The Validity of the “Mother” and “Father” Cards of the Rorschach

This article presents analyses on psychometric properties of a recent revision of the Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (SASSI-3). Participants were 772 individuals from a range of clinical settings who were independently diagnosed according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed., rev. [DSM-III-R]; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1987) or DSM-IV (APA, 1994) criteria regarding the presence or absence of a substance-dependence disorder. A development sample (n = 391) was used to formulate SASSI-3 decision rules that yielded 95% agreement with clinical diagnoses of substance dependence. Correspondence with the criterion variable was shown to be 97% in a cross-validation sample (n = 381) from the same clinical settings. Convergent relations were demonstrated with a variety of other indexes of substance misuse, including clinical assessments of substance abuse history, alcohol and drug-related arrests, self-reported use of illicit drugs, and other instruments designed to screen for substance misuse. Further, logistic regression analyses indicated no significant differences in the overall accuracy of the SASSI-3 as a function of respondents' demographic characteristics or clinical ratings of respondents' level of adjustment and functioning (Global Assessment of Functioning ratings; APA, 1987, 1994).     

Hussearle's Representationalism and the “hypothesis of the Background”

John Searle's hypothesis of the Background seems to conflict with his initial representationalism according to which each Intentional state contains a particular content that determines its conditions of satisfaction. In Section I of this essay I expose Searle's initial theory of Intentionality and relate it to Edmund Husserl's earlier phenomenology. In Section II I make it clear that Searle's introduction of the notion of Network, though indispensable, does not, by itself, force us to modify that initial theory. However, a comparison of this notion to the notion of horizon from Husserl's later phenomenology and an interpretation of Husserl's conception of the determinable X as providing a solution to the problem of perceptual misidentification lead me to conclude that in his discussion of 'twin examples' Searle had better modified his initial theory. Finally, I critically examine Searle's claim that anyone who tries seriously to follow out the threads in the Network will eventually reach a bedrock of non-Intentional capacities. In Section III I show in detail, partly in a rather Husserlian vein, that Searle's four official arguments for the Background thesis, though containing some very valuable contributions to a theory of linguistic skills, are not convincing at all if they are to be understood as going beyond the scope of (Hus)Searle's 'content-cum-Network' picture of Intentionality. The upshot of these considerations is that the Background thesis should be read as a thesis concerning the causal neurophysiological preconditions of human Intentionality rather than concerning the logical properties of Intentional states in general. Recently Searle himself has come to the same result, but he does not say for which reasons. The present essay makes it clear why Searle just had to arrive at this important result.     

“The end of history ” and the fate of the philosophy of history

The “end of history” by Fukuyama is mainly based on Hegel’s treatise of the end of history and Kojeve’s corresponding interpretation. But Hegel’s “end of history” is a purely philosophical question, i.e., an ontological premise that must be fulfilled to complete “absolute knowledge.” When Kojeve further demonstrates its “universal and homogeneous state,” Fukuyama extends it into a political view: The victory of the Western system of freedom and democracy marks the end of the development of human history and Marxist theory and practice. This is a misunderstanding of Hegel. Marx analyzes, scientifically, the historical limitation of Western capitalism and maintains, by way of a kind of revolutionary teleology, the expectation of and belief in human liberation, which is the highest historical goal. His philosophy of history is hence characterized by theoretical elements from both historical scientificalness and historical teleology.     

Comparing the meanings of “if” and “all”

In this study, we compared the everyday meanings of conditionals (“if p then q”) and universally quantified statements (“all p are q”) when applied to sets of elements. The interpretation of conditionals was predicted to be directly related to the conditional probability, such that P(“if p then q”) = P(q|p). Quantified statements were assumed to have two interpretations. According to an instance-focused interpretation, quantified statements are equivalent to conditionals, such that P(“all p are q”) = P(q|p). According to a set-focused interpretation, “all p are q” is true if and only if every instance in set p is an instance of q, so that the statement would be accepted when P(q|p) = 1 and rejected when this probability was below 1. We predicted an instance-focused interpretation of “all” when the relation between p and q expressed a general law for an infinite set of elements. A set-focused interpretation of “all” was predicted when the relation between p and q expressed a coincidence among the elements of a finite set. Participants were given short context stories providing information about the frequency of co-occurrence of cases of p, q, not-p, and not-q in a population. They were then asked to estimate the probability that a statement (conditional or quantified) would be true for a random sample taken from that population. The probability estimates for conditionals were in accordance with an instance-focused interpretation, whereas the estimates for quantified statements showed features of a set-focused interpretation. The type of the relation between p and q had no effect on this outcome.     

The “concept of time” and the “being of the clock”: Bergson, Einstein, Heidegger, and the interrogation of the temporality of modernism

The topic to be addressed in this paper, that is, the distinction between the “concept” of time and the being of the clock, divides into two parts: first, in the debate between Albert Einstein and Henri Bergson, one discovers the ground for the diverging concepts of time characterized by physics in its opposing itself to philosophy. Bergson’s durée or “duration” in opposition to Einstein’s ‘physicist’s time’ as ‘public time,’ one can argue, sets the terms for Martin Heidegger’s extending, his ontological analysis of Da-sein, as human being-in-the-world. Second, in this the ‘concept of time’ gives way to the analysis of the ‘being of the clock.’ What is this being of the clock that makes evident the fundamental temporality of Da-sein? This question is rehearsed in Division Two of Being and Time. My claim is that the fundamental insight into the nature of time revealed by the encounter between Bergson and Einstein is that time extemporizes itself. Temporality “is” not a being but a process that temporalizes itself, precisely because it “is not.”     

Developmental study of the comprehension and production of the pronoun “it”

Forty-two English-speaking children aged 3,3 to 7,0 were asked to act out instructions of the type There is clay on the table, give it to me, where the pronoun it occurs in object position and refers to a collective noun, or to a count noun, or to a noun (chocolate) which can be either. They were also asked to describe actions performed by the experimenter and to repeat the experimenter's instructions. A hierarchical pattern of behavior emerged and unexpected errors were noted. The results do not appear to be interpretable from the purely linguistic point of view; it is argued that analogous observations have been made in problem-solving tasks and that therefore cognitive development in general must play an important part.     

Note on the “Semantic” and the “Absolute” concept of truth

Philosophical Studies -     

Note on the “semantic” and the “absolute” concept of truth

Philosophical Studies -     

Enactivism and the “problem” of perceptual presence

One of the classic debates in cognitive science is between nativism and empiricism about the development of psychological capacities. In principle, the debate is empirical. However, in practice nativist hypotheses have also been challenged for relying on an ill-defined, or even unscientific, notion of innateness as that which is “not learned”. Here this minimal conception of innateness is defended on four fronts. First, it is argued that the minimal conception is crucial to understanding the nativism-empiricism debate, when properly construed; Second, various objections to the minimal conception—that it risks overgeneralization, lacks an account of learning, frustrates genuine explanations of psychological development, and fails to unify different notions of innateness across the sciences—are rebutted. Third, it is argued that the minimal conception avoids the shortcomings of primitivism, the prominent view that innate capacities are those that are not acquired via a psychological process in development. And fourth, the minimal conception undermines some attempts to identify innateness with a natural kind. So in short, we have little reason to reject, and good reason to accept, the minimal conception of innateness in cognitive science.

     

Semantic minimalism and the “miracle of communication”

According to semantic minimalism, context-invariant minimal semantic propositions play an essential role in linguistic communication. This claim is key to minimalists’ argument against semantic contextualism: if there were no such minimal semantic propositions, and semantic content varied widely with shifts in context, then it would be “miraculous” if communication were ever to occur. This paper offers a critical examination of the minimalist account of communication, focusing on a series of examples where communication occurs without a minimal semantic proposition shared between speaker and hearer. The only way for minimalists to respond to these examples is by restricting the scope of their account to intra-lingual communication. It can then be shown (1) that the minimalist’s notion of a language shrinks to a point, such that practically no instances of communication will fall under that account, and (2) that the retreat to intra-lingual communication is in any case self-defeating, since the only way for minimalists to account for the individuation of languages is by resort to precisely the kinds of contextual considerations they abjured in the first place. In short, if, as minimalists allege, contextualism founders because it renders communication contingent on speaker and hearer sharing a context, it can now be seen that minimalism faces a parallel problem because it renders communication contingent on speaker and hearer sharing a language. I end by arguing that the possibility of communication cannot, as minimalists assume, be grounded in shared semantic conventions; rather, successful communication must precede the establishment of any particular set of semantic conventions.     

A Review of “Personality and the fate of organizations”

In this study, we compared self-ratings and informant ratings of personality as predictors of implicit motives, need for achievement (nAch), and need for affiliation (nAff). A total of 120 participants wrote creative stories to 5 images from the Picture Story Exercise (Smith, 1992 Smith, C. P., Feld, S. C. and Franz, C. E. 1992. “Methodological considerations: Steps in research employing content analysis systems”. In Motivation and personally: Handbook for thematic content analysis, Edited by: Smith, C. P. 515–536. New York: Cambridge University Press.  [Google Scholar]) and completed the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa &; McCrae, 1992 Costa, P. T. and McCrae, R. R. 1992. Revised NEO Personality Inventory and NEO Five-Factor Inventory: Professional manual, Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.  [Google Scholar]). Three well-acquainted informants rated each participant's personality with the Big Five Inventory (John &; Srivastava, 1999 John, O. P. and Srivastava, S. 1999. “The Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and theoretical perspectives”. In Handbook of personality: Theory and research, , 2nd ed., Edited by: Pervin, L. A. and John, O. P. 102–138. New York: Guilford.  [Google Scholar]) and Saucier's (1994) Saucier, G. 1994. Mini-Markers: A brief version of Goldberg's unipolar Big-Five markers. Journal of Personality Assessment, 63: 506–516. [Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] Mini-Markers. Consistent with the study hypotheses, peer ratings of Conscientiousness significantly predicted nAch scores after controlling for word count and self-rated Conscientiousness. Contrary to hypotheses, peer ratings and self-ratings in all 5 domains did not significantly predict nAff scores. The findings are considered in the interest of bridging the gap between trait and motive concepts in personality assessment.     

Perceptual categories and the computation of “grandmother”

Abstract

Recent theoretical approaches to understanding face recognition have used converging evidence from studies of normal face processing, everyday errors and patterns of neuropsychological impairment to suggest how different face processing modules are related to each other. This paper disuses four issues that arise from this body of work. These concern the nature of representations involved in face recognition, the existence of parallel pathways for processing different types of information, the relationship between recognition and awareness, and the question of how faces become familiar. Current research provoked by these issues is reviewed in the paper and suggestions are made about the ways in which such research will help refine theories of face processing.     

Kant and the Pleasure of “Mere Reflection”

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant refers to the pleasure that we feel when judging that an object is beautiful as the pleasure of “mere reflection”. Yet Kant never makes explicit what exactly is the relationship between the activity of “mere reflection” and the feeling of pleasure. I discuss several contemporary accounts of the pleasure of taste and argue that none of them is fully accurate, since, in each case, they leave open the possibility that one can reflect without having a feeling of pleasure, and hence allow a possible skepticism of taste. I then present my own account, which can better explain why Kant thinks that when one reflects one must also have a feeling of pleasure. My view, which emphasizes the role of attention in Kant, depicts well what we do when we judge something to be beautiful. It can also suggest a way to explain the relation between judgments of taste and moral feeling, and begin to show how the faculty of feeling fills a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties.