The Virtues in their Place: Virtue Ethics in Medicine

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - We are currently in the midst of a revival of interest in thevirtues. A number of contemporary moral philosophers havedefended a virtue-based approach to...     

Virtue Ethics,Applied Ethics and Rationality twenty-three years after After Virtue

Abstract

In evaluating the merits and shortcomings of virtue ethics I focus on some central differences between virtue ethics and rival theories such as deontology and utilitarianism. Virtue ethics does not prescribe strict rules of conduct. Instead, the virtue ethical approach can be understood as an invitation to search for standards, as opposed to strict rules, that ought to guide the conduct of our individual lives. This requires a particular method. The importance of this approach in present times will become clear when we investigate the relation between virtue ethics and postmodernity. In our postmodem age moral concepts are no longer perceived as deriving their meaning from larger frameworks. Instead, their meanings are perceived as being derived from the contingencies that define our particular existences. Thus ongoing grassroots moral engagement is required, and virtue ethics is the appropriate moral framework for doing this. This results in a broadening of rationality insofar as the full richness of our situated lives are factored into our accounts of rationality. At the same time virtue ethics prevents relativism, mainly because it does justice to the social embeddedness of human activities. In order to illustrate the virtue ethical approach I will discuss two key concepts in our moral vocabulary: responsibility and integrity. We will see how these basic concepts can be properly understood only if one takes into consideration the contingencies, inherent paradoxes and tensions in human life.     

Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics and Right Action: A Reassessment

My question in this paper concerns what eudaimonist virtue ethics (EVE) might have to say about what makes right actions right. This is obviously an important question if we want to know what (if anything) distinguishes EVE from various forms of consequentialism and deontology in ethical theorizing. The answer most commonly given is that according to EVE, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances. However, understood as a claim about what makes particular actions right, this is not especially plausible. What makes a virtuous person??s actions right must reasonably be a matter of the feature, or features, which she, via her practical wisdom, appreciates as ethically relevant in the circumstances, and not the fact that someone such as herself would perform those actions. I argue that EVE instead should be understood as a more radical alternative in ethical philosophy, an alternative that relies on the background assumption that no general account or criterion for what makes right actions right is available to us: right action is simply too complex to be captured in a ??finite and manageable set of??moral principles?? (McKeever and Ridge, Principled ethics, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 139). This does not rule out the possibility that there might be some generalizations about how we should act which hold true without exception. Perhaps there are some things which we must never do, as well as some features of the world which always carry normative weight (even though their exact weight may vary from one context to another). Still, these things are arguably few and far between, and what we must do to ensure that we reliably recognize what is right in particular situations is to acquire practical wisdom. Nothing short of that could do the job.     

New Directions in Ethics: Naturalisms, Reasons and Virtue

This paper discusses three topics in contemporary British ethical philosophy: naturalisms, moral reasons, and virtue. Most contemporary philosophers agree that 'ethics is natural' - in Section 1 I examine the different senses that can be given to this idea, from reductive naturalism to supernaturalism, seeking to show the problems some face and the problems others solve. Drawing on the work of John McDowell in particular, I conclude that an anti-supernatural non-reductive naturalism plausibly sets the limits on what we can do in ethics. Moral reasons are widely discussed - in Section 2 I describe some of the criteria that used to distinguish moral practical reasons, and note possibilities and problems. Drawing on the work of Elizabeth Anscombe in particular, I suggest that an inclusive, minimalist account of moral reasons may be most fruitful. There has been a revival of philosophical interest in virtue ethics, which I take to be linked to the emergence of non-reductive naturalisms - in Section 3 I describe three points where virtue ethics has an especially significant contribution to make: learning, motivational self-sufficiency, and the question of whether virtues can be reasons. The naturalism of Section 1 constrains the accounts of moral reasons considered in Section 2, and depends upon an account of virtue as learned second nature, discussed in Section 3.     

Virtues,Values, and the Good Life: Alasdair MacIntyre's Virtue Ethics and Its Implications for Counseling

The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre's critique of modern ethics and his virtue‐centered alternative suggest that counseling can be considered a form of applied virtue ethics, helping clients cultivate the qualities necessary to live the good life. Although similar to developmental theory and positive psychology, this perspective also questions whether counseling is value neutral and suggests that counseling should account for the (often hidden) traditions, virtues, and practices of the good life it promotes. Comparison with spiritual direction suggests ways counseling can apply the insights of this model ethically within a pluralistic setting.     

Eugene Thomas Long (ed.), God,Reason and Religions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion.

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

政治伦理:个人美德,或是公共道德

自上世纪 70年代始 ,政治哲学和政治伦理便逐渐凸显并最终主导了西方哲学论坛。然而在我国 ,这一哲学和伦理学的理论转向似乎刚刚发生 ,学界对此一理论转向的学术意识也才刚刚显露 ,可我们面对的是 ,大量的理论问题和实践问题不断涌现 ,异常复杂 ,难以把握。在此情形下 ,采取学术群体性的民主商谈方式来探究这一理论转向所产生的基础性课题 ,恐怕比学术个体的专题研究更为慎重 ,也更为急迫。2 0 0 4年夏 ,教育部高校哲学教学指导委员会在海南召开年会。期间与《伦理学研究》杂志主编、著名伦理学家唐凯麟先生重逢 ,承蒙先生厚爱如昨 ,托我组织一期学术专栏 ,命之为“政治伦理笔谈”。盛情之下 ,却之不恭。于是诚恳邀请到怀宏、剑涛、建华三位学兄襄助 ,切磋数月 ,始成如下四篇。现惶然贡献于学界 ,祈求抛顽石以引玉璞 ,或求其友声 ,或聆听批评 ,以此促进我国政治伦理的前沿研究。如此或可既不负凯麟先生雅扶后学之美意 ,又可尽我等伦理学者之天职。是以记之 !(万俊人 )     

Ethical Analysis in Counseling: A Case for Narrative Ethics,Moral Visions,and Virtue Ethics

The author presents an overview of the current content of ethics education in counseling, grouping that content into 3 areas: decision‐making models, principle ethics, and the standard of care. It is argued that as the field of ethics education has grown, so has the need for additional content models, especially ones that enhance moral sensitivity and reduce objectification of client circumstances. The author presents 3 possible approaches to revising the conceptualization of professional ethics that meet the need for new models: moral visions, narrative ethics, and virtue ethics.