Freedom in responsibility: a response.

This paper is a critical response to Elisabeth Gr?b-Schmidt's article "Freedom in responsibility: On the relevance of 'sin' as hermeneutic guiding principle in bioethical decision making." Gr?b-Schmidt's chief contention is that ethics begins with anthropology, and that moral responsibility is thereby grounded within a set of given limits. Freedom is distorted into sin when these limits are transgressed. My principal complaint is that her account of the relationship between freedom and sin is grounded in a tragic ontology. Alternatively, I contend that anthropology is grounded in Christology in which freedom is a gift of the Spirit. Consequently, sin is not so much tragic as it marks a refusal of humans to accept their divine election. The issues of human cloning and embryonic stem-cell research are used to exemplify what difference these respective differences might make in a process of moral deliberation.     

Taking Sin Seriously

Contemporary Roman Catholic ethics endeavors to take sin seriously by offering theologies of sin that emphasize it as a force and as a basic, personal orientation. Such efforts rightly counter the Catholic tradition's earlier reduction of sin to sins, and sins to external acts and moral culpability. But perhaps they go too far in this regard. By engaging Charles Curran, this study argues that inattention to sins undermines the theological referent of sin as a discourse that concerns more than moral culpability, obscures God as the source of freedom and value, and neglects the way in which acts express and sustain sin and fashion a personal orientation. Drawing on the work of Jean Porter, the essay shows that attention to sins highlights the historicity, particularity, and provisionality of human acts because of the theological referent and analogical character of sin and sins.     

Our inalienable ability to sin: Peter Olivi’s rejection of asymmetrical freedom

From the time of Augustine to the late thirteenth century, leading Christian thinkers agreed that freedom requires the ability to make good choices, but not the ability to make bad ones. If freedom required the ability to sin, they reasoned, neither God nor the angels nor the blessed in heaven could be free. This essay examines the work of Peter Olivi, the first medieval philosopher known to reject the asymmetrical conception of freedom. Olivi argues that the ability to sin is essential to creaturely freedom and remains even in heaven. While Anselm is the nominal target of Olivi’s arguments on this topic, they form part of a wider critique directed even more at Aquinas and his followers. Olivi faults them for misunderstanding the nature of the created will and for failing to provide a foundation for a particular kind of moral responsibility: personal merit.     

Emancipation from what? The concept of freedom in classical Ch'an Buddhism

This essay attempts to articulate an understanding of the goal of ‘freedom’ in classical Ch'an Buddhism by setting concerns for ‘liberation’ in relation to the kinds of authority and regulated structure characteristic of Sung dynasty Ch'an monasteries. It begins with the thesis that early Western interpreters of Zen have tended to emphasise the dimensions of Zen freedom that accord with modem Western versions of freedom presupposing tension between freedom and authority as well as between individual autonomy and the demands of a communal setting. These dichotomies, assumed by modem Western interpreters, appear to have been absent from this medieval Chinese context, thus suggesting that their concepts of freedom and liberation must have differed significantly from our own. The essay examines classical Ch'an rhetoric and practices in an effort to reconceive what ‘freedom’ might have meant in this context and concludes with a proposal for this reconception.     

EVOLUTION,CULTURE, AND SIN: RESPONDING TO PHILIP HEFNER'S PROPOSAL

Abstract. In his recent book, The Human Factor, Philip Hefner proposes to deepen theological understanding of the natural world and the place of humans within it. He describes humans as products of converging streams of genes and culture, and as possessors of freedom that requires them to be “created cocreators.” In accordance with the requirements of “the way things really are” (God), humans are to become divine agents in enlarging the realm of freedom in the world through self-sacrificing altruism. While Hefner's insights are admirable, his work could be viewed, in part, as a covert expression of nineteenth century liberal beliefs in progress. In fact, human culture and freedom are more ambiguous products of both good and evil, and hence we must take more cognizance of the pervasiveness of what theology has termed sin.     

The Virtue of Freedom in Capitalism

ABSTRACT This paper argues that the sort of liberty associated with a capitalist economic system is of particular value because it ensures moral self-responsibility. Two conceptions of freedom are considered but only one is invoked. It is contended that one, namely, positive freedom, is actually a kind of ability or power. One's positive freedom may be lost as a result of events not initiated by other human beings. Negative freedom, by contrast, is a distinctively normative notion. It is a social condition that members of a community ought to maintain out of respect for human dignity, that is, each person's responsibility to choose to live rightly.
It is argued that since 'ought' implies 'can', persons can only be morally responsible for what they can choose to do. If they lack negative freedom, then in addition to natural limitations, they will also be limited by the voluntary conduct of others. Yet this limitation could be prevented by the choices of others, including governments, to secure for all persons their negative freedom. Because of the universality of the requirement that each person be left free, such negative freedom is the quintessential public good.
Finally, the concrete expression of negative freedom is the right to private property— one's sphere of moral authority. This makes the capitalist economic system an essential aspect of the society that secures negative freedom.     

Autonomy and Common Good: Interpreting Rousseau’s General Will

Rousseau’s project in his Social Contract was to construct a conception of human subjectivity and political institutions that would transcend what he saw to be the limits of liberal political theory of his time. I take this as a starting point to put forward an interpretation of his theory of the general will as a kind of social cognition that is able to preserve individual autonomy and freedom alongside concerns with the collective welfare of the community. But whereas many have seen Rousseau’s ideas as a prelude to communitarianism or authoritarianism, we should instead see his project as articulating an alternative model of moral-cognitivist reasoning. In order to provide a framework for this interpretation, I propose reading his conception of the general will through the theory of collective intentionality and social ontology. I end with a consideration of how this interpretation of the general will can provide a more satisfying understanding of political and practical rationality contemporary debates over republicanism and liberalism.     

WILLIAM AMES'S CALVINIST AMBIGUITY OVER FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

Reformed Christianity's qualified embrace of freedom of conscience is perhaps best represented by William Ames (1576–1633). This essay explores Ames's interpretation of conscience, his understanding of its relationship to natural law, Scripture, and civil authority, and his vacillation on the subject of conscientious freedom. By rooting his interpretation of conscience in natural law, Ames provided a foundation for conscience as an authority whose convictions are binding and worthy of some civil respect and freedom. At the same time, his Puritan worldview ultimately required the deference of conscience to the superior manifestations of divine law in Scripture and civil institutions. As a result, Ames provided raw ingredients for a theological doctrine of freedom of conscience despite his unwillingness to commend the idea himself consistently. In this way, Ames symbolizes an ambiguity on freedom of conscience characteristic of the broader Reformed tradition.     

Confessions from the Classroom Teaching with Augustinian Eyes

Through an analysis of Augustine's Confessions, this essay aims to identify the sources, tenets, and implications of the theological anthropology that grounds the author's pedagogy. The author describes classroom dynamics and teaching strategies in terms of the concepts of creation, sin, and redemption found in the Confessions. In relation to Augustine's doctrine of creation, the author argues that a theological anthropology that posits an ineradicable relationship of the human person to God justifies optimism about student response to the study of theology. It also supports a sacramental understanding of the effectiveness of the teacher. In relation to Augustine's theology of sin, the author reflects on the effects of pride on both teacher and student. The section on redemption acknowledges that although the teacher cannot eradicate sin in the classroom, he or she can counter such effects through the responsible and sensitive exercise of authority. Throughout the essay, the virtues of humility and gratitude in the classroom are highlighted, and concrete pedagogical issues are examined in a theological light.     

Voluntarism,Atonement, and Duns Scotus

The two most important concepts in Duns Scotus's (1265/6‐1308) theology of the Atonement are satisfaction and merit. Just what these amount to and how they function in his theory are heavily conditioned by two more general commitments: Scotus's voluntarism, which includes the claim that nearly all of God's relations with the created order are contingent; and his formulation of the Franciscan Thesis, which holds that fixing the sin problem is not the primary purpose of God's Incarnation in Christ and that if Adam hadn't sinned God would have become incarnate anyway. In this essay I will discuss the theoretical background of Scotus's atonement theology—his voluntarism and his version of the Franciscan Thesis—before moving on to discuss his understanding of merit and satisfaction, how these are related, and how they relate to the theoretical background. I will engage some important recent scholarly attempts to position Scotus's Atonement theology as not quite as anti‐Anselmian as history has characterized it, arguing that one of these attributes to Scotus an understanding of merit which cannot be Scotus's in fact, since it entails a restriction on divine freedom that Scotus certainly would reject.     

Sin and the Limits of Theology: A Reflection in Conversation with Julian of Norwich and Martin Luther

While the confession of divine transcendence entails that all theological speech faces intrinsic limits, the problem of sin brings theology’s limits into focus in a very particular way. For while Christians confess that God has been uniquely and unsurpassably revealed in Jesus Christ, insofar as they do not claim that even this revelation explains the place of sin in the divine economy, the ongoing mystery of sin and evil presents the theologian with a stark alternative. On the one hand, if the grace of God revealed in Christ is emphasized, less attention will be given to the mystery of sin that remains hidden in God; on the other, if theologians emphasize what is hidden, the light of Christ will be obscured. This article explores the tension between these two alternatives with reference to the Showings of Julian of Norwich and Martin Luther’s Bondage of the Will.     

Would a neuroscience of violence aid in understanding legal culpability?

Defense attorneys in criminal cases are beginning to argue that their clients were biologically predisposed to committing their crimes and therefore were less responsible for their behavior. Indeed, if our brains cause our behavior, and our brains are the way they are because of genetic composition, insults, disease, and life experiences, it becomes difficult to argue that any punishment as justified retribution for behavior is cogent. In this essay, I address the question of whether understanding the neuroscience behind human behavior should alter our legal notion of responsibility. We will examine this query in greater detail, using violence as a case study, asking whether understanding the neuroscience underlying violent behavior impacts our notion of personal or legal culpability. I shall argue that it does not. I proceed by first briefly sketching what we know about human violence and the biology behind it. Then I turn to a quick discussion of psychopaths, their connections to violence, and what we think we know about the biology of their brains. Finally, I come to the question of whether we should consider violent people with specific brain abnormalities as mad or bad, which will feed into the question of whether such people are responsible for their criminal behavior. I conclude with some very general and very brief speculations on what this discussion has to tell us about nature of being human.     

Commanding good and prohibiting evil in contemporary Islam: cases from Britain, Nigeria, and Southeast Asia

This paper examines the concept of (public) sin as well as efforts to counteract sin from the perspective of Islam. The understanding that hisba, the prohibition of vice and enjoining of virtues, are a responsibility of both the state and the community is common in historical and contemporary Muslim societies. Where the state cannot or does not provide means for countering (public) sin, the perception for some Muslims is that the responsibility on the community and individuals to do so increases. Based on ethnographic research in Britain, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, the paper highlights examples of how sin has been defined amongst Muslim communities as well as the methods and rationales given to justify the forbidding of sin as a collective and communal public obligation. As the world becomes more integrated, there is growing concern amongst Muslim communities that sin is becoming the norm, leading society to degeneracy, that people who would not have otherwise sinned are influenced to do so. Common features in forbidding sin across Muslim communities have appeared, often focusing on what are seen as moral issues such as dress codes, music, gambling, alcohol, smoking, and the mixing of men and women in public. The forbidding of sin has resulted in attempts to introduce “Shari’a Zones” in some predominantly Muslim areas of London, whilst in Indonesia, this has given rise to the Islamic Defenders Front and in some Northern Nigerian states to the reintroduction of the criminal codes of the Shari’a.     

Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury

Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3, finally, shows that Anselm's account requires that acts of the will or ‘willings’ qualify as voluntary, a suggestion as interesting as problematic.     

Human agency in the twenty-first century: the views of P. S. Davies,R. Niebuhr,and A. N. Whitehead

With neuroscience and psychology making significant advances in contemporary brain research, fundamental questions concerning the nature of human life and activity will become evermore critical as we proceed further into the twenty-first century. Put simply, are we creatures who exercise some genuine degree of freedom and agency in the world or are we creatures whose actions are largely if not wholly determined by biological, neurological, and psychological factors far below the radar of our conscious awareness? This article explores this important and timely question by examining the views of Paul Sheldon Davies, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Alfred North Whitehead. Drawing on contemporary science, Davies dismisses Niebuhr’s existential analysis of human existence and any meaningful conception of human agency. Succinctly stated, can one take both the results of contemporary neuroscience seriously, as Davies does, and the affirmation of human agency seriously, as Niebuhr does? The thesis of this essay is that Whitehead offers a constructive bridge between Davies’ affirmation of science and Niebuhr’s existential account of human existence. In sum, it is argued that Whitehead’s process philosophy enables us to affirm the genuine influence of nonconscious factors in experience as well as the authenticity of human agency and subjectivity in the world.     

Towards a research programme for ethics and technology

In this editorial contribution, two issues relevant to the question, what should be at the top of the research agenda for ethics and technology, are identified and discussed. Firstly: can, and do, engineers make a difference to the degree to which technology leads to morally desirable outcomes? What role does professional autonomy play here, and what are its limits? And secondly, what should be the scope of engineers' responsibility; that is to say, on which issues are they, as engineers, morally obliged to reflect? The research agendas proposed by the authors contributing to this special section, implicitly, give different answers to these questions. We suggest that an explicit discussion of these issues would greatly help in constructing a common research agenda.     

Zorba The Buddha: Capitalism,Charisma and the Cult of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh

This essay suggests a new way of understanding the notorious Indian guru, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, by examining the intimate relationship between his religious teachings and his business practices. Rajneesh's ideal was in fact that of ‘Zorba the Buddha’, the perfect synthesis of the spiritual and material, the religious and capitalist impulses. After analysing and criticizing the classical Weberian concept of ‘charisma’, this paper argues that charismatic authority is by no means incompatible with bureaucratic organization or rational business practices. On the contrary, not only can charismatic authority be combined with a complex bureaucratic organization, but it can also be transformed into a kind of ‘commodity’ which is bought and sold on the consumer market. Rather than a ‘routinization of charisma’ what we find in the Rajneesh movement is a kind of ‘commodification’ and ‘commercialization’ of charisma. Bhagwan offered (and sold) his followers the promise of the same charismatic authority and divine freedom which he himself enjoyed (though, in practice, this authority could never actually be attained by any of his followers). Moreover, charismatic authority became the basis for a new kind of bureaucratic organization in Rajneesh's world-wide network of commercial enterprises—an organization characterized by a high degree of fluidity and flexibility, able to adapt itself rapidly to meet the changing demands of its consumer market.     

FREEDOM OF THE HEART

Philosophical accounts of freedom typically fail to capture an important kind of freedom—freedom to change what one cares about—that is central to our understanding of what it is to be a person. This paper articulates this kind of freedom more clearly, distinguishing it from freedom of action and freedom of the will, and gives an account of how it is possible. Central to this account is an understanding of the role of emotions in determining what we value, thus motivating a rethinking of the importance of emotions in the mental lives of persons.     

Is there an ivory tower in reality?

What is the measure of the social responsibility of scientists? Even if technology is not just applied science, the scientist cannot simply waive responsibility for the negative manifestations of technological progress borne out of scientific research. However, there are limits to the practicable realization of any moral maxims in this sphere, concerning, for instance, the very awareness of the future consequences of basic research. Insofar as it is possible to believe in a distinction between pure and applied research, there exists a difference in the corresponding measure of social responsibility for scientists.     

Women as wives and rulers in Martin Luther's theology

This article offers a theological analysis of Martin Luther's complex view on women and their role in society, focusing on his exposition of the narratives of creation and fall in the Lectures on Genesis. Luther's understanding of women is defined by an ostensible paradox. On the one hand, Luther claims that all women are equal to men in relation to God and hold the power to rule over the earth, which they execute as leaders of the household. On the other hand, Luther passes on a traditional view of women being of a weaker nature and argues that wives have to subordinate to their husbands. I interpret this understanding of women as an outcome of Luther's theological anthropology based on his doctrine of justification. Men and women are equal as priests and kings in relation to God and authorized to manage their relationship with him, to teach and pray for others, and to disobey authority that interferes with this faith relation. As sinners, though, they must submit to authority to suppress sin. Both men and women exercise authority through their gender-specific callings in the earthly hierarchies, which constitute God's created order. However, women have to subordinate to their husbands in order to suppress sin. The article discusses whether this complex view on women promoted patriarchal social structures or whether the freedom and equality of the spiritual realm over time filtered through to the role of women in society, paving the way for their liberation.