共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Windy Dryden 《Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy》2011,29(4):211-219
I discuss what I consider to be Albert Ellis’s ten most important contributions to the development of REBT. I also give a
personal view on what we will miss on his passing and on what we won’t. 相似文献
2.
Luca Moretti 《Synthese》2012,184(3):217-234
Crispin Wright has given an explanation of how a first time warrant can fall short of transmitting across a known entailment.
Formal epistemologists have struggled to turn Wright’s informal explanation into cogent Bayesian reasoning. In this paper,
I analyse two Bayesian models of Wright’s account respectively proposed by Samir Okasha and Jake Chandler. I argue that both
formalizations are unsatisfactory for different reasons, and I lay down a third Bayesian model that appears to me to capture
the valid kernel of Wright’s explanation. After this, I consider a recent development in Wright’s account of transmission
failure. Wright suggests that his condition sufficient for transmission failure of first time warrant also suffices for transmission
failure of supplementary warrant. I propose an interpretation of Wright’s suggestion that shields it from objections. I then
lay down a fourth Bayesian framework that provides a simplified model of the unified explanation of transmission failure envisaged
by Wright. 相似文献
3.
Ruth Malkinson 《Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy》2011,29(4):257-262
In this article, I reflect on what I believe are Albert Ellis’ important contributions to the field of psychotherapy. Having
worked closely with Albert Ellis for 32 years, I offer my opinions on some misconceptions of Albert Ellis. 相似文献
4.
John R. Minor 《Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy》2010,28(3):145-156
This paper is a response to Robb’s analysis of Ellis’ and Dryden’s sessions held with “Jane” in the summer of 1994. As Robb
noted, these consecutive sessions with the same client make for interesting, and clarifying, comparisons. My analysis considers
Robb’s overview of REBT and where I believe it diverges from the position of Ellis. It also considers why Ellis used the strategy
he did with “Jane” and compares and contrasts the assumptions that Ellis and Dryden seem to be making during their respective
sessions. It ends with a brief summary of the two approaches and some general comments about the nature of psychotherapy. 相似文献
5.
J. C. Pinto de Oliveira 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(1):147-157
In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap’s work.
In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap “would have found Structure philosophically congenial”. I claim that Kuhn’s book, from Carnap’s point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather
in history of science (in the context of a sharp discovery–justification distinction). It could also explain the fact that,
despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn’s book in his work in philosophy of science. 相似文献
6.
Matthew Ratcliffe 《Synthese》2011,178(1):121-130
This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds
of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s
claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of
the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This
latter stance does not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility
serves to illustrate that empiricism as an all-encompassing philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and
propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique. 相似文献
7.
José L. Zalabardo 《Synthese》2006,148(1):135-169
In this paper I assess the two central ingredients of Laurence BonJour’s position on empirical knowledge that have survived
the transition from his earlier coherentist views to his current endorsement of the doctrine of the given: his construal of
the problem of the epistemic regress and his rejection of an internalist solution to the problem. The bulk of the paper is
devoted to a critical assessment of BonJour’s arguments against externalism. I argue that they fail to put real pressure on
externalism, as they rely on a highly questionable conception of epistemic rationality and responsibility. Then, more briefly,
I take issue with BonJour’s endorsement of the irrelevance thesis—the claim that even if externalism were true it would not offer a satisfactory solution to the epistemic regress problem.
I contend that he is not entitled to subscribe this thesis unless he is prepared to abandon his construal of the problem.
*I have presented some of this material at UCL, Trinity College Dublin and the 10th Italo-Spanish meeting of Analytic Philosophy,
held in Pamplona. I am grateful to these audiences. 相似文献
8.
Alan Haworth 《Res Publica》2007,13(1):77-100
Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’.
I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections
fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the
liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that
Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public
interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit,
if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard
against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism. 相似文献
9.
Raymond DiGiuseppe 《Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy》2011,29(4):220-227
In this article, I reflect on what I believe are Albert Ellis’ important contributions to the field of psychotherapy. Having
worked closely with Albert Ellis for 32 years, I offer my opinions on some misconceptions of Albert Ellis. 相似文献
10.
Paul Crowther 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):151-170
Heidegger’s paper ‘Art and Space’ (1969, Man and world 6. Bloomington: Indiana university Press) is the place where he gives his fullest discussion of a major art medium which is
somewhat neglected in aesthetics, namely sculpture. The structure of argument in ‘Art and Space’ is cryptic even by Heidegger’s
standards. The small amount of literature tends to focus on the paper’s role within Heidegger’s own oeuvre as an expression of changes in his understanding of space. This is ironic; for Heidegger’s main thematic in the essay is
the way in which space is overcome in the creation of sculpture. Of course, by virtue of its three-dimensional character, sculpture seems to be a spatial medium,
par excellence. The counter-intuitive character of Heidegger’s position requires, accordingly, that his argumentative strategy be scrutinized
very closely. In this paper, therefore, I will examine closely the structure of Heidegger’s argument, with the aim of understanding,
rectifying, and then developing his most important insights. My ultimate aim is to show the subtle, but radical points which
are at issue in Heidegger’s arguments, and to develop them much further in the clarification of sculpture’s key philosophical
significance.
相似文献
Paul CrowtherEmail: |
11.
Michael Wolff 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):359-371
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory
of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view
they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning
perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only
the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory.
As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article
published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer
in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published
in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical
theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. 相似文献
12.
In this paper I focus on a central phenomenological concept in Michel Henry’s work that has often been neglected: generation.
Generation becomes an especially important conceptual key to understanding not only the relationship between God and human
self but also Henry’s adoption of radical interiority and his critical standpoint with respect to much of the phenomenological
tradition in which he is working. Thus in pursuing the theme of generation, I shall introduce many phenomenological-theological
terms in Henry’s trilogy on Christianity as well as how he understands the relationship between phenomenology and theology.
In the final sections of the paper, I turn to positively defining Henry’s notion of divine generation and examine the theological
implications of it in light of his confrontation and rejection of the doctrine of creation in the book of Genesis found in
his book, Incarnation: une philosophie de la chair. Humans are not created but are eternally generated, a bold claim that brings Henry to the brink of a kind of interiorized
pantheism or Gnostic dualism. Finally, I offer some critical comments specifically about Henry’s doctrine of generation in
light of the tension between auto-affection and hetero-affection and thus how one might think “after Henry” in light of the
basic Augustinian theological distinction between self and God and the intentionality of faith opened up by that distinction. 相似文献
13.
Sandra Lapointe 《Synthese》2010,174(2):263-281
This paper is aimed at understanding one central aspect of Bolzano’s views on deductive knowledge: what it means for a proposition
and for a term to be known a priori. I argue that, for Bolzano, a priori knowledge is knowledge by virtue of meaning and that Bolzano has substantial views about meaning and what it is to know the
latter. In particular, Bolzano believes that meaning is determined by implicit definition, i.e. the fundamental propositions
in a deductive system. I go into some detail in presenting and discussing Bolzano’s views on grounding, a priori knowledge and implicit definition. I explain why other aspects of Bolzano’s theory and, in particular, his peculiar understanding
of analyticity and the related notion of Ableitbarkeit might, as it has invariably in the past, mislead one to believe that Bolzano lacks a significant account of a priori knowledge. Throughout the paper, I point out to the ways in which, in this respect, Bolzano’s antagonistic relationship to
Kant directly shaped his own views. 相似文献
14.
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2008,47(4):560-576
In four earlier articles, I focused on the theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, and suggested that the
melancholic self may experience humor (Capps, 2007a), play (Capps, 2008a), dreams (Capps, 2007c), and art (Capps, 2008b) as restorative resources. I argued that Erik H. Erikson found these resources to be valuable remedies for his own melancholic
condition, which had its origins in the fact that he was illegitimate and was raised solely by his mother until he was three years
old, when she remarried. In this article, I focus on two themes in Freud’s Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood (1964): Leonardo’s relationship with his mother in early childhood and his inhibitions as an artist. I relate these two themes
to Erikson’s own early childhood and his failure to achieve his goal as an aspiring artist in his early twenties. The article
concludes with a discussion of Erikson’s frustrated aspirations to become an artist and his emphasis, in his psychoanalytic
work, on children’s play.
Donald Capps is Professor of Pastoral Psychology at Princeton Theological Seminary. His books include Men, Religion, and
Melancholia (1997), Freud and Freudians on Religion (2001), and Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor 相似文献
15.
Matthew I. Burch 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(3):157-171
In this paper I challenge Merold Westphal’s claim that Jean-Luc Marion’s hermeneutical phenomenology is especially useful
for theology. I argue that in spite of his explicit allegiance to Husserl’s “principle of all principles,” Marion fails to
embody a commitment to phenomenological seeing in his analyses of revelation. In the sections of Being Given where he discusses revelation, Marion allows faith-based claims to bleed into his phenomenological analyses, resulting in
what I call his ‘blurred vision’—the pretension that phenomenological seeing can be extended to theological matters. This
pretension undermines Marion’s phenomenological aspirations, because it invests his analyses with a theological content that
phenomenological intuition cannot account for or clarify. At the same time, this blurring of the line between theology and
phenomenology also makes Marion’s work theologically ineffective. For it furnishes the theologian and believer with the false
assurance that faith-based commitments can be grounded in phenomenological knowledge—a claim that he simply cannot make good
on. In light of these problems, I propose an alternative Heideggerian approach that maintains the boundary between philosophical
and theological discourse and thereby safeguards the integrity of both. 相似文献
16.
How to Define a Number? A General Epistemological Account of Simon Stevin’s Art of Defining 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jurgen Naets 《Topoi》2010,29(1):77-86
This paper explores Simon Stevin’s l’Arithmétique of 1585, where we find a novel understanding of the concept of number. I will discuss the dynamics between his practice and
philosophy of mathematics, and put it in the context of his general epistemological attitude. Subsequently, I will take a
close look at his justificational concerns, and at how these are reflected in his inductive, a postiori and structuralist
approach to investigating the numerical field. I will argue that Stevin’s renewed conceptualisation of the notion of number
is a sort of “existential closure” of the numerical domain, founded upon the practice of his predecessors and contemporaries.
Accordingly, I want to make clear that l’Aritmetique have to be read not as an ontological analysis or exploration of the numerical field, but as an explication of a mathematical
ethos. In this sense, this article also intends to make a specific contribution to the broader issue of the “ethics of geometry.” 相似文献
17.
Justin Broackes 《Erkenntnis》2007,66(1-2):27-71
This paper proposes a fundamentally opposite conception of the possibility of metaphysics to that of Barry Stroud in The Quest for Reality and other writings. I discuss Stroud’s views on everyday ‚truth’ and metaphysics (Section 1), on interpretation (Section
2 – replying with a theory of ‚quasi-understanding’), and his ‚no threat’ claim (Section 3). But the main argument (Section
4) is a response to Stroud’s claim that we have no right either to affirm or to deny the metaphysical reality of colours.
Stroud’s view resembles Carnap’s (1950, Revue Internationale de Philosophie
4, 20–40), that experience can in some sense never settle the metaphysical issue between e.g. materialism, idealism and phenomenalism;
though we can allow everyday ‚knowledge’ e.g. that there is a fallen tree in the garden outside, as something available on
all three views. (Carnap takes the undecidability as a sign that the metaphysical issue is a pseudo-question; Stroud insists
it is factual, but places it beyond our ken, ‚external’.) I argue, instead, that metaphysical argument is possible from within our conceptual scheme and epistemic situation (as in Gareth Evans’s arguments for realism over phenomenalism); that ‚external’
and ‚internal’ questions cannot be separated as Stroud wishes; and that if we really were denied knowledge on ‚metaphysical’
matters, that would infect our right to claim knowledge of ‚observational’ matters too. And I sketch a theory of colour that
would allow us to conclude (at once ‚metaphysically’ and ‚internally’) that things are indeed ‚really’ coloured. For all his
expressions of sympathy for Wittgenstein, Stroud’s metaphysics is remarkably Cartesian. 相似文献
18.
Ed Pluth 《Continental Philosophy Review》2006,39(3):293-312
I explore Lacan’s theory of the subject by responding to two well-known criticisms of it, found in Borch-Jacobsen’s Lacan and Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s The Title of the Letter. I argue that the relation of the subject to language is an important part of Lacan’s theory, but his conception of the subject
cannot be reduced to language, as the critiques allege. The real must be included in the picture too. I then discuss the situation
of Lacan’s subject between language and the real, and conclude with a contrast of Lacan’s subversion of the subject to a Derridean
paleonymic approach. 相似文献
19.
In this essay I critique a particular reading of Bergson that places an excessive weight on the concept of the ‘virtual’. Driven by the popularity of Deleuze’s use of the virtual, this image of Bergson (seen especially through his text of 1896,
Matter and Memory, where the idea is introduced) generates an imbalance that fails to recognise the importance of concepts of actuality, like space or psychology, in his other works. In fact, I argue that the virtual is not the key concept for Bergsonism and
that there is a good deal of evidence in Bergson’s other writings, especially those connected with his actualist notion of
‘refraction’, to think of him as a perspectivist philosopher. Moreover, it will be seen that Virtualism resides within an economy of
reflection that is subsumed within the broader paradigm of Actualist refraction. Taking these optical metaphors seriously, the virtual
becomes a perspectival image seen from an actual position, or rather, an interacting set of actual positions. This interaction
is termed ‘virtualization’, denoting the substitution of a substantive conception with a processual one. In the first two parts of the essay, I direct
my remarks more towards Deleuzian readings of the actual rather than Deleuze himself (Deleuze is so open about the biases
he brings to his reading of Bergson as to be beyond criticism). In the second two sections, I pursue a philosophical argument
for the probity of a non-Virtualist position as such within philosophy, based upon the concept of refraction. This is done
not only because it is important that we remain open to other readings of Bergson that are not so heavily mediated in one
direction, but also in view of the power of refraction as a new concept for reconciling actual modes such as molar identity,
the present, and extension, with their virtual opposites. 相似文献
20.
Jeremy Gwiazda 《Sophia》2009,48(4):393-398
Swinburne relies on principle P in The Existence of God to argue that God is simple and thus likely to exist. In this paper, I argue that Swinburne does not support P. In particular,
his arguments from mathematical simplicity and scientists’ preferences both fail. Given the central role P plays in Swinburne’s
overall argument in The Existence of God, I conclude that Swinburne should further support P if his argument that God likely exists is to be persuasive. 相似文献