and practice. This is a misunderstanding of Hegel. Marx analyzes, scientifically, the historical limitation of Western capitalism and maintains, by way of a kind of revolutionary teleology, the expectation of and belief in human liberation, which is the highest historical goal. His philosophy of history is hence characterized by theoretical elements from both historical scientificalness and historical teleology.     

Philosophy, the “unknown knowns,” and the public use of reason

There are not only true or false solutions, there are also false questions. The task of philosophy is not to provide answers or solutions, but to submit to critical analysis the questions themselves, to make us see how the very way we perceive a problem is an obstacle to its solution. This holds especially for today’s public debates on ecological threats, on lack of faith, on democracy and the “war on terror”, in which the “unknown knowns”, the silent presuppositions we are not aware of, determine our acts.     

Democracy and Education: About the Future of a Problem

In 20th century’s European theory of education there was little interest in philosophy ofdemocracy. John Dewey’sDemocracy and Education was translated in nearly every European language but did not become the center of discussion. Even “radical education” was much more childcentered than open to radical questions of political democracy. This article discusses the problem in two respects, first the tension between neo-liberalism’s concept of individuality and public education, and second the future problems of a theory of “democratic education”after Dewey. The aim is to overcome traditional European dualisms like that of “citizen”or “man” i.e. to pave the way for a post-Rousseauian theory of education. Inaugural lecture upon taking office at the University of Zurich on 22nd November 1999.     

Cosmopolitanism and its Predicaments

The aim of my paper is to show the discussion concerning the idea of cosmopolitan society. I intend to examine the structure and content of the argumentation which put into question the very notion of cosmopolitanism, as well as the contemporary content of this concept. I will look at nationalistic discourse as presented, for instance, by Gertrude Himmelfarb, which puts emphasis on national values as an indispensable part of group and individual identity. On the other hand, I am going to analyze left-wing evaluation of cosmopolitanism (for instance, that of Chantal Mouffe) as an ideologically motivated attempt to hide the real contradictions of the contemporary world. Finally, I will prove that these critiques cannot undermine the concept of cosmopolitanism, but they force us to rethink a way in which cosmopolitan society can be achieved. If cosmopolitan society is to emerge, we need to reconstruct the idea of democracy and the notion of multi-cultural pluralistic society. I propose such rethinking of cosmopolitanism by the introduction of the notion of “dialogical cosmopolitanism,” which refers to M.M. Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue and G.H. Mead’s idea of “taking the role of the other.”     

Fearful asymmetry: Kierkegaard’s search for the direction of time

The ancient problem of whether our asymmetrical attitudes towards time are justified (or normatively required) remains a live one in contemporary philosophy. Drawing on themes in the work of McTaggart, Parfit, and Heidegger, I argue that this problem is also a key concern of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or (1843). Part I of Either/Or presents the “aesthete” as living a temporally volatilized form of life, devoid of temporal location, sequence and direction. Like Parfit’s character “Timeless,” these aesthetes are indifferent to the direction of time and seemingly do not experience McTaggart’s “A-Series” mode of temporality. The “ethical” conception of time that Judge William offers in Part II contains an attempt to normativize the direction of time, by re-orienting the aesthete towards an awareness of time’s finitude. However, the form of life Judge William articulates gives time sequentiality but not necessarily the robust directionality necessary to justify (and make normative) our asymmetrical attitudes to time. Hence while Either/Or raises this problem it remains unanswered until The Concept of Anxiety (1844). Only with the eschatological understanding of time developed in The Concept of Anxiety does Kierkegaard answer the question of why directional and asymmetrical conative and affective attitudes towards time are normative.     

Against over-estimating the role of ethics in technology development

The role of ethics in technology development has been often questioned, especially in the early days of societal reflection of technology. However, the situation has changed dramatically. Ethical consideration now is generally declared to be indispensable in shaping technology in a socially acceptable and sustainable way. The expectations of ethics are large; often even a kind of “New Ethics” is postulated. In the present paper an over-estimation of the role of ethics for technology development is rejected. It is argued that ethical reflection is, indeed, indispensable in certain problem areas and situation types; but there is, on the other hand, space for technology development free from the requirement for ethical reflection. The absence of a requirement for ethical reflection, however, always has to be considered relative to some “morale provisoire” (provisional morality) as an accepted normative framework within which technology development may occur without explicit ethical reflection. If this framework, however, is doubted or is shown to be insufficient the situation changes completely. Ethical reflection in this case becomes necessary, to consider this normative framework in order to offer modifications or supplements.     

G.A.T.S. and universities: Implications for research

The likely impact of applying the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to higher education are examined. GATS aims to “open up” services to competition: no preference can be shown to national or government providers. The consequences for teaching are likely to be that private companies, with degree-awarding powers, would be eligible for the same subsidies as public providers. Appealing to the inadequate recently introduced “benchmark” statements as proof of quality, they would provide a “bare bones” service at lower cost. Public subsidies would go: education being reduced to that minimum which could be packaged in terms of verifiable “learning outcomes”. The loss of “higher” aspirations, such education of critically-minded citizens of a democratic and civilised society would impoverish the university’s research culture which demands honesty and openness to public scrutiny. Most university research is substantially supported by public subsidy. Under GATS discipline, commercial providers of research services could be entitled to similar public subsidies. Publicly funded fundamental research would fade, leaving university research totally dependent for funds upon the good will of industry and commerce. Present problems, such as the suppression of unwelcome results and the use of questionable results to manipulate public opinion, would considerably increase. The public would lose a prime source of trustworthy knowledge, needed in political discourse, legal disputation, consumer protection and in many other contexts.     

W<Emphasis Type="SmallCaps">ang</Emphasis> Yangming’s 王陽明 Philosophy and Modern Theories of Democracy: A Reconstructive Interpretation

Liu Shipei 劉師培 (1884–1919) was the first scholar to locate intellectual resources of modern democracy in Wang Yangming’s theory of the “original knowing” (liangzhi 良知). In the 1950s there was a debate between Taiwanese liberals and the “New Confucians” over the relationship between the traditional Confucianism and modern democracy. Like Liu Shipei, the “New Confucians” justified modern democracy by means of Confucian philosophy (including that of Wang Yangming). For liberals, however, the Confucian tradition encompassed only the concept of “positive liberty,” which was irrelevant to or even incompatible with modern democracy. In this article, I try to argue for the position of the “New Confucians” by reconstructing Wang Yangming’s theory of the “original knowing” from a communitarian perspective.     

Mathematical Intuition and Natural Numbers: A Critical Discussion Charles Parsons, Mathematical Thought and Its Objects, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, xx + 378?pp

Charles Parsons’ book “Mathematical Thought and Its Objects” of 2008 (Cambridge University Press, New York) is critically discussed by concentrating on one of Parsons’ main themes: the role of intuition in our understanding of arithmetic (“intuition” in the specific sense of Kant and Hilbert). Parsons argues for a version of structuralism which is restricted by the condition that some paradigmatic structure should be presented that makes clear the actual existence of structures of the necessary sort. Parsons’ paradigmatic structure is the so-called ‘intuitive model’ of arithmetic realized by Hilbert’s strings of strokes. This paper argues that Hilbert’s strings, considered as given in intuition, cannot play the role Parsons assigns to them: the criteria of identity of these strings do not have the sharpness that Parsons wants to see in them, and Parsons inadvertently projects abstract structures into his ‘intuitive model’. This diagnosis is exemplified with respect to (a) Parsons’ distinction between addition and multiplication on the one hand and exponentiation on the other and (b) his analysis of arithmetical knowledge in simple cases like “7 + 5 = 12”. All in all, it is claimed that Parsons book contains many important insights with respect to, for example, different versions structuralism, the notion of “natural number” and its uniqueness, induction, predicativity and other things, for which he is rightly famous, but that his way of drawing on the notion of intuition leaves too many questions unanswered.     

Structural correspondence between theories and convergence to truth

While “scientism” is typically regarded as a position about the exclusive epistemic authority of science held by a certain class of “cultured despisers” of “religion”, we show that only on the assumption of this sort of view do purportedly “scientific” claims made by proponents of “intelligent design” appear to lend epistemic or apologetic support to claims affirmed about God and God’s action in “creation” by Christians in confessing their “faith”. On the other hand, the hermeneutical strategy that better describes the practice and method of Christian theologians, from the inception of theological reflection in the Christian tradition, acknowledges the epistemic authority of the best available tests for truth in areas of human inquiry such as science and history. But this strategy does not assume that such tests, whose authority must be regarded as provisional, provides authority for the warrant of affirming claims constituting the confessed “faith”. By attributing theological import to claims advanced by appeal to the best available tests for truth in the practice of science, supporters of ID not only confuse the epistemic authority of these tests with the normative authority of a faith community’s confessional identity, but impute to scientific tests for truth a sort of authority that even goes beyond the “methodological naturalism” against which they counterpose their claims.