Interdimensional interference in the Stroop effect: uncovering the cognitive and neural anatomy of attention

In the classic Stroop effect, naming the color of an incompatible color word (e.g. the word RED printed in green ink; say, 'green') is much slower and more error-prone than is naming the color of a control item (e.g. XXX or CAT printed in green; say 'green'). This seemingly simple interference phenomenon has long provided a fertile testing ground for theories of the cognitive and neural components of selective attention. We present a sketch of the behavioral phenomenon, focusing on the idea that the relative automaticity of the two dimensions determines the direction and the degree of interdimensional interference between them. We then present an outline of current parallel processing explanations that instantiate this automaticity account, and we show how existing interference data are captured by such models. We also consider how Stroop facilitation (faster response of 'red' to RED printed in red) can be understood. Along the way, we describe research on two tasks that have emerged from the basic Stroop phenomenon - negative priming and the emotional Stroop task. Finally, we provide a survey of brain imaging research, highlighting the possible roles of the anterior cingulate in maintaining attentional set and in processing conflict or competition situations.     

Degeneracy of the local structure renormalizing infinite time and space

A model for a system consisting of elements which detect the measurement apparatus of other elements is proposed. By any apparatus one can observe locally, however it can refer to non‐local property because apparatus itself is indefinite. In taking this aspect into consideration, I formulate expressions for a local interaction referring to non‐local property. This formalization can satisfy the aspect of what is called, internal measurement. This system shows teleological global motion toward criticality which is relevant to the degeneracy of a specific element featuring D ? Hom(Z), E) by which infinite time and space are renormalized.     

Bridging pure cognitive research and cognitive enrichment

Animal Cognition - Cognitive enrichment is a growing subset of environmental enrichment for captive animals. However, it has been difficult for practitioners to design, implement, and evaluate...     

Female anatomy and hysterical duality

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - This article attempts to add another layer to our understanding of the phenomenon of hysterical duality. The author postulates that hysterical duality can...     

Infants’ Brain Responses to Looming Danger: Degeneracy of Neural Connectivity Patterns

Abstract

A fundamental property of most animals is the ability to see whether an object is approaching on a direct collision course and, if so, when it will collide. Using high-density electroencephalography in infants and a looming stimulus approaching under three different accelerations, we previously found how visual information for impending collision is sustained in the young human nervous system. In the present study, using longitudinal data on 25 infants at 4–5?months and 12–13?months, we show that infants’ looming-related brain activity is clearly localized in the visual cortex (V1) following retinotopic mapping, but is highly adaptive in its organization otherwise. Analyzing the orientation of electrical source flow, we provide evidence for a high degree of variability, spread across a relatively large area of the visual cortex. The findings reveal a highly dynamic functional organization, with connectivity patterns constantly emerging and changing in many different directions between trials. This suggests degeneracy of neural connectivity patterns through reentry principles, where neurons temporarily assemble to enable an appropriate looming response with the necessary precision.     

Degeneracy in Candecomp/Parafac and Indscal Explained For Several Three-Sliced Arrays With A Two-Valued Typical Rank

The Candecomp/Parafac (CP) method decomposes a three-way array into a prespecified number R of rank-1 arrays, by minimizing the sum of squares of the residual array. The practical use of CP is sometimes complicated by the occurrence of so-called degenerate sequences of solutions, in which several rank-1 arrays become highly correlated in all three modes and some elements of the rank-1 arrays become arbitrarily large. We consider the real-valued CP decomposition of all known three-sliced arrays, i.e., of size p×q×3, with a two-valued typical rank. These are the 5×3×3 and 8×4×3 arrays, and the 3×3×4 and 3×3×5 arrays with symmetric 3×3 slices. In the latter two cases, CP is equivalent to the Indscal model. For a typical rank of {m,m+1}, we consider the CP decomposition with R=m of an array of rank m+1. We show that (in most cases) the CP objective function does not have a minimum but an infimum. Moreover, any sequence of feasible CP solutions in which the objective value approaches the infimum will become degenerate. We use the tools developed in Stegeman (2006), who considers p×p×2 arrays, and present a framework of analysis which is of use to the future study of CP degeneracy related to a two-valued typical rank. Moreover, our examples show that CP uniqueness is not necessary for degenerate solutions to occur. The author is supported by the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), VENI grant 451-04-102.     

Personal tempo, personality, cognitive speed and cognitive performance

One hundred young males filled in an untimed personality questionnaire. The time needed was taken to be the subjects' personal tempo. They also worked twice on a timed substitution test; their score on this test was taken to be their cognitive speed. It was hypothesized that personal tempo was related to personality and cognitive speed to performance on cognitive tests. The results confirmed the hypothesis. Those whose personal tempo was faster had higher Extraversion and lower Neuroticism and Lie-scores. Those whose cognitive speed was faster, however, did better on four out of five cognitive tests and had a higher Lie-score. It seems that the two speed factors, as hypothesized by Spearman, are indeed two separate and distinct factors, each correlated with different variables: cognitive and personality.     

Facial affect processing and depression susceptibility: cognitive biases and cognitive neuroscience

Facial affect processing is essential to social development and functioning and is particularly relevant to models of depression. Although cognitive and interpersonal theories have long described different pathways to depression, cognitive-interpersonal and evolutionary social risk models of depression focus on the interrelation of interpersonal experience, cognition, and social behavior. We therefore review the burgeoning depressive facial affect processing literature and examine its potential for integrating disciplines, theories, and research. In particular, we evaluate studies in which information processing or cognitive neuroscience paradigms were used to assess facial affect processing in depressed and depression-susceptible populations. Most studies have assessed and supported cognitive models. This research suggests that depressed and depression-vulnerable groups show abnormal facial affect interpretation, attention, and memory, although findings vary based on depression severity, comorbid anxiety, or length of time faces are viewed. Facial affect processing biases appear to correspond with distinct neural activity patterns and increased depressive emotion and thought. Biases typically emerge in depressed moods but are occasionally found in the absence of such moods. Indirect evidence suggests that childhood neglect might cultivate abnormal facial affect processing, which can impede social functioning in ways consistent with cognitive-interpersonal and interpersonal models. However, reviewed studies provide mixed support for the social risk model prediction that depressive states prompt cognitive hypervigilance to social threat information. We recommend prospective interdisciplinary research examining whether facial affect processing abnormalities promote-or are promoted by-depressogenic attachment experiences, negative thinking, and social dysfunction.     

The anatomy of loneliness

Loneliness is a potent but little understood risk factor for broad-based morbidity and mortality. We review five social neurobehavioral mechanisms that may account for this association. The evidence suggests that different mechanisms explain short-term and long-term effects, and that the long-term effects operate through multiple pathways. Implications for the design of interventions are discussed.     

An anatomy of hope

This paper speaks of hope as a state of being that originates in conditions of despair and is transformed as a function of its participation in transcendent relationships. In transcendence of self, one establishes the dynamic awareness of that peace which enlarges the self to accommodate life's anguish.He is President of the Chicago Association of Temple Administrators and a member of the Executive Board of the National Association of Temple Administrators.     

Consciousness and cognitive control

The implementation or change of information processing routines, known as cognitive control, is traditionally believed to be closely linked to consciousness. It seems that we exert control over our behavior if we know the reasons for, and consequences of, doing so. Recent research suggests, however, that several behavioral phenomena that have been construed as instances of cognitive control can be prompted by events of which actors are not aware. Here we give a brief review of this research, discuss possible reasons for inconsistencies in the empirical evidence, and suggest some lines of future research. Specifically, we suggest to differentiate cognitive control evoked either because of explicit or because of implicit control cues. While the former type of control seems to work outside of awareness, the latter type of control seems to be restricted to consciously registered events that call for control.     

Conservatism and cognitive ability

Conservatism and cognitive ability are negatively correlated. The evidence is based on 1254 community college students and 1600 foreign students seeking entry to United States' universities. At the individual level of analysis, conservatism scores correlate negatively with SAT, Vocabulary, and Analogy test scores. At the national level of analysis, conservatism scores correlate negatively with measures of education (e.g., gross enrollment at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels) and performance on mathematics and reading assessments from the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) project. They also correlate with components of the Failed States Index and several other measures of economic and political development of nations. Conservatism scores have higher correlations with economic and political measures than estimated IQ scores.     

Hypertension and cognitive function

Previous research indicates that blood pressure may impact a variety of cognitive functions, including short-term memory, abstract reasoning, visual-spatial abilities, and attention (Boller, Vrtunski, Mack, & Kim, 1977; Elias, Robbins, Schultz, & Pierce, 1990; Franceschi, Tancredi, Smirne, Mercinelli, & Canal, 1982; Mazzucchiet al., 1986). However, studies which have assessed the cognitive functioning of hypertensive adults have offered conflicting results, particularly when hypertension levels were in the mild range (e.g., Bolleret al., 1977; Eliaset al., 1990; Elias, Wolf, D'Agostino, Cobb, & White, 1993; Farmeret al., 1987, 1990; Franceschiet al., 1982; Pérez-Stable, Coates, Halliday, Gardiner, & Hauck, 1992; Schmidtet al., 1991; Waldstein, Ryan, Manuck, Parkinson, & Bromet, 1991). A number of factors may contribute to the inconsistent findings in this area. Researchers have employed a wide range of neuropsychological instruments to assess varying domains of cognitive function. Sample sizes in some studies have been too small to ensure sufficient power. Finally, studies have employed varying methodological control over potential confounding factors such as concurrent medical conditions, alcohol abuse, psychiatric disorders, or antihypertensive medication. This study compared male veterans with blood pressures in the mildly hypertensive range (n=166) to normotensive veterans (n=176) on neuropsychological measures of verbal fluency, visual-spatial ability, verbal and visual memory, dexterity, attention, and executive functions. Results revealed that, after controlling for differences in education and income, there was no relationship between mild hypertension and combined measures of cognitive performance. The present findings suggest that mild hypertension alone has little effect on cognitive function in adults.     

Handedness and cognitive bias

2165 Subjects, ranging from nine-year-old schoolchildren to adult students, took Test AH 2/3 which yields subscores on Verbal, Numerical and Perceptual reasoning. The left-handers are compared with the right-handers, differences being found with respect to cognitive bias, sex, age and nationality.     

Multidisciplinarity and cognitive science

The aim of Schunn, Crowley and Okada's (1998) study is to address the question of whether the current state of cognitive science, as represented by Cognitive Science and the Cognitive Science Society, “reflects the multidisciplinary ideals of its foundation.” To properly interpret and respond to their results, we need to ask a prior question: What is cognitive science's multidisciplinary ideal? There are at least two conceptions—a “localist” conception, which seems to be implicit in Schunn, Crowley and Okada's discussion, and a “holist” conception. I argue that while both have been endorsed by some cognitive scientists, there are reasons for preferring the holist conception. I then consider what Schunn, Crowley and Okada's findings tell us about the state of cognitive science in light of a holist approach and report on an analysis of the journal's contents which looks at the domain, subdomain, and cognitive capacity investigated.     

Representation and cognitive science

‘Representation’ is a concept which occurs both in cognitive science and philosophy. It has common features in both settings in that it concerns the explanation of behaviour in terms of the way the subject categorizes and systematizes responses to its environment. The prevailing model sees representations as causally structured entities correlated on the one hand with elements in a natural language and on the other with clearly identifiable items in the world. This leads to an analysis of representation and cognition in terms of formal symbols and their relations. But human perception and cognition use multiple informational constraints and deal with unsystematic and messy input in a way best explained by Parallel Distributed Processing models. This undermines the claim that a formal representational theory of mind is ‘the only game in town’. In particular it suggests a radically different model of brain function and its relation to epistemology from that found in current representational theories.     

Archaeology and cognitive evolution

Archaeology can provide two bodies of information relevant to the understanding of the evolution of human cognition--the timing of developments, and the evolutionary context of these developments. The challenge is methodological. Archaeology must document attributes that have direct implications for underlying cognitive mechanisms. One example of such a cognitive archaeology is found in spatial cognition. The archaeological record documents an evolutionary sequence that begins with ape-equivalent spatial abilities 2.5 million years ago and ends with the appearance of modern abilities in the still remote past of 400,000 years ago. The timing of these developments reveals two major episodes in the evolution in spatial ability, one, 1.5 million years ago and the other, one million years later. The two episodes of development in spatial cognition had very different evolutionary contexts. The first was associated with the shift to an open country adaptive niche that occurred early in the time range of Homo erectus. The second was associated with no clear adaptive shift, though it does appear to have coincided with the invasion of more hostile environments and the appearance of systematic hunting of large mammals. Neither, however, occurred in a context of modern hunting and gathering.