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1.
Michelle Ciurria 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(2):259-269
In A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, Daniel Doviak develops a novel agent-based theory of right action that treats the rightness (or deontic status) of an action
as a matter of the action’s net intrinsic virtue value (net-IVV)—that is, its balance of virtue over vice. This view is designed
to accommodate three basic tenets of commonsense morality: (i) the maxim that “ought” implies “can,” (ii) the idea that a
person can do the right thing for the wrong reason, and (iii) the idea that a virtuous person can have “mixed motives.” In
this paper, I argue that Doviak’s account makes an important contribution to agent-based virtue ethics, but it needs to be
supplemented with a consequentialist account of the efficacy of well-motivated actions—that is, it should be transformed into a mixed (motives-consequences) account, while retaining
its net-IVV calculus. This is because I believe that there are right-making properties external to an agent’s psychology which it is important to take into account, especially when an agent’s actions negatively affect
other people. To incorporate this intuition, I add to Doviak’s net-IVV calculus a scale for outcomes. The result is a mixed view which accommodates tenets (ii) and (iii) above, but allows for (i) to fail in certain cases.
I argue that, rather than being a defect, this allowance is an asset because our intuitions about ought-implies-can break
down in cases where an agent is grossly misguided, and our theory should track these intuitions. 相似文献
2.
Richard Tieszen 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):31-52
In 1928 Edmund Husserl wrote that “The ideal of the future is essentially that of phenomenologically based (“philosophical”)
sciences, in unitary relation to an absolute theory of monads” (“Phenomenology”, Encyclopedia Britannica draft) There are references to phenomenological monadology in various writings of Husserl. Kurt G?del began to study Husserl’s
work in 1959. On the basis of his later discussions with G?del, Hao Wang tells us that “G?del’s own main aim in philosophy
was to develop metaphysics—specifically, something like the monadology of Leibniz transformed into exact theory—with the help
of phenomenology.” (A Logical Journey: From G?del to Philosophy, p. 166) In the Cartesian Meditations and other works Husserl identifies ‘monads’ (in his sense) with ‘transcendental egos in their full concreteness’. In this
paper I explore some prospects for a G?delian monadology that result from this identification, with reference to texts of
G?del and to aspects of Leibniz’s original monadology. 相似文献
3.
Daniel Kolak 《Synthese》2008,162(3):341-372
Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians”
such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that
abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake
on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity.
Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of personal identity, including Derek Parfit, have either
completely distorted or not understood Locke’s actual view. Shoemaker’s defense, which uses a “package deal” definition that
relies on internal relations of synchronic and diachronic unity and employs the Ramsey–Lewis account to define personal identity,
leaves far less room for psychological continuity views than for my own view, which, independently of its radical implications,
is that (a) consciousness makes personal identity, and (b) in consciousness alone personal identity consists—which happens to be also Locke’s actual view. Moreover, the ubiquitous Fregean conception of borders and the so-called “ambiguity
of is” collapse in the light of what Hintikka has called the “Frege trichotomy.” The Ramsey–Lewis account, due to the problematic
way Shoemaker tries to bind the variables, makes it impossible for the neo-Lockean ala Shoemaker to fulfill the uniqueness
clause required by all such Lewis style definitions; such attempts avoid circularity only at the expense of mistaking isomorphism
with identity. Contrary to what virtually all philosophers writing on the topic assume, fission does not destroy personal
identity. A proper analysis of public versus perspectival identification, derived using actual case studies from neuropsychiatry,
provides the scientific, mathematical and logical frameworks for a new theory of self-reference, wherein “consciousness,”
“self-consciousness,” and the “I,” can be precisely defined in terms of the subject and the subject-in-itself. 相似文献
4.
We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason
to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains
an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort
of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chance that not p” and “p but it there’s a chance that not p.” We argue that the best defense of fallibilism against this objection—a “pragmatist” defense—makes the following claims.
First, while knowledge that p is compatible with an epistemic chance that not-p, it is compatible only with an insignificant such chance. Second, the insignificance of the chance that not-p is plausibly understood in terms of the irrelevance of that chance to p’s serving as a ‘justifier’, for action as well as belief. In other words, if you know that p, then any chance for you that not p doesn’t stand in the way of p’s being properly put to work as a basis for action and belief.
相似文献
Matthew McGrathEmail: |
5.
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2011,50(2):313-320
When asked in a questionnaire to describe a spiritual person, William James named one instead: Phillips Brooks. This article
focuses on Brooks—his life, his sermons, and his poem “O Little Town of Bethlehem”—to make the case that he exemplified James’
view of spirituality as “a susceptibility to ideals, but with a certain freedom to indulge in imagination about them.” It
also supports Belzen’s (Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 12:205–222, 2009) view that there is no spirituality in general but only individual manifestations of it, a point that James’ nomination of
Brooks implicitly supports. 相似文献
6.
Michael Davis Ph.D. 《Science and engineering ethics》1999,5(4):463-478
Many outside science and engineering, especially social scientists and “rhetoricians”, claim that rhetoric, “the art of persuasion”,
is an important part of technical communication. This claim is either trivial or false. If “persuasion” simply means “effective
communication”, then, of course, rhetoric is an important part of technical communication. But, if “persuasion” has anything
like its traditional meaning (a specific art of winning conviction), rhetoric is not an important part of technical communication;
indeed, its use in technical communication would be unethical.
[By] an advocate is meant one whose business it is to smooth over real difficulties, and to persuade where he cannot convince.
—Thomas Henry Huxley, Man’s Place in Nature
1 (p. 238) As a profession, engineers frown on persuasiveness and find it suspect.
—Dorothy A. Winsor, Writing Like an Engineer
2 (p. 12), A
Michael Davis’s research interests are in the areas of engineering ethics and the social contract. Recent published books
include Thinking Like an Engineer, 1998, Oxford, and Ethics and the University, 1999, Routledge. 相似文献
7.
Liisa Steinby 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(3):227-249
In this article, Bakhtin’s early aesthetics is reread in the context of Hermann Cohen’s system of philosophy, especially his
aesthetics. Bakhtin’s thinking from the early ethical writing Toward a Philosophy of Act to Author and Hero in Artistic Activity and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics is followed. In Author and Hero, an individual is in his life conceived as involved in cognitive and ethical action but as remaining without a consummative
form; the form, or the ‘soul’, is bestowed upon a person by the creative activity of the artist alone. In his understanding
of artistic creativity and the relationship between the ‘hero’ and the author, Bakhtin closely follows Cohen, with the exception
that for Cohen the object of artistic form-giving is the universal, idealized man, whereas for Bakhtin it is an individual.
In the concept of a ‘polyphonic novel’ as developed in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin, however, considers this view of the activity of the artist (or the novelist) to apply to the “traditional” novel
only, while in a Dostoevskyean novel the characters are not subordinated to any defining power of the author. Bakhtin’s theory
of the Dostoevskyean novel is thus a return to the emphasis of the cognitive and ethical autonomy of the individual. His understanding
of the encounter between persons as a ‘subject’—‘subject’ or an ‘I’—‘thou’ relation has a predecessor, among others, in Cohen. 相似文献
8.
Itay Snir 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):407-437
This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is
an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It
is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative
attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential
part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge
to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to
suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into
happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My
interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence
and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. 相似文献
9.
In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood
as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving
force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that
the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving
and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the proposal runs headlong into the now familiar “bootstrapping” objection
that helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first place. Lastly, even if Southwood
is right—the demands of rationality just are the demands or our first-personal standpoints—the explanation as to why our standpoints
generate reasons will entail that we sometimes have no reason at all to be rational. 相似文献
10.
B. Brogaard 《Synthese》2006,152(1):47-79
Russell’s new theory of denoting phrases introduced in “On Denoting” in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell’s new theory is the so-called ‘Gray’s Elegy’
argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts (analogous to Frege’s theory of senses) promoted by
Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then
the proposition is not about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument does not exhaust
Russell’s ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that
it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even
though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely
denoting concepts, Russell’s new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires
a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting
concepts is unproblematic once the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument is blocked. 相似文献
11.
Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">My Way</Emphasis> 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
John Perry 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):157-166
My aim in this study is not to praise Fischer's fine theory of moral responsibility, but to (try to) bury the “semi” in “semicompatibilism”.
I think Fischer gives the Consequence Argument (CA) too much credit, and gives himself too little credit. In his book, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer gave the CA as good a statement as it will ever get, and put his finger on what is wrong with it. Then he declared
stalemate rather than victory. In my view, Fischer’s view amounts to sophisticated compatibilism. It would be nice to be able
to call it by its right name. In The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer develops his own version of Consequence Argument, which turns on two principles, one of which is the fixity of the
past. FP: For any action Y, agent S and time t, if it is true that is S were to do Y at t, some fact about that past relative to t would not have been a fact, then S cannot at t do Y at t. I argue that the equipment needed to reject FP (and thereby defend the most plausible version of compatibilism) is needed
to deal with the problem of fatalism. In addition, I argue that the rejection of FP is compatible with Fischer’s approach
to Frankfurt cases and with his account of transfer principles. 相似文献
12.
Daniel Halliday 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(2):381-393
13.
David Ellerman 《Synthese》2009,168(1):119-149
Categorical logic has shown that modern logic is essentially the logic of subsets (or “subobjects”). In “subset logic,” predicates
are modeled as subsets of a universe and a predicate applies to an individual if the individual is in the subset. Partitions
are dual to subsets so there is a dual logic of partitions where a “distinction” [an ordered pair of distinct elements (u, u′) from the universe U] is dual to an “element”. A predicate modeled by a partition π on U would apply to a distinction if the pair of elements was distinguished by the partition π, i.e., if u and u′ were in different blocks of π. Subset logic leads to finite probability theory by taking the (Laplacian) probability as the normalized size of each subset-event
of a finite universe. The analogous step in the logic of partitions is to assign to a partition the number of distinctions
made by a partition normalized by the total number of ordered |U|2 pairs from the finite universe. That yields a notion of “logical entropy” for partitions and a “logical information theory.”
The logical theory directly counts the (normalized) number of distinctions in a partition while Shannon’s theory gives the
average number of binary partitions needed to make those same distinctions. Thus the logical theory is seen as providing a
conceptual underpinning for Shannon’s theory based on the logical notion of “distinctions.”
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Gian-Carlo Rota—mathematician, philosopher, mentor, and friend. 相似文献
14.
Tomasz Szkudlarek 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):113-125
In this text I concentrate on semiotic aspects of the theory of political identity in the work of Ernesto Laclau, and especially
on the connection between metaphors, metonymies, catachreses and synecdoches. Those tropes are of ontological status, and
therefore they are of key importance in understanding the discursive “production” of identity in political and educational
practices. I use the conceptions of both Laclau and Eco to elucidate the operation of this structure, and illustrate it with
an example of the emergence of the “Solidarność” movement in Poland, expanding its analysis provided by Laclau. I focus on
the moment when one of particular demands assumes the representation of totality, which, in Laclau, is left to “circumstantial”
determination. This moment inspires several questions and needs to be given special attention if Laclau’s theory is to be
used in theory of education. It is so because theory of education cannot remain on the level of the ontological (which is
the core of Laclau’s achievement), but has to theorize “non-ontological” dimensions as well, that is the ontic (i.e. “content”
of education), the deontic (duty, obligation, and the normative in general), as well as what I call the deontological—the very relation between “what there is” and “what there is not” (including that which should be) as the locus of education. 相似文献
15.
Fred Dallmayr 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(3):189-204
During the last few years two major volumes have been published, both greatly revised versions of earlier Gifford Lectures: Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) and Raimon Panikkar’s The Rhythm of Being (2010). The two volumes are similar in some respects and very dissimilar in others. Both thinkers complain about the glaring blemishes of the modern, especially the contemporary age; both deplore above all a certain deficit of religiosity. The two authors differ, however, both in the details of their diagnosis and in their proposed remedies. Taylor views the modern age—styled as “secular age”—as marked by a slide into secular agnosticism, into “exclusive humanism”, and above all into an “immanent frame” excluding theistic “transcendence”. Although sharing the concern about “loss of meaning”, Panikkar does not find its source in the abandonment of (mono)theistic transcendence; on the contrary, both radical transcendence and agnostic immanence are responsible for the deficit of genuine faith. For him, recovery of faith requires an acknowledgment of our being in the world, as part of the “rhythm of being” happening in a holistic or “cosmotheandric” mode. In classical Indian terminology, while Taylor’s emphasis on the transcendence-immanence tension reflects ultimately a dualistic perspective (dvaita), Panikkar’s holistic notion of the rhythm of being captures the core of Advaita Vendanta. 相似文献
16.
17.
Peter Langland-Hassan 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):145-173
Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we
imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom.
Three different proposals are outlined, building on theories that link visualization to sensorimotor predictive mechanisms
(e.g., “efference copies,” “forward models”). Each sees visualization as a kind of reasoning, where its freedom consists in our ability to choose the topic of the reasoning. Of the three options, I argue that the approach many will find most attractive—that visualization is a
kind of “off-line” perception, and is therefore in some sense misrepresentational—should be rejected. The two remaining proposals
both conceive of visualization as a form of sensorimotor reasoning that is constitutive of one’s commitments concerning the way certain kinds of visuomotor scenarios unfold. According to the first, these commitments
impinge on one’s web of belief from without, in the manner of normal perceptual experience; according to the second, these commitments
just are one’s (occurrent) beliefs about such generalizations. I conclude that, despite being initially counterintuitive,
the view of visualization as a kind of occurrent belief is the most promising. 相似文献
18.
Stephen Curkpatrick 《Sophia》2002,41(2):63-72
In “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’,” Jacques Derrida argues that the law’s authority is mystical, unattainable
in its origins, theforce of law therefore precipitating conditions for its perpetual contest. The force of Derrida’s “Force of Law” is illustrated in his
study of Nelson Mandela (“The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, In Admiration”). Derrida’s Mandela reflects the law’s divisibility,
and therefore its iterability in representation beyond the force of its founding letter—of which apartheid was an extreme
example. Mandela makes visible the need for the law’s supplement, as performative justice in the face of inherent violence
in the law’s conserving force. Mandela’s performativeforce of law, contesting the inaugural violence of law, is inseparable from an implicit warp and weft of historical and theological influences. 相似文献
19.
Lauren Freeman 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(4):545-568
An important shift occurs in Martin Heidegger’s thinking one year after the publication of Being and Time, in the Appendix to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. The shift is from his project of fundamental ontology—which provides an existential analysis of human existence on an ontological
level—to metontology. Metontology is a neologism that refers to the ontic sphere of human experience and to the regional ontologies that were
excluded from Being and Time. It is within metontology, Heidegger states, that “the question of ethics may be raised for the first time.” This paper makes explicit both Heidegger’s
argument for metontology, and the relation between metontology and ethics. In examining what he means by “the art of existing,” the paper argues that there is an ethical dimension to Heidegger’s
thinking that corresponds to a moderate form of moral particularism. In order to justify this position, a comparative analysis
is made between Heidegger, Aristotle, and Bernard Williams. 相似文献
20.
Michael Friedman 《Synthese》2008,164(3):385-400
Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem
of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between
Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools
of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed
by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine. 相似文献