信任及其对公共财物两难博弈中合作行为影响

社会两难的行为动机研究认为,害怕和贪婪是人们选择不合作的原因。信任的心理学研究为社会两难的合作行为提供了另一种观点,即害怕被利用的背后实际上体现了博弈者对对方的信任的缺失。鉴于传统社会两难范式存在难以区分信任和合作两个因素的问题,本研究设计了“信任一合作”二阶段模拟实验,通过操作重复信托博弈中的信息反馈,研究虚拟多人信托博弈中初始信任和基于经验的信任对随后的公共财物两难博弈中合作行为的影响,结果发现：（1）初始信任对基于经验的信任的建立具有一定的积极影响,但是它对合作行为的作用远不如随后的基于经验的信任;（2）基于经验的信任水平高的被试在随后的公共财物两难博弈中也表现出较高的合作行为。     

社会价值取向与反馈对动态社会两难决策的影响：以水资源两难决策为例

以水资源两难情景为实验任务,探讨了社会价值取向与反馈在社会两难决策中的作用.结果表明: (1)社会价值取向在决策者的两难决策行为中起着非常重要的作用.合作型个体比非合作型个体显著地表现出更多的合作行为.个体的社会价值取向可以作为预测两难决策行为的一个重要因素: (2)不同的反馈类型对具有不同社会价值取向的决策者的决策行为影响不同.非合作型个体受反馈信息影响比较明显,而合作型个体则不易受他人的决策信息影响.     

社会两难行为理性特点的实验分析

本研究运用定量和定性的方法探讨了动态适应性学习条件下两难行为的理性特点及其影响因素。72名杭州本科生参加了本实验,结果发现:1、在有限次重复的两难博弈实验中,人们的两难行为不符合纳什博弈理论,进一步的定性分析指出,这种两难行为体现出“社会理性”的特征;2、在高奖罚的条件下,人们更容易做出接近“纳什均衡点”决策;3、群体规模和反馈方式对人们的对策行为影响不显著,但是,进一步的定性分析部分支持了群体规模的社会理性解释。     

中学生合作行为的影响因素的实验研究

用囚犯两难游戏和懦夫游戏作实验材料,采用L16（215）正交实验设计,对64名初二、高二学生在不同实验情境中的合作行为反应策略进行了研究。结果表明,被试对交流的预期、交流的进行、被试对对手社会地位的评估、以及被试所面临的游戏矩阵和被试自身的年龄特点都影响被试对对手的表征,进而影响被试游戏行为的决策过程和合作行为的反应倾向。研究结果支持社会表征理论,为创设有利于合作的人际互动情境提供一定的理论依据。     

群体任务中合作行为的跨阶段演变

合作是电子商务时代群体工作的重要基础。本实验通过资源两难任务研究群体工作中的合作行为的演变。111名被试参加了实验。研究发现,在动态博弈过程中,群体其他成员行为的多个阶段反馈将成为决策者合作机制形成的主要基础,与决策者价值等内部因素和环境不确定性等外部因素,共同影响合作行为的演变     

社会决策：自我利益与他人利益的权衡

自我利益与他人利益之间的冲突是社会决策中最重要的心理冲突之一。在自我利益与他人利益中寻求平衡是社会决策的关键。西方经济学理论在很长一段时间里认为,追求自我利益是人类行为的唯一动机。近年来越来越多的理论和实证研究表明在社会互动中,人类同时也会关心他人的利益。本文试图将自我利益和他人利益作为社会决策中利益权衡的两端,综合起来阐释诸如合作、利他、公平、利己等人类社会决策行为的重要概念,力图将纷繁的概念整合到统一、清晰的框架中。     

催产素对社会决策行为的影响

大量的研究已经证明催产素对人类社会决策起着重要的调节作用。以往研究者采用多种实验范式用于探讨催产素对社会决策的影响, 研究内容主要包括合作与保护行为、道德行为、信任行为和慷慨行为。研究者已提出三种关于催产素的可能的作用机制用来解释观察到的实验结果, 三种理论各有侧重。未来的研究中应关注鼻喷催产素和受体基因多态性等生理机制、并考虑催产素影响社会决策行为的性别差异、建立更完善并可供检验的理论模型。     

声誉关注与社会距离对伤害困境中道德决策的影响：来自行为与ERPs的证据

在社会交往中, 声誉关注是人类合作行为和道德判断的重要决定因素之一。以往研究只是单独考察声誉关注或社会距离会如何影响道德决策行为, 但两者如何交互影响道德决策尚不清楚, 尤其是禁止性道德范畴领域(如, 伤害他人行为)下道德决策的认知神经机制。本研究要求被试在匿名或公开情境下决策是否愿意对不同社会距离他人(朋友、熟人、陌生人)实施疼痛电击以增加自己的金钱收益, 同时记录其决策时的行为和神经反应。结果发现, 匿名情境下被试对朋友的电击伤害要显著低于对熟人和陌生人的, 表现出一种明显的“利己的利他主义”决策倾向; 与朋友和陌生人相比, 被试在涉及熟人的两难决策中花费了更长的时间, 体验到了更强烈的厌恶情绪, 并诱发了更大波幅的与情绪反应有关的P260成分, 以及与认知推理有关的晚期正成分(LPP: 300~450 ms), 表现出一种典型的“熟人效应”。然而, 行为与ERP指标上的这些差异在公开情境下均显著减弱了。这表明个体在禁止性道德范畴领域下的道德决策遵循着一种“利己的利他主义”的道德原则, 熟人关系的不确定性会在道德决策中诱发强烈的负性情绪和认知负荷, 而声誉关注削弱了利己倾向和人际关系的不确定性所带来的厌恶情绪和认知冲突。     

亲社会视频游戏中的合作对博弈决策中合作行为的影响

以38名大学生和研究生为被试,采用Chicken Game实验范式测量合作行为,考察了单人和双人合作模式游戏后,性别和游戏习惯对玩家在博弈决策中合作行为的影响。结果表明：（1）双人合作模式游戏可以促进玩家在博弈决策中的合作行为;（2）双人合作模式游戏后,男玩家（相比女玩家）在博弈决策中的合作行为更多;（3）玩游戏的习惯影响博弈决策中的合作行为,相比于经常习惯与现实朋友玩游戏和独自玩游戏的玩家,经常习惯与网友玩游戏的玩家在双人合作模式游戏后的合作行为更多。本研究不仅证实了一般学习模型,也证实了亲社会合作类视频游戏可以有效促进博弈决策中的合作行为。     

公共资源两难管理的社会学习过程和动机释放机制

公共资源两难的根本问题是个人经济利益与社会整体利益的矛盾。一些人为了追逐个人利益最大,过度获取公共资源,走向＂公共的悲剧＂,或不愿为公共资源作出贡献,＂搭便车＂现象流行。传统的研究从理性经济人的角度探讨公共资源两难博弈行为的机制,用＂贪婪＂来解释＂搭便车＂现象,并根据强化理论以奖励和惩罚作为主要对策。但是,这种理性经济人观点忽视了人的社会动机。实际上,公共资源两难博弈是一个社会互动的过程,人的社会心理因素在其中起了很重要的作用,因此在方法论上有必要从社会人（Homo socius）的人性观来进行分析。本文在当前的相关研究文献基础上,分析了公共资源两难博弈行为的动机模式,从社会学习理论出发,提出了公共资源两难管理的社会学习过程和动机释放机制。     

社会价值取向与损失情境对不同时间压力下双人社会困境中合作行为的影响

为揭示双人社会困境中合作行为的影响因素,选取四种不同类型的双人社会困境,采用实验法考察社会价值取向与损失情境对不同时间压力下合作行为的影响。结果显示,亲社会个体的合作率显著高于亲自我个体的合作率,收益情境下的合作率显著高于损失情境下的合作率,在社会困境中双方冲突程度越大合作率越低;此外,高时间压力提升了亲自我个体在囚徒困境以及收益情境下信任困境中的合作率,同时降低了亲自我个体在损失情境下最大差异困境中的合作率。结果表明,社会价值取向、收益损失情境以及困境冲突程度均对合作行为的发生具有影响作用,而时间压力对合作行为的作用也同样受到三者的影响。这些发现能够为合作行为自动性的理论分歧提供新的证据。     

公共物品困境中惩罚的形式与作用

公共物品困境中对惩罚的操纵表明：惩罚搭便车可以维持群体内的合作行为。早期研究表明, 惩罚的设置有助于建立社会合作规范, 有代价惩罚、利他惩罚和第三方惩罚等惩罚形式为间接互惠提供了合理的解释。随着实证研究的进一步深入, 惩罚表现出新的形式, 如自私惩罚和反社会惩罚, 被惩罚者的威胁报复将使合作者不再继续惩罚搭便车行为, 导致合作行为的减少直至消失。正当性理论、道德情感理论和文化基因协同进化理论表明惩罚的存在具有一定的必要性和价值, 惩罚的作用存在框架效应。本文介绍了一些有关的中介变量, 如利他、信任、声誉、文化、期望等, 可以对惩罚作用的积极面和破坏性予以适当的解释, 也为合作的心理机制研究提供新的视角。     

实验社会心理学中的社会困境

社会困境是指个体理性会导致集体非理性这样的情境。大量实证研究考察社会困境中合作行为的机制,然而缺乏系统的理论框架。实验室研究中所用的社会困境可以从4个方面来分类：“给-游戏”与“拿-游戏”、两人困境与多人困境、对称与非对称困境以及重复与非重复困境。综合而言,以往实验研究主要从个体差异、任务结构以及知觉与策略等3个方面考察影响社会困境的因素,这些影响因素可以整合在一个概念框架中。未来的研究尚需要联合多个学科,澄清研究变量之间的关系,并继续丰富相关概念和理论     

Reward, punishment, and cooperation: a meta-analysis

How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in social dilemmas or situations when immediate self-interest and longer term collective interest conflict? What variables can promote the impact of these incentives? Although such questions have been examined, social and behavioral scientists provide different answers. To date, there is no theoretical and/or quantitative review of rewards and punishments as incentives for cooperation in social dilemmas. Using a novel interdependence-theoretic framework, we propose that rewards and punishments should both promote cooperation, and we identify 2 variables—cost of incentives and source of incentives—that are predicted to magnify the effectiveness of these incentives in promoting cooperation.A meta-analysis involving 187 effect sizes revealed that rewards and punishments exhibited a statistically equivalent positive effect on cooperation (d =0.51 and 0.70, respectively). The effectiveness of incentives was stronger when the incentives were costly to administer, compared to free. Centralization of incentives did not moderate the effect size. Punishments were also more effective during iterated dilemmas when participants continued to interact in the same group, compared to both (a) iterated dilemmas with reassignment to a new group after each trial and (b) one-shot dilemmas. We also examine several other potential moderators, such as iterations, partner matching, group size, country, and participant payment. We discuss broad conclusions, consider implications for theory, and suggest directions for future research on rewards and punishment in social dilemmas.     

Think and act globally, think and act locally: Cooperation depends on matching construal to action levels in social dilemmas

The authors proposed and tested hypotheses that cooperation in social dilemmas depends on matching construal to action levels. Using a computerized resource dilemma that modeled fishing the oceans, when motives were framed at abstract levels, in terms of values (e.g., cooperation vs. competition), high construal levels produced more cooperativeness and competitiveness, respectively. Conversely, when motives were framed at concrete levels, in terms of actions (e.g., returning vs. taking), low construal levels produced more cooperativeness and competitiveness, respectively. Implications for integrating and extending research on construal levels in social dilemmas and increasing cooperation are discussed.     

THE ILLUSION OF MORALITY AS SELF-INTEREST:

Abstract— One reason for people's voluntary cooperation in social dilemmas, or altruistic behavior in general, may be their belief that altruism pays off in terms of long-run self-interest. Although this is often true, it is typically false in large-scale social dilemmas among strangers. In three questionnaire studies, subjects endorsed this self-interest illusion frequently for large-scale dilemmas, such as over-fishing and pollution, in which the benefits of cooperation are delayed.     

Self-Construal and Cooperation: Is the Interdependent Self More Cooperative Than the Independent Self?

The present study examined whether a temporary activation of independent or interdependent self-construals by priming has an influence on cooperation in social dilemmas. It was expected that individuals primed with independence would be primarily concerned with their own outcomes, whereas individuals primed with interdependence would also be concerned with the outcomes of their interaction partner. The former should therefore exhibit lower levels of cooperation. Additionally, the influence of social value orientation on cooperation was measured. Participants played 32 rounds of a give-some dilemma with an alleged interaction partner. As predicted, participants primed with independence exhibited lower levels of cooperation than participants primed with interdependence. Results are discussed in terms of their significance for research on self-construals and social dilemmas.     

Accountability and cooperation in social dilemmas: The influence of others’ reputational concerns

The present study examined the assumption that non-anonymous choices in social dilemmas (i.e., choices for which one is accountable) may influence cooperation, but only to the extent that decision-makers believe that the others will evaluate non-cooperation negatively. Based on a recent review by Kerr (1999), it was expected that under conditions of accountability, decision-makers would cooperate more when they believed that the others within the group were also concerned about their social reputation and therefore were aware of the social norm of cooperation within social dilemmas. As a consequence, it could be expected that non-cooperation by oneself would be evaluated negatively by those others since they seemed to be aware of what ought to be done in a social dilemma (i.e., the norm of cooperation). Results confirmed these predictions and, in addition, also showed that greater willingness to cooperate was associated with stronger feelings of collective concern. The findings are discussed in terms of recent literature on anonymity effects in social dilemmas. This research was part of the second author's master thesis at Maastricht University. The first author was supported by a fellowship of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, no. 016.005.019).     

Characteristics of affected third parties and cooperative behavior in social dilemmas

ABSTRACT

The studies described in this article explore the influence of an under-emphasized determinant of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas: affected third parties. Two experiments examined the effect of characteristics of third parties on individual cooperative behavior in social dilemmas, and identified mechanisms associated with these relationships. Study 1 demonstrated that third-party need affects individual cooperative behavior, and tested prosocial motivation and intra-group trust as mediators of this relationship. Study 2 provided further elaboration by demonstrating that individual cooperative behavior was reduced when a needy third party was low on reliability, and by showing that prosocial motivation and intra-group trust mediated this relationship. This research connects the literatures on individual cooperation in social dilemmas and relational job design, and demonstrates why third parties influence individuals’ cooperative behavior.