There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: new directions in theory of mind research

For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Older (but not younger) preschoolers understand that knowledge differs between people and across time

We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' understanding of general knowledge (e.g., knowing that clocks tell time) by investigating whether (1) they recognize that their own general knowledge has changed over time (i.e., they knew less as babies than they know now), and (2) such intraindividual knowledge differences are easier/harder to understand than interindividual differences (i.e., Do preschoolers understand that a baby knows less than they do?). Forty‐eight 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds answered questions about their current general knowledge (‘self‐now’), the general knowledge of a 6‐month‐old (‘baby‐now’), and their own general knowledge at 6 months (‘self‐past’). All age groups were significantly above chance on the self‐now questions, but only 5‐year‐olds were significantly above chance on the self‐past and baby‐now questions. Moreover, children's performance on the baby‐now and self‐past questions did not differ. Our findings suggest that younger preschoolers do not fully appreciate that their past knowledge differs from their current knowledge, and that others may have less knowledge than they do. We situate these findings within the research on knowledge understanding, more specifically, and cognitive development, more broadly.     

Children's Understanding of Second‐Order False Belief: Comparisons of Content and Method of Assessment

This research examined children's performance on second‐order false belief tasks as a function of the content area for the belief and the method of assessing understanding. A total of 70 kindergarten and first‐grade children responded to four second‐order stories. On two stories, the task was to judge a belief about a belief, and on two, the task was to judge a belief about an emotion. On one trial within each group, the task was to predict the target's belief, and on one trial, the task was to explain the belief. Older children outperformed younger children on the prediction measure. Differences as a function of content area and method of assessment were limited; when they did occur, performance was generally better with belief than with emotion as the target, and better with prediction than with explanation as the response criterion. Finally, there was no relation between number of siblings and performance.     

Knowing minds: Linking early perspective taking and later metacognitive insight

Recent metacognitive research using a partial knowledge task indicates that a firm understanding of ‘knowing about knowing’ develops surprisingly late, at around 6 years of age. To reveal the mechanisms subserving this development, the partial knowledge task was used in a longitudinal study with 67 children (33 girls) as an outcome measure at 5;9 (years;months). In addition, first- and second-order false belief was assessed at 4;2, 5;0, and 5;9. At 2;6, perspective taking and executive abilities were evaluated. Metacognition at 5;9 was correlated with earlier theory of mind and perspective taking – even when verbal intelligence and executive abilities were partialled out. This highlights the importance of perspective taking for the development of an understanding of one’s own mind.     

Using video modeling and reinforcement to teach perspective-taking skills to children with autism

We evaluated video modeling and reinforcement for teaching perspective-taking skills to 3 children with autism using a multiple baseline design. Video modeling and reinforcement were effective; however, only 2 children were able to pass an untrained task, indicating limited generalization. The findings suggest that video modeling may be an effective technology for teaching perspective taking if researchers can continue to develop strategies for enhancing the generalization of these new skills.     

Effects of Deception on Children's Understanding of Second‐order False Belief

This research examined two questions: effects of deception on children's understanding of second‐order false belief, and possible effects of number of siblings on second‐order performance. Kindergarten children responded to 3 second‐order problems that varied in the presence and the nature of deception. Performance was better on the problems with deception, but significantly so only when the target for the belief attribution produced the deception. This finding helps to clarify differences between the two main paradigms for assessing second‐order false belief. There was no relation between number of siblings and performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

视觉观点采择的发生发展及其影响因素

通过总结视觉观点采择的概念和研究范式,概括发展心理学和比较心理学中视觉观点采择演化发生和个体发展的已有研究,分析视觉观点采择与心理理论的关系及语言和文化等影响因素,指出将来的研究需要归纳测验不同水平视觉观点采择的一系列研究范式,系统考察不同物种间视觉观点采择的演化发生过程,还可将不同水平的实验范式与脑成像研究相结合来考察视觉观点采择的脑神经机制,并关注影响视觉观点采择发展的因素.     

特定句法提示对3－4岁儿童错误信念理解的影响

通过在错误信念任务中,为儿童提供关于错误信念表征的特定句法,考察这种句法理解对儿童的错误信念理解成绩是否有促进作用。124名3-4岁幼儿参加实验,每个年龄组幼儿随机分配到零级提示,一级提示和二级提示等三个句法提示条件组,并完成4个错误信念任务。结果发现,一级提示条件和二级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩显著高于零级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩,而一级和二级两种提示条件之间没有显著差异。句法提示对不同的错误信念任务的影响是相同的,对错误信念的预测问题和解释问题的影响模式是一致的。表明对错误信念表征的特定句法提示,有效促进了儿童的错误信念成绩,提示这种句法结构可能有助于儿童的错误信念理解     

Relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions

We investigated relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions (ICs) and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions in 180 children, aged 5–6 years old. We examined the potential differences in second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding between children with and without ICs, children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships, as well as children with invisible friends and personified objects. The results revealed that children with ICs had better second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding than children without ICs. Compared with children with hierarchical relationships, children with egalitarian relationships had better second-order false belief understanding. However, children with invisible friends and personified objects did not differ on their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions. The results suggest that compared with IC types, IC status and child-IC relationship qualities may be more relevant to children's theory of mind. It will be interesting for the future researchers to investigate the underlying mechanism of the differences between children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships.     

Effect of lie labelling on children's evaluation of selfish,polite, and altruistic lies

This study investigates how 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds' evaluations of selfish, polite, and altruistic lies change as a result of whether these false statements are explicitly labelled as lies. We are also interested in how interpretive theory of mind may correlate with such evaluations with and without a lie label. Our results showed that labelling lowered children's evaluations for the polite and altruistic lies, but not for the selfish lies. Interpretive theory of mind correlated positively with the evaluation difference between the polite and altruistic lies and that between the selfish and altruistic lies in the label, but not in the non‐label condition. Correlation between the selfish and altruistic lies and that between the polite and altruistic lies were stronger with than without labelling, after controlling for age, and verbal and non‐verbal intelligence. We conclude that lie labelling biases children towards more negative evaluations for non‐selfish lies and makes them see lies of different motives as more similar. If a lie label is applied, whether lies of different motives are still evaluated differently depends on interpretive theory of mind, which reflects the child's ability to represent and allow different interpretations of an ambiguous reality.     

Empathy,Perspective Taking and Prosocial Behaviour: The Importance of Parenting Practices

The current study analyzed the relationships among maternal empathy (emotional and cognitive), parenting that encourages the child to take the perspective of others, child cognitive empathy and child prosocial behaviour. Participants were 72 typically developing children (66 Caucasian, six Asian) aged between 47 and 76 months (M = 61.5 months, SD = 8.3 months). Results support the facilitative effect of parenting that encourages the child to take the perspective of others. Thus, the role played by parents in the development of prosocial behaviour extends beyond warm/sensitive/responsive parenting in infancy. Together these forms of parenting are key factors that facilitate the development of prosocial behaviour. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

记忆提示与表征能力对幼儿心理理论发展的影响

本研究通过经典的错误信念任务及修正后的错误信号和错误照片任务探讨了 3、4、5岁幼儿心理理论的发展以及记忆和表征对这一发展的影响。结果表明 ,3岁儿童还没有具备像 4、5岁儿童那样的心理理论 ;记忆上的帮助并不能提高幼儿在错误信念任务上的成绩 ;所有儿童都能够很好地表征目前及过去的事件     

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge,Ignorance, and False Belief

The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3–7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.     

Relationship between implicit false belief understanding and role play: Longitudinal study

Pretend play is one of the earliest forms of children’s imagination. While social pretend play (role play) may facilitate the development of theory of mind – including false belief understanding – theoretically, the reverse may be true; theory of mind may facilitate the development of role play. To clarify this relationship, the present longitudinal study examined whether toddler’s implicit understanding of false beliefs predicted their role play during preschool years. We examined 18-month-old toddlers’ looking time in an implicit false-belief task (Time 1). When the children were 4/5 years old (Time 2), children’s parents answered a questionnaire on their child’s engagement in role play, such as playing with an imaginary companion and impersonating an imagined character. Toddlers’ looking time in the false-belief task at Time 1 predicted impersonation scores at Time 2. The results suggest that early theory of mind skills can facilitate children’s role play.     

读心的比较研究：非人灵长类与人类在心理理论上的异同点及其解释

利用非人灵长类开展比较研究是探索心理理论本质、起源和进化动因的重要途经。大量实证研究显示非人灵长类可以表现出一些基础心理理论成分,包括联合注意、意图理解和一级观点采择,这表明心理理论在灵长类动物的进化谱系中具有进化连续性。然而,非人灵长类无法像人类一样达成二级观点采择和错误信念理解,潜心智化假说、替代表征假说、最小限度心理理论假说和意识关系假说试图对此差异进行解释。尽管视角与具体内容不同,但这些假说都强调,非人灵长类无法对其他个体关于外部世界的心理信念形成表征,信念表征是非人灵长类与人类读心能力的重要分界点。未来研究需要重点澄清共享意图、语言机制以及社会生态环境因素与心理理论产生的相互影响作用。     

Contextual influence over deriving others' true beliefs using a relational triangulation perspective‐taking protocol (RT‐PTP‐M1)

This paper introduces the relational triangulation framework as a functional contextual expansion of the established Relational Frame Theory (Hayes, Barnes‐Holmes, & Roche, 2001) account of perspective‐taking. Initial support for the new framework is provided through data collected with a novel relational triangulation perspective‐taking protocol configured in the present study to show contextual influence over deriving true belief in others following the direct training of a “seeing leads to knowing” repertoire (Leslie & Frith, 1988). Eight verbally competent adults were directly trained to make operant discriminations on a first set of target stimuli (i.e., the identities of three distinct figurines) and then directly trained to make contextually controlled deictic pointing responses to a second set of target stimuli (i.e., to the relative location of a target beacon according to the signaled spatial perspective of the self vs. two others). The test for derivation was whether the stimuli that had directly acquired contextual control over deictic perspective‐taking during training would spontaneously exert contextual control over figurine discrimination relative to the spatial perspective of the two others. That is, passing the test for derivation required participants to infer that the others would “report what they were seeing” the same way that the self would if the self were in their position, suggesting coordination of the self and others. Seven of the eight participants exhibited the intended derivation of the others' “true beliefs,” confirming successful relational triangulation perspective‐taking protocol configuration for this purpose.     

Perspective taking in children and adults: Equivalent egocentrism but differential correction

Children generally behave more egocentrically than adults when assessing another's perspective. We argue that this difference does not, however, indicate that adults process information less egocentrically than children, but rather that adults are better able to subsequently correct an initial egocentric interpretation. An experiment tracking participants' eye movements during a referential communication task indicated that children and adults were equally quick to interpret a spoken instruction egocentrically but differed in the speed with which they corrected that interpretation and looked at the intended (i.e., non-egocentric) object. The existing differences in egocentrism between children and adults therefore seems less a product of where people start in their perspective taking process than where they stop, with lingering egocentric biases among adults produced by insufficient correction of an automatic moment of egocentrism. We suggest that this pattern of similarity in automatic, but not controlled, processes may explain between-group differences in a variety of dual-process judgments.