共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(2):267-280
In this paper I explore how the tenseless copula is to be interpreted in sentences of the form “a is F at t”, where “a” denotes a persisting, changeable object, “F” stands for a prima facie intrinsic property and “t” for a B-time. I argue that the interpretation of the copula depends on the logical role assigned to the time clause. Having
rejected the idea that the time clause is to be treated as a sentence operator, I argue: (1) that if “at t” is thought of as being associated with “a” or “F”, then the tenseless copula is most plausibly read as an “is” simpliciter; and (2) that if “at t” is treated as being associated with the copula, then the tenseless copula is most plausibly understood as expressing a disjunction
of tensed copulas. I end the paper by explaining the importance of the issue. I indicate the ramifications interpretation
of the tenseless copula has for the so-called problem of temporary intrinsics. 相似文献
2.
Charles B. Cross 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(2):101-120
In “Backward Causation and the Stalnaker–Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals,” Analysis 62:191–7, (2002), Michael Tooley argues that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker–Lewis comparative world
similarity account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. In “Tooley on Backward Causation,” Analysis 63:157–62, (2003), Paul Noordhof argues that Tooley’s example can be reconciled with a Stalnaker–Lewis account of counterfactuals if the comparative
world similarity relation on which the Stalnaker–Lewis account relies is allowed to be antecedent-relative. In this paper
I show that taking comparative world similarity to be antecedent-relative results in a formal semantics which is a comparative
world similarity semantics in name only. 相似文献
3.
James Mensch 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,42(4):449-463
In his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explored the fact that we believe that perception occurs in our heads (“in the recesses of a body”) and, hence,
assert that the perceptual world is “in” us, while also believing that we are “in” the world we perceive. In this article,
I examine how this intertwining of self and world justifies the faith we have in perception. I shall do so by considering
a number of examples. In each case, the object “in itself” will turn out to be neither within us nor outside of us, but rather
at the intersection set by the intertwining. I will then turn to what this disclosure of this object reveals about human temporality
and, indeed, about human being as a place (or “clearing”) that permits disclosure. 相似文献
4.
According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational
content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.”
According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing
an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency
thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First,
I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory
qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can
vary despite constancy in representational content. 相似文献
5.
Jaegwon Kim 《Philosophical Studies》2010,148(1):101-112
This paper discusses in broad terms the metaphysical projects of Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization. Specifically, I examine the effectiveness of Shoemaker’s novel “subset” account of realization for defusing the problem
of mental causation, and compare the “subset” account with the standard “second-order” account. Finally, I discuss the physicalist
status of the metaphysical worldview presented in Shoemaker’s important new contribution to philosophy of mind and metaphysics. 相似文献
6.
In recent years Derrida has devoted a considerable number of writings to addressing “the question of the animal,” and, more
often than not, this question arises in a reading of one of Heidegger's texts. In order to appreciate more fully the stakes
of Derrida's posing of this question in relation to Heidegger, in this essay I offer some prefatory remarks to the question
of the animal in Derrida's reading of Heidegger. The essay opens with a careful analysis of Derrida's early essay “The Ends
of Man,” in which Heidegger's “Letter on ‘Humanism”’ is read in terms of the motif of man's “proper.” Taking my point of departure
from this Derridean reading of Heidegger's humanism, I return to Heidegger's “Letter” in order to uncover the manner in which
Heidegger distinguishes man's “proper” from what is “improper,” namely, animality. This reading reveals that, while Heidegger
offers a convincing account of the limits of metaphysical humanism, this critical account nevertheless ends up uncritically reinforcing the anthropocentrism of this same tradition. My closing suggestion is that Derrida's rethinking of animality should be understood as an extended
meditation on the various consequences and effects of this dogmatic anthropocentrism in Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian
thought. 相似文献
7.
Patricia Hanna 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):343-355
In “Practical Knowledge of Language”, C.-h. Tsai criticizes the arguments in “Swimming and Speaking Spanish” (this issue,
pp. 331–341), on the grounds that its account of knowledge of language as knowledge-how is mistaken. In its place, he proposes
an alternative account in terms of Russell’s concept “knowledge-by-acquaintance”. In this paper, I show that this account
succeeds neither in displacing the account in Swimming and Speaking Spanish nor in addressing Tsai’s main concern: solving
the “delivery problem”. 相似文献
8.
A. David Smith 《Synthese》2008,160(3):313-333
It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual
experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as
a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share
with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short,
it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of
any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses
on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality. 相似文献
9.
Aaron Rizzieri 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(3):217-229
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument
against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of
epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant
propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.” 相似文献
10.
Christian Lotz 《Continental Philosophy Review》2011,44(4):491-510
I argue from a hermeneutic point of view that formal elements of poetry can only be identified because poetry is based on
both the phenomenon and the conception of poetry, both of which precede the attempt to identify formal elements as the defining
moment of poetry. Furthermore, I argue with Gadamer that poetry is based on a rupture with and an epoche of our non-poetic use of language in such a way that it liberates “fixed” universal aspects of everyday language, and that
through establishing itself in a new, self-referential and monologue unity, it individualizes speech. From the hermeneutic position, poetry is a form of speaking rather than a “fixed” object. As such, I will try to make sense
of what Paul Celan said in his famous “Meridian” speech: namely, that the poem is “actualized language, set free under the
sign of a radical individuation, which at the same time stays mindful of the limits drawn by language, the possibilities opened
by language.” 相似文献
11.
12.
Peter Brian Barry 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(1):5-21
Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally
responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal “Freedom and Resentment,” Peter Strawson denies that the truth
of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed
to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers
sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at least appear to have difficulty incorporating evil persons
into their accounts of moral responsibility. In what follows, I argue that Strawson is not committed to supposing that being
evil is an exempting condition—at least, that he can allow that evil persons are morally responsible agents. 相似文献
13.
Patrick Stokes 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(1):23-44
Visual forms of episodic memory and anticipatory imagination involve images that, by virtue of their perspectival organization,
imply a “notional subject” of experience. But they contain no inbuilt reference to the “actual subject,” the person actually
doing the remembering or imagining. This poses the problem of what (if anything) connects these two perspectival subjects
and what differentiates cases of genuine memory and anticipation from mere “imagined seeing.” I consider two approaches to
this problem. The first, exemplified by Wollheim and Velleman, claims that genuinely reflexive memories and anticipations
are phenomenally “unselfconscious,” with the co-identity of the notional and actual subjects secured by a determinate causal
history. The second approach posits some distinctive phenomenal property that attaches to genuinely reflexive memories and
anticipations and serves to experientially conflate the notional and actual subject. I consider a version of the second approach,
derived from Kierkegaard’s discussions of phenomenal “contemporaneity,” and argue that this approach can better account for
the possibility of affective alienation from the selves we were and will be: the way in which our sense of self and awareness of our causal history can sometimes come apart. 相似文献
14.
Dale Dorsey 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(2):267-285
An important constraint on the nature of intrinsic value---the “Supervenience Principle” (SP)---holds that some object, event,
or state of affairs ϕ is intrinsically valuable only if the value of ϕ supervenes entirely on ϕ's intrinsic properties. In this paper, I argue that SP should be rejected. SP is inordinately restrictive. In particular,
I argue that no SP-respecting conception of intrinsic value can accept the importance of psychological resonance, or the positive
endorsement of persons, in explaining value. 相似文献
15.
The present study explores to what extent Asian elephants show “means–end” behavior. We used captive Asian elephants (N = 2) to conduct four variations of the Piagetian “support” problem, which involves a goal object that is out of reach, but
rests on a support within reach. In the first condition, elephants were simultaneously presented with two identical trays
serving as the “support”, with the bait on one tray and the other tray left empty. In the next two conditions, the bait was
placed on one tray, while additional bait was placed beside the other tray. In the last condition, both trays contained bait,
but one of the trays had a small gap which prevented the elephants from reaching the reward. Subjects were required to choose
and pull either tray with their trunk and to obtain the bait (i.e. goal). Results showed that one elephant performed all of
the support problems significantly above chance after several sessions, suggesting that the elephant was capable of understanding
that pulling the tray was the “means” for achieving the “end” of obtaining the bait. This study showed that elephants show
means–end behavior when subjected to a Piagetian “support” task, and indicates that such goal-directed behavior occurs in
species other than primates. 相似文献
16.
Peter Langland-Hassan 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):145-173
Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we
imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom.
Three different proposals are outlined, building on theories that link visualization to sensorimotor predictive mechanisms
(e.g., “efference copies,” “forward models”). Each sees visualization as a kind of reasoning, where its freedom consists in our ability to choose the topic of the reasoning. Of the three options, I argue that the approach many will find most attractive—that visualization is a
kind of “off-line” perception, and is therefore in some sense misrepresentational—should be rejected. The two remaining proposals
both conceive of visualization as a form of sensorimotor reasoning that is constitutive of one’s commitments concerning the way certain kinds of visuomotor scenarios unfold. According to the first, these commitments
impinge on one’s web of belief from without, in the manner of normal perceptual experience; according to the second, these commitments
just are one’s (occurrent) beliefs about such generalizations. I conclude that, despite being initially counterintuitive,
the view of visualization as a kind of occurrent belief is the most promising. 相似文献
17.
18.
Robert E. Goodin 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(1-2):53-74
If free markets consist in nothing more than “capitalist acts between consenting adults,” and if in the old legal maxim “volenti non fit injuria,” then it seems to follow that free markets do no wrongs. But that defense of free markets wrenches the “volenti” maxim out of context. In common law adjudication of disputes between two parties, it is perfectly appropriate to cast standards
of “volenti” narrowly, and largely ignore “duress via third parties” (wrongs done to or by others who are not themselves party to the action). In economic markets, of course,
those third-party effects are rife. But we want them to be rectified systematically, not piecemeal through particular cases
between particular parties that happen to come to court. That is the proper province of political philosophers and system-designers,
in critiquing and constraining the operation of the market.
* I thank Peter Cane for much good advice, and exonerate him from any blame for the use I have made of it. 相似文献
19.
Toby Handfield 《Synthese》2008,160(2):297-308
This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears
the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks
and antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility that some dispositions—those
which lack any causal basis—may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks and antidotes are a major obstacle to
a conditional analysis of dispositions, these dispositions that are unfinkable may be successfully analysed by the conditional
analysis of dispositions. This result is of importance for those who think that the fundamental properties might be dispositions
which lack any distinct causal basis, because it suggests that these properties, if they exist, can be analysed by simple
conditionals and that they will not be subject to ceteris paribus laws. 相似文献
20.
In this paper, we describe a behaviour pattern similar to the “A-not-B” error found in human infants and young apes in a monkey
species, the common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). In contrast to the classical explanation, recently it has been suggested that the “A-not-B” error committed by human infants
is at least partially due to misinterpretation of the hider’s ostensively communicated object hiding actions as potential
‘teaching’ demonstrations during the A trials. We tested whether this so-called Natural Pedagogy hypothesis would account
for the A-not-B error that marmosets commit in a standard object permanence task, but found no support for the hypothesis
in this species. Alternatively, we present evidence that lower level mechanisms, such as attention and motivation, play an
important role in committing the “A-not-B” error in marmosets. We argue that these simple mechanisms might contribute to the
effect of undeveloped object representational skills in other species including young non-human primates that commit the A-not-B
error. 相似文献