Are perspectival shapes seen or imagined? An experimental approach

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - This paper proposes a novel experimental approach that would help to determine whether perspectival shapes, such as the elliptical profile of a tilted...     

Are human bodies represented differently from other objects? Experience shapes object representations

This study investigated the cognitive organization of the human body representation and its relationship to other object representations. It addressed whether (1) all objects and their parts were organized similarly, (2) animate objects and their parts were organized differently from inanimate objects and their parts, and (3) the human body was organized differently from all other objects. The relations among the parts of three exemplar objects (human body, bear, and bicycle) were examined. Participants performed a series of sorting tasks using stimulus cards illustrating various part and part combinations of these objects; the cards were constructed so that the same strategies could be used to categorize all three objects. Dissimilarity data were analysed using multidimensional scaling techniques. Results indicated that the human body was organized differently from the other objects, and that categorization did not follow the animate–inanimate distinction. Although animate objects were represented more on their visual characteristics and inanimate objects were represented more on functional characteristics, the human body was represented on its ability to perform actions. Representations of the other objects suggested that their organization was embodied in that they appear to be shaped by how the human body interacts, or doesn't interact, with the object.     

The Zeigarnik effect and intrinsic motivation: Are they the same?

The present study focused on delineating the parameters under which intrinsic motivation leads an individual to reengage an activity from those that result in the Zeigarnik effect. In a posttask free-choice period, participants not completing the experimental task displayed more reengagement behavior than participants completing the task (the Zeigarnik effect). When participants were also provided self-efficacious performance feedback via a prearranged competitive outcome manipulation, there was no evidence of the Zeigarnik effect, while there was support for intrinsic motivation from competent self-efficacious performance feedback. Results were discussed in terms of distinguishing between intrinsic motivation and the Zeigarnik effect as sources of reengagement motivation. It was concluded that, in the presence of self-efficacious performance feedback, the competent-incompetent impression was more salient than task-completion feedback.Preparation of this article was supported by Texas Christian University grant TCU/RF 5-23757.     

Does sport have intrinsic value?

This paper considers the suggestion, central to McFee's (2004 Mcfee, Graham. 2004. Sport, Rules and Values: Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Sports, London: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) moral laboratory argument, that sport is intrinsically valuable. McFee's position is outlined and critiqued and various interpretations of intrinsic value found in the philosophical literature are considered. In addition, Morgan's (2007 Morgan, William J. 2007. Caring, final ends and sports. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 1(1): 7–21. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]) claim that sport is an appropriate final end is considered and partially accepted. The paper draws a number of terminological distinctions and concludes that sport does not have intrinsic value as traditionally conceived, but that this is of little consequence with regard to the role of sport as a moral laboratory.     

Is color an intrinsic property of object representation?

The role of color in object representation was examined by using a variation of the Stroop paradigm in which observers named the displayed colors of objects or words. In experiment 1, colors of color-diagnostic objects were manipulated to be either typical or atypical of the object (eg a yellow banana versus a purple banana). A Stroop-like effect was obtained, with faster color-naming times for the typical as compared to the atypical condition. In experiment 2, naming colors on words specifying these same color-diagnostic objects reversed this pattern, with the typical condition producing longer response times than the atypical condition. In experiment 3, a blocked condition design that used the same words and colors as experiment 2 produced the standard Stroop-like facilitation for the typical condition. These results indicate that color is an intrinsic property of an object's representation at multiple levels. In experiment 4, we examined the specific level(s) at which color-shape associations arise by following the tasks used in experiments 1 and 2 with a lexical-decision task in which some items were conceptually related to items shown during color naming (eg banana/monkey). Priming for these associates was observed following color naming of words, but not pictures, providing further evidence that the color-shape associations responsible for the differing effects obtained in experiments 1 and 2 are due to the automatic activation of color-shape associations at different levels of representation.     

Are models necessary?

Modelling is currently one of the most successful and popular ways of dealing with some neurotic problems. It is based on a social learning theory that amongst other virtues takes into account cognitive variables. helps shed light on the aetiology of some neurotic disorders (Rachman. 1972). and seems particularly relevant to the understanding of much child behaviour.The technique of the modelling treatment has been refined over the years, largely through the work of Bandura, and the contention to date has been that behavioural improvement is brought about by vicarious processes (Bandura, 1969). However, since a modelling procedure by necessity involves exposure to a phobic object it is possible that vicarious processes are in fact redundant and that improvement is affected by ‘straightforward’ extinction processes. In short the contention is that interaction with a model disguises the fact that the modelling situation is no more than a modified flooding session. In one of the few studies to test this hypothesis Bandura, Grusec and Menlove (1967) found that exposure alone resulted in some gains for dog-phobic children, but that these changes were neither as great nor as stable as those achieved by similar children in a modelling treatment. Other indirect evidence for this hypothesis can be found by-relating the amount of exposure to the phobic object to outcome in modelling studies. Despite obvious difficulties in cross-trial comparison, rate of success for longer exposure treatments would constitute some support, albeit very tentative, for this hypothesis. Unfortunately, few of the studies contained enough reliable information on the relevant variables to reveal much. Bandura et al. (1967) used 80 min of exposure in all, with success rates of 70%, whilst less exposure time resulted in worse outcome in studies by Spiegler et al. (1969) and Ritter (1969). However, against this, Hill et al. (1968) and Rimm and Mahoney (1969) both report good results with brief participant modelling. The fact that participant modelling seems to be more beneficial than symbolic modelling, may be regarded as some support for the exposure hypothesis, since presumably exposure in these cases is more intense.However, these studies are largely indirect and one test of the hypothesis requires a comparison between groups one of which is exposed to both phobic object and model interaction (symbolic modelling) and one of which is exposed just to the phobic object.     

What Are Quantities?

This paper presents a view of quantities as ‘adverbial’ entities of a certain kind—more specifically, determinate ways, or modes, of having length, mass, speed, and the like. In doing so, it will be argued that quantities as such should be distinguished from quantitative properties or relations, and are not universals but are particulars, although they are not (Fregean) objects, either. A main advantage of the adverbial view over its rivals will be found in its superior explanatory power with respect to both certain fundamental principles of quantity and ordinary quantitative reasoning involving quantitative relations like three times as long as and 2 metres longer than.     

Are adjustments insufficient?

Many judgmental biases are thought to be the product of insufficient adjustment from an initial anchor value. Nearly all existing evidence of insufficient adjustment, however, comes from an experimental paradigm that evidence indicates does not involve adjustment at all. In this article, the authors first provide further evidence that some kinds of anchors (those that are self-generated and known to be incorrect but close to the correct answer) activate processes of adjustment, whereas others (uncertain anchors provided by an external source) do not. It is then shown that adjustment from self-generated anchors does indeed tend to be insufficient, both by comparing the estimates of participants starting from different anchor values and by comparing estimates with actual answers. Thus, evidence is provided of adjustment-based anchoring effects similar to the accessibility-based anchoring effects observed in the traditional anchoring paradigm, supporting theories of social judgment that rely on mechanisms of insufficient adjustment.     

Are beliefs signals?

Eric Funkhouser argues that beliefs can function as social signals. I argue that Funkhouser’s argument for this conclusion rests on a problematic definition of “signal,” and that on standard definitions, the imperceptibility of beliefs disqualifies them from counting as signals. However, I also argue that Funkhouser’s insights about the social functions of beliefs can be true even if his claim that beliefs are signals is false.     

Are Fallacies Vices?

Why are some arguments fallacious? Since argumentation is an intellectual activity that can be performed better or worse, do we evaluate arguments simply in terms of their content, or does it also make sense to evaluate the arguer in light of the content put forward? From a ‘virtue’ approach, I propose understanding fallacies as having some link with intellectual vice(s). Drawing from recent work by Paul Grice, Linda Zagzebski, Andrew Aberdein, and Douglas Walton, this essay argues that if there is some sense of argumentation where an argument is (1) truth-propagating and not (2) put forward in order to ‘win’, fallacies may be the vicious element in arguments that undermines (1), most often because the arguer’s goal is only (2). From this perspective, fallacies may not only be improper ‘moves’ in an argument, but may also reveal something lacking in the arguer’s intellectual character.     

Are Lesbians Women?

I argue that Mordque Wittig's view that lesbians are not women neglects the complexities involved in the composition of the category “woman.” I develop an articulation of the concept “woman” in the contemporary United States, with thirteen distinct defining characteristics, none of which are necessary nor sufficient. I argue that Wittig's emphasis on the material production of “woman” through the political regime of heterosexuality, however, is enormously fruitful for feminist and queer strategizing.     

Are affordances normative?

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - In this paper we explore in what sense we can claim that affordances, the objects of perception for ecological psychology, are related to normativity....     

Are Counterpossibles Epistemic?

It has been suggested that intuitions supporting the nonvacuity of counterpossibles can be explained by distinguishing an epistemic and a metaphysical reading of counterfactuals. Such an explanation must answer why we tend to neglect the distinction of the two readings. By way of an answer, I offer a generalized pattern for explaining nonvacuity intuitions by a stand‐and‐fall relationship to certain indicative conditionals. Then, I present reasons for doubting the proposal: nonvacuists can use the epistemic reading to turn the table against vacuists, telling apart significant from spurious intuitions. Moreover, our intuitions tend to survive even if we clear‐headedly intend a metaphysical reading.     

Are abilities dispositions?

Synthese - Abilities are in many ways central to what being an agent means, and they are appealed to in philosophical accounts of a great many different phenomena. It is often assumed that...